Kasparov versus Anand

The Inside Story of the 1995 World Chess Championship Match

Patrick Wolff
International Grandmaster
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Photographs by Roland Pierre Trandafir and Jerome Bibuld

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Back cover: Garry Kasparov, Bob Rice, and Viswanathan Anand at the post-match press conference; view north from the World Trade Center observation deck; Patrick Wolff.

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I also must thank the other members of Anand's team for their efforts in analyzing the games. You may wonder how much of the analysis published here is my own and how much is due to other people. It is a fair question, but not an easy one to answer. Where I have simply copied from another source, I have cited the source and credited the person for his work. I have drawn from published analyses by Kasparov, Anand, Keene, King, Seirawan, Fedorowicz, I. Gurevich, and Christiansen. In addition, I have referred to the official match bulletin edited by John Donaldson and John MacArthur, which featured analysis by others, including de Firmian, Benjamin, Browne, and Dzindzichashvili. If the bulletin credited a specific person with an idea, I have attributed the idea to him; otherwise I have simply cited the bulletin.

Although I have drawn from many other sources, nearly all the analysis is original. Does that mean it is all my own work? No, because I have drawn from the notes on the games that we kept during the match, reflecting the contributions of every member of the team. Where a specific idea had a single author, I have credited that person. But many times the analysis was an amalgam of all our work, so it was impossible to credit people individually. Even this disclaimer does not do justice to how much my work in this book owes to the efforts of other team members, because much of my analysis builds upon ground first broken by the team. That is why I owe such a great debt of thanks to Ubilava, Speelman, Yusupov, and Anand for their contributions.

You should not conclude, however, that I did nothing but recycle the analysis that I took away from the match. The team's original analysis was the starting point from which I began my own work. The finished product is what you see in this book.

This book is dedicated to my father, who taught me how to play chess.
PREFACE

This is a book about the match between Viswanathan Anand and Garry Kasparov that took place in New York City from 10 September to 10 October 1995. The book is divided into two parts. The first part gives the reader background for the match: the history of the world chess championship, a profile of the two combatants, and my own personal perspective on Anand as a player and a person, as well as a brief recounting of the work we did together to prepare. The second part is the meat of the book, if you will: a thorough analysis of the games, with an introduction to each.

Three of the games were essentially devoid of content: 15, 16, and 18. In each one, Anand and Kasparov had both decided beforehand that a draw would be satisfactory. That is not to say that there was any communication between them. It simply means that a draw was quickly offered and accepted before any sort of struggle could ensue. Therefore I have not done any analysis of these games. Where there is nothing to say, one should say nothing.

The rest of the games I analyzed deeply except for game 7. That is not because there is nothing of interest to say about this game, but because everything of interest is in the opening, where I am not at liberty to discuss our team’s analysis. Indeed, throughout this book I have avoided revealing anything that Anand might want to keep private. However, as I hope the reader will agree, this small degree of self-censorship has not hampered the analysis of the rest of the games.

Many people have complained that the quality of these games was low for a world championship match. I can understand the frustration behind this complaint. The match began with eight draws. After six more games—of which five were decisive—the match was practically
over. Of the last four games, only game 17 was a fight. Its significance was almost purely symbolic, as it was too late realistically to expect Anand to stop Kasparov from winning the match. Somehow the match seemed too short for the satisfaction of chess fans around the world.

While I can understand the frustration, I do not believe it is justified. One can complain about the character of the match—that perhaps these players were too cautious, or too nervous, or whatever—but I don’t think one should complain about the quality of the games themselves. These games are typical of world championship matches: containing brilliant ideas mixed with nervous mistakes. In fact, these games may be of higher quality than average for a title match—amazing when one considers that they were played at a faster time control than any other match except Kasparov–Short 1993, and that the schedule was more taxing than any other title match in history: four games a week with no timeouts.

What do I mean when I speak of higher quality than average? For one thing, there was only one game (11) containing what might be called an outright blunder. (Actually, one could say that there was a pair of blunders—see the analysis.) Virtually every world championship match that is closely contested has more than one blunder. Furthermore, game 11 was unusually tense, and the mistakes in that game are mostly more subtle than those of other world championship matches.

Although a couple of the games may have been abandoned too soon, the positions contested were very interesting, the ideas behind the moves very subtle. One needs to analyze the games closely to reveal those ideas, but once revealed they are obviously the ideas of a world champion and a worthy challenger. I am sure that my analysis is insufficient in many places and plain wrong in others, but I hope that it will serve to excite the reader. If you love chess, these games are worthy of your attention and affection.

I hope you will agree that the games themselves are not deficient, or unworthy of a world championship match. But yes, I admit, something was funny about the character of this match. The two players, especially Kasparov, were unusually cautious in the first half of the match. Then when the storm broke, somehow Anand found himself unable to press on toward the goal. If you consider, as I do, that game 11 began the critical phase of this match, it becomes clear that Anand lost this match in four games. Since I was one of the people working for Anand, I suppose it is my job to try to explain how this happened. Why did Anand lose so quickly a match that was dead even after 10 games?

Part of the explanation is excellent match strategy by Kasparov. Kasparov chose his black defenses perfectly, making us expend all our energy against the Najdorf Sicilian. Then in game 11 he switched to the Dragon Sicilian, never to look back. He chose the perfect moment to
introduce this hyper-sharp opening, doing so when the tension was at its apex. Not only did the Dragon put more pressure on Anand, it also forced us to drain our resources looking for a good way to play against it.

While Kasparov's match strategy deserves high praise, it is a mistake to talk as though the course of the match followed the dictates of his strategy. Look at game 3, for example: Kasparov very easily could have lost this game. Had he done so, it would have been partly due to our opening work. Although Anand was on his own around move 18, he was playing a position that he understood very well and that was in itself quite good—the results of opening analysis. Had Anand won this game, would Kasparov have felt it necessary to unveil the Dragon in game 5? If so, observers would not have been able to praise his timing. Or would he still have waited until game 11 to reveal the Dragon? Perhaps in that case he would have lost game 9 anyway. Then people would have been saying, "If he had this new opening, why did he wait to reveal it until he lost two games with Black?" This is all rank speculation. My point is that the match strategy follows the details of the match, not the other way around.

The Dragon was not impossible to slay. It is true that White's opening in game 13 was inadequate. However, it must be kept in mind that Anand wanted only to make a draw in game 15, so we were not looking so hard for a way to get an advantage in that game. By game 17 we had several ideas, including the one that Anand actually played. Let's also notice that in game 17, Kasparov played the position right out of the opening badly. Perhaps it was difficult for him to concentrate when victory was within reach. Even so, a move like 16 ... b5? could only be played by someone who doesn't fully understand the position—a natural consequence of playing a new opening.

Even if we praise Kasparov's match strategy, we must look elsewhere for the cause of Anand's defeat. In my opinion, the games show that the root cause was Anand's nerves. As Anand himself said in a post-match interview in *New In Chess*, "Game 11 was really the blow ... After [that] game my confidence dropped and things went wrong." I believe that his mistakes in games 11–14 were mostly caused by psychological factors, not by deficiencies in preparation or chess skill. After game 14, Anand was so psychologically battered that he needed two more draws to recover his ability to fight, and then the match was over.

More than this I cannot (or rather, will not) discuss. There is much to say about the team and Anand himself. All of us made mistakes, and all of us share some responsibility for the loss of the match. To go into detail would be to reveal things that are both private and useful to Anand; these fall under the aegis of self-censorship. Yet I can say this: all of us worked hard and well. It was a privilege and an honor to be part of such a splendid team and such a marvelous effort.
Will Anand challenge Kasparov again, and could he win the second match? It would not be without precedent. Sometimes the ultimate successor to the title has failed on the first attempt, to succeed on the second. Think of Smyslov against Botvinnik, Spassky against Petrosian, and—although he might not like the comparison—Kasparov against Karpov.

There is no question that Anand has the raw talent to do it. His main challenge will be to grow as a fighter. That will take great effort and sacrifice, but in my opinion he has shown the character to do it. He lost a difficult match to Kamsky in 1994, but recovered his composure to defeat the same opponent in 1995. Anand is a sensible and pragmatic person. He understands that no matter how painful a defeat may be, it provides opportunities to learn and grow. If he is willing to devote his energy to the task, he can grow beyond this disappointment.

Of course, there are no guarantees in this world. Even if Anand does what he should, there are other players who will work toward the same goal. One might think of Vasily Ivanchuk, Vladimir Kramnik, and Gata Kamsky as the most obvious young competitors at the time of writing, with the veteran Anatoly Karpov still dangerous. No doubt new names will force themselves to the top soon. Who can say with certainty which among them will be Kasparov's next challenger?

Perhaps the best thing to say is this: if Anand draws the proper lessons from this painful defeat, the experience will prove to be a great advantage. If he allows himself to be overwhelmed by the pain of this loss, it will prove to be a hindrance. No one can say in advance whether he will emerge from this defeat weaker or stronger. It is up to him.

Somerville, Massachusetts
23 December 1995
History of the World Chess Championship

It is customary to begin a book about a world championship match with a brief history of the world chess championship. In this case it is especially apt. The Kasparov–Anand 1995 World Championship Match took place at a time of unusual turmoil in the chess world, with the status of the world championship title under a cloud. This chapter will establish the historical context for the Kasparov–Anand match.

Early History

The history of chess spans more than two thousand years; its lineage can be traced back through several similar board games. The modern version of what we call chess, with the same board, pieces, and rules, dates back to the 16th century in Europe. The game’s early-modern era features such legendary names as Ruy López of Spain (who flourished in the 16th century), André Philidor of France (1726–1795), and the American Paul Morphy (1837–1884).

It may seem surprising that the title of World Champion dates back only to 1866. However, international chess competitions were difficult to organize in the pre-industrial era. Also, for a world champion to arise, the chess world needed the appearance of a great chess player with a large ego—someone good enough to earn the title of champion, and arrogant enough to claim it.

That man was Wilhelm Steinitz (1836–1900), the Austrian chess genius. In 1866 he played a match against Adolf Anderssen (1818–1879) of Germany. The two were generally acknowledged to be the best active players in the world at the time. To prevent games of interminable length, a recent innovation was used: each player would be allotted only two hours per 20 moves. (To compare, Kasparov and Anand each had
two hours to complete the first 40 moves in New York.) The winner would be the first player to win eight games. Steinitz won the match +8−6 with no draws! (Kasparov and Anand drew the first eight games in New York.) After this match, Steinitz vociferously proclaimed that he was the Chess Champion of the World, and the world took him seriously.

Steinitz defended his title several times under similar conditions, until he finally lost to Emanuel Lasker (1868–1941) of Germany in 1894. Today Steinitz is regarded as the first world champion for two reasons: he met and defeated the best active players of his time, and he started a lineage of world champions that lasted unbroken for 80 years. From 1866 to 1946, that player was recognized as world champion who had defeated the previous world champion in a set match. Notice that a match between the two best players, and not a tournament among several top players, became the ultimate standard. For instance, even though Anderssen went on to win the Baden-Baden 1870 tournament ahead of Steinitz, Steinitz was still considered world champion because he had not been defeated in a match. Subsequent world champions have also failed to win individual tournaments, but this has had little bearing on their status.

For many years, the organization of world-championship title matches remained an informal affair. The champion had only two incentives to agree to a match: money and pride. Both of these factors, however, could present barriers. Sometimes the champion would consent to a match against a markedly weaker player simply because financial backing was available from rich friends or admirers. On the other hand, worthy challengers could not always obtain backing. Sometimes, too, the champion would avoid a match against the strongest challenger because he did not want to risk his title. The champion always imposed conditions favoring himself. He could do whatever he wanted because the chess world took seriously the claim that the champion owned the title. Even when many fans bemoaned his behavior, they rarely denied the champion's claim to the title.

Lasker remained champion for 27 years, the longest reign, until he was finally defeated by Cuban-born José Capablanca (1888–1942) in 1921. Capablanca had clearly been the most legitimate challenger for several years, but World War I had helped Lasker to put off a match. Capablanca won easily, +4=10, without a single loss. Although the match was supposed to continue until one player won six games, Lasker gave up after his fourth loss.

Capablanca, unfortunately for him, did not continue the previous champion's policy of avoiding the strongest challenger. Instead he accepted the challenge of Alexander Alekhine (1892–1946) in 1927. Once again the victor would be the first player to win six games. The chess
world expected Capablanca to keep his title, but the challenger’s determination had been underestimated. Alekhine won the longest title match yet, +6–3 with 25 (!) draws.

When Capablanca had won the title, all parties had acknowledged that Lasker was past his prime, including Lasker himself. But when Capablanca lost the title to Alekhine, the result was a surprise and Capablanca was still considered the strongest possible challenger. Therefore, he quickly demanded a rematch. Alekhine demurred, saying that the former champion should wait for other challengers to have their shot. Capablanca never got his rematch.

Once again the faults of this informal system were apparent, for Alekhine was a champion who understood very well the value of his title and was not about to risk it unless absolutely necessary. Alekhine defended his title twice in the next seven years to the same player, Efim Bogoljubow (1889–1952) of Germany, once in 1929 and once in 1934. Although the first match was quite legitimate, the second match can only be understood as being in both players’ interests—Bogoljubow got another chance at the title, and Alekhine got to play Bogoljubow.

Alekhine defended the title once more in 1935 against the Dutch player Max Euwe (1901–1981). No doubt Alekhine expected to win easily, but just as Capablanca had done before, Alekhine underestimated his opponent and lost the match. However, Euwe did not learn from the Champion he had just defeated, and graciously granted a rematch. Alekhine won the rematch in 1937.

World War II prevented any serious international chess competitions until its resolution in 1945. When Alekhine died in 1946—thereby becoming the only world champion to keep the title until his death—the chess world faced a crisis. How could it establish the next champion and thereby maintain the legitimacy of the title?

**The Era of FIDE**

In 1924 an organization named FIDE (an acronym for its French name “Fédération Internationale des Échecs”) had been established to organize the existing national federations, to run the biannual Olympiad competition featuring national teams, and to promote chess throughout the world. With Alekhine dead, FIDE seized the authority to supervise the world-championship competition.

To resolve the title vacuum, a tournament was organized to which six leading players were invited: Mikhail Botvinnik, Paul Keres, and Vasily Smyslov of the Soviet Union; Reuben Fine and Samuel Reshevsky of the United States; and Max Euwe of the Netherlands (the last world champion before Alekhine). Fine withdrew for personal reasons and was not replaced. The remaining five players played each other four times in this marathon-length tournament. The clear winner was Botvinnik.
FIDE resolved that the champion should defend his title once every three years. FIDE, rather than the champion, would determine the legitimate challenger through a series of tournaments and matches. The exact system has gone through many changes over the years. From 1948 to 1972, the culmination of each three-year cycle was a world championship match consisting of 24 games, played at a time control of 40 moves in two and a half hours (with another hour added to each player's clock for each succeeding 16 moves). The champion kept the title in case of a 12–12 tie. Until 1963, if the champion lost, he had the right to a rematch the next year. In that rematch the new champion would have the draw odds, but he would not have the right to a rematch of his own if he lost.

It is worth asking why the champion was granted the two advantages of draw odds and a rematch. The answer probably lies in the previous history of the world championship. From Steinitz to Alekhine, the title was considered the property of the champion. Recall that each challenger had to obtain financial backing for a match. The onus was on the challenger because he was trying to take something that belonged to the champion. If the match were tied, the challenger had clearly not succeeded in "taking away" the champion's title. Of course, those matches were generally of unlimited duration, rather than a fixed number of games, so the problem of a tied match rarely arose. (In one famous case it did: Lasker played a 10-game match for the title in 1910 against Carl Schlechter of Austria, retaining the title after the match was tied 5–5.) The mindset of the previous matches is very clear, and FIDE was probably still very much under the sway of the historical conception of the world championship.

As for the rematch clause, that can be understood in light of the unfortunate history of Capablanca, Alekhine, and Euwe. The chess world thought that Alekhine should have granted a rematch to Capablanca, but he did not. Euwe had actually agreed in advance, if he won, to grant a rematch to Alekhine. In each case, Capablanca was arbitrarily prevented from playing to regain the title. Few people were happy about the way events had turned out.

Although history's influence is understandable, one might argue that conditions favoring the champion are inappropriate for a title that is now formally regulated. Why not resolve a tie, rather than ending the match in a de facto victory for the champion? And why not force a defeated champion to go through the qualification process to prove he is the most worthy challenger? Eventually the rematch clause would be scuttled, then revived and scuttled again, while the draw-odds clause has always remained. We shall return to these issues later. For now, let us continue reviewing the recent history of the world championship.

Botvinnik defended his title in 1951 against David Bronstein of the
Soviet Union. (From 1948 until 1972 every champion and challenger was Soviet.) That match ended in a 12–12 tie, so Botvinnik retained his title.

In 1954 Botvinnik faced Vasily Smyslov. Once again the match was a 12–12 tie, so Botvinnik kept the title.

In 1957 Smyslov again challenged Botvinnik, this time emerging triumphant, +6–3=13.

Botvinnik worked very hard to prepare for his rematch and in 1958 surprised most observers by recapturing the title, +7–5=11. Notice that in three world championship matches against Botvinnik, Smyslov scored +18–17=34, but Smyslov was champion for only one year because Botvinnik happened to be champion first.

In 1960 Botvinnik faced the brilliant young Latvian, Mikhail Tal. Tal won a splendid match, +6–2=13.

Few expected Botvinnik to win the rematch. But Botvinnik worked very hard and Tal had some health problems; those two factors combined in a stunning victory for Botvinnik of +10–5=6.

Botvinnik's amazing world championship career ended in 1963. The Armenian Tigran Petrosian finally ended his reign with a solid victory, +5–2=15, and Petrosian was safe for three years because FIDE had finally decided to drop the rematch clause. Botvinnik gave up title play, admitting that he did not have the desire and energy to compete in the necessary qualification events to challenge again for the world championship.

Petrosian faced Boris Spassky in 1966 and defended his title successfully, +4–3=17.

Future world champions do not always win the title on their first try. Just as Smyslov only succeeded in his second match against Botvinnik, so Spassky needed two matches against Petrosian, finally defeating him in 1969, +6–4=13.

The next world champion was the most famous and perhaps the most brilliant of them all, Bobby Fischer. Fischer dominated the chess world in 1970–71. He won the Interzonal qualifying tournament by 3½ points, scoring +15–1=7. Then he won three Candidates matches by the incredible scores of 6–0, 6–0, and 6½–2½. Counting the last seven games of the Interzonal and his first 13 games in the Candidates, Fischer won 20 games in a row against the best players in the world. This brief chapter cannot do justice to the significance of Fischer's influence on professional chess in general or the world championship in particular, but several aspects should at least be considered briefly.

Fischer was the first non-Soviet to play in a FIDE world championship match. As we have seen, he was hardly the first non-Soviet world champion; no champion before 1948 had been Soviet. (Alekhine was born in Russia, but he left in 1920 and was reviled by Soviet propagan-
Indeed, recall that two of the six players invited to the 1948 World Championship tournament were American. Thus it is not surprising that another country would have the culture or the resources to produce a world champion. However, the Soviet Union had poured tremendous resources into their chess, establishing hegemony over the chess world from 1948 to 1972.

Fischer worked harder at chess than perhaps anyone ever had before—and it showed in his phenomenal results. Fischer had taken the game to a new level, and his success led to a general rise in the level of chess preparation. It became standard for players to spend more time analyzing openings and to study them more deeply. The Soviet chess establishment even assigned players to do opening work for the Soviet stars, especially for Anatoly Karpov. In the 1980s the Western world would catch up by using computer databases, which could do some of the organizing work that had previously required intelligent humans.

Like mountaineers attempting Everest, world-championship contenders began hiring teams to support their assaults on the chess summit. Before the Fischer–Spassky 1972 match, each player generally worked with only one other player. Spassky worked with several people to prepare for Fischer and future matches saw each player using entire teams. Fischer himself did not have a team, but his great talent and the enormous amount of work he had put in himself made it necessary for Spassky to seek more help. When Fischer brought big money prizes into chess, top players were better able to afford such help. (Although it must be said that Soviet players under Communism could sometimes command the help that other people might hire.)

The prize fund of pre-1972 title matches was low because of the peculiarities of the Communist system. Every previous FIDE match had been played within the Soviet Union, contested by Soviet players, and organized by Soviet officials. It is impossible to talk of a market value of the match, because the market had nothing to do with the prize fund. The winner might receive a nominal prize of a couple of thousand dollars, but the real reward would come in terms of his power and perks within the Soviet system.

Fischer changed all that. Fischer demanded that the match be played outside the Soviet Union, and he demanded that the prize fund be commensurate with his idea of the match's status. If he didn't like the match conditions, he could simply refuse to play.

In fact, Fischer did exactly that in 1972. Just as the chess world needed Steinitz's strong ego to establish the world championship title, so it needed Fischer's strong ego to push for the first lucrative world-championship prize fund. Lambasted by Soviet propagandists as a degenerate product of "the Western dollar-cult," Fischer demanded a prize fund suitable for a world-class sporting event. It was initially set at
$125,000, but just before the match, Fischer presented a list of financial demands that threatened to derail the event. When FIDE threatened to forfeit him, Fischer stood firm.

Fortunately, world-wide interest in the match was so high that a patron from England named Jim Slater stepped forward to double the prize fund. In 1972, $250,000 was a staggering amount for a chess match, and Fischer was persuaded to play. Even after the match began Fischer complained about every aspect of the playing conditions and even forfeited the second game in protest. Perhaps this was a kind of psychological intimidation; more likely it was just Fischer being himself. In the end, though, Fischer won the match, +7−2=11 and one forfeit victory to Spassky.

Bobby Fischer had won the world championship, but he had also accomplished much more. Thanks to him, media interest in chess was enormous. Prize funds for all kinds of chess competitions grew much larger. The opportunities existed for Fischer to become a millionaire many times over, and with him would rise the fortunes of all chess grandmasters. If Fischer as challenger had commanded a quarter-million-dollar prize fund, what would the purse be in 1975 when he was the champion?

Alas, the question turned out to be moot, because Fischer did not defend the title. He demanded many changes in the match conditions, not all of which FIDE would grant. He was seeking a format similar to that favored by Steinitz, the first World Champion. The winner would be the first player to win 10 games, draws not counting. However—and this proved to be the sticking point with FIDE—if the match were tied 9–9, the champion would keep the title. After FIDE refused to meet his demands, Fischer resigned the title in 1975. It devolved to his challenger, Anatoly Karpov of the Soviet Union.

There is not enough space in this brief history to debate the merits of Fischer's disqualification. Certainly Fischer was never an easy person to deal with, and certainly he can be faulted for wanting to change the match conditions arbitrarily. However, even if the length of the match that Fischer wanted seems unreasonable, one should at least note that the 9–9 tie rule is not obviously more favorable to the champion than the draw-odds rule—not to mention the advantage the old rematch clause had given to Botvinnik throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.

Fischer's abdication left the chess world in an uncomfortable situation. The legitimate champion had not ceded his title to his challenger; he had merely declined to defend it under FIDE auspices. The world might have been willing to acknowledge a match played outside the auspices of FIDE between the obvious champion and a worthy challenger. In fact, Karpov met Fischer several times in 1976 to discuss such a match, but they could not agree on terms. The world was denied a
Fischer–Karpov match and FIDE was spared a potentially strong challenge to its legitimacy.

In 1978 Anatoly Karpov defended his title against Viktor Korchnoi, who had defected from the Soviet Union in 1976. Although Karpov had assumed the title by default, FIDE restored the rematch clause for his benefit—a much more generous treatment than the world organization had given Fischer. Karpov enjoyed this “title insurance” throughout his reign as world champion. The fixed format of 24 games had been eliminated; now the winner would be the first player to win six games.

The 1978 Karpov–Korchnoi match was very tense, but after 32 games Karpov emerged victorious with a score of +6–5=21. Both players benefited from Fischer’s legacy of a massively increased prize fund. Whereas Spassky and Petrosian in 1966 had fought for less than $2,000 (converted from rubles), by 1978 FIDE had guaranteed that the prize fund would be not less than one million Swiss Francs. Not only did Fischer hand Karpov his title without a fight, he also made Karpov a rich man. Since 1978, no world championship match has been held with a prize fund less than one million Swiss Francs.

Korchnoi returned to challenge Karpov in 1981, but this time Karpov won the match easily by the score of +6–2=10. The sporting aspect was disappointing, but the organizational side of the world championship was running smoothly. FIDE had survived the Fischer crisis and emerged stronger. One might object to the champion’s rematch clause, but the format of playing to six wins in the title match had worked well.

However, the six-wins format collapsed in the 1984 match. To a great extent, this was due to the extraordinary fighting qualities of the new challenger, young Garry Kasparov of the Soviet Union.

The match was grotesquely long: 48 games. Karpov began by taking a commanding lead of four wins and no losses after nine games. But Kasparov hunkered down and defended, defended, defended. Kasparov’s tenacity, coupled with Karpov’s caution, produced 35 games where each player could win only one game each. Finally (in early 1985), Kasparov broke through and won games 47 and 48. Karpov still held a 5–3 lead, but Kasparov had the initiative. Was Karpov just too tired to play on? Or would he somehow find the energy to win just one more game?

The world would never find out, because after the 48th game the FIDE President, Florencio Campomanes of the Philippines, stepped in and annulled the match. He announced that a new match would start seven months later with the score 0–0. The match would be played under the old format of 24 games with the champion, Karpov, retaining the title in case of a tie. In addition, Karpov would have the right to a rematch if he lost.

Western public reaction was hostile. Even The New York Times condemned Campomanes in an editorial. Once again, we have touched
upon a controversy that is too large for this brief history, but we can note two things. First, the immediate result was to make Kasparov and Campomanes bitter enemies. After Kasparov beat Karpov in the new 1985 match to win the world championship, he spent several years trying to smash FIDE—at least partly to get back at Campomanes.

Second, FIDE lost some of its legitimacy in the eyes of many chessplayers. Whether halting the match benefited Karpov or Kasparov—and partisans argued both sides—it seemed to many people that FIDE had no right to stop the match in progress. There are some indications that Karpov may have asked Campomanes to intercede, although he had probably wanted a temporary rest rather than a new contest. Many people argued that if Karpov was too tired to continue he should have resigned the match, as Lasker had done 64 years earlier to Capablanca.

At any rate, Karpov and Kasparov played their match over again in the fall of 1985. Kasparov played superbly to capture the title by the score of +5–3=16.

Due to the rematch clause Kasparov had to defend his title the next year, which he did by one point, +5–4=15.

Yet Kasparov would not shake Karpov so easily. Karpov was still the only worthy challenger, and played Kasparov twice more for the title in 1987 and 1990. In 1987 Karpov came very close to winning, needing only a draw in the 24th game to prevail. Losing this match would have cost Kasparov the title for at least three years because FIDE had taken away the rematch clause. Kasparov managed to win a very intense battle in the last game of the match to retain his title, +4–4=16.

In 1990 he again defeated Karpov, again by one point, +4–3=17. Although Karpov had kept every match close, Kasparov had always held him off with a combination of great play and superb sporting qualities.

The Rise of the PCA

In 1992, one year before the next scheduled world championship match, something extraordinary happened. Karpov was upset in the qualifying stage by Nigel Short of England, who went on to defeat Jan Timman of the Netherlands in the Candidates Final match in February 1993. For the first time in almost 20 years, Anatoly Karpov had not qualified for the world championship match. Also for the first time in 20 years, a non-Soviet-born player was the challenger.

Before we continue the history of 1993, we should mention another extraordinary event in 1992. Another alleged world championship match was held that year between the old antagonists Bobby Fischer and Boris Spassky. Fischer had not played a single serious game of chess since beating Spassky for the FIDE title in 1972, but 20 years later he re-emerged in the rump state of Yugoslavia. A rich Serbian banker, Jezdimir
Vasiljevic, put up a $5 million prize fund for Spassky and Fischer to play a rematch that was called, quite simply, the World Championship.

The conditions were just what Fischer had demanded in 1975: a match of unlimited duration with the winner being the first to win 10 games. In case of a 9–9 tie, Fischer would retain his “title,” which he claimed never to have lost. At a pre-match press conference, it was pointed out to Fischer that he had not played anybody for 20 years. In solipsistic fashion, Fischer replied, “No, that is not exactly correct. Nobody has played me for 20 years.”

The Fischer–Spassky 1992 match lasted 30 games, with Fischer prevailing +10–5=15. (This 1:1 ratio of decisive games to draws was positively bloodthirsty compared to some of the recent FIDE title matches. The FIDE matches of 1978, 1981, and 1984 had an overall ratio of 1:2.6.) Few people considered it the world championship, although millions followed the match with great interest. It was viewed mainly as a curiosity; the interest was in Fischer, not in the dubious title at stake. Kasparov had proven himself a worthy champion through his match and tournament record, while Fischer had been gone for so long that most doubted he could still win against the best opposition. If Fischer had walked away from FIDE in 1975 and played a match against Karpov for the world championship, millions of chess fans would have walked with him. But in 1992, few would walk with Fischer. Few doubted that the real world championship was with FIDE.

That certainty would change in 1993, just one month after Nigel Short defeated Jan Timman to earn the right to challenge Kasparov. According to Dominic Lawson in his book *End Game*, Short became incensed at the way FIDE handled the bidding for the world championship. In particular, he was angry that FIDE falsely claimed to have consulted him about which bid he preferred. Short telephoned Kasparov and described the behavior of FIDE officials. According to Lawson, Short said, “Let’s play our match outside FIDE.” Kasparov is reported to have hesitated a few seconds and then responded, “Nigel, I have been waiting eight years for this moment.”

When Campomanes stopped the world championship match in 1985, that event may have kindled in Kasparov the ambition to take the World Championship outside FIDE. But he had never before had an opponent who shared this desire. Short’s suggestion set in motion the formation of a new organization, called the Professional Chess Association, under whose auspices their match would be held. Short and Kasparov formally announced on 26 February 1993 that they would play their match outside FIDE.

FIDE quickly responded by declaring the world championship vacant. FIDE announced a match to fill this vacancy between Timman and Karpov, both of whom had been defeated by Short on his way to
playing Kasparov. This action followed the procedure stipulated in FIDE's own regulations for filling a vacancy due to voluntary abdication of the title by the world champion.

The reaction of the chess world was mixed. On the one hand, everyone regarded Kasparov as the true world champion, i.e., the world's best chessplayer. Therefore the only true world championship would be one involving Kasparov. Moreover, Kasparov had agreed to play the challenger selected by the FIDE qualifying process, so his challenger also had legitimacy. On the other hand, FIDE was regarded by most as the chess world's official organizing body, and FIDE's credibility was not universally thought to be so low as to warrant rebellion.

For the first time in the history of the world championship, there was a serious split in the title's lineage. Two matches were held in 1993, each with a serious claim to being the world championship. (*The New York Times* described the situation in an article titled, "Chess Adopts Boxing's Anarchy and Attitude," September 9, 1993.)

Kasparov won his match against Short, +6−1=13; while Karpov won his match against Timman, +6−2=13. Kasparov's PCA match was held at a faster time control of 40 moves in 2 hours, with each player getting an extra hour for each additional 20 moves. The FIDE match was held at the traditional time control of 40 moves in 2½ hours with one hour for each additional 16 moves, the traditional limit used in all FIDE world championship matches since 1948.

The PCA proclaimed its wish to build relationships with Western corporate sponsors, such as *The Times* of London, which sponsored the Short–Kasparov match; while FIDE trumpeted its legitimacy as the only body that could confer the world championship title. After all, if even Bobby Fischer had not been above FIDE, why should Kasparov be?

The biggest differences between Fischer in 1975 and Kasparov in 1993 are that Kasparov did, in fact, play his legitimate challenger, and has since remained an active player. Moreover, since the twin world championship matches in 1993, there can be no doubt that Kasparov's PCA has been more successful financially than FIDE. At the end of the year the PCA signed a contract with the high-technology giant Intel Corporation. Intel agreed to sponsor a series of tournaments and the next PCA world championship match in 1995. Since 1993, the PCA has successfully organized its first candidates' cycle and its second world championship match.

Meanwhile, FIDE completed its candidates cycle but did not manage to hold its own world championship match as scheduled in 1995. Its champion, Karpov, was supposed to face Gata Kamsky of the United States. As of January 1996 the fate of that match was still in doubt.

Indeed, the fate of FIDE itself is in doubt. At the FIDE Congress of December 1994, held in Moscow, Florencio Campomanes used legally
dubious strongarm politics to achieve his own reelection as FIDE President. Surprisingly, Kasparov himself helped to reelect the ethically challenged Filipino, who has always labored under allegations of financial and other misconduct. At the Moscow FIDE Congress, Kasparov and Campomanes made a deal for a reunification match between the FIDE champion and the PCA champion. Subsequent to this match there would be only one world championship, managed by the PCA.

Unfortunately for Campomanes, Kasparov, and their deal, many people were appalled at the politics of the Moscow Congress and later rose up in protest. At the next FIDE Congress in Paris in November 1995 Campomanes was removed from the FIDE presidency and kicked upstairs to a post without salary, and the FIDE–PCA reunification match agreement was repudiated.

The future of the world chess championship is uncertain and its current status is ambiguous. However, having surveyed the history of the world championship, we can see that Kasparov's lineage is impeccable. Kasparov must be regarded as the true world champion, and only the player who defeats Kasparov in a match can expect to be regarded as his successor.

In the 1995 PCA World Chess Championship Match held in New York, Viswanathan Anand made his first attempt to do just that.
The Champion and the Challenger

Garry Kimovich Kasparov was born in Baku, Azerbaijan on 13 April 1963. He learned chess at the age of six and immediately showed great promise. At age 13 he was allowed to represent the Soviet Union at the World Under-18 Championship, finishing joint 3rd–6th. At 14 he demolished the field in the Soviet Junior (under 20) Championship. By age 16 he was already winning strong international tournaments. At 17 he won the World Junior Championship. At 18 he shared joint 1st–2nd places in the Soviet Championship and was recognized as one of the world's top 10. At the extraordinarily young age of 19, Kasparov qualified as one of eight candidates for the world championship, with his FIDE rating of 2690 marking him as the second-strongest chess player in the world. On 9 November 1985, at 22, Kasparov became the youngest ever world chess champion.

Kasparov's rise to the top was nothing less than phenomenal; but his subsequent career as world champion may be even more impressive. He never lost a single match on the way to becoming world champion, and he has never since lost a match. For several years after winning the world championship, Kasparov did not fail to win or come shared first in a tournament.

Karpov also had a tremendous tournament record while world champion, but Kasparov's record is even more impressive because he achieved it while Karpov was still active and arguably at the peak of his powers. During the last few years Kasparov has not been quite so dominant. It is no longer a shock when one of the other top players in the world—such as Anand, Kramnik, Ivanchuk, or Karpov—wins a tournament ahead of Kasparov. Nevertheless, Kasparov has still maintained a performance that establishes him as the strongest player in the world.
In addition to his outstanding sporting record in both tournaments and matches, Kasparov has set the record for the highest-ever FIDE rating—2805—surpassing the record of 2785 set by Bobby Fischer after winning the world championship in 1972. There is much debate as to what Kasparov’s higher rating means, because many people feel that there has been a certain amount of rating inflation. The evidence for this is mixed, but it is obvious that the ratings of the top 20 players in 1995 are significantly higher than the ratings of the top 20 players in 1972. If one does not want to say that the current top 20 are significantly better than the top 20 in 1972, that would imply that a higher rating in 1995 is the equivalent of a lower rating in 1972. Since flux is a statistical property of the rating pool, there is a strong argument that what matters is not a rating itself, but its relationship to the ratings of other players active at the same time. By that measure, it is indisputable that Bobby Fischer dominated the chess world from 1970 to 1972 more than anyone after him, including Kasparov.

While Kasparov may not ever have exercised such a complete and total domination over the chess world as Fischer briefly did, he has maintained such a high level of performance over the past decade that many observers consider him the greatest player in the history of the game.

What are the features of his style? Of course, Kasparov excels in every facet of chess; no world champion could be seriously deficient in any area. But several stylistic elements stand out particularly strongly:

1. Kasparov’s opening analysis and preparation is superb. He is very skilled in analyzing an opening position and discovering new, deep, and powerful ideas. His opening knowledge is not only deep but broad. The effect of this is that his own opening repertoire is well worked out, while he can strike very powerfully at weaknesses in his opponents’ openings.
2. Kasparov loves the initiative. He is very good at dictating the course of events over the chessboard. He is unprejudiced in his judgments and creative in finding ways to give material or sacrifice certain positional pluses to maintain the initiative.

3. Kasparov is a very strong attacking player. Quite simply, your king is never completely safe when you are playing him.

4. Kasparov can calculate very well. He is capable of very deep and accurate calculations at the board.

One can choose from a multitude of games to illustrate these aspects of his style. My choice is a game I actually witnessed in person, the second game of his 1990 world championship match against Karpov in New York City. The analysis below is based on Kasparov’s notes in Chess Informant 50.

**Kasparov—Karpov, New York (M/2) 1990**

**Spanish Game C92**

1 e4 e5 2 f3 d6 3 Ab5 a6 4 aa4 d5 5 0-0 Ac7 6 Ac1 b5 7 Ab3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3 Ab7 10 d4 Ae8

Karpov adopts the Zaitsev Variation, named after the Russian player Igor Zaitsev, who was also a trainer and coach to Karpov. Karpov had used this opening for many years before this game, so Kasparov obviously spent a lot of time preparing strong ideas for it.

11 Abxd2 f8 12 a4 h6 13 Ac2 exd4 14 cxd4 b4 15 Ab1 bx4

The position after 15 Ab1 is one of the critical positions for the theory of this opening. Black has two main options: he can capture the pawn on a4 as Karpov plays in this game, or he can strike at the center with 15 ... c5. Karpov had adopted both moves in previous games, but after this game Karpov switched to 15 ... c5 for the rest of the match. In fact, not only did Karpov never return to the capture of the a-pawn, but no other grandmaster has since adopted the line. Such was the powerful impression made by Kasparov’s opening play in this game.

16 Axb4 a5 17 Aa3 Aa6 18 Adh2 g6 19 f3! [1]

Here is the powerful new idea that Kasparov had prepared before the game. As is so often the case with Kasparov, the novelty is conceptual instead of tactical. He weighs the positional elements differently than had been done before, rather than merely finding a new tactical possibility.

Why is White’s last move so strong? With this little move, White bolsters the e4 square. By so doing, he significantly lessens Black’s possibilities for counterplay. Not only does Black have three pieces trained on the e4 square, but he also hopes to play...
... d6-d5, which would enable Black to play ... \( \mathcal{D}e4 \), which would in turn activate Black's pieces. If White were to capture such a knight on e4, then this would open an attack on the d4 pawn by the Black queen. So by protecting e4 White also indirectly protects d4.

Nor is the move purely defensive. White also prepares the move \( \mathcal{D}g4 \) (see White's 24th move), which moves the White knight dangerously close to Black's already weakened king, and in particular to the weak squares f6 and h6.

What are the drawbacks of this move? White weakens the g3 and e3 squares, but this is not so serious because White can defend those squares more easily (for example by playing \( \mathcal{D}f1 \)) than Black can attack them. Also White takes away the f3 square from his knights, but this turns out to be unimportant because each knight has other good squares to use. Finally, White takes away the f3 square from his rook (on a3) and his queen, but this is not so important as White has other good lines for those pieces.

Here are two previous games, both played by Karpov as Black, that show how other ideas for White had not achieved any advantage:

- a) Hjartarson–Karpov, Seattle (m/5) 1989: 19 \( \mathcal{D}g4 \) \( \mathcal{D}xg4 \) 20 \( \mathcal{W}xg4 \) c5! 21 \( \mathcal{D}xc5 \) (21 d5? \( \mathcal{A}x\mathcal{D}5 \) exploits the pin along the e-file) 21 ... \( \mathcal{D}xc5 \) 22 e5 \( \mathcal{W}d4! \) 23 \( \mathcal{G}g3 \) \( \mathcal{A}e6 \), and Black had enough counterplay against the e-pawn to compensate for White's initiative (based on comments in Informant 47 by Zaitsev).

- b) Ivanchuk–Karpov, Linares 1989: 19 f4 d5! (19 ... c5? 20 d5 \( \mathcal{A}g7 \) 21 \( \mathcal{H}f3 \) would give White a large advantage. It is important for Black to counterattack in the center, but only insofar as this increases the activity of his pieces. After 19 ... c5?, Black has only helped White to establish a powerful wedge on e4 and d5, which severely limits the activity of Black's queenside pieces) 20 e5 \( \mathcal{D}e4 \) 21 \( \mathcal{D}g4 \) (21 \( \mathcal{D}xe4 \) dxe4 22 \( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) 23 \( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) c5 gives Black excellent play for a pawn. In particular, it will be very hard for White to maintain the d4 point after ... \( \mathcal{W}d5 \) and ... \( \mathcal{A}d8 \), especially given the possibility of pinning a piece that recaptures on d4 to the king by ... \( \mathcal{L}c5 \); if White plays instead 21 \( \mathcal{H}f3 \), then Karpov suggests that 21 ... c5 22 \( \mathcal{A}ae3 \) allows Black sufficient counterplay after either 22 ... \( \mathcal{C}x\mathcal{D}4 \) or 22 ... c4) 21 ... c5! 22 \( \mathcal{D}xe4 \) dxe4 and Karpov was able to demonstrate excellent counterplay (based on comments by Karpov in Informant 47).

So Kasparov saw into this position much more deeply than anyone had before, but good opening ideas are not enough to win the game. One must also play the rest of the game well.

19 ... \( \mathcal{W}d7?! \)

Kasparov calls this move dubious, and I agree. He suggests two alternatives:

- a) First, he suggests that 19 ... c5 20 d5 is only slightly worse for
Black. One should compare this position to the variation given by Karpov in his game against Ivanchuk after 19 f4 c5? 20 d5; this is a less favorable version of that line for White, but it would still be better for White, and understandably unappealing for Black.

b) A better idea might have been 19 ... Ag7 20 Oc4 (attacking the a-pawn) 20 ... Aa8 (defending the a-pawn and threatening to play 21 ... d5) 21 d5 Aa8, which Kasparov calls unclear. The point of Black's last move is to defend the d-pawn so as to prepare the pawn break ... c7-c6.

When I was working as a commentator at the 1990 World Championship Match, I analyzed this position the evening after it was played. I arrived at the same conclusion, that Black might get reasonable play in variation b. By a twist of fate, I met Kasparov the next day. I suggested this line to him and asked how White would keep the advantage. Kasparov just smiled and changed the topic of conversation. I have no doubt that Kasparov had quite a good idea of how to continue, but I feel that this position may be playable for Black. Still, I understand why the result of this game would cause players to avoid it as Black.

20 Oc4 Ab5 21 Ae3 Ac8

It is hard for Black to get counterplay. Kasparov points out that 21 ... d5 fails to liberate Black's game because White can play 22 Oc3 attacking the queen and follow up with 23 e5. Also, 21 ... Aa6 22 Oc3 Ab6 23 Ae3 does not help Black; White just continues to develop his game smoothly. Notice that the key to Kasparov's plan is that he maintains his center against any counterattack by Black.

22 Ae3 c6!

Kasparov suggests that 22 ... Ab8 might be better, to prepare 23 ... d5, liberating his game by attacking the knight and the e4 pawn at the same time. Of course White would not sit still and allow this, but he would have to make a minor concession to prevent it, for example by moving the knight from c4.

23 Ac1!

A nice move. Not only does White take aim at the weak pawn on h6, but the queen also exerts pressure along the open c-file behind the rook. One by one, Kasparov gets his pieces working in greater harmony.

23 ... Ah7 24 Ag4! [2] Ag8

Kasparov analyzes Black's only two alternatives, the capture of the knight on g4 by either the bishop or the knight:

a) 24 ... Axb4 25 hxb4 d5 26 Oc3, and White keeps a large advantage by following up with 27 e5.

b) 24 ... Oc4 25 hxc4 d5 (25 ... Ae6 26 Oc3 Ab8 27 Af2 Ag7 28 Bd2 is very strong for White;
notice that White already threatens 29 \( \text{Axh6} \) \( \text{Axh6} \) 30 \( \text{Hh1} \), a continuation that was not possible last move because Black would capture on d4, which is the reason White played 28 \( \text{Bd2} \) 26 \( \text{Ee5} \) dxe4 (26 ... \( \text{Axh6} \) 27 \( \text{Gf2} \) dxe4 28 \( \text{Axh6}! \) \( \text{Axh6} \) 29 \( \text{Hh1} \) gives White a winning attack against Black's king) 27 \( \text{Gxf7} \) and now:

\( b1 \) 27 ... \( \text{Dd5} \) 28 \( \text{Axh6!} \) scoops out Black's king, e.g. 28 ... \( \text{Dxc3} \) 29 \( \text{Axf8} \) e3 (29 ... \( \text{Bxf8} \) 30 \( \text{Wh6}+ \) \( \text{Gg8} \) 31 \( \text{Gxg6}+ \); 29 ... \( \text{Gg8} \) 30 \( \text{Wh6} \) \( \text{Gxf7} \) 31 \( \text{Aa2}+! ? \) \( \text{Dxa2} \) 32 \( \text{Gg7}+ \) \( \text{Gxe6} \) 33 \( \text{Bxe4+} \) \( \text{Dd5} \) 34 \( \text{Dxe8} \) and White wins material or mates Black) 30 \( \text{Dxc3} \) \( \text{Bxf8} \) 31 \( \text{Dc5} \) \( \text{Gf6} \) 32 \( \text{Dd3} \) and White wins back his material investment with two pawns as interest.

\( b2 \) 27 ... \( \text{Dd3} \) 28 \( \text{Axh6} \) \( \text{cxd3} \) 29 \( \text{Dd5} \) gives White a huge advantage.

\( b3 \) 27 ... \( \text{Exf3} \) is the toughest move, but it doesn't work: 28 \( \text{gxf3}! \) (28 \( \text{Axh6} \) \( \text{Bxe1}+ \) 29 \( \text{Dxe1} \) \( \text{Gxe1} \) simultaneously defends the g6 pawn and undermines the knight on e5) 28 ... \( \text{Dd5} \) 29 \( \text{Axh6} \) \( \text{Bxe1}+ \) 30 \( \text{Dxe1} \) \( \text{Bxb2} \) 31 \( \text{Axf8} \) \( \text{Bxc3} \) 32 \( \text{Wh4}+ \) \( \text{Gg8} \) 33 \( \text{Wh8}+ \) \( \text{Gxf7} \) 34 \( \text{Gxg6}+ \) forces mate after either 34 ... \( \text{Gg8} \) 35 \( \text{Gg7} \), or 34 ... \( \text{Dxe6} \) 35 \( \text{Dxe5+} \) \( \text{Dd7} \) 36 \( \text{Dd6} \)—a very attractive variation given by Kasparov.

25 \( \text{Axh6!} \) [3]

This move is typically Kasparovian. All of the grandmaster commentators expected Kasparov to play a simple move such as 25 \( \text{Af4} \) to intensify pressure on the d6 pawn. Kasparov acknowledges that this move would have maintained a large advantage, but he is always looking for a way to increase his advantage rather than maintain it—even if that involves radically altering the position. Some grandmasters thought at the time that Kasparov was playing very well, while others thought he had made a mistake. It will soon become clear that Kasparov's judgment was 100% correct in this case.

25 ... \( \text{Axh6} \) 26 \( \text{Axh6} \) \( \text{Axh6} \) 27 \( \text{Dxd6} \) \( \text{Bb6} \) 28 \( \text{Dxe8} \) \( \text{Dd4}+ \) 29 \( \text{Dh1} \) \( \text{Dd8} \) 30 \( \text{Dd1} \) \( \text{Dxe8} \) 31 \( \text{Gg5} \) \( \text{Ba7} \) [4]

Kasparov mentions that 31 ... \( \text{Dd7} \) does not work well for Black because White intensifies the attack with 32 \( \text{f4} \), and if Black tries to stop the pawn from pushing to f5 (thereby further exposing Black's king) by playing 32 ... \( \text{f5} \) himself, then 33 \( \text{Dc5!} \) enables the White rook to penetrate into Black's position via e5 and e7 with deadly effect.

White has many advantages in this position. His
rooks and queen are very active, whereas Black's pieces are generally passive. Look especially at the knights on b4 and h6, which attack squares that are already controlled by White's pawns. (When knights attack only squares guarded by the opponent's pawns, it usually means they are badly placed, especially if they cannot easily move to other squares where they would attack squares not so controlled.) Look also at Black's rook and queen, and compare them to White's rook on d1 and his queen on g5.

However, it is possible to see advantages in Black's position as well. If the queens were exchanged, Black would stand well in the endgame. Not only would he have a slight material advantage (because a rook and pawn are usually not quite enough for two minor pieces, all other things being equal), but his two kingside pawns are perfectly placed to control White's four kingside pawns in an endgame. For White to press his advantage he must quickly exploit the weakest part of Black's game: his king. While I was commenting on the game, I had no doubt that White could do this, but Yasser Seirawan thought otherwise. He was of the opinion that Kasparov had erred on move 25. When I heard that he held this opinion, I quickly offered a $20 bet that Kasparov would win the game, and that subsequent analysis would prove his decision correct. Seirawan accepted my offer, and I was rewarded at the end of the evening with a free dinner.

32 d8+ e6 33 f4!

This move is not obvious, and is crucial to White's strategy. It is imperative to rip open lines to the king as quickly as possible.

33 ... a6

Kasparov also analyzes:

a) 33 ... d7 34 f5! gxf5 35 exf5 e1+ 36 h2 e5+ (White threatens 37 g3 anyway, and Black has no good response) 37 g3, and White wins.

b) 33 ... f6 34 c5! d7 35 xd7 xd7 36 xa5 wins another pawn and attacks the knight on b4, and if Black now plays 36 ... d1+ 37 h2 xb1, White wins with 38 c7+. Perhaps Black could retreat with 36 ... a6 and try to grovel for awhile, but after, say, 37 d3 White has increased his material advantage and maintains a strong attack against the black king.

34 f5 e7 35 d2!

Of course White does not want to exchange queens.

35 ... e5

Black probably has no good defense to White's burgeoning attack. Kasparov analyzes two alternatives:

a) 35 ... d5 36 fxg6+ fxg6 37 exd5! e8 38 xg6+! xg6 39 xc6+ and White wins after taking on h6 because Black's naked king cannot hope to survive.
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b) 35 ... \( \text{d}8 36 \text{d}4 \text{c}7 37 \text{e}5 \text{d}5 38 \text{fxg6+} \text{fxg6} 39 \text{AXg6+!} \text{g7} 40 \text{Xxd5 cxd5} 41 \text{g3} \) and White has a winning attack. These variations by Kasparov should not be thought of as exhausting Black's possibilities, but as evidence of how strong White's attack has become.

36 \( \text{f2!} \text{e7} \)

If 36 ... \( \text{e7} 37 \text{e5!} \text{f6} (37 ... \text{c7} 38 \text{fxg6+} \text{fxg6} 39 \text{f8 + -}) 38 \text{e5!} \text{xe5} 39 \text{fxg6+} \text{g7} 40 \text{xf6+} \text{xf6} 41 \text{xe5} \text{xe5} 42 \text{h8 d5} 43 \text{xf5} \text{xf5} 44 \text{g7 + -} \)

37 \( \text{d4} \text{g8} 38 \text{e5} \text{d5} 39 \text{fxg6+} \text{fxg6} 40 \text{xc6} \text{xd8} 41 \text{xa7+} \text{de7} 42 \text{xa6} \text{d1+} 43 \text{g1} \text{d2} 44 \text{f1} 1-0

Kasparov has two other strengths that must be mentioned: strong nerves and good psychological judgment. In a match, strong nerves are especially important because the tension can become ferocious. An old aphorism says, “Most chess games are lost, not won,” and the same can be said of matches. Remember that in 1987 Kasparov faced the loss of his title unless he won the last game of his match against Karpov. That last game was not particularly impressive from a creative point of view, but as a sporting achievement it is hard to find any other recent game that compares.

Good psychological judgment also is important in a match, because you are facing the same opponent game after game. If you can judge him well, that will give you an edge. Karpov himself acknowledges Kasparov's skill in this regard (as quoted in Mortal Games by Fred Waitzkin): “De-

The champion with his team of seconds for the 1995 match: Vladimir Kramnik, Garry Kasparov, Evgeny Pogusov, and Yuri Dokhoian.
spite his age he is a deep psychologist on the chessboard. He is good at sensing what his opponent is feeling. Because of this, he knows whether to take a risk or not. And sometimes you must take a risk to win. His sense of the initiative is fantastic."

There could be no better expert on this subject than Karpov himself. The reader would be well advised to bear this assessment in mind when looking through the games of the Kasparov–Anand match, especially game 14.

Some people have suggested that Kasparov has passed his peak strength. They point out that Kasparov no longer dominates world chess the way he did five years ago. In a recent *New In Chess* interview Kasparov himself admitted, "from 1990 onwards I have been losing my training abilities." Elsewhere in the same interview he says that he has not done much serious chess work since the mid-1980s. However, he insisted, "I have serious intentions to stay concentrated on the game for a few more years ... I don't think that, if I am in normal shape, that anybody can beat me in a match."

In my own view, Kasparov's decreasing dominance is not entirely due to his own falling off, but also to an increase in the level of his competition. There are two reasons for this. First, the recent proliferation of computer databases has made it possible for grandmasters to raise their opening preparation to a much higher level than ever before. Kasparov now has been active for 15 years, providing a lot of data about himself to his competition. Ten years ago it was normal for Kasparov to be the one playing new and dangerous ideas in his openings, but now it is often Kasparov's opponent who has the prepared opening novelty.

Second, Kasparov's competition is simply better, in absolute terms, than it was 10 or five years ago. A small group of chessplayers has arisen that is strong enough to rival both Kasparov and Karpov in pure chess skill. This group includes such players as Vassily Ivanchuk and Vladimir Kramnik. However, the strongest member of the new generation is Viswanathan Anand.

While Kasparov is a man who drove himself to the top from early childhood, Anand gives the impression of a man whose gift for chess forbade him from taking it easy. Kasparov is regarded by many as the greatest player of all time, but Anand is often considered the greatest living talent—surpassing Kasparov himself.

Viswanathan Anand was born in Madras, India on 11 December 1969. According to local Indian custom he was given his own name, "Anand," as his last name and took his father's name, "Viswanathan," as his first name. However, the distinction between first and last names is not the same in that part of India as in the West, so to his family and his
Anand with his father and mother on the eve of the New York match.

Indian friends he is known simply as "Anand." As Anand played more in the West, many Westerners instinctively wanted to address him by his first name, so they began to call him by the nickname "Vishy." Always easygoing, he had no objections, and so is affectionately known as "Vishy" to most of his Western friends.

Anand did not have the meteoric rise of Kasparov, but he had something else that was immediately apparent: enormous talent. I first met him when we both played in the 1984 World Junior Championship in Kiljava, Finland. I was 16 and Anand only 14. I won that game, but had the impression Anand wasn't trying as hard as he could—after all, he only used 15 minutes for the whole game! In the post mortem, Anand rattled off variations so fast that I could barely follow him. I had to wonder to myself just what kind of player he was. On the one hand, he did not seem to have the intensity of a future world champion; on the other hand, he clearly had a unique gift. Anand's behavior in our game was typical of his teenage years, when he seldom used more than half an hour for the entire game.

Anand's first major tournament victory came three years later in the 1987 World Junior Championship. This earned him more tournament invitations. In 1989 he shared first place at the strong Wijk aan Zee invitational tournament in Holland. In 1990, at age 21, he shared third place in the Manila Interzonal with Nigel Short. The top seven players in this tournament qualified to play the series of elimination matches to
decide who would challenge Kasparov in 1993.

By this time Anand’s play had slowed down somewhat. He still rarely used more than an hour and a half to play his first 40 moves, but usually took more than an hour. His rating went over 2600 in 1991. He later told me that his result in Manila was a great encouragement to him: “I figured that if I could play this well as I was, then maybe if I worked hard I could get really good.” I remember thinking to myself that many people would consider him “really good” already, but genius has its own standards.

Anand easily won his first candidates match against Alexei Dreev of the Soviet Union, +4−1=1. His next opponent was Anatoly Karpov. Most people expected Karpov to win easily, but the match was very close. Karpov only managed to squeak through by winning the last game, taking the match +2−1=5. The loss was disappointing to Anand, but he took it as he takes all setbacks: pragmatically and with a view to the future. “I just wasn’t ready yet,” he told me later, “and I learned a lot from that match.”

Anand bounced back to win the super-strong Reggio Emilia tournament in December 1991–January 1992. He finished a half-point ahead of the world champion Kasparov and a full point ahead of Karpov. Later that year he achieved another superb success by beating Vasily Ivanchuk, who was ranked third in the world at the time, 5–3 in an exhibition match in Linares. (I will relate more about that match in the next chapter.)

Even while Nigel Short and Jan Timman were competing for the right to challenge Kasparov in 1993, people were buzzing about the possibility that Anand would be the next challenger after that. Anand started along that road by sharing first place in the first PCA World Championship Qualifying Tournament in Groningen, the Netherlands in 1993. In the PCA candidates matches, Anand easily won his first-round match against Oleg Romanishin of Russia in June 1994 and his second-round match against Michael Adams of England in September 1994. One more match remained, against the always-dangerous young prodigy, Gata Kamsky of the United States. Although Anand’s lifetime record against Kamsky was quite favorable, and moreover Anand was considered by all observers to be much the more talented player, Kamsky had defeated Anand in their FIDE candidates match the summer before. Anand had been leading that match comfortably before Kamsky surged from behind to tie the match and win the playoff. Therefore nothing could be taken for granted in their second encounter.

The match was played in March 1995 and started with a horrible disaster for Anand: in a winning position, he lost the first game on time. Anand had never before in his entire career lost a game on time. Would he be able to recover after such a loss? Had his previous match loss to
Kamsky left him psychologically vulnerable?

Anand showed everyone how far he had come by playing the rest of the match with tremendous poise. He was never in serious trouble in any of the remaining games, and along the way won games 3, 9, and 11 to score a convincing +3–1=7 victory. Finally Anand would challenge Kasparov for the world championship.

Anand’s style is in many ways opposed to Kasparov’s. Whereas Kasparov excels in grand plans unified by sharp tactics, Anand’s forte is his natural feeling for the game. Anand’s superb intuition allows him to judge small transactions very accurately. Change the pawn structure a bit, exchange off one or two pairs of pieces, and Anand will tell you exactly whom it favors and why. It is very difficult to confuse him.

Furthermore, Anand’s tactical ability is incredible. He can calculate a huge number of variations quickly, and will usually sense tactics in a position almost immediately. Strangely, he can have tactical blind spots: he senses so much so quickly that occasionally something slips through his attention. Thus we see a contrast between Kasparov and Anand: Kasparov is more accurate and sometimes calculates more deeply, while Anand’s tremendous intuition will alert him to more hidden possibilities more quickly.

The following game illustrates Anand’s strengths very well. It is the first game of the aforementioned Anand–Ivanchuk match. The annotations are reprinted from an article I published on this match in the first issue of American Chess Journal. Note particularly Anand’s fantastic judgment on moves 17 and 20. This game is one of the finest I have ever seen, and it will be studied for many years to come.

**Ivanchuk–Anand, Linares (m/1) 1992**

**Sicilian Defense B66**

1 e4 c5 2 d4 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 cxd4 f6 5 c3 e6 6 g5 e6 7 d2 a6 8 0–0–0 h6 9 Ae3 Qxd4 10 Qxd4 b5 11 f3

Perhaps surprised by Anand’s opening choice, Ivanchuk plays a quiet and unambitious system.

11 ... Aa5?! 12 a3 e5 13 Ae3 Ae6 14 Ab1 Ae7 15 g4?! [5]

This move starts a bad idea. Ivanchuk wants to put pressure on Black’s game, but he has missed Black’s superb 17th move. White should play 15 Ad5 and admit he has nothing.

15 ... Ab8

Also possible was 15 ... b4?! 16 Aa2 (16 Ad5 Axd5 17 exd5 Ebd8 and 16 axb4 Wxb4 17 Ad5 Axd5 18 exd5 Wxd2 19 Axd2 Ad7 don’t offer much) 16 ... d5 with a mess, but the text move is sounder.
16 \( \texttt{c} \texttt{d}5 \)
Now 16 \( \texttt{b}4 \) was really threatened!
16 \( \texttt{b}5 \) 17 \( \texttt{g} \times \texttt{d}6+ [6] \)
Better was 17 \( \texttt{g} \times \texttt{d}2 \) \( \texttt{e} \).
17 \( \texttt{g} \times \texttt{x}6!! \)
This is a spectacular move, all the more impressive because Anand had to foresee it several moves ago. On the surface it seems completely anti-positional, and that is why Ivanchuk never even considered it. Why does Black give himself doubled pawns? The answer is that Anand has judged that White cannot stop Black from undoubling them. Black can trade the h-pawn and an f-pawn and then either the second f-pawn or the d-pawn. This will leave White with a useless h-pawn and a meaningless extra queenside pawn to fight against an overwhelming pawn duo. In fact, even if White had not pushed his g-pawn it would still be correct to recapture this way, although it would not be nearly as strong.

The resulting pawn structure can be compared to the Pelikan Sicilian, but in this position Black has the advantage of the “two bishops”—White’s two bishops, specifically the dark-squared bishop, which is useless in the fight to blockade the black pawns on the light squares. If the piece on c3 were a knight, then White would have a firm blockade and a solid advantage. As it is, Black is better.

18 \( \texttt{g} \times \texttt{d}2 \) \( \texttt{h}5 \) 19 \( \texttt{g}1 \) \( \texttt{h} \times \texttt{g}4 \) 20 \( \texttt{x} \times \texttt{g}4 \) \( \texttt{c}4!! \)
Another magnificent move! Vishy told me afterward that when he saw this move, he knew immediately that it was correct. On the surface, it looks insane to trade the “good” bishop for White’s “bad” bishop, but the point is that Black must stop White from playing h2-h3 and \( \texttt{g}2 \), which would blockade the pawns.

21 \( \texttt{b}3 \)
21 \( \texttt{x} \times \texttt{c}4 \) \( \texttt{b} \times \texttt{c}4 \) is clearly better for Black with the point that 22 \( \texttt{d}5 \) is met by 22 ... \( \texttt{g}5 \).
21 ... \( \texttt{x} \times \texttt{f}1 \) 22 \( \texttt{b} \times \texttt{f}1 \) \( \texttt{h}3?? [7] \)
Simply 22 ... \( \texttt{d}7 \) to bring the queen rook into play gives Black a clear advantage; the game move is more ambitious but it seems justified.

23 \( \texttt{e}2 \)
At this point grandmaster Ljubomir Ljubojevic, who was watching the game, was walking around to anyone who would listen and ranting that both players were absolutely hopeless; first of all Black had made several terrible moves, and now White had missed his chance to consolidate his “advantage” by...
23 \textit{Ag}1. I challenged him on this, and we analyzed 23 ... \textit{Ed}7 24 \textit{Ed}3 (this was Ljubojevic’s point). After 30 or 45 minutes where I took the black pieces and Ljubojevic, joined by a considerably less agitated grandmaster Valery Salov, took the white pieces, we agreed that after 24 ... \textit{Exd}3 25 \textit{cxd}3 \textit{Hh}8 26 \textit{fxf}3 \textit{d}5! Black is equal, e.g., 27 \textit{b}2 \textit{d}4 28 \textit{h}3 \textit{f}5! with counterplay.

After the game, Anand and I took a walk, and I mentioned this possibility to him. He turned it over for a few minutes, and then we continued walking. Yet another few minutes later, he looked up and pointed out that 24 ... \textit{Hh}4! is better. Here are two variations, both with the same essential idea:

\textit{a)} 25 \textit{g}3 \textit{g}8 26 \textit{h}3 \textit{gh}8 27 \textit{ff}3 \textit{f}5! 28 \textit{xf}5 (or else White’s position falls apart, e.g., 28 \textit{exf}5 \textit{e}4 29 \textit{e}e\textit{c} \textit{d}5 is horrible) 28 ... \textit{Exh}3 29 \textit{Exh}3 \textit{Exh}3 30 \textit{Af}2 (30 \textit{Exf}7? \textit{h}1 31 \textit{ff}1 \textit{Ag}5 \rightarrow as White will not be able to break the pin and will have to give the exchange, e.g., 32 \textit{e}e1 \textit{Ad}2) 30 ... \textit{Ee}6 and White will quickly lose either the g-pawn or the e-pawn and then the game.

\textit{b)} 25 \textit{h}3 \textit{bb}8 26 \textit{ff}3 \textit{f}5! (Same theme!) 27 \textit{xf}5 \textit{Exh}3 and the position is essentially similar the one in the last note.

Admittedly, though, Ivanchuk’s 23rd move is listless, not even trying to stop Black from executing his plan.

23 ... \textit{Ed}7 24 \textit{g}5

Carrying out Black’s plan for him, but otherwise it’s hard to see how White will save the pawn.

24 ... \textit{Ee}6 25 \textit{gxf}6 \textit{Exf}6 26 \textit{Ad}2 \textit{Ae}7!

Simplest and best. During the game Anand spent some time considering 26 ... \textit{Ah}4, but he didn’t like giving White counterplay against the d-pawn with 27 \textit{Ab}4. In the audience, I was considering 26 ... \textit{Ag}8 27 \textit{Eef}2 \textit{Ae}7 28 \textit{Exf}7 \textit{Ag}4. Although it activates the rooks (and also keeps a large advantage), it trades the wrong pawn for the e-pawn. There is no hurry. Black can patiently trade the d-pawn for the e-pawn, and the f- and e-pawns will dominate the board. Black is strategically winning.

27 \textit{Ae}1 \textit{f}6 28 \textit{Ag}3 \textit{d}5 29 \textit{Exd}5+ \textit{Exd}5 30 \textit{ff}5 [8] \textit{Ec}6!

Black must still be careful! For example, 30 ... \textit{Ab}7 31 \textit{Ax}5 \textit{Ee}6 (31 ... \textit{fxe}5 32 \textit{Bxe}5+ \textit{Ed}6 33 \textit{Ee}6+ \textit{Ed}5 34 \textit{Exe}5! \textit{±}) 32 \textit{Exf}6+ =, or 30 ... \textit{Ee}6? 31 \textit{Ax}e5! \textit{Ee}8 32 \textit{Exf}6+.

31 \textit{Eef}2?

This move surprised me, but of course it is horribly dreary to defend such a position. The only chance was for White to play 31 \textit{Ef}3 \textit{Hh}7 32 \textit{Ec}3+ \textit{Bb}6 to activate his rooks and drive the black king from the
center. Note that Black should not play 32 ... \( \text{g}d7 \) 33 \( \text{g}d2+ \text{a}d6 \) as after 34 \( \text{c}d3 \text{h}b6 \) 35 \( \text{f}f2 \text{c}e6 \) 36 \( \text{c}c5 \) White gets a great deal of counterplay. But after the move Ivanchuk played, White's position is irretrievably lost.

31 ... \( \text{h}h6! \)

If White can sac the exchange on f6 he gets good counterplay.

32 \( \text{b}b2 \text{d}d7! \) 33 \( \text{a}e2 \text{e}d6! \) 34 \( \text{f}f3 \text{e}c8! [9] \)

Perhaps it is excessive to give five exclamation points in a row, but I want to emphasize the importance of accurate play in this position. White has been completely deprived of counterplay and can no longer put up serious resistance.

35 \( \text{c}c1 \text{c}e6 \) 36 \( \text{e}d3 \text{h}b7 \) 37 \( \text{g}g3 \text{a}c5 \) 38 \( \text{a}a2 \text{d}d7 \) 39 \( \text{c}c3 \text{c}c7 \)

Note 39 ... \( \text{d}d1? \) because of 40 \( \text{f}f2 \text{xf}2 \) 41 \( \text{x}e8 \text{d}d4 \) 42 \( c3 \).

40 \( h4 \text{d}d1 \) 41 \( \text{f}f2 \text{a}d6 \) 42 \( \text{g}g3 \text{e}4! \) 43 \( \text{x}e4+ \text{c}c5 \) 44 \( \text{x}e5+ \)

44 ... \( \text{x}e5 \) 45 \( \text{b}b2 \text{d}d2 \) 0–1.

In previous games between Kasparov and Anand (see Appendix 1), Kasparov has enjoyed a large plus score. But then, Kasparov has also had White most of the time. When Kasparov is able to use his advantage in opening preparation he often wins the game in impressive style. One has only to think of such examples as the famous Evans Gambit clash at Riga 1995. That game looks very impressive, and it is: Kasparov blows Anand away by sacrificing a pawn in the opening. But it is important to keep in mind that Kasparov was not making it up at the board; he was playing a new idea that he had prepared beforehand.

When Anand is able to steer the opening into a position that has not been studied by either side, he can sometimes outplay Kasparov by using his gift of seeing more hidden resources in the position. A good example of this is his Reggio Emilia 1991 game against Kasparov in the Tarrasch French, where Kasparov as White played 1 \( e4 \) \( e6 \) 2 \( d4 \) \( d5 \) 3 \( \text{d}d2 \) \( c5 \) 4 \( \text{c}xd5 \) \( \text{g}x\text{d}5 \) 5 \( \text{dxc5?!} \)

Anand's victory in this game may not look as impressive as Kasparov's Evans Gambit, but the reader should keep in mind that it was not prepared at home. When Anand can avoid or nullify Kasparov's opening preparation, not only his judgment can be superior but also his ability to foresee the clever little tactics so crucial to many positions. (Good examples in the Tarrasch French game are the moves 16 ... \( \text{a}e4! \) and 18 ... \( \text{g}6! \))

A match, however, is not just a collection of individual games. Each match also has unique characteristics unto itself. Like Kasparov, Anand
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Anand: The
Inside
Story has
plenty of match experience. But unlike Kasparov, Anand can have
trouble with his nerves.

The problem displayed itself most dramatically in his first match
against Kamsky, the FIDE candidates match of August 1994 where
Anand led until he lost two games in a row toward the end. He recov-
ered enough to draw the final game, but collapsed in the two rapid-play
tiebreak games where his natural quickness and talent would normally
have enabled him to prevail.

Nor has Kasparov been unaware of this weakness in Anand, as I
learned from a casual conversation with the world champion. After
Kasparov won the fourth game of his 1993 world championship match
against Nigel Short, he led with a score of +3=1. Consequently, he was
very relaxed and taking visitors. Kasparov's manager, Andrew Page, in-
vited me to have dinner with them. After dinner, the three of us went for
a walk with Alexander Beliavsky, one of Kasparov's seconds. Kasparov,
obviously feeling secure about the result of the current match, mused
about who would challenge him next time.

"Anand will challenge," I offered, with a mischievous grin.

Kasparov pondered this a moment. "Yes, maybe. But there are some
psychological problems there."
A Personal Perspective

Anand and I met for the first time at the World Junior Championship in 1984, but we were only acquaintances until 1992. It was then that I first worked for Anand as a second, for his match against Vassily Ivanchuk in Linares, Spain. The match was sponsored by Luis Rentero, the multi-millionaire chess patron who has built the Linares tournament into one of the world’s most respected events. Rentero simply decided that it would be fun to hold a match between the two most promising young players of that time. Although there was no title or opportunity at stake, both players took the match very seriously. Not only would a victory impress the world at large, it would also be a major boost to the winner’s self-esteem. It would also be invaluable experience for both players in case of a future candidates match between the same opponents.

Anand had worked with Mikhail Gurevich for his last match, the candidates match against Karpov. They had gotten along very well. But now Gurevich had other projects, so Anand had to find another second. I was flattered and astonished that he chose me. My surprise quickly changed to excitement as I prepared to fly to Spain to train and be a second for two months.

I must now confess a secret. It had been some time since I had competed in a tournament with Anand. Even though I was well aware of his recent successes, I couldn’t quite believe that the young player I knew from the World Junior Championships in 1984 and 1987 was really as good as his ranking. Surely, I thought, some of his success must be due to the sheer intimidation factor of his playing so fast. I suspected that after I worked with him for a few weeks, I would see that he was certainly very good, and no doubt extremely talented, but was not really
a 2700-rated player.

Was I ever wrong. In the middle of August 1992 I arrived in Madrid, where Anand and his friend Maurice Perea picked me up at the airport. They drove me to a small town in the mountains about 30 miles outside of Madrid, where Anand was staying as a guest of Maurice and his wife Nieves. The Pereas are an elderly couple who have been involved in the Linares tournament for several years. Anand and the Pereas have grown fond of each other. Maurice and Nieves are very warm, good-hearted people, and it is easy to understand how the friendship grew. Not only is Maurice a wonderfully nice man, he is also a talented chess player. Maurice had a long business career in America and Spain, but his passion had always been chess. In his prime he may have been about FIDE 2400-level, and once defeated Samuel Reshevsky in a tournament game.

Collado Mediano was a very pleasant town. It was quiet and friendly; a good place to live and a perfect place to work. It was clear to me that Anand loved it there, so it was no surprise to me when he bought a house there two years later. Perhaps best of all, there were no distractions. We had a lot of work to do and only a month to do it in.

As I said, I expected to see that Anand was not quite as good as his recent results. It took about two days for that illusion to pass. Anand was, if anything, better than his results. He had so much talent for chess—so much raw ability—that it was clear to me he had not yet fulfilled his potential. He still rattled off variations so quickly I could barely keep up, but now he was much more focused. Instead of simply saying whatever he saw, now he organized his thoughts around clear and powerful conceptions of the position. I discovered that he didn’t just have a gift for calculation; he also had a gift for understanding the subtlest nuances of a position at first glance.

With Anand possessing so much talent, it was only natural that the subject of playing for the world championship would come up at some point. Anand told me that he had never seriously considered the subject until two years prior, in 1990, when people started telling him that he should make it his goal. This story sets him in remarkable contrast to all recent world champions. I am sure that both Karpov and Kasparov were thinking about the world championship from an early age. If you were a gifted Soviet player, it was unavoidable that you should think about it. As for Fischer, I imagine that such an intense young man would probably have set his sights on the chess crown when he was as young as 14 or 15. But Anand did not come from a chess culture that expected its talented youth to aim for the top, nor did he have the kind of driven personality that would naturally bend all else to achieving that goal. Anand was an easy-going guy who loved chess and had suddenly discovered that the world championship was a realistic—if difficult—goal.

While Anand is easy-going, he is no slouch. He knew that it would
take a lot of work for him to have a real chance of winning the world championship. While we were together, we discussed how a world championship team should be organized, how much effort it would take, and the costs and risks. I pointed out to him that he had to be prepared to do all the work and still fail—there are no guarantees. We even talked about what my role might be in such an endeavor. It was clear that our working relationship had gone well so far, and we both were interested in working together again. Unfortunately, my own plans made it difficult for us to maintain continuity over the next few years, as I will explain below.

By the time we had finished our pre-match work, we had spent a solid month together. Some of that time we spent talking—mainly about subjects other than the world championship, by the way—and some of it walking around town, or sharing a meal with Maurice and Nieves, who were graciously housing and feeding us. But most of our time we spent analyzing chess. I was deeply impressed by his chess ability, and I had no doubt he had excellent chances against Ivanchuk. The big question now was: How would he perform?

**Showtime in Linares**

The match was to be eight games played at the time control of 40 moves in two hours, followed by successive time controls of 20 moves in one hour. By now this had become the standard time control for tournaments, but candidates matches and world championship matches were still using the older time control of 40 moves in two and a half hours followed by time controls of 16 moves in one hour. When the PCA was founded the next year, it adopted the faster time control for its candidates and title matches; so these games would turn out to be even better practice for the world championship than we realized at the time.

As the first game against Ivanchuk began, I noticed something to my dismay. Anand was not moving as quickly as I remembered. In fact, during the first two hours of the game I became afraid that I had tainted his natural genius. I could imagine the reports in chess magazines around the world: "Anand works with Wolf? loses first game ever on time!" What was he doing?

What he was doing, I later realized, was playing deep and brilliant chess. The game is annotated in the previous chapter. If the reader has not yet played it over, I suggest he or she do so. Such a game is not as immediately exciting as the slashing attacks for which Kasparov is known, but is every bit as impressive. To make the kinds of difficult decisions Anand made, and to make them as accurately as he did, requires deep thought. No wonder he had to use a lot of time.

While watching this game I caught a glimmer of something I had never before guessed, something that I did not fully realize until after his
world championship match against Kasparov three years later in New York: Anand is still learning how to use his clock time properly. His amazing talent allowed him to play with unprecedented alacrity in his early career. But talent alone is never enough; to play better, he has had to use more of his time at the board. Now in 1995 his style has matured to the point where, in serious games against world-class opposition, he uses most of his clock time to play a deeper, more correct kind of chess. That means he is now encountering a problem that most of us have dealt with for years, but for him is completely new: time pressure. Most leading players learn in their early years of competition how to handle time shortage, but Anand is still grappling with this new problem. An excellent illustration of this fact is game 14 of the 1995 World Championship match.

But I digress. Returning to the first game of the Linares match, I can report that I was ecstatic when the game finished. Not only had Anand taken an early lead, and not only had he won with Black, but in addition he had played a splendid game. It was a fine way to start.

The match went well for the next several games. Anand won the second game on a blunder by Ivanchuk. He drew the third game as Black by using our opening preparation to perfection. Ivanchuk drew the fourth game, a minor setback, but who could complain? At the halfway point in an eight-game match, Anand was two points up.

The next day was a rest day, and then came the fifth game. For the first time in the match, Anand came under pressure. Ivanchuk found a powerful new idea and Anand had a tough time holding on. Yet after some good defense by Anand, Ivanchuk offered a draw which Anand accepted. After the game, Anand realized that he had actually possessed a clear advantage in the final position. The combination of being under pressure in the opening and missing an opportunity to put away the match made Anand upset. I think it made him more upset than I realized at the time.

The next game was a tense struggle. With Black, Ivanchuk gamely fought to win. With White, Anand played unsteadily. I think he had conflicting desires: on the one hand he wanted to win the game, but on the other hand he wanted to make a draw so as to finish the match as quickly as possible. Perhaps that sounds illogical—after all, a win would finish the match more quickly than a draw. However, it is typical for a chessplayer who is ahead in a match to think he should just make draws. A draw in a match is almost like the game never took place, so psychologically it feels like you are just erasing the game. When you are in the lead, it is natural to want to erase each remaining game.

However, Ivanchuk didn't want to be erased. He struggled hard and at one point in the game held the upper hand. But in the end, Anand defended well and drew.
In game 7 the axe finally fell. Ivanchuk kept up the pressure with the white pieces; although Anand should have been able to draw, he finally made a small mistake that allowed Ivanchuk to break through and win. There was a rest day before the final game, and now there was some real excitement to the match. Could Ivanchuk win the last game to tie the match, or would Anand hold him off at the finish?

In the evening after the seventh game finished, Anand and I went to one of the local bars to unwind. Over drinks—I had a beer, while the teetotaler Anand drank juice—Anand toyed with the idea of playing for a draw in the last game. After all, he had the white pieces and could probably deaden the game if he wanted to. It was an understandable thought, but I told him in no uncertain terms that I thought it would be a mistake. There was no prize for the winner of this match, so he should use this opportunity to fight and try to win the match from a position of strength. Two days later, just before we parted company before the last game, I told him, “Anand, I want you to do so much damage to this guy that they’ll have to use dental records to identify him.” He smiled, obviously amused and said, “Okay, Pat.” As he walked off, I told him, “Remember, dental records!”

To Anand’s great credit, he won that game. It was a tense game in which both players made some mistakes; but when push came to shove, Anand was the one who triumphed. I love chess, and I love beautiful, well-played games, but I think what really makes the difference between a champion and the rest of the world is not the brilliant masterpiece but scoring the tough point under pressure. Think of Kasparov’s 24th-game victory over Karpov in Seville, 1987. That was not a good game, and the fact is that Karpov played better chess in that match than Kasparov. But Kasparov showed he was truly a great champion by delivering the goods in the critical last game. Anand played better than Ivanchuk in this match, but he also showed that he had what it took to be a champion by winning that tense final game.

On the Road to Kasparov
Anand and I worked together several times after that match. In May 1993 we prepared for the FIDE Interzonal in Biel, Switzerland. In October 1993 we prepared for the PCA candidates tournament in Groningen, The Netherlands. I was Anand’s second for his FIDE candidates match against Yusupov and for his PCA candidates match against Romanishin.

Even though our work went well and we enjoyed each other’s company, we both knew that our partnership would soon end. I had decided to return to college to finish my undergraduate education. I was set to matriculate in September 1994, so Anand and I decided that the match against Romanishin would be our last time working together.
Everything had gone well for our partnership until that point, as Anand had easily won every match he had played and had breezed through each of the qualifying tournaments for which we had prepared together. I had no doubt he would continue his winning ways after we parted company.

Unfortunately, after Anand began work with a new second, his very first match ended in defeat.

Anand had struck up a friendship with Elizbar Ubilava, who lived in the same small town in Spain as Maurice and Nieves Perea. Anand chose him as a second for his FIDE candidates match in August 1994 against Gata Kamsky, held in Sanghi Nagar, India. After jumping to an early lead, Anand lost two games in a row toward the end and then succumbed in the tie-breaker. What could explain this loss?

It would be easy to claim that the end of our partnership had some role in this disaster, but that would be an absurd exercise of vanity on my part. Ubilava is a very skilled chessplayer, an excellent second, and someone with whom Anand had developed a good friendship over the preceding months. I think Anand's setback had many causes. He played this match in his home country and must have felt great pressure to win. He made no excuses, but probably it was difficult for him to get the privacy and quiet he needed while Indian journalists were constantly hounding him. Blessed with a normal ego, Anand does not relish the spotlight. Credit is also due to his opponent, Gata Kamsky, a great fighter who never gives up. Many players might crack on finding themselves two points down with three games left to play, but Kamsky fought on with his usual determination.

But perhaps the most important cause of his defeat was within Anand himself. I will not speculate too much on the psychological factors. Many people have suggested that what happened to Anand in New York against Kasparov looks very similar to what happened to him in Sanghi Nagar against Kamsky: a sudden collapse after an excellent start, in the face of stiff resistance from the opponent. Each and every chessplayer has to face his own psychological weaknesses on the way to defeating his opposition. The two matches may form some kind of pattern, but the true meaning of that pattern is for Anand to resolve. He has already shown the strength of character needed to learn from a defeat and come back stronger. As I will relate below, Anand managed to do just that against Kamsky. I think he can do the same thing against Kasparov in the future.

Whatever the ultimate reasons, Anand lost his 1994 FIDE candidates match against Kamsky. He consoled himself with the knowledge that he could still reach a match against the true world champion, Kasparov, by winning the PCA candidates matches. Indeed, there was some reason to think that the FIDE matches were far less important.
Nevertheless, he had lost a tough match in disheartening fashion. Now he had to pick up the pieces and prepare himself to play another strong opponent, Michael Adams of England, in little over one month.

Anand passed this difficult test with flying colors. With Ubilava's help he crushed Adams in seven games, +4=3. I spoke to Anand on the phone several times during this match to offer whatever meager assistance I could, but there was no need for me to do anything: Anand played superbly.

At the same time that Anand was demolishing his opponent, Kamsky was crushing no less a player than Nigel Short, the man who had challenged Kasparov for the world championship the year before. Kamsky won his match by the same four-point margin as Anand, +5–1=1. Thus Anand and Kamsky were slated to play each other again in March 1995, this time in the PCA candidates final, to decide who would challenge Kasparov for the world championship.

Anand and I discussed the possibility of working together for the new match against Kamsky. It would be difficult for me because of my studies at school, but I wanted to do it to help Anand. After mulling it over for some time, Anand decided to decline my offer. I was disappointed, but he probably made the right decision. Our work together had been excellent before, but the situation was different now that I was at school. Not only was Anand now working very well with Ubilava, he had also signed up Artur Yusupov—one of the strongest, most capable, and most conscientious players in the world—as another member of his team.

Yusupov's close and friendly collaboration with Anand, after Anand had defeated him the year before in their FIDE candidates match, speaks volumes about the characters of the two men. Both are nice, thoughtful people who do not have any need to dominate others or to prove their superiority. Although on other occasions they are professional rivals, and even though one of them had recently inflicted a painful loss upon the other in an important match, they could still work together. Anand had no need to remind Yusupov of their match result, and Yusupov could put aside his earlier defeat to offer Anand genuine support. Jumping ahead a bit, during all the time I worked with them before and during the world championship match I never detected the slightest trace of bitterness or animosity.

With two such helpers, Anand vanquished Kamsky in superb fashion. Not that there wasn't drama and difficulty along the way. In the first game of the match, in a winning position, Anand time-forfeited for the first time in his career!

What made the incident even more amazing was that Anand had not reacted to the fact of his time pressure. He did not speed up his moves, and to the bitter end was still neatly recording the moves and the
times on the clock. Poor Anand was as much confused by the loss as he was upset. “You’ve got to put it behind you and focus on playing your best game,” I told him on the phone that night.

“Yeah, I guess,” he said, his voice quiet, “but to lose like this…”

“Listen, Vishy, you can beat this guy. He’s good, but you’re better. You have an excellent chance to win the match if you keep playing your best game. It’s only natural to encounter a setback at some point, and you can take a lot of confidence from the fact that you clearly outplayed him. All you can do is play your best game and keep plugging away.”

I followed every game as it was played. I even planned to fly to Spain and surprise him if I thought he needed a boost for the last game or two. But after getting over his first-game jitters, Anand was completely in control. In the remaining 10 games he won three and drew the other seven, without ever being in serious danger of losing a game. Two days after the match he called me, still excited from his victory.

“Anand,” I cried, “you played brilliantly! I can’t believe you’re really going to play for the goddamned world championship!”

“Neither can I, Pat! So tell me, do you want to help me prepare?”

How could I say no? I wanted him to win almost as much as he wanted it himself. School could wait one more semester. So that is how I found myself flying to Spain, where Anand now lived, just two weeks after my final exams, to help him prepare for his greatest challenge yet.

**Training in Spain**

In early June 1995 I arrived at the same airport as three years earlier when I had first worked with Anand. I was picked up and driven to the same town as before. This time, rather than staying at the home of Maurice and Nieves Perea, I stayed at the home that Anand had recently bought. Times have been good for Anand during the last few years; he bought his house outright with cash. “How did you pay for it?” I asked one day.

“Well, I took some money out of my German bank account, my French bank account, my Spanish bank account…”

I was amused to see that his house was decorated in both Spanish
and Indian style. He had bought the house from a Spanish couple who already had another home in Madrid, so they sold it furnished. But Anand also brought a few bibelots from India to remind him of his native land. Every morning I would descend to the living room to see Vishnu perched atop a Spanish mantle, beckoning me to enter with her many hands. I was the first of Anand's seconds to arrive from outside the country. Of course Ubilava, who lived in the same town, was already working with Anand. We all knew there was no time to waste. Kasparov had spent more than 10 years preparing for world championship matches, and we only had two and a half months. The day after I arrived I joined Anand and Ubilava in their work.

I had never met Ubilava and did not know what to expect. Ubilava is from Georgia in the former Soviet Union but had emigrated to Spain with his wife, daughter, and son. Times are hard in Georgia; chessplayers are lucky in that they can ply their trade in many countries. Even so, moving is not easy. One must learn a new language and become comfortable with a new culture. There are thousands of small details one must take care of, as well as legal hoops to jump through. Yet Ubilava and his family were willing to endure the necessary difficulties so that they could live in Spain. It seemed to me that they had approached the task with extraordinary energy. Ubilava had studied Spanish for only three months in Georgia before coming to Spain, yet as far as I could tell he now spoke Spanish fluently. The family had a nice little apartment in town, the children were in school, and all in all the family seemed to have adjusted very well to their new environment.

Unfortunately for me, Ubilava's English was rudimentary and my Spanish, Russian, and Georgian were much worse! It was hard for us to communicate, so Anand tended to work with Ubilava for the first few weeks before the other seconds arrived, and I worked alone. Anand speaks good conversational Spanish. Later when all of the seconds were together, it would sometimes strike me how funny it was that the same message sometimes had to be translated from Russian to English to Spanish!

Anand had another good reason to put me to work alone. There was much preliminary spade work to be done before we could conduct deep analysis. While Anand and Ubilava did analysis for the black pieces, I began organizing our work with White. For example, we decided that Anand would play the Classical Scheveningen against Kasparov's Najdorf Sicilian. We felt that this system suited him stylistically, as well as offering good chances for advantage. But before we could analyze the finer points, we had to organize all the existing theory into a form we could use. For two weeks, that job was one of my primary responsibilities.

Ubilava, quite naturally, wanted to spend his free time with his family; that gave Anand and me time to chat about various things. One
topic that kept coming up was the PCA’s organization of the world championship. To put it bluntly, we had no clue what was going on.

Imagine you are going to play a match for the world championship. You have a great deal of chess work to do. You do not want to worry about organizational details. You want to be told what the accommodations and travel arrangements will be. You want to know what the rules will be, including the time control and the arrangements in event of a tie. (Of course it is traditional for the champion to keep his title in such cases, but the PCA had been floating the idea of a tiebreak match of quick chess.) You want to see a contract. None of these things was forthcoming from the PCA. At the end of June, Anand sent a fax to Bob Rice, the commissioner of the PCA, to request some answers. There was no reply. However, a surprising answer to at least one of these questions would arrive with Artur Yusupov.

Yusupov arrived in Spain at the beginning of July, several days after the fax was sent. Yusupov had just finished competing in the New York leg of the PCA’s Intel Grand Prix. On the last day of the event there was a closing party at which he had spoken with Kasparov. Kasparov told him that the world championship match, which was supposed to be held in Cologne, Germany, would probably be moved to New York City.

We were shocked to hear this news. There had been rumors that the sponsorship in Germany was in some kind of trouble, but the PCA had not told Anand anything about it. Indeed, we had heard the rumors not from the PCA but from other people. Now the match was being moved and nobody had so much as asked Anand what he thought.

I still do not have reliable information about what caused the German sponsorship to dry up. Kasparov of course was intimately involved in these matters, because the PCA was his baby: he held the most power in the organization, and he with Bob Rice and perhaps two or three other people made the decisions. Apparently nobody felt a responsibility to tell Anand what was happening with the forthcoming world championship match, although he was one of the two players.

One problem is that the PCA is still just a part-time organization. Bob Rice, who is the commissioner and responsible for the PCA’s day-to-day operations, works full-time as a lawyer in the New York firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. Probably he was so busy with his two jobs that he had no time to respond to Anand’s faxes. Until August 6, we received few details. The feeling of being kept in the dark, that anything could change about the match at any time without our knowing what or why, added more pressure to what was already a tense endeavor.

It must be said that Anand did manage to speak with Rice by telephone several times during the months of July and August, and in
the end most details were worked out. Anand did sign a contract, although not until just before the match. And the accommodations turned out to be good. However, Anand never had the feeling of being involved in the decisions.

Adding injury to insult, the PCA notified Anand privately that 10% of the prize money would be taken to pay organizing costs. This was an expensive and upsetting development for Anand, who already saw himself paying more for taxes and other expenses than he had anticipated due to the change in venue from Cologne to New York. The original prize fund of $1.5 million, with $1 million going to the winner and $500,000 to the loser, was reduced to $900,000 for the winner and $450,000 for the loser. In public, the PCA maintained the farcical pose that the purse was still $1.5 million with $1 million to the winner. At the closing ceremony Kasparov received a giant facsimile of a $1 million check. But now I am leaping ahead of my story.

We could not let organizational details distract us from our main job; we had more than enough chess work to keep us busy. With Yusupov on board we had considerably more brainpower to devote to our analysis. It was also nice that I had finished the task of collecting and organizing the data we needed, so we could get down to the far more interesting task of analyzing it.

Artur Yusupov was a great boon to the team. He is a very strong player who has been a candidate for the world championship several times. I was impressed not only by his ability but also his intellectual flexibility. Yusupov has very little experience with the Sicilian Defense, whereas I have quite a lot. At first his lack of experience was apparent, but after only a few days he quickly caught onto all the important themes and ideas. I had the impression that Yusupov could train himself to analyze almost any kind of chess position just as well as someone who had spent many years playing that kind of position. It was very valuable for us all, and a great honor for me, to work with a player of his level.

Artur taught me something else as well: how to appreciate art. I must shamefacedly admit that I was ignorant that Madrid has some of the world’s great art museums. We took two trips into Madrid together, one to the Prado and one to the museum of modern art. In particular, Picasso’s Guernica made a powerful impression on me. There was not much time to spare, but I was glad that we had enough free time to share that experience.

Yusupov gave me the impression of being calm, at peace with himself. What a contrast to the fourth second, Jon Speelman of England.
While Artur is a rock, Jon is a tempest. Jon has an enormous amount of energy and a brilliant talent for chess. Whereas Artur will patiently probe all the aspects of a position to form a complete conception of it, Jon will shoot off dozens of sparks simultaneously, hoping one of them will light a fire on the chessboard that only he can control. Many times he succeeds. It was fascinating for me to observe how differently my colleagues would analyze the same position.

For example, suppose that Artur and I were probing a position together as we would often do. Artur and I both like to organize our thoughts carefully. We want to consider all aspects of a position, to arrive at the truth as accurately as we can.

Now suppose that Speelman and Ubilava have entered the room and become interested in the same position we have been analyzing. Ubilava would set up the position on his small board and sit off to the side. He is now thinking about the position by himself. Jon, meanwhile, would walk up to our board, lean over somebody's shoulder, and plop his hands down just on the edge of the board. Usually this meant that one of us would have to lean away to make room for his enormously long arms and large head. "Hullo, boys. What do we have here?" he would ask.

There was no use answering, because he would quickly suggest an outrageous move. But the move would never be silly and would often be brilliant. Quickly one side or the other would have sacrificed material in return for fascinating play. I don't think Jon consciously chose this way to analyze; he just has so much energy that he has to express it. And often his ideas would help us reach a higher level of understanding.

Meanwhile, let's not forget Ubilava off to one side. He has been patiently analyzing the position on his own, and now has a move to suggest. If you thought that Jon's suggestion was difficult to find, wait until you see Ubilava's idea. He has probably suggested a move that looks absolutely ridiculous; and yet, and yet ... The more you look, the more you realize that he really has something there. His idea looks radically different than anybody else's, but may have fantastic potential. I will give one example of Ubilava's ideas. Look at the line Anand played in game 8 against Kasparov, starting with the amazing move 9 ... g5?!. Many people thought that Speelman suggested this move, but they did not know Ubilava well enough to understand that this is just the kind of thing he would think of. This was only one of many excellent ideas he found and you can see how effective it was.

We were an excellent team, I think: a good mix of the rational and the creative. All of us worked very
hard at Anand’s house because we all really wanted him to win. The eight weeks I spent there flew by. Although I dearly missed my home and my friends, I wished I could spend even more time helping Anand prepare for Kasparov. I remember telling Yusupov, “I think we’ve done a lot of good work, Artur, but I wish we had another month to prepare.”

“A month?” he replied. “I wish we had a year.”

But we didn’t, and that was that. I left on 6 August. Speelman had already left and Ubilava was taking time off to be with his family since he would not be able to see them during the match. Yusupov stayed until the middle of August to help Anand tie up some loose ends. Then the training camp had completely disbanded, and we would not meet again until a few days before the match in New York.
Monday, 11 September 1995

The night before the first game an opening ceremony was held at the top of the World Trade Center, where the match would be played. The players were introduced to the invited guests. All the people involved in organizing the event got a chance to thank each other and say how happy they were to be involved.

I am very happy that the PCA is succeeding in organizing and promoting its events. I believe that the future of chess lies in building relationships with corporate sponsors who derive commercial benefit
from promoting chess events. The PCA must be praised for its successful partnership with Intel Corporation, the main sponsor of this world championship match and other PCA chess tournaments over the last two years.

Still, one thing rankled me every time I heard it: the $1.5 million prize fund. Everyone was constantly harping on this point. Yet it was untrue, and at least some of the people saying it were lying. I knew, from talking with Anand and from talking with Bob Rice, that 10% was being taken off the top of this so-called prize fund before the players saw it. It was true that Intel was putting in $1.5 million, but the PCA was deducting $150,000 to pay for organizational costs, in particular the cost of making some television shows about the match for British TV.

Kasparov, of course, didn't want to say anything to jeopardize the PCA because it was his organization. Anand didn't want to make waves during the match so he didn't say anything, either. But just in case, the PCA had made up some media notes for the players (i.e., Anand) which gave suggested answers to embarrassing questions. If a journalist should happen to ask about the reduction of prize money, Anand was to say that he was happy to contribute the money for the success of the sport, because he realized how difficult it is to promote such a slow game as chess as opposed to basketball or tennis. Of course this was nonsense. Anand was very unhappy that the money was being taken from him and he had no choice in the matter.

So a big lie was being spread about the prize money. The PCA wanted to have its cake and eat it, too: Intel got full publicity value from its investment of $1.5 million dollars, while the PCA was able to spend part of the players' prize money to cover organizing costs. I was outraged over how Anand was being treated and unwilling to participate in this lie, but on the other hand I wanted the sponsor to be happy. However, there was no real question whether I could say anything. Anand had decided that he wasn't going to speak to the media about it. While I was on the team and in his employ, that was that.

Anand won the toss at the opening ceremony and chose White in the first game.

**ANAND–KASPAROV, NEW YORK (m/1) 1995**

**SICILIAN DEFENSE B85**

1 e4 c5 2 â3 d6 3 d4 c×d4 4 â×d4 âf6 5 âc3 a6 6 âe2

The same opening that Karpov played against Kasparov 10 years ago is once again played in a world championship match.

6 ... e6

Black can play a pure Najdorf with 6 ... e5, and we were also prepared for that idea. But with Kasparov, one has to expect the Scheveningen first. It has been his choice at every opportunity in serious
tournament games over the last ten years.

7 a4 Qc6 8 0-0 Le7 9 Le3 0-0 10 f4 Qc7 11
Qh1 Be8 12 Qd2?! [1]  

What goes into the choice of an opening move? It cannot be merely an estimation of what is “objectively best,” because if chess is played well then all moves “objectively” lead to a draw. In the early opening, it is possible to have such a deep knowledge of what positions will arise from certain moves that one has to also take into account the character of the game that will result. In the first game of the world championship, especially if one has never played in a world championship match before, it makes good sense to begin quietly, to try to pose some problems while also playing oneself into the match. That was the motivation for this move—which is quite tricky, but should not give White any advantage if Black plays well.

12 ... Qd7 13 Qad1 Qad8!  
Kasparov thought for half an hour on this move, correctly sensing that this was a critical moment. He comes up with an excellent plan that should equalize the game.

14 Qb3  
The other logical move is 14 Af3. I myself once played this as White. That game continued 14 ... Da5 15 Qc1 Qc4 16 Ac1 e5 17 De2 b5 18 b3 Ab6 19 axb5 axb5 20 Le3, Wolff-DeBoer, Wijk aan Zee 1993, and White was slightly better. But a better way for Black to play is the fairly obvious 14 ... Qxd4 15 Qxd4 e5 16 Qd2 (16 Qd3 Le6! 17 Qd5 Qxd5 18 exd5 e4! 19 Qxe4 Qxe4 20 Qxe4 Af6) 16 ... b5! and Black has good counterplay.

14 ... Qc8!  
14 ... d5 15 e5 Qe4 16 Qxe4 dxe4 17 a5! (17 Qc3 Ac8 18 Qc4 Qb4! [18 ... Qed8 19 a5! Qb8 20 Qxe4 Ac6 21 Qxd8+ leaves White up a clear pawn] 19 Qxc7 Qxc7 20 Ab6 Qxc2 hits the bishop on e2 and gives Black the advantage) and now Black must stop White from playing Ab6 unimpeded. After 17 ... Qb4 there are two moves:

a) 18 Ab6 Qxb6 19 axb6 Qxd2 20 Qxd2 (20 Qxd2 Qd4) and Black can choose between 20 ... Qb4 and 20 ... Qc8. The position is not clear, but I think Black should be happier than White.

b) 18 c3! Qxa5 (18 ... Qxa5 19 Qc5 Ac8 20 Qc2 [20 Qc1?!] is very good for White; Black has no compensation for his passive position) 19 Qxb4 Qxb3 20 Qc3 Qxc3 21 bxc3 leads to an interesting position. Black has a solid extra pawn, but his knight is trapped. The knight probably cannot be won immediately, but neither can it easily escape. My hunch is that White is better, perhaps much better, after
playing  \( \mathfrak{b}b6 \) quickly to ensure control of the d-file. Probably the correct assessment of this position determines whether 14 ... d5 is good or bad; it is understandable that Kasparov did not want to play the move.

15  \( \mathfrak{b}b3 \) b6

Once again 15 ... d5 is critical, but here it fails for different reasons: 16  \( \mathfrak{f}f2! \) (16  \( \mathfrak{e}e4 \) 17  \( \mathfrak{x}xe4 \)  \( \mathfrak{d}xe4 \) 18  \( \mathfrak{f}f2 \)  \( \mathfrak{d}xe1 \) 19  \( \mathfrak{d}xe1 \)  \( \mathfrak{b}b4 \) is unclear; the e-pawn is weak, but Black has counterplay against White's queenside) 16 ...  \( \mathfrak{d}xe4 \) 17  \( \mathfrak{b}b6 \) (17  \( \mathfrak{d}xe4 \)  \( \mathfrak{x}d5 \)) 17 ...  \( \mathfrak{w}xf4 \) (17 ...  \( \mathfrak{x}xd1 \) 18  \( \mathfrak{d}xc7 \)  \( \mathfrak{c}xf1+ \) 19  \( \mathfrak{x}xf1 \)  \( \mathfrak{b}x\mathfrak{b}3 \) 20  \( \mathfrak{w}xb3 \) is much better for White) 18  \( \mathfrak{a}xd8 \) [2] and now:

a) 18 ...  \( \mathfrak{e}xf3 \) 19  \( \mathfrak{x}xe7 \)  \( \mathfrak{e}xe7 \) (19 ...  \( \mathfrak{fxg}2+?? \) 20  \( \mathfrak{x}xg2 \) \(+\)) 20  \( \mathfrak{w}xb3 \) \( \pm \).

b) 18 ...  \( \mathfrak{a}xd8 \) 19  \( \mathfrak{x}xe4! \)  \( \mathfrak{x}xe4 \) 20  \( \mathfrak{d}xe4 \)  \( \mathfrak{w}xf2 \) (20 ...  \( \mathfrak{w}xe4 \) 21  \( \mathfrak{w}xf7? \) +) 21  \( \mathfrak{gxf2} \) \( \pm \).

c) 18 ...  \( \mathfrak{a}xd8 \) 19  \( \mathfrak{e}xd8+ \)  \( \mathfrak{e}xd8 \) 20  \( \mathfrak{d}xe4 \)  \( \mathfrak{w}xf2 \) 21  \( \mathfrak{gxf2} \)  \( \mathfrak{d}xe4 \) 22  \( \mathfrak{d}xe4 \) \( \pm \).

d) 18 ...  \( \mathfrak{a}xd8 \) 19  \( \mathfrak{d}xe4 \) (19  \( \mathfrak{d}xe4 \)  \( \mathfrak{x}xe4 \) 20  \( \mathfrak{d}xe4 \)  \( \mathfrak{x}xe4 \) 21  \( \mathfrak{a}xd8 \)  \( \mathfrak{e}xd8 \) 22  \( \mathfrak{x}xf7+ \)  \( \mathfrak{g}h8 \) 23  \( \mathfrak{x}xe7 \)  \( \mathfrak{g}g8 \) is unclear; Black's rook and bishop are passive, but his queen is very active) and White has the advantage. Black has some compensation for the exchange in his compact kingside pawns and his dark-squared bishop, but White stands actively and so has good chances to exploit Black's weakened queenside.

16  \( \mathfrak{f}f2 \)  \( \mathfrak{d}d7 \) [3]

This is a critical position. Black has been driven back, but his position is very solid, and it is easy to see how Black can make good moves to improve his position. White must find a good plan, or he may slip backwards.

17  \( \mathfrak{d}d4 \)

Probably best; White may try 17  \( \mathfrak{c}c5 \), but Black holds his own after 17 ...  \( \mathfrak{d}xe5 \) (17 ... d5 18  \( \mathfrak{d}e2 \) \( \pm \)) and now:

a) 18  \( \mathfrak{f}f5? \)  \( \mathfrak{e}xf5 \) 19  \( \mathfrak{d}d5 \)  \( \mathfrak{b}b8 \) and Black will quickly play ...  \( \mathfrak{e}4 \).

b) 18  \( \mathfrak{a}xc6 \)  \( \mathfrak{bxc6} \) 19  \( \mathfrak{fxe5} \)  \( \mathfrak{f}f8 \)! (19 ... \( \mathfrak{d}xe5 \) 20  \( \mathfrak{a}d4 \)  \( \mathfrak{a}xd4 \) [20 ...  \( \mathfrak{f}f6 \) 21  \( \mathfrak{a}xe5 \)  \( \mathfrak{e}xd1 \) 22  \( \mathfrak{d}xd1 \)  \( \mathfrak{f}xe5 \) 23  \( \mathfrak{x}xf7+ \)  \( \mathfrak{h}h8 \) 24  \( \mathfrak{x}xe7! \) 21  \( \mathfrak{a}xd4 \) [21  \( \mathfrak{a}xd4 \)  \( \mathfrak{f}5 \)] 21 ...  \( \mathfrak{c}c7 \) 22  \( \mathfrak{g}g3 \) and Black does not have enough compensation for the exchange) 20  \( \mathfrak{g}g3 \)  \( \mathfrak{b}b7 \) 21  \( \mathfrak{d}d4 \) (21  \( \mathfrak{h}h6 \)  \( \mathfrak{g}g2+! \) 21 ...  \( \mathfrak{c}c7 \) 22  \( \mathfrak{f}f4 \)  \( \mathfrak{h}h8 \) and Black stands well. White is not in place to begin an attack on Black's king, and is tied down to the defense of the e-pawn. Notice that Black already threatens to
play 23 ... g5!

c) 18 \(\text{fxd7?!} \) may be White's best, although Black can force White to make a draw:

\[
\text{c1) 18 ... } \text{fxd7? 19 } \text{a6 e5} + 20 \text{b1 b7 21 } \text{xb7 d1 + (21 ... } \text{xa5 22 xeb7 23 xd8 \text{+}) 22 xeb1 xa5 23 xeb7 xeb7 24 xeb4 ++.}
\]

\[
\text{c2) 18 ... xeb7 19 xeb6 b6 20 ac5 (20 b1 d1 d4!! 20 c5 d4 21 xeb7 22 xeb4 [22 xe5 xeb6 23 xeb6 xeb6 24 xeb7+ xeb8 25 xeb7 e8] 22 ... exd4 23 d1 [23 d4 xeb4 24 xeb4 ac6! 25 xeb4 c7] 20 ... xeb4 21 ab6 xd6 22 ac5 =.}
\]

\[
\text{c3) 18 ... xeb7?! 19 xeb6 b8 20 xeb6 c6 21 xeb8 d8 22 xe5 xeb8 was suggested by Anand as giving Black good compensation.}
\]

17 ... ab7 (?!)

During the game, Ferdinand Hellers suggested to me that Black could equalize with 17 ... axd4 18 acxd4 a6. I think this is correct, but Black must still face 19 e5? dxe5 20 xe5 xeb5 21 a5:

\[
\text{a) 21 ... a6? 22 d4 e5 23 dxe6+ xeb6 (23 ... axd6 24 axb6) 24 a3 is terrible for Black.}
\]

b) But 21 ... xeb8 is fine for Black. After 22 xeb7+ xeb8 23 xeb4 (23 w2 acxd4 24 xeb4 ab6 25 xeb8 xeb8 26 xeb6 [26 ac5 xeb5 ++) 26 ... xeb8 27 b1 ab7! [27 ... ac7 28 xeb4] and the pin on the e-file is too strong) 23 ... xeb6 24 xeb5 (24 xeb6?? xeb4 25 xeb4 xeb6 ++) 24 ... xeb1 25 xeb1 xeb5 26 ac6 ab7 27 ab1 is unclear, but Black should not be worse.

Kasparov's move is more ambitious, trying to keep as much tension as possible; but he probably did not notice White's next move.

18 ah5! [4] xeb8

After another long think, Kasparov finds this move which stops any quick tactics. The point of 18 ah5, of course, was to put pressure on f7, thereby making f4-f5 a strong threat. Other possible replies allows White to strike in one way or another:

\[
\text{a) 18 ... g6? 19 f5! crashes through:}
\]

\[
\text{a1) 19 ... gxf5 20 xeb6 xeb6 21 xeb7+ xeb8 22 xeb6 ++, as pointed out by Yasser Seirawan.}
\]

\[
\text{a2) 19 ... exf5 20 d5 xeb8 21 xeb5?! (there may be other ways as well) 21 ... gxf5 22 xeb7+ xeb7 (this is practically forced mate, so 22 ... xeb8 is better, but of course it is wretched for Black) 23 xeb5+ xeb8 (23 ... xeb6 24 xeb7+ xeb6 25 xeb4 xeb4 26 xeb7 xeb7 27 xeb4+ xeb8 28 xeb6+ xeb8 29 xeb6 mates) 24 xeb4+ xeb8 25 xeb7 xeb8 (25 ... xeb8 26 xeb7+ xeb7 27 xeb5+ xeb5 28 xeb6+ and 29 xeb8 mate) 29 xeb5 xeb7 (26 ... xeb6 27 xeb6 27 xeb7 28 xeb7! xeb7 28 xeb6+}
\]
\( \text{h8} 29 \text{gf7} \text{g8} 30 \text{fd6} \text{and mates.} \)

b) 18 ... \( \text{dx} \text{d4} \) 19 \( \text{Lxd4 Lfd6} \) 20 e5! \( \text{Lxe7} \) (20 ... \( \text{dxe5} 21 \text{fxe5} \text{Lxe5} \) 22 \( \text{Lxb6} \) 21 f5! is very strong, but not 21 \( \text{exd6 Lxd6} \) 22 \( \text{Lxg7? Lxg7} \) 23 \( \text{Ld4+ Lf6} \).

c) 18 ... \( \text{Lf6} \) 19 \( \text{Lxc6} \) (19 \( \text{Lxc6} \)? \( \text{fxe6} 20 \text{Lxb6 Lwb8} \) 21 \( \text{Lxc8} \) \( \text{Lce2} \) is promising for White, but messy) 19 ... \( \text{Lxc6} \) (19 ... \( \text{Lxc6} \) 20 \( \text{Lxb6 Lwb7} \) 21 \( \text{Lxd8 Lxd8} \) 22 \( \text{Lxf3 Lxb2} \) 23 \( \text{Lxe3} \) \( \pm \) 20 \( \text{Lxf3} \) \( \text{Ld7} \) 21 f5! (John Fedorowicz suggests that 21 e5!? d5 22 \( \text{Ld4} \) is good for White, with the idea of playing a quick f4-f5) 21 ... \( \text{Lc7} \) (21 ... \( \text{Lxf8} \) 22 f6! \( \text{gx} \text{f6} \) 23 \( \text{Lh6} \) \( \pm \); perhaps 21 ... \( \text{Lc5} \) is objectively best, although of course after 22 \( \text{Lxb6} \), Black is a clear pawn down) 22 \( \text{fxe6 Lxe6} \) 23 \( \text{Lh5 Lf8} \) (23 ... \( \text{g6} \) 24 \( \text{Lxg6 h} \text{hxg6} \) 25 \( \text{Lxf7+ Lh8} \) 26 \( \text{Lxf3} \) \( += \)) 24 \( \text{Lxf7+ Lh8} \) 25 \( \text{Lg} \text{g3} \) \( \pm \).

d) 18 ... \( \text{Lf6} \)? (Notice that all Black’s options a through d block the bishop or the rook from f7; White has different tactics to exploit each move. In variation b, White played e4-e5; here does not work as Black has better control of that square, but now White can try to exploit the d-pawn.) 19 \( \text{Ld5?! a} \text{xb5} \) 20 \( \text{Lxb5 Lwb8} \) 21 \( \text{Lxd6 Lf8} \) (forced). Now:

d1) 22 \( \text{Lc4?! Lxe5} \).

d2) 22 e5 \( \text{Lxe5} \) 23 \( \text{Lxb6 Lxb6} \) 24 \( \text{Lxb6 Lxd6} \) (24 ... \( \text{La8} \) 25 \( \text{Lxb8 Lxb8} \) 26 \( \text{Ld5} \) is unclear) 25 \( \text{exd6 Lxa8} \) 26 \( \text{Lxb8 Lxb8} \) 26 b3 \( \text{Ld4} \) 27 c4 unclear.

d3) 22 \( \text{Lxb6 Lxb6} \) (22 ... \( \text{La6} \) 23 \( \text{Lxd8 Lxf1} \) 24 \( \text{Lxf6 Lxf6} \) 25 \( \text{Lxf1} \) \( \text{Lh5} \) 26 \( \text{Lxb5} \) \( \text{Lxb5} \) 27 \( \text{axb5} \) \( \pm \) as White is very well placed to push his queenside pawns) 23 \( \text{Lxb6 Lxb6} \) (23 ... \( \text{La8} \) 24 \( \text{Lxb8 Lxb8} \) 25 e5 [25 b3 e5! is good for Black; it is desirable to fix the e-pawn as a weakness] 25 ... \( \text{Lxe7} \) 26 \( \text{Lb5} \) unclear) 24 \( \text{Lxd6 Lxd6} \) 25 \( \text{Lxb7} \) (25 ... \( \text{Lxe5} \) 26 \( \text{fxe5 Lb4} \) 27 \( \text{Lc7} \) g6) and once again I am unwilling to venture a more courageous assessment than “unclear”; perhaps Black should play 25 ... e5! here.

Given the difficulties Black could have had in the game, 18 ... \( \text{Lf6} \)? might have been the best move.

19 \( \text{Lg3} \)

Now 19 f5? just gives Black the advantage after 19 ... \( \text{Lxd4} \) 20 \( \text{Lxd4 Lf6} \), since Black has the vital e5 square. Notice that White cannot play 21 \( \text{Lxf7+ Lxf7} \) 22 \( \text{Lxe6+ Lxe6} \) 23 \( \text{Lxf5+ Lxe7} \) (23 ... \( \text{Lxf7} \) 24 \( \text{Lxh7} \) is unclear), as neither 24 \( \text{Lxh7 Lxd4} \), nor 24 \( \text{Ld5+ Lxd5} \) 25 \( \text{exd5 Lde8} \)! gives White any play.

19 ... \( \text{Lxd4} \) 20 \( \text{Lxd4 Lf6} \)

20 ... \( \text{e5} \) 21 \( \text{fxe5 dxe5} \) (21 ... \( \text{Lxe5} \)? 22 \( \text{Lxe5} \) wins either the b-pawn or the f-pawn) 22 \( \text{Lg4} \) is \( \pm \).

21 \( \text{Le2} \) \( \text{e5} \) 22 \( \text{fxe5 Lxe5} \)

This is one of those cases in the Sicilian when Black should recap-
nature on e5 with a piece and not a pawn, because active play for his pieces is more important than pawn structure. After 22 ... dxe5? 23 \texttt{A}e3, White has a clear advantage because of his pressure against the kingside, and also the prospect of an advantageous \texttt{D}d5.

23 \texttt{W}f2?

Seirawan in \textit{Inside Chess} pointed out quite correctly that White should play 23 \texttt{A}xe5! dxe5 (23 ... \texttt{D}xe5 24 \texttt{D}d4! and 25 \texttt{F}d1 is quite pleasant for White; see the next note for an analogous position) 24 b3! and then put the bishop on c4. This gives White a solid edge after 24 ... \texttt{C}c5 (It's hard to see a better move, since 24 ... \texttt{F}f6?? loses a piece.) 25 \texttt{F}xd8 \texttt{F}xd8 26 \texttt{F}xe5 \texttt{D}d2 [26 ... \texttt{F}e8 27 \texttt{F}f4] 27 \texttt{C}c4) 26 \texttt{C}c4. Compare this position to the similar one arising from the note to 24 \texttt{A}B, and it is clear that b2-b3 is much more useful than \texttt{g}3-f2. It was this single conceptual error, that Anand didn't realize he should aim for the best possible version of this position, that caused him to let his edge slip.

23 ... \texttt{C}c5 [5]

23 ... \texttt{A}xd4? 24 \texttt{D}xd4 (also 24 \texttt{F}xd4! \texttt{C}e5 25 \texttt{D}d2! with the idea of \texttt{F}d1 and \texttt{b}4 is interesting) 24 ... \texttt{C}e5 25 \texttt{F}d1 leaves White comfortably better, as Black has no active prospects.

24 \texttt{A}f3?

Kasparov rightly criticized this move in the press conference after the game. (After each game, the winner answered questions from reporters and the audience for about 30 minutes. If the game was a draw, the player of the black pieces assumed that duty.) Kasparov pointed out that the critical move was 24 \texttt{A}xe5 dxe5 25 \texttt{F}xd8 (same idea as 23 \texttt{A}xe5) and now:

a) 25 ... \texttt{F}xd8 26 a5! What follows now is my own analysis. 26 ... \texttt{A}xe4 (26 ... \texttt{A}xe4? 27 axb6 \pm; 26 ... \texttt{F}c7 27 axb6 \texttt{F}xb6 28 \texttt{C}c4! \pm) 27 \texttt{A}xe4 \texttt{A}xe4 [6]. At this point, I beg your indulgence. To finish this variation, it is enough to note that 28 axb6 \texttt{C}xc2 29 \texttt{A}xa6 gives White the better position because of his strong b-pawn, and therefore White keeps an edge after 25 ... \texttt{F}xd8. (Black can't force a draw by 29 ... \texttt{A}d3 30 \texttt{D}d1 e4 [30 ... \texttt{A}xa6 31 \texttt{F}xd8 \texttt{A}xd8 32 h3 is unclear, but certainly can only be better for White] 31 \texttt{A}xd3 \texttt{e}x\texttt{d}3 32 \texttt{F}e3, as White collects the d-pawn and keeps the b6 pawn. Note also that 29 ... \texttt{A}a8?? is a blunder because of 30 b7! \texttt{A}xa6 31 \texttt{F}xf7+.) But while this is all that is needed to pursue the truth of the position, I became fascinated by the endgame that arises.
after 28 $\text{h}x\text{b}6$, instead of 28 $\text{a}x\text{b}6$. Certainly this is also a logical move, and is forcing, so it is relevant. If you too are interested, explore with me the position after 28 $\text{h}x\text{b}6$:

a1) 28 ... $\text{A}x\text{c}2$ and now:

a11) 29 $\text{Exf}7$? only draws after 29 ... $\text{Exf}7$! 30 $\text{A}c4+$ $\text{g}e8$ (30 ... $\text{g}e7$? 31 $\text{g}e6$ mate) 31 $\text{g}e6+$ $\text{e}7$ 32 $\text{A}c8+$ $\text{d}8$ 33 $\text{g}e6+$ etc.

a12) 29 $\text{Exd}8$? $\text{Exd}8$ 30 $\text{A}x\text{a}6$ $\text{e}4$ (30 ... $\text{A}a8$? 31 $\text{A}c4 \pm$, as 31 ... $\text{A}x\text{a}5$? 32 $\text{Exf}7$ is $\pm$) 31 $\text{A}c4$ $\text{d}7$ (31 ... $\text{e}3$ 32 $\text{Exf}7+$ $\text{g}h8$ 33 $\text{g}g1$ is unclear, but White has an extra pawn and a more active king, so I will guess White is for choice) 32 $\text{a}6$ $\text{e}3$ (32 ... $\text{A}d3$? 33 $\text{Exf}7!!$ $\text{Exf}7$ 34 $\text{A}x\text{f}7+$ $\text{Exf}7$ 35 $\text{a}7$ $\pm$) 33 $\text{b}4$ (33 $\text{Exf}7?\text{Exf}7$ 34 $\text{a}7$ $\text{A}e4$ $\pm$)$33...\text{Ae}4$ 34 $\text{Ae}1$ $\text{d}2$ 35 $\text{Ae}2$ $\text{b}2$ 36 $\text{b}5$ $\text{f}8$ 37 $\text{g}g1$ $\text{f}5$ (37 ... $\text{A}e7$? 38 $\text{A}f3$! $\text{A}x\text{f}3$ 39 $\text{A}x\text{e}3+$ $\text{f}8$ [39 ... $\text{A}d6$ 40 $\text{A}x\text{e}3$ $\text{b}5$ 41 $\text{A}x\text{f}7$ $\pm$] 40 $\text{A}x\text{f}3$ $\text{A}x\text{b}5$ 41 $\text{A}a3$ is a winning rook and pawn endgame) 38 $\text{a}7$ and White will win after $\text{A}f3$. These variations do not prove that White is winning or even better in this unclear and double-edged endgame; they do illustrate Black's troubles.

a13) 29 $\text{A}x\text{a}6$ might be the simplest of all. White's queenside looks more dangerous than Black's e-pawn; note that 29 ... $\text{h}x\text{b}6$? 30 $\text{a}x\text{b}6$ is very bad because White is too fast with $\text{A}c1$, $\text{b}7$, and $\text{A}e8$.

a2) 28 ... $\text{h}x\text{b}6$! 29 $\text{a}x\text{b}6$ $\text{A}b8$! is the best defense. White continues with 30 $\text{A}c4$ (30 $\text{A}d1$ $\text{f}8$ $\pm$ since 31 $\text{A}d6$ $\text{A}e7$ kicks the rook away) 30 ... $\text{A}g6$ 31 $\text{A}d1$ (31 $\text{A}e1$! is best, and allows White to draw: 31 ... $\text{h}x\text{b}6$ 32 $\text{A}x\text{e}5$ $\text{f}8$ 33 $\text{A}b3$ $\text{A}d6$ 34 $\text{A}g1$ $\text{A}d1$+ 35 $\text{A}f2$ $\text{A}b1$ 36 $\text{A}e5$ $\text{h}x\text{b}2$ 37 $\text{A}x\text{a}6$ $\text{A}x\text{c}2$ 38 $\text{A}x\text{c}2$ $\text{A}x\text{c}2$+ 39 $\text{A}g3$ is slightly better for Black, but of course the position is objectively [and quite easily] drawn) 31 ... $\text{h}x\text{b}6$ 32 $\text{A}d6$ (32 $\text{A}x\text{a}6$ $\text{A}x\text{b}6$ $\mp$) 32 ... $\text{A}x\text{c}2$ 33 $\text{A}x\text{a}6$ (33 $\text{A}d7$ $\text{A}g6$ 34 $\text{b}7$ $\text{A}e8$ and White is unlucky that he cannot defend the rook from either $\text{e}6$ or $\text{b}5$ with the bishop, so it will be driven away from the protection of the b-pawn) 33 ... $\text{A}e7$ 34 $\text{A}c6$ $\text{A}e4$ 35 $\text{A}c4$ (35 $\text{A}c7+$ $\text{A}d6$ 36 $\text{Exf}7$ $\text{A}x\text{b}6$ 37 $\text{A}f1$ $\text{A}x\text{b}2$ 38 $\text{Exg}7$ $\text{A}b1$ 39 $\text{g}1$ $\text{A}d3$ 40 $\text{Exf}7$ $\text{e}4$ $\pm$) 35 ... $\text{f}5$ (35 ... $\text{A}x\text{b}6$ 36 $\text{A}x\text{e}4$ $\text{A}x\text{a}6$ 37 $\text{A}x\text{e}5+$ $\text{A}d6$ 38 $\text{A}e1$=) 36 $\text{A}b4$ $\text{A}d6$ and Black has all the chances.

After all of that, and keeping in mind that 28 $\text{a}x\text{b}6$ is correct, we can see that Black should recapture on $\text{d}8$ with the rook.

b) 25 ... $\text{Exd}8$ and now Kasparov indicated that 26 $\text{A}c4$! is best, which is certainly true. However, it seems that Black can equalize with accurate play:

b1) 26 $\text{A}e6$ 27 $\text{A}d5$

b2) 26 ... $\text{A}d7$ 27 $\text{A}d5$ $\text{A}x\text{d}5$ 28 $\text{Exd}5$! (but 28 $\text{Exd}5$ $\text{A}c6$ [28 ... $\text{A}xe4$?] 29 $\text{A}x\text{b}6$ $\text{A}x\text{b}6$ 30 $\text{A}x\text{b}6$ $\text{A}d2$ 31 $\text{A}c1$ is also interesting for Black) looks good for Black, as after 29 $\text{A}g3$, White is not threatening to play $\text{A}f6+$ because of his weak back rank, so Black can even play 29 ... $\text{f}6$! and meet 30 $\text{A}x\text{f}6$+ with 30 ... $\text{A}xf6$, or 30 $\text{A}x\text{f}6$ with 30 ... $\text{Exd}5$. 

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61
b3) 26 ... Qxe4! 27 Qxf7+ Qxf7 28 Qxf7 Qh8! (28 ... Qd4? 29 Ab3! Qxc3 30 Qxb7+ Qf8 31 h3 Qxa4 32 f7+ Qe8 33 Qxg7 +) 29 Qxb7 Qxc3 30 h3 (30 bxc3?? Qd1+) 30 ... Qxa4 31 b3 b5=, e.g. 32 Qxb5 axb5 33 bxa4 bxa4 34 a7 Qg8 35 Qxa4 Qd2 36 Qe4 Qxc2 37 Qxe5.

After the text move, Black achieves a slight edge due to White’s passive pieces.

24 ... fe8

Kasparov criticized this move after the game, preferring 24 ... Qc6 or 24 ... a5 right away. Kasparov is used to having the rook on e8. Probably he was not happy to have moved it away, and wanted it back on its usual square. (Such vague psychological impressions often have a strong influence on even the strongest chess players in choosing their moves.) However, the move does not really accomplish that much. Seirawan offers 24 ... Qc6 25 b3 a5, with the idea of 26 ... Qb7, as a good continuation for Black. This looks reasonable.

25 h3 a5

Not a usual move for a Scheveningen, but now that Black has gotten his bishop to e5, he wants to stabilize the queenside pawns. The weakness of b5 will not matter, because the d-pawn is amply protected, and Black will play ... Bc6 next move anyway.

26 Qxe1 Qc6 27 b3 h6

At this point, Anand had 20 minutes left to reach move 40, while Kasparov had 13. Kasparov offered a draw, which Anand accepted immediately. Black has the more pleasant game. Under different circumstances Kasparov would no doubt play on with every hope of increasing his edge. But after defending this position, and not wanting to take any chances (there was, after all, the clock to think about), he decided to call it a day.

½–½

After 1 game: Kasparov ½, Anand ½
Tuesday, 12 September 1995

The first Black of the match was upon us. How would Anand fare? We were all a little nervous before this game; a match hasn't really started until you've played one game with each color.

Anand played well, and Kasparov played cautiously, so the result was an easy draw. It was interesting that Kasparov opened with the d-pawn. Against Anand, he has shown a tendency to open with the e-pawn, so we thought that would be the most likely choice in this game. The fact that he opened "towards his left" undoubtedly meant that he had prepared very well for the openings that Anand usually plays against 1 d4, i.e., the Slav and the Grünfeld. How nice, then, that we had prepared the Nimzo-Indian so deeply! Kasparov was clearly taken off guard, and chose to play very safely. We anticipated that he would try at least once more with 1 d4, but in fact he never did. Was this because he thought he could crash through with 1 e4, or because he never found anything good against the Nimzo? We can only guess, because Garry isn't telling ...

KASPAROV–ANAND, NEW YORK (m/2) 1995

NIMZO-INDIAN DEFENSE E34

1 d4 ☐f6 2 c4 e6 3 ☐c3 ☐b4 4 ☐c2

Kasparov used to play 3 ☐f3, inviting the Queen's Indian Defense, against which he would play the sharp Petrosian System (4 a3) with great success. But around 1990 he started allowing the Nimzo-Indian and playing 4 ☐c2, known as the Classical Variation, and has played it consistently since then.

4 ... d5 5 ☐xd5 ☐xd5!

The normal recapture is 5 ... exd5, but the queen recapture has
become much more popular during the last few years.

6 c3

This is an older move, thought to be less critical than 6 d3, but not at all without merit. We were not surprised that he chose this move because he had played the same way in a recent game against Predrag Nikolic in Moscow, 1994.

6 ... c5 7 d2!?

But this is new. Against Nikolic, Kasparov played 7 a3. He achieved nothing and the game was quickly drawn after 7 ... cxd4 8 axb4 dxc3 9 bxc3 b5!? 10 d3 0–0 11 c4 bxc4 12 dxc4 e4 13 d3 b4+ 14 e2 b6 15 a3 e8 16 c5 c7 17 h1 a5 18 b4 c2+ 19 c2 a6 20 a5 d3+.

7 ... dxc3 8 dxc3 xd4 9 xd4 xc6 10 xf6 gxf6 [1]

Kasparov’s strategy in this game is ultra-minimalist. Black has achieved almost everything he could ever hope for out of the opening. He has developed smoothly, traded a couple of minor pieces, and has a position that is generally free of weaknesses. His one problem, of course, is the permanently damaged kingside pawns. The damage should not be overestimated, but it is still a real structural weakness. White, on the other hand, has nothing wrong with his position except that he has not developed quickly enough.

These factors give the position a certain character. Black’s goal is to use his lead in development to force further simplification, completely levelling the position. White would like to pull level with Black in development and aim for certain endgames in which he can try to exploit Black’s kingside pawns.

The risk to White is tiny; only if he plays badly should Black’s lead in development become threatening. But the chances for success are also small; as long as Black is careful, his one minor static weakness will not cause too much distress. Thus, the overwhelmingly probable result from this position between two strong players is a draw.

Why did the normally hyper-aggressive Kasparov play so cautiously?

There are two reasons, one specific to this game, one general to the match as a whole. As regards this game, it is clear that Kasparov was surprised by the choice of the Nimzo-Indian and had not deeply prepared for this possibility. Therefore he chooses a line that gives him a little something to play for, while not incurring any risk. In addition, he hopes to avoid any specific preparation we must have done.

As regards the match as a whole, Kasparov clearly used the first few games to probe Anand’s preparation. If you are trying to probe, then
you need not try too hard to win the early games. Besides, just as Anand needed one or two games to get used to playing for the world championship, no doubt Kasparov needed one or two games to get used to defending it.

11 \( \text{d}2 \text{d}7 \\
11 \ldots \text{b}4 \) is silly after 12 \( \text{a}4+ \).

12 \( \text{a}3 \)

White can try for nothing after 12 \( \text{c}3 \text{c}4 \), and indeed must then try to “kill the position” (make a draw), as the following lines show:

a) 13 \( \text{x}d5? \text{x}c2+ 14 \text{d}2 \text{x}a1 15 \text{e}7+ \text{e}7 16 \text{x}a8 \text{x}a8 17 \text{d}3 \text{c}6 and only White is in danger of being worse.

b) 13 \( \text{h}1 \text{a}5 14 \text{c}2 (14 \text{c}4 \text{c}8 15 \text{b}3 \text{b}5!; 14 \text{e}4 \text{a}4! 15 \text{x}a4 [15 \text{d}3 \text{d}8; 15 \text{b}3 \text{c}8 16 \text{x}a4 \text{c}2+ 17 \text{e}2 \text{c}5] 15 \ldots \text{x}a4 16 \text{b}3 \text{c}5) 14 \ldots \text{d}5 15 0-0 \text{c}3 16 \text{b}3 \text{c}6 \pm .

c) 13 \( \text{d}2 \text{d}2+ 14 \text{x}d2 \text{c}6 = .

d) 13 \( \text{d}1 \text{x}d1+ 14 \text{d}1 \text{c}6 15 \text{a}3 \text{d}5 = .

e) 13 \( \text{e}1 \text{a}5 (13 \ldots \text{d}3+? 14 \text{d}2! \text{c}1+ 15 \text{x}d5 \text{d}5 16 \text{x}c1 is clearly better for White, but 13 \ldots \text{d}3!! and 13 \ldots \text{f}5!! are interesting as well) 14 \text{d}2 \text{c}6 = .

12 \ldots \text{e}5 13 \text{c}3 [2] \text{f}5?! 

There is nothing “wrong” with this move, except that Black had a stronger move which would demonstrate immediate equality: 13 \ldots \text{d}4! and now:

a) 14 \( \text{d}1 \) gives Black two good options:

\( a1 \) 14 \ldots \text{f}5?! was the move that was popular in the press room: 15 \( \text{h}5?! (15 \text{e}2 \text{h}4! 16 \text{g}3 \text{c}6! 17 0-0 \text{d}8! takes over the light squares) 15 \ldots \text{c}8 16 \text{c}1 (16 \text{d}3? \text{x}c3! 17 \text{c}3 \text{x}c3+ 18 \text{e}2 \text{b}2+ 19 \text{f}3 \text{c}6+ 20 \text{e}4 \text{c}3 21 \text{h}1 \text{c}7 gives Black a strong attack with \ldots \text{d}8 coming up) 16 \text{e}7 is unclear.

\( a2 \) But 14 \ldots \text{b}5?! is simpler, and was what Yusupov and Ublava and I were looking at during the game: 15 \( \text{x}b5 (15 \text{e}1 \text{c}3 16 \text{c}3 \text{c}6 =) 15 \ldots \text{x}b5 16 \text{x}b5+ \text{x}b5 17 \text{e}2 \text{xe}2+ 18 \text{xe}2 \text{c}8 19 \text{ac}1 \text{c}7 = .

b) 14 \( \text{d}3 \text{b}3 15 \text{d}1 \text{c}6 (15 \ldots \text{c}5?! also looks fine) 16 \text{b}5 \text{c}5 .

Anand’s move is perfectly reasonable, but not best, and it probably
dragged the game out another 10 or 15 moves more before it reached its natural equilibrium in a draw.

14 0-0-0 0-0-0

Seirawan suggests 14 ... \( \text{Q} \)e7 with the idea of 15 ... \( \text{A} \)c6, and 14 ... f4 15 exf4 \( \text{Q} \)xf4+ 16 \( \text{Q} \)b1. Both ideas are reasonable, but the way Anand played seems the most solid and sensible.

15 g3 \( \text{Q} \)b8

Now Kasparov thought for 44 minutes! Such a long think in such a quiet position may seem strange, but it is absolutely correct, because if White does not find something in this position, then he may as well offer a draw. Thus it is important to play precisely at this point.

16 \( \text{Q} \)e2

But this does not look like the most precise move. Probably 16 \( \text{Q} \)a4 does not achieve anything, as after 16 ... \( \text{Q} \)a5 17 \( \text{Q} \)f4+ (but maybe 17 \( \text{Q} \)xa5?! \( \text{Q} \)xa5 18 b4 keeps an edge) 17 ... \( \text{Q} \)e5 White must either exchange his queen or send it far away from the queenside, leaving the king in some danger.

However, 16 \( \text{Q} \)g2 looks slightly more dangerous: 16 ... \( \text{Q} \)e7 (16 ... \( \text{Q} \)a5? 17 \( \text{Q} \)d4 \( \text{A} \)c6 18 \( \text{Q} \)h4!! is good for White, because 18 ... \( \text{Q} \)xd4 19 exd4 and 20 d5 is very bad for Black) 17 \( \text{Q} \)d3 (17 \( \text{Q} \)d4 \( \text{A} \)c6 =) 17 ... \( \text{Q} \)c7 (17 ... \( \text{A} \)c6? 18 \( \text{Q} \)xd8+ \( \text{Q} \)xd8 19 \( \text{Q} \)xd8+ \( \text{Q} \)c7 20 \( \text{Q} \)h4!! is good for White because 20 ... \( \text{Q} \)xg2 21 \( \text{Q} \)d7+ is strong, as is 20 ... \( \text{Q} \)d5 21 \( \text{Q} \)d5! \( \text{Q} \)xh5 22 \( \text{Q} \)xh5+ exd5 23 \( \text{Q} \)xh5, and only White has winning chances) 18 \( \text{Q} \)d6 \( \text{Q} \)xd6 (Seirawan gives 18 ... \( \text{A} \)c6 19 \( \text{Q} \)xc7+ \( \text{Q} \)xc7 20 \( \text{A} \)xc6 \( \text{Q} \)xc6 [20 ... \( \text{Q} \)xc6 21 \( \text{Q} \)b5+ is mildly unpleasant for Black, e.g. 21 ... \( \text{Q} \)b8 22 \( \text{Q} \)xd8+ [22 \( \text{Q} \)d6 \( \text{Q} \)d7] 22 ... \( \text{Q} \)xd8 23 \( \text{Q} \)d1] 21 \( \text{Q} \)xd8 \( \text{Q} \)xd8 22 \( \text{Q} \)d1 \( \text{Q} \)xh5+ 23 \( \text{Q} \)xh5 and White is slightly better in the knight endgame) 19 \( \text{Q} \)xd6 \( \text{A} \)c6 (19 ... \( \text{Q} \)c7 20 \( \text{Q} \)h4! ±) 20 \( \text{Q} \)xd8+ \( \text{Q} \)xd8 21 \( \text{A} \)xc6 \( \text{Q} \)xc6 22 \( \text{Q} \)d1, and again White can try for an edge in the knight endgame, although probably Black should be just fine. The point is that in the knight endgame the weakness of Black's kingside pawns is more salient than in a bishop endgame or a rook endgame, particularly if White can bring up his king quickly. But if White has no advantage in king position, even the knight endgame is fine for Black.

16 ... \( \text{Q} \)e7 17 \( \text{Q} \)d3 \( \text{Q} \)c7

Once again, 17 ... \( \text{A} \)c6? does not look so good after 18 \( \text{Q} \)xd8+ \( \text{Q} \)xd8 19 \( \text{Q} \)xd8+ \( \text{Q} \)c7 20 \( \text{Q} \)h4, because 20 ... \( \text{Q} \)d5? 21 \( \text{Q} \)xd5! \( \text{Q} \)xd5 22 \( \text{Q} \)xd5+ exd5 23 \( \text{Q} \)d4 [3] only gives chances to White. The point is that Black's pawns, particularly on d5, are horribly weak, while White has only two pawns to defend—on f2 and b2, and this can be done trivially with a rook on d2. It is interesting to note
that for a human who understands the endgame, there is no real difference between this position with or without the d5 pawn, because that pawn will quickly be lost, but for a computer, the pawn makes a huge difference in the evaluation of the position as long as it cannot see how the pawn will be lost within its horizon! Such quirks continue to make life difficult for the machine at the highest level.

18 \( \text{d}6 \text{Ac6} \) 19 \( \text{\texttt{gx}}\text{c7} + \text{\texttt{hx}}\text{d1} + \) 20 \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{d1} \text{Ed8} \) 22 \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{d8} \text{\texttt{exe8}} \) 23 \( \text{\texttt{d}2} \) [4]

This endgame is a draw, but still has to be played accurately. What should Black do? He should bring his pieces to squares where a blockade can be established against the possible intrusion of the White king. He should try to avoid the exchange of bishops, unless White has to lose a lot of time to trade them, while encouraging the exchange of knights—as long as he will not then be forced into a disadvantageous exchange of bishops (for example, if White can play his bishop somehow to the long diagonal and force their exchange because otherwise Black would lose the b7 pawn). A king endgame is very dangerous, a knight endgame is somewhat dangerous, and a bishop endgame is relatively harmless. Notice how crucial it is that Black has not played his h-pawn to h5! Some of the spectators were suggesting that Black play an early ... h7-h5 back when there were rooks and queens on the board. Now we can see that would have been a horrible idea. In these endgames the h-pawn is fine on h7 or h6 (specifically, so long as it can go to h6 when necessary), but the position can be lost if the pawn is fixed on h5 as a permanent weakness.

23 ... \( \text{\texttt{c}8} \)

Redeploying the knight to d6 is an excellent plan. Bad, however, is 23 ... \( \text{\texttt{d}5} \) because of 24 \( \text{\texttt{f}3} \) \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{c3} \) 25 \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{c6} \text{\texttt{b}1} + \) (25 ... \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{e}4 + 26 \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{c4} \text{\texttt{f}4} \text{\texttt{exe}4} \) 27 ... \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{c3} \) is a winning king and pawn endgame for White) 26 \( \text{\texttt{c}1} \) \( \text{\texttt{c}a3} \) (It would take a lot of analysis to establish for sure whether 26 ... \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{xc6} \) 27 ... \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{xb1} \) is lost for Black, but it certainly looks terrible) 27 \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{b7} \text{\texttt{b}5} \) is a difficult endgame for Black. If he had a b-pawn on b6 instead of the pawn on a7, then Black would be all right: the knight on d6, pawn on f6, and king on c7 would be a fortress. But with an a-pawn instead of a b-pawn, the c5 and a5 squares are terribly weak against a possible white king invasion. Meanwhile the black kingside pawns are all on light squares, making them vulnerable to the bishop. White would have very good winning chances.

24 \( \text{\texttt{d}3} \) 25 \( \text{\texttt{d}4} \) b6

After the game, Anand felt that the easiest way to draw was 25 ... \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{e}4 \) 26 ... \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{e}4 \) (26 \( \text{\texttt{f}3} ? \) \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{f2} \) 26 ... \( \text{\texttt{exe}}\text{c4} \) and once Black puts his
king on e7 and his pawns on b6 and f6, White can make no progress. But there is nothing wrong with the way Anand played.

26 b4  \( \text{\textit{e7}} \)

Now 26 \( \ldots \) \( \text{\textit{e4?}} \) 27 \( \text{\textit{f3}} \) forces a disadvantageous exchange of bishop for knight. With Black's knight stuck behind enemy lines, White's twin threats of penetrating the queenside with the king and getting the bishop to e8 would make life very difficult for Black.

27 \( \text{\textit{f4}} \) \( \text{\textit{h6}} \) 28 \( \text{\textit{a4}} \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 29 \( \text{\textit{a5}} \) \( \text{\textit{d7}} \)

Kasparov offered a draw at this point. White still has a very tiny edge, but White had only eight minutes left to make eleven moves (compared to Black's 21 minutes), so Kasparov decided he had tried hard enough for the day. White gets nowhere by playing 30 \( \text{\textit{e4}} \) \( \text{\textit{fxe4}} \) 31 \( \text{\textit{dxe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{cxe4}} \) 32 \( \text{\textit{dxe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{d6}} \), but 30 \( \text{\textit{axb6}} \) \( \text{\textit{axb6}} \) 31 \( \text{\textit{h3}} \) with the idea of playing 32 \( \text{\textit{g4}} \) keeps a nominal edge. But a draw is the only result one can reasonably expect from this position.

\( \frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2} \)

\textit{After 2 games: Kasparov 1, Anand 1}
Thursday, 14 September 1995

The first two games had passed quietly, which was quite a relief to our team. Kasparov had 10 years of world championship match experience, but Anand and the rest of us were newcomers—except for Speelman who had worked with Nigel Short in his 1993 match against Kasparov. We were very happy to have survived the first two games without a loss. In particular, it was nice to have drawn game 2 as Black without any real difficulties. Anand's record with the black pieces against Kasparov had been abysmal before this match.

Now, however, it was time to turn up the heat, which is exactly what Anand did in this game. Both Anand and Kasparov played sharply, but Anand's play had more justification. Indeed, just out of the opening Anand had a winning attack. However, he did not realize how good his game was, and missed his chance. Afterward the game petered out to a draw.

The experience was both frustrating and heartening: frustrating because Anand had missed a win, but heartening because Kasparov had been lucky to avoid losing. Anand had not done it yet, but now we knew that he could beat Kasparov in this match. Even the king of the chess world was vulnerable.

ANAND–KASPAROV, NEW YORK (m/3) 1995
SICILIAN DEFENSE B85

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 dxd4 f6 5 c3 a6 6 e2 e6 7 0–0 c7 8 a4 c6 9 e3 0–0 10 f4 e8 11 h1 e8 12 d3 [1] b4 13 a5 d7 14 f3!!?

The more common move is 14 f3, but after careful study we decided that 14 f3, though less often played, was actually the more
dangerous move.

14 ... \( \texttt{Ac6} \)?!

Better is 14 ... \( \texttt{Ac8} \), as Kasparov played in games 5 and 7 and as Anand himself played in game 16.

15 \( \texttt{Ab6} \) ! \( \texttt{Ec8} \) 16 \( \texttt{Ee1} \) \( \texttt{Ed7} \) 17 \( \texttt{Ed4} \) \( \texttt{Ec5} \) 18 \( \texttt{Gg3} \) [2] \( \texttt{f6} \)?

Since White threatens mate in one, we can literally analyze all of Black's possible moves:

a) 18 ... \( \texttt{Af6} ? \); 18 ... \( \texttt{g5} ? \); and 18 ... \( \texttt{e5} ? \) all lose material.

b) 18 ... \( \texttt{Af8} ? \) 19 \( \texttt{f5} \) ! \( \texttt{Exf5} \) \( \texttt{20} \texttt{Exf5} \) \( \texttt{Edx3} \) is awful for Black.

c) Therefore, the only serious alternative to the move Kasparov played is 18 ... \( \texttt{g6} \), whereupon follows 19 \( \texttt{f5} \)! The analysis that follows will try to show that White has a good game in all circumstances after this move, but I must warn the reader that the position will get rather complicated along the way. Black's two serious choices are to capture the bishop on \( \texttt{d3} \) with either knight:

1) 19 ... \( \texttt{Dxd3} \) 20 \( \texttt{cxd3} \) \( \texttt{Exf5} \) (20 ... \( \texttt{Dbb3} \) 21 \( \texttt{fxg6} \) [21 \( \texttt{Ba3} \)!! \( \texttt{Dxd4} \) 22 \( \texttt{Dxd4} \) is interesting. In general it is good for White to force this exchange, but on the other hand the \( \texttt{Ba3} \) is stupid. However, not 21 \( \texttt{Ad1} \)!! which allows 21 ... \( \texttt{Exf5} \) 22 \( \texttt{Exf5} \) \( \texttt{Dxf5} \) 23 \( \texttt{exd3} \) is awful for Black.

2) 19 ... \( \texttt{Af6} \) 20 \( \texttt{Af7} \) !+ ...

and now:

1) 22 ... \( \texttt{g5} ? ? \) 23 \( \texttt{Dxf6} \) !+ .

2) 22 ... \( \texttt{f5} ? \) 23 \( \texttt{Exb4} \) \( \texttt{Dxe5} \) 24 \( \texttt{Dxd5} \) ± .

3) 22 ... \( \texttt{Exf1} + \) 23 \( \texttt{Exf1} \) \( \texttt{Dxe5} \) 24 \( \texttt{Dxe5} \) \( \texttt{Dxf6} \) 26 \( \texttt{Dxf6} \) \( \texttt{Dxe1} + \) 24 ... \( \texttt{Dad8} \) 25 \( \texttt{Dd4} \) is better for White.

4) 22 ... \( \texttt{Ed7} \) 23 \( \texttt{Dxf7} \) (23 ... \( \texttt{Dd7} \) 24 \( \texttt{Dxf6} \) [24 \( \texttt{Dxf4} \) \( \texttt{Df5} \) !+ 25 \( \texttt{Dh6} + \) \( \texttt{g8} \) and White has overextended in his zeal to attack] 24 ... \( \texttt{Dxf6} \) 25 \( \texttt{Dxf6} \) is unclear; White may have compensation) 23 ... \( \texttt{Df6} \) (23 ... \( \texttt{Dbb3} \) ? 24 \( \texttt{Df4} \) !??) 24 ... \( \texttt{Df5} \) !+ 25 ... \( \texttt{Dxe5} \) is unclear, but with Black's rather exposed king, presumably White has good chances.

2) 19 ... \( \texttt{Dxd3} \) 20 \( \texttt{cxd3} \) and now:

1) 20 ... \( \texttt{e5} ? \) 21 \( \texttt{fxg6} \) \( \texttt{hxg6} \) 22 \( \texttt{Dxe5} \) ! \( \texttt{Dxe5} \) 23 \( \texttt{Dxe5} \) 24 \( \texttt{Dxf6} \) 25 \( \texttt{Dxf6} \) + .

2) 20 ... \( \texttt{Exf5} \) and:

1) 21 \( \texttt{Exf5} \) \( \texttt{Dxf5} \) 22 \( \texttt{Dxe5} \) \( \texttt{Eh5} \) (22 ... \( \texttt{Dxf1} + \) 23 \( \texttt{Dxf1} \) \( \texttt{Dxe5} \) 24 \( \texttt{Dxe5} \) 25 \( \texttt{Dxe6} + - ; 22 ... \( \texttt{Dxe5} \) !? 23 \( \texttt{Dxf5} \) \( \texttt{Dxd4} \) is tricky.
Probably White has a winning game, but Black has a solid position and chances for counterplay) 23 \( \text{Qxf7} \) and White has a very strong threat of \( \text{Qf4} \), for example 23 ... \( \text{Qc2} \) 24 \( \text{Qf4!} \) g5 25 \( \text{Qh6+} \)

2222) 21 \( \text{Qh4} \)? is also promising for White. Some sample lines:

22221) 21 ... \( \text{Af8} \) 22 \( \text{exf5} \) \( \text{Qc2} \) 23 \( \text{fxg6} \)
22222) 21 ... \( \text{Axh4} \) 22 \( \text{Qxh4} \) \( \text{Qc2} \) (22 ... \( \text{Qxd3} \) 23 \( \text{Af6} \))
23 \( \text{exf5} \) (23 \( \text{Af6} \) \( \text{Qe6} \)) is good for White.

22223) 21 ... \( \text{Qc2} \) 22 \( \text{exf5} \)? (22 \( \text{Qxf5} \) \( \text{Af8} \) 23 \( \text{Ac1} \) (23 \( \text{Af6} \) \( \text{Qxa1} \) 24 \( \text{Exa1} \) \( \text{Qe6} \)) 23 ... \( \text{Qxd4} \) 24 \( \text{Qxd4} \) \( \text{Qxd7} \)) and the threat of \( \text{Qxg6} \) is hard for Black to meet.

22224) 21 ... \( \text{Ad7} \) 22 \( \text{Ac1} \) \( \text{Qxd3} \) 23 \( \text{Qxh4} \) \( \text{Qxh4} \) 24 \( \text{Qd5} \) \( \text{Qd8} \) 25 \( \text{exf5} \) \( \text{Qxf5} \) 26 \( \text{Qxf5} \) \( \text{gxf5} \) 27 \( \text{Qxf5} \) \( \text{Qe5} \) equalizes. I have not found an improvement for White, so perhaps this line holds for Black.

223) 20 ... \( \text{Qxd3} \) 21 \( \text{Qg5} \) (also 21 \( \text{Qh4} \)? \( \text{Axh4} \) 22 \( \text{Qxh4} \) \( \text{exf5} \) 23 \( \text{Qxf5} \) gives White good compensation for a pawn) and now:

2231) 21 ... \( \text{Qe5} \) 22 \( \text{Qxe5} \) dxe5 23 \( \text{Qxf7} \)! \( \text{Qxf5} \) (23 ... \( \text{Qxf7} \) 24 \( \text{Qxg6+ wins} \) \( \text{Qh6+} \) \( \text{Qg7} \) 25 \( \text{Qxg5} \) gives White a clear advantage.

2232) 21 ... \( \text{Qxf5} \) 22 \( \text{Qxh7} \) (22 ... \( \text{Qxf5} \)) 22 ... \( \text{Qe5} \) (22 ... \( \text{Qxh7} \) 23 \( \text{Qh3} \) and \( \text{Qh8 mate} \) 23 \( \text{exf5} \) \( \text{Qxh7} \) 24 \( \text{fxg6} \) \( \text{fxg6} \) 25 \( \text{Qxe5} \) dxe5 26 \( \text{Qf7} \) + \( \text{Qh6} \) 27 \( \text{Qxe7} \) ±

2233) 21 ... \( \text{Qxg5} \) 22 \( \text{Qxg5} \) \( \text{exf5} \) 23 \( \text{exf5} \) (23 \( \text{Qxf5} \))? is interesting, with the idea that 23 ... \( \text{Qxe4} \) fails to 24 \( \text{Qxf7} \)! 23 ... \( \text{Qe5} \) 24 \( \text{Qf4} \) (24 \( \text{f6} \) \( \text{Qg4} \) 24 ... \( \text{f6} \)24 \( \text{f6} \) \( \text{Qg4} \) 24 ... \( \text{f6} \)! (Black has to stop White from playing \( \text{f5-f6} \) himself, and then \( \text{Qh6} \) and \( \text{Qh4} \) 25 \( \text{Qxf6} \) \( \text{Qd8} \) 26 \( \text{fxg6} \) \( \text{Qxf6} \) 27 \( \text{Qxf6} \) \( \text{Qxg6} \) 28 \( \text{Qg1} \) (28 \( \text{Qxd6} \) \( \text{Qh4} \) ±

Although the above lines do not prove a decisive advantage for White, it is obvious that Black is hanging by a thread, and White has the better prospects against even the most stubborn defense. So it makes perfect sense that Kasparov chose to defend the mate threat by pushing his f-pawn.

To the reader who already knows that White could have won this game, Kasparov's play may seem difficult to understand. Actually, in many ways it is quite impressive. Black is playing the position as ambitiously as possible. The two knights put maximum pressure on White's queenside and the e4 pawn, and White must play energetically or he will quickly find himself seriously worse strategically. Perhaps Kasparov even thought he held the advantage in this position; that was the opinion of many of the grandmasters watching this game at the time.

Anand, however, finds a brilliant solution to his difficulties. In fact, it suddenly becomes clear that he is close to winning. But Anand did not realize that his position, which feels as though it is under heavy pressure, held so much potential. Such is the character of these Sicilian middlegames. Both sides are playing chess on the highwire. One slip can
be fatal, but it is also possible to regain one's balance immediately if the opponent fails to take advantage of one's stumble. Anand seizes his chance here but fails to follow through on the next move, allowing Kasparov to right himself.

19 e5!!

Not 19 $\text{Axe}5 \text{dxe}5! (19 ... $\text{dxe}5 20 $\text{Axe}7 \text{Bx}e7 21 $\text{dxe}7 \text{Bxe}7$, because now that White's knight cannot go to e5, Black's knight on b2 will get out easily. 19 ... $\text{Bxe}7 [3])$

Anand spent over 40 minutes on his last move, yet when Kasparov came back to the room he bashed this move out instantly! It is difficult to believe that he would have done so had he seen what Anand could have played, but it is at least clear that he saw what could happen if he were to capture on e5: 19 ... $\text{dxe}5 20 $\text{Axe}7+! (In the press conference after the game, Kasparov said that this move led to "forced mate.") 20 ... $\text{Bxe}7 21 $\text{fxe}5 [4] and indeed Black faces an overwhelming attack:

$a) 21 ... \text{Axf}3 22 \text{gx}f6 \text{gxf}6 23 $\text{Axf}3 \text{e}5 24 $\text{Axe}5 $\text{Bxe}5 (24 ... $\text{Axe}5 25 $\text{h}4+ and 26 $\text{xf}6)$ $\text{g}4 \text{f}8 26 \text{d}e4 --.$

$b) 21 ... \text{f}5 22 \text{Axe}5 $\text{dxe}5 23 $\text{g}5+ $\text{f}8 (23 ... $\text{gg}6 24 $\text{xe}6+; 23 ... $\text{h}6 24 $\text{h}4+ $\text{g}6 25 $\text{h}7+ $\text{g}5 26 \text{h}4+ mates) 24 $\text{h}4 \text{d}5 (24 ... $\text{dxc}2 25 \text{d}e1 \text{d}4 26 \text{d}e2! --)$ 25 $\text{c}e4! $\text{e}3 (25 ... $\text{b}5 26 $\text{h}7+ $\text{g}8 27 $\text{g}6! $\text{xf}1 28 $\text{g}8+ $\text{g}7 29 $\text{f}7+ $\text{d}8 30 $\text{xd}8+ $\text{c}7 31 $\text{xc}6+ $\text{b}8 32 $\text{xc}8+ $\text{d}8 33 $\text{xd}5+ --) 26 $\text{h}7+ $\text{f}8 27 \text{d}6 \text{d}7 28 \text{f}5! \text{ex}f5 29 \text{e}5+ $\text{e}7 (29 ... $\text{xf}5 30 $\text{xf}5+ $\text{f}7 31 $\text{f}7+ $\text{d}8 32 $\text{c}6+ $\text{c}8 33 \text{d}1+ -- [33 ... \text{e}7 34 \text{d}x}d5]) 30 \text{e}6! (30 \text{f}7+ $\text{d}8 31 \text{d}x}d7+ \text{Axd}7 32 $\text{h}xg7 $\text{h}xg5 and 33 ... $\text{c}7 is unclear) 30 ... $\text{c}7 (30 ... $\text{c}8 31 $\text{g}7+ $\text{d}8 [31 ... \text{d}6 32 $\text{e}4+ $\text{xe}6 33 $\text{xf}7 mate] 32 \text{c}4 \pm) 31 \text{c}4 $\text{g}5 32 \text{c}x}d5 (also 32 \text{d}x}g5 is strong) 32 ... $\text{f}6! 33 $\text{b}x}f6! $\text{x}f6 34 \text{f}1+ $\text{e}5 (this variation leads to mate; Black can avoid the mate only at the cost of his queen) 35 \text{f}5+ $\text{d}4 36 $\text{g}4+ $\text{x}d}5 37 $\text{d}1+ $\text{c}5 38 $\text{f}5+ $\text{c}4 (38 ... $\text{b}4 39 $\text{d}4+ $\text{b}3 40 $\text{d}3+ leads to mate) 39 $\text{c}1+ $\text{d}4 40 $\text{c}5+ $\text{e}4 (40 ... $\text{d}3 41 $\text{c}4+ leads to mate.

$c) 21 ... \text{xc}2 gives White a choice between two ways to mate:

c1) 22 $\text{h}4+ $\text{g}6 (22 ... $\text{g}8 23 \text{ex}f6 \text{d}4 [23 ... $\text{xf}6 24 $\text{d}6 $\text{xc}2 25 $\text{x}f6 is a winning attack] 24 $\text{f}7+! $\text{xf}7 [24 ... $\text{f}8 25 $\text{h}8+ and 26 $\text{e}5 \text{mate}] 25 $\text{g}5+ $\text{g}6 26 \text{h}7+ and mates) 23 $\text{g}4+!
&h7 (23 ... &f7 24 &g5+ &g8 25 exf6 +--; 23 ... &h6 24 &xc5 &x1 [24 ... &xc5 25 &h4 g5 26 &xf6+] 25 &h4 g5 26 &xc7 ++) 24 &h5+ &g8 25 exf6 gives White a winning attack.

c2) 22 exf6! &xf6 23 &xf6 gx&f6 24 &w4+ &g7 25 &e5! &xg2+ 26 &xg2 &e3+ 27 &h1 &xf1 28 &xf1 is mate in five!

20 &xc5?

Anand could not explain after the game why he did not believe that the same bishop sacrifice he had calculated last move could also work here. Interestingly, it is not clear that Kasparov himself saw the move, because he did not bring it up at the press conference (he was normally very forthcoming in volunteering his impressions of the games), but had to be asked whether he thought it worked. As far as I know, it was Boris Gulko who first pointed out that 20 exf6! &xf6 21 &xh7+! &xh7 22 &g5+ [5] is very strong:

a) 22 ... &g6 23 f5+! exf5 24 &ge4+ &h7 (24 ... &f7 25 &xd6+ snags the queen) 25 &xd6+ g6 26 &f4 +--.

b) 22 ... &g8 23 &h4 &xg5 24 f&xg5 &w8 (24 ... &f5 25 g6 e5 26 &h7+ &f8 27 &h5! &d7 28 &xc5 dxc5 29 &xf5+ &xf5 30 &f1 ++) 25 &xf8+ &xf8 (25 ... &xf8 26 g6 &xf6 27 &w7+ &x8 28 &xg7+ &e8 29 &xf6 +--) 26 &f1+ &g8 (26 ... &e7 27 g6+ &d7 28 &xf7+ &xf7 [28 ... &c8 29 &xg7 +++] 29 &xf7 =) 27 &xg7 &xg7 28 &h6+ &g8 29 &f6! (29 g6 &e7 30 &f7 &xf7 31 &xg7+ &xf7 32 &w7+ &xf6 33 &h4+ &f7 34 &xb4 &g8! suddenly gives Black some real counterplay) 29 ... &ec8 (29 ... &d8 30 &g6+ &xg6 31 &xg6+ &f8 32 &f6+ &e8 33 g6 ++) 30 &g6+ &xg6 31 &xg6+ &h8 (31 ... &f8 32 &w7! and g5-g6-g7) 32 h4 gives White a strong attack just by pushing his pawns.

c) 22 ... &xg5 23 fxe5! is the point. It may look at first as though White does not have enough pieces on the kingside to attack, until one realizes that Black has still fewer pieces there to defend. Black can try:

cl) 23 ... &g8 24 g6!

c2) 23 ... &g6 24 &f6+! gxf6 25 gxf6+ &h5 (this is the only move to stave off mate) 26 &h3+ (26 &e3? &xg2+! 27 &g1 [27 &xg2 &g8; 27 &xg2 &c6; 27 ... &g8] 26 ... &g3 and now:

2c2) 27 &e3+ &xf6 28 &f1+ &g7! (found by Speelman; my original idea was 28 ... &e7 29 &g5+ &e8 30 &h5+ &d7 31 &h7+ &e8 32 &c7 mate) 29 &h6+ (29 &h6+ &g8 30 &g6+ &h8 31 &h5+ is just perpetual check) 29 ... &g6 30 &xg8 &xf8 31 &g4+ &h7 32 &xf8 &xf8 and again, the best White has is perpetual check.

c22) 27 &f1! is simple and deadly, leading to 27 ... &d7 (27 ... e5 28 &e3+ &g6 29 &h6+ &f7 30 &g7+ &e6 31 &e7 mate) 28 &f4!!
(the only move that wins) 28 ... $\text{xf4}$ (28 ... $\text{De}_2+ \text{h4}$ also loses) 29 $\text{De}_4+$ $\text{f3}$ 30 $\text{De}_5+$ $\text{f4}$ 31 $\text{De}_2+$ $\text{g}8$ 32 $\text{g}3$ mate, as shown in a nice piece of analysis by Raymond Keene in his book of the match.

3) 23 ... $\text{xf1}+$ 24 $\text{xf1}$ $\text{e}8$ 25 $\text{h}4+$ $\text{g}8$ 26 $\text{xg7}$! transposes to line $b$ above (with one less move played).

4) 23 ... $\text{e}8$ 24 $\text{xf8}$ $\text{xf8}$ 25 $\text{g}6+$ $\text{g}8$ (25 ... $\text{h}6$ 26 $\text{e}3+$) 26 $\text{h}4$ transposes to the note to Black's 25th move in line $b$ above.

20 ... $\text{xc5}$

Anand suggests in *New In Chess* that 20 ... $\text{xd}3$ 21 $\text{x}6$ $\text{x}6$ $\text{xd}6$ 22 $\text{ex}d3$ gives Black compensation for the pawn minus, and he says that Kasparov explained his rejection of this line by claiming he was in no mood for speculative play after his close escape the move before.

21 $\text{c6} [6] \text{d}5$

Bad is 21 ... $\text{x}3$ (21 ... $\text{xc}2$? 22 $\text{f5}$) 22 $\text{xf3}$ $\text{xc}2$? 23 $\text{f5}$ $\text{d}4$ 24 $\text{xe}6!$ $\text{xf}3$ 25 $\text{d}5$ (Anand said afterward that he intended simply 25 $\text{gx} f3$ with an excellent game, but it turns out that White can practically win on the spot) 25 ... $\text{d}8$ 26 $\text{xf6}$ $\text{xf6}$ 27 $\text{e}7+$ $\text{xe}7$ 28 $\text{c}7+$ $\text{h}8$ 29 $\text{e}6$ $\text{d}4$ 30 $\text{xd}4$ $\text{xd}4$ 31 $\text{c}7$, and White's material advantage bears fruit. However, 21 ... $\text{f5}$! was an interesting alternative.

22 $\text{xd}5$ $\text{ex}d5$

22 ... $\text{xd}5$? 23 $\text{f5}$ ±.

23 $\text{ab}3$ $\text{c4}$ 24 $\text{a}4$ $\text{c6} [7] 25 \text{c3}$

Interesting and more ambitious would have been 25 $\text{ae}1$? as suggested by the match bulletin: 25 ... $\text{xa}5$ 26 $\text{c3}$ with the idea of $\text{a}2$, and White has a strong initiative for the pawn. If instead 25 ... $\text{f}5$? 26 $\text{xe}5!$ $\text{xe}5$ 27 $\text{xe}5$ gives White a free hand to attack Black's king; Anand in *New In Chess* suggests in this variation 26 ... $\text{ab}4$ 27 $\text{c3}$ $\text{xa}5$ and "Black shouldn't be worse here." But in my humble opinion, White stands well after 28 $\text{f}3$! and $a)$ 28 ... $\text{e}7$ 29 $\text{d}7$ and 30 $\text{e}6+$; $b)$ 28 ... $\text{d}8$ 29 $\text{c}6$ and 30 $\text{xc}6$; $c)$ 28 ... $\text{xc}5$ 29 $\text{xe}5$; $d)$ 28 ... $\text{d}8$ 29 $\text{f}5$ (also 29 $\text{xc}6$?! $\text{bxc}6$ 30 $\text{a}2$ is interesting).

25 ... $\text{f}5$ 26 $\text{xc}5$

If White takes with the pawn, 26 $\text{f}5$, then Black can more easily afford to capture on a5: 26 ... $\text{xa}5$ 27 $\text{c}2$ (27 $\text{d}4$? is suggested by Keene) 27 ... $\text{c}6$, and Kasparov said after the game that he would not have minded playing this position. The sacrifice of
the a-pawn is stronger if White can recapture on e5 with pieces, to keep lines open and prevent ... \( \text{e6} \) to consolidate. So the merit of the sacrifice 26 \( \text{fxe5} \) may depend upon the strength of Keene’s move 27 \( \text{dxd4} \).

26 ... \( \text{gxe5} \)
27 \( \text{fxe5} \) \( \text{e6} \)

The position is now equal.

28 \( \text{Ac2} \) \( \text{xf1}+ \)
29 \( \text{exf1} \) \( \text{f8} \)
30 \( \text{xf8}+ \) \( \text{xxf8} \)
31 \( \text{g4} \)
31 ... \( \text{xf7} \)? \( \text{Ah7}+ \).
32 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{f7} \) [8] 33 \( \text{d4}! \)

White has to be a little careful:

a) 33 \( \text{xf7}+ \)? \( \text{xf7} \) is a mistake; White loses time compared to the game, and this is costly: 34 \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 35 \( \text{e8} \) b6 36 \( \text{xb6} \) \( \text{xb6} \) (Compare this position to the game; White’s king is much farther away from the b2 and c3 pawns) 37 \( \text{xa6} \) \( \text{e3} \) and both the pawns will fall, while Black defends d5 from e6 with the king.

b) 33 \( \text{g3} \)? might also be okay, though: 33 ... \( \text{h6} \) (33 ... \( \text{xf4} \) 34 \( \text{gxf4} \) \( \text{f7} \) [34 ... \( \text{h6} \) 35 \( \text{f3} \) 35 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{c5} \) 36 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c6} \)) 34 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c1} \) 35 \( \text{e2} \) and not 35 ... \( \text{xb2} \)? because of 36 e6.

33 ... \( \text{f1}+ \) 34 \( \text{g1} \) \( \text{g1}+ \)
34 ... \( \text{xf4} \) 35 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{d1} \) 35 ... \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{d1} \) 36 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{e1}+ \) 37 \( \text{g1} \) and Black is making no progress.

35 \( \text{g1} \) \( \text{f7} \) 36 \( \text{g4} \) b6 ½–½

If 36 ... \( \text{c5}+ \) 37 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{e3} \) 38 \( \text{c8} \) \( \text{c1} \) (38 ... \( \text{b6} = \) 39 \( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{e6} \) 40 \( \text{xb6} \) \( \text{xb6} \) 41 \( \text{c8}+ \) and suddenly the a-pawn is a goer.

After the text move Kasparov offered a draw. The position is completely drawn, i.e. 37 \( \text{axb6} \) \( \text{c5}+ \) 38 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{xb6} \) 39 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{c7} \) 40 e6+ \( \text{f6} \) 41 h3 h5 42 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{xex6} \) 43 \( \text{d2} \). Black has an extra pawn but absolutely no advantage. White puts the king on c2 and keeps the bishop on f3, and Black will never make any progress.

After 3 games: Kasparov 1½, Anand 1½
Friday, 15 September 1995

Game 4 was rather strange. It had flashes of excellent play intermingled with moments of flaccid, nervous play. And all in just 21 moves. This game clearly indicates that both players were shaken by the turn of events in game 3. Kasparov must have been very upset to have been so close to getting blown off the board just a few moves out of the opening, and Anand was upset with himself to have missed a fairly obvious sacrifice after having played such a superb move to set it up.

The reaction by both players was caution and timidiry. At several points in this game, each player steered for the draw when he could have played more ambitiously. This was a trend we would see from both players through the first eight games of the match.

KASPAKOV–ANAND, NEW YORK (m/4) 1995
ENGLISH OPENING A17

1 e4!

We were still expecting 1 e4, figuring that if Kasparov had not shown anything against the Nimzo-Indian, he would try to see what he could achieve on the other side of the board. The way Kasparov played is patient, not trying for any advantage, just setting up a tense position and seeing whether he can outplay Anand with the white pieces.

1 ... e6 2 c4 e6 3 d4 f5 4 g3 0–0 5 d5 c5 6 b3 c5 7 0–0

Of course, Black should stop White from playing g5, which would put intolerable pressure on the d5 pawn.

9 c3!

Also possible is 9 a3, when there might follow: 9 ... a5! 10 bxc3 d4 (10 ... a5 11 e5! c5 12 x e5 b6 13 b3) 11 c2
a5 (11 ... e5? 12 b4!) 12 Af4 (12 c3 e5) 12 ... Ah5!? 13 Ae5 (13 Ad2 e5) 13 ... Ax4f 14 Axc6 Ax2+ 15 Axe2 bxc6 16 Axc6 Ab8. There isn't any experience with the position after move eight in the game—at least not in my database of recent games. Perhaps this is one of those times when we must look at the games of the past to relearn what to do.

9 ... Ae8!

This is a superb move. Anand told me that his original thought was 9 ... b6, but he realized that although the move looks normal, it doesn't really address the needs of Black's position, to wit: 10 a3! and now:

a) 10 ... Axc3 11 Wxc3 Ab7 12 b3! is slightly better for White, but less good is 12 b4 Axb4 13 axb4 dxc4 14 dxc4 (14 Wxc4 Axc8 is unclear) 14 ... Ae4 15 Wb3 a5! when Black gets good counterplay against White's overextended queenside pawns.

b) 10 ... dxc4 11 dxc4 (11 Axc4? Aa5 12 Wa2 Axc3 13 bxc3 Ab7 is slightly better for Black) 11 ... Aa5 (11 ... Axc3 12 Wxc3 Ab7 13 b3! with the idea of 14 Ab2 is pleasantly better for White)—once again, it would be a mistake for White to push the pawn to b4 where it would just give Black counterplay.) 12 Axc2 Axc3 13 Wxc3 Ab7 (13 ... Axc7 14 Ad2 Ab7 15 b4 Ag2 16 Ag2 Ac6 17 Ab2 =) 14 b4 Ac6 (14 ... Ae4?? 15 Ac2 wins a piece) 15 Ab2 =.

Anand's idea is to eschew ... b6 altogether, instead playing for ... e6-e5 in the center.

10 a3
10 Aa4!
10 ... dxc4
10 ... Axc3 was also possible, to go for a Modern Benoni setup, i.e., 11 Axc3 d4 (11 ... dxc4? 12 Wxc4 is just better for White) 12 exd4 (12 Ac2 a5) 12 ... exd4 13 Ac2 a5, as was suggested by Nick de Firmian during the game. After 14 Ad2 (14 Ab1 e5 15 b4 axb4 16 axb4 e4? 17 dxe4 d3 is unclear) 14 ... e5 15 Ab1, the game is very sharp.

Bad, however, is 10 ... Aa5 11 Aa4!, as pointed out by the bulletin, which mentions this line as an example: 11 ... Ae7 12 Ac2 b6 13 exd5 exd5 14 b4!

11 dxc4 Axc3 12 Axc3 e5 13 b4 e4 14 Ad2

[1]

This was the position Anand had envisioned when he played 9 ... Ae8. His intuition had told him that Black should stand well, but now he had to find a concrete continuation. In fact he chose a promising idea, but with the wrong follow-up in mind. A less incisive but still quite reasonable way to go was 14 ... Af5, as suggested by many people including Seirawan, who gave the continuation 15 Ab3 cxb4 16 a xb4 Ae5 with a sharp and unclear position.
14 ... \( \mathcal{e}e7 \) 15 \( b5 \)

This must have been Kasparov's intention a few moves earlier, but it
was not impossible to play 15 \( bx\mathcal{c}5 \) \( \mathcal{xe}5 \) 16 \( \mathcal{b}2 \). Kasparov's continua-
tion is more ambitious but also more risky.

15 ... \( \mathcal{d}e5 \! \)

There is really no question about this move. If Black were to retreat the
knight to \( d8 \) or \( b8 \), White would have too easy a time after 16 \( \mathcal{b}2 \).

16 \( \mathcal{d}xe4 \) \textbf{[2]}

Nor was there a question about this. After 16 \( \mathcal{b}2 \) \( \mathcal{f}5 \) (16 ... \( \mathcal{d}3?! \)), Black has a pleasant advantage at no cost. But now how should Black play?

16 ... \( \mathcal{f}3+?! \)

This clever idea is actually a mistake. Black had two other moves:

\( a \) The first is 16 ... \( \mathcal{d}xe4 \) 17 \( \mathcal{c}xe4 \) \( \mathcal{d}xc4 \) (the bulletin points out that 17 ... \( \mathcal{h}3? \) is strongly met by
18 \( \mathcal{b}2 \! \) \( \mathcal{xf}1 \) 19 \( \mathcal{xf}1 \), when White has tremendous compensation for his tiny material investment), which
is the obvious continuation, and was in fact Anand's first idea several moves earlier when he had first envis-
ioned this position. After 18 \( \mathcal{d}d5 \) (18 \( \mathcal{xc}4? \) \( \mathcal{xe}4 \) is good for Black; 19 \( \mathcal{xc}5?! \) is suicide: 19 ... \( \mathcal{h}3 \) 20 \( \mathcal{f}d3 \) 21 \( \mathcal{xe}1 \) \( \mathcal{ac}8 \) 22 \( \mathcal{xa}7 \) \( \mathcal{xc}2 \! \) ) 18 ... \( \mathcal{b}6 \)
(18 ... \( \mathcal{e}5?! \) 19 \( \mathcal{xc}4 \) \( \mathcal{xa}1 \) 20 \( \mathcal{xf}7+ \) ) 19 \( \mathcal{b}2 \) \( \mathcal{g}5 \)
20 \( \mathcal{b}3 \! \) (not 20 \( \mathcal{g}2 \) \( \mathcal{a}4 \)) is unclear, might be prom-
ising for White. Still, if Black did not have the strong-
er line considered in variation \( b \), this would be
acceptable, and better than what Anand played.
b) Much stronger is 16 ... \( \text{Ah3} \! \) as I suggested to Ilya Gurevich as we were watching the game together (later I learned that Pal Benko had also suggested it around the same time). How should White reply?

\[ b1 \] 17 \( \text{A} \times \text{h} 3 \) \( \text{Af} 3+! \) (Anand told me afterward that he had seen 16 ... \( \text{Ah3} \! \), but that he had not seen this move, which Kasparov mentioned to him just after they agreed to the draw. If Black does not have this move, he would have to play 17 ... \( \text{D} \times \text{e} 4 \) 18 \( \text{W} \times \text{c} 2 \) \( \text{d} 6 \) [18 ... \( \text{Df} 3+ \) 19 \( \text{g} 2 \! \) makes a critical difference for White's defense—the king does not have to go to \( h1 \), so Black cannot coordinate the knights in time, i.e., 19 ... \( \text{f} 5 \! \) 20 \( \text{Af} 5 \! \) 19 ... \( \text{D} \times \text{g} 5 \) 20 \( \text{Ag} 4 \! \) 19 ... \( \text{F} \text{ad} 8 \) 20 \( \text{Xf} 3 \) \( \text{Xf} 6+ \) 21 \( \text{g} 2 \) \( \text{X} \times \text{a} 1 \) 22 \( \text{L} \text{b} 2 \) \( \text{X} \times \text{a} 2 \) 23 \( \text{F} \text{a} 1 \) 19 \( \text{Ag} 2 \), and the game should favor the two bishops) 18 \( \text{h} 1 \) (now 18 \( \text{g} 2 \! \) is strongly met by 18 ... \( \text{C} \times \text{e} 4 \! \), 19 \( \text{h} 1 \) \( \text{D} \times \text{g} 4 \! \)) 18 ... \( \text{X} \times \text{e} 4 \) 19 \( \text{w} \times \text{c} 2 \? \) (19 \( \text{b} 2 \! \) is a better move, but Black stands well after 19 ... \( \text{F} \text{ad} 8 \) [19 ... \( \text{D} \times \text{g} 5 \) 20 \( \text{Ag} 2 \) \( \text{f} 5 \) is just unclear] and White is tied up badly, e.g., 20 \( \text{g} 2 \) \( \text{d} 2 \! \) 19 ... \( \text{w} 5 \) 20 \( \text{Ag} 2 \) (20 \( \text{F} \text{b} 2 \) \( \text{h} 5 \) 21 \( \text{D} \times \text{g} 2 \) \( \text{D} \times \text{g} 5 \) 22 \( \text{D} \times \text{g} 5 \) \( \text{F} \times \text{e} 4 \! \) and 23 ... \( \text{h} 4 \! \) is coming, e.g., 23 \( \text{F} \text{d} 1 \) \( \text{h} 4 \! \) 24 \( \text{g} 4 \) \( \text{X} \times \text{h} 3 \! \) 25 \( \text{gxh} 5 \) \( \text{D} \times \text{h} 4 \! \) 20 ... \( \text{c} \times \text{a} 1 \) 21 \( \text{L} \text{b} 2 \) (21 \( \text{D} \times \text{f} 3 \) \( \text{w} 5 \) 22 \( \text{L} \text{b} 2 \) \( \text{f} 5 \) 23 \( \text{D} \times \text{g} 2 \) \( \text{F} \text{ad} 8 \) is clearly better for Black) and while it may look like Black's queen is trapped, take a look at 21 ... \( \text{D} \times \text{e} 1 \! \) 22 \( \text{w} 2 \) \( \text{a} 2 \) 23 \( \text{D} \times \text{e} 1 \) \( \text{F} \text{ad} 8 \) 24 \( \text{c} 1 \) \( \text{b} 3 \).

\[ b2 \] 17 \( \text{X} \times \text{f} 6 \! \) \( \text{D} \times \text{f} 6 \) and now:

\[ b21 \] 18 \( \text{A} \times \text{h} 3 \? \) \( \text{D} \times \text{f} 3 \) wins the queen.

\[ b22 \] 18 \( \text{e} 4 \) \( \text{D} \text{ad} 8 \) (18 ... \( \text{D} \times \text{g} 2 \) 19 \( \text{w} \times \text{g} 2 \) \( \text{w} 6 \) isn't bad either) 19 \( \text{L} \text{b} 2 \) (19 \( \text{f} 4 \) \( \text{D} \times \text{g} 2 \) 20 \( \text{w} \times \text{g} 2 \) \( \text{D} \times \text{c} 4 \! \) is very good for Black, because after 21 \( \text{D} \times \text{f} 6 \) \( \text{g} \times \text{f} 6 \), Black's shattered kingside pawns are not as important as White's weak e-pawn and Black's strong queenside, as well as the strong domination of the White bishop by the powerful \( \text{D} \times \text{c} 4 \)!) 19 ... \( \text{D} \times \text{g} 2 \) 20 \( \text{w} \times \text{g} 2 \) \( \text{d} 4 \), and Black has a large advantage.

\[ b23 \] 18 \( \text{L} \text{b} 2 \) \( \text{D} \times \text{g} 2 \) (18 ... \( \text{D} \times \text{g} 3 \! \) 19 \( \text{D} \times \text{b} 3 \) \( \text{D} \times \text{f} 1 \) [19 ... \( \text{D} \times \text{f} 3 \)??]}
20 $\text{g7} \text{ mate]} 20 \text{x} f6 \text{gxf6} 21 \text{a7} 22 \text{c6} =) 19 \text{g2} \text{f7}+ 20 \text{g1, and now I think the best move is 20 ... h5! threatening a quick 21 ... h4, making White's king position tender. Less accurate is 20 ... \text{d8} 21 \text{c2} h5 22 \text{xe5!}, when 22 ... \text{xe5} probably gives Black about enough for the pawn, but not more, and 22 ... h4? 23 \text{f1! h3 24 \text{f1}} suddenly gives White a winning position.

b3) 17 \text{b2} \text{g2} (17 ... \text{a4}? 18 \text{xe4} \text{f1} 19 \text{f1} with the idea of 20 f4 gives White good compensation in his powerful bishops and extra center pawn) 18 \text{xf6}+ \text{xf6} 19 \text{g2} \text{f3}+ transposes to "b23."

b4) 17 \text{h1} is a slightly wacky possibility. White gets a certain amount of compensation for the exchange: 17 ... \text{a4} 18 \text{xe4} \text{f1} 19 \text{xf1} \text{a5} 20 \text{d5! d5} 20 ... \text{e5?} 21 \text{xe4} \text{xf1} 22 \text{f7+ \text{h8} 23 \text{xe8} \text{xe8} 24 \text{xc5} is not good, but 20 ... \text{d6?} 21 \text{b2} \text{g5} 22 \text{xc5 d8} \text{ad8} is interesting) 21 \text{b2} \text{ad8} 22 \text{e4 and White threatens 23 f4, so Black should either play 23 ... \text{f6} or 23 ... \text{xd5 24 exd5 f6 25 \text{e1} \text{f8. My feeling is that Black should be able to prove an advantage, but the position is murky."

b5) 17 \text{d2} \text{xg2} 18 \text{xg2} \text{ad8} is unclear. Black has fairly good compensation for the pawn because of his lead in development and White's weaknesses on both sides of the board. Still, a pawn is a pawn, so the most I will say is "unclear." One cute line is 19 \text{b2} b6! 20 \text{xe5?? b7+!}
... and the players discuss the game while Arbiter Carol Jarecki looks on.

Anand's idea was to liquidate the position and reach a positional draw. White would have an extra pawn but also a weak c4 pawn and opposite colored bishops, thereby giving Black enough counterplay for equality. There are two flaws with this idea. First, White has a simple tactical trick that allows him not to trade his light-squared bishop for the e4-knight, and second, even when he does do so, the position is not so dead-drawn as both players thought.

17 AxB Exe4 18 Ax4?

Several days later, we were chatting about something else, and somehow the subject turned to this game. Anand then admitted rather sheepishly that he had realized during the interim that this move was not forced, as he and Kasparov and virtually all the other grandmasters had thought, because after 18 Ac2 Af5, White can play simply 19 Ab2!, when Black cannot play 19 ... Exg3?? because of 20 Ac3 ++. But that means that White gains a crucial tempo that allows him to consolidate his extra pawn: 19 ... Ae6 (to defend the Af5) 20 Ac2 Ad8 21 Ad1, and White is up a solid pawn, although the weakness of his queenside and Black's well-centralized pieces do still give Black some chances to drum up play.

18 ... Exe4 19 Fc3 Ae7 20 e4 Ae6 [3]

At this point, I was nervous that Anand was going to have to defend a worse position for a long time. All the other grandmasters were anticipating a long game to come. Moments later those of us in the press
room saw on the monitor that the players were shaking hands. Draw? What had happened?

What had happened is that Kasparov had played his next move and offered a draw, which Anand had immediately accepted.

21 $a3 \frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}$

After this move, it is true that White has no advantage, because Black plays ... $\text{ad}8$, ... b6, ... f6, ... $\text{tf}7$, and Black has good counterplay against White's c-pawn. But the text move is not the best. Better is 21 $\text{ab}2!$ f6 22 e5! f5 (22 ... $\text{fxe}5$ 23 $\text{ae}1$ opens up lines for White, and if 23 ... $\text{tf}7$ 24 $\text{xc}5$ $\text{xc}4?$, then 25 $\text{tf}5!$ wins for White) 23 $\text{fd}1$ $\text{tf}7$ (23 ... $\text{ad}8$ 24 $\text{ed}6!$) 24 $\text{ac}1$. Black is certainly not dead, but White has every reason to continue.

It was a strange case of double-blindness. Both players seemed almost hypnotized by the idea that the position was leading inexorably to a draw, when in fact there were many subtle twists and turns possible at every move.

After 4 games: Kasparov 2, Anand 2
GAME 5

Monday, 18 September 1995

When an opening variation works as well as Anand's play did in game 3, you have to repeat it if you don't think there is anything wrong with it. So of course Anand repeated the variation in this game, and of course Kasparov anticipated it. Kasparov must have put in some good preparation because he played the opening superbly. After equalizing easily he even achieved an advantage, but missed one crucial move in an important variation. After playing less strongly than he could have,
Kasparov was content to draw. This was the fifth draw in a row, and more remarkably, the fifth draw offer in a row by Kasparov.

**ANAND–KASPAROV, NEW YORK (m/5) 1995**

**SICILIAN DEFENSE B85**

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 cxd4 f6 5 c3 a6 6 6 0–0 e6 7 0–0 e7 8 a4 c6 9 e3 0–0

10 f4 c7 11 h1 e8 12 d3 b4 13 a5 d7 14 f3 f6!

An early indication that Kasparov had done his homework. He does not let his queen get in the way of his queen’s rook as it did in game 3.

15 e2 c6 16 b6 b8

This was one of the ideas we had looked at against Black’s 14th move, and we had thought that White had good chances for an opening advantage. But we had not taken enough notice of the plan Kasparov chose here:

17 ... d3! 18 cxd3 d5! [2]

When Black turns a Scheveningen Sicilian into a French Defense structure, he is normally consigned to passivity if his knight cannot hop to e4 or White has not weakened himself with an early g4 push. In this case the position of White’s bishop on b6 gives Black extra chances.

19 f3

Anand played this after a long think, and was clearly not happy. Neither was his team, by the way. White had several choices and it is difficult to tell what is best:

a) Most principled is 19 e5 d7, when White must go after Black’s king to compensate for Black’s play on the queenside. If White rescues the bishop by 20 dxc6 bxc6 (or even 20 ... dxc6), Black’s play on the queenside will be more than equal to White’s nebulous attack on the kingside. Thus White should sacrifice the pawn, but it is hard to drum up enough play:

a1) 20 h5 d6 21 axb6 c5 22 f3 makes sense, to threaten 23 g5, but Black is in no rush to capture the b6 pawn, and after 23 ... f8! it is not clear that White’s attack will be sufficient.

a2) 20 g4 and:

a21) 20 ... c5 21 c2 a6 22 a5 (22 a6 d8 is also interesting) 22 a6 d6 23 f3! was suggested by Larry Christiansen in Chess Life. His idea is to follow up with g3-h5 or g3 and
f4-f5, and I must say this looks like a crucial test.

a22) 20 ... \( \text{\$x} \text{b6} 21 \text{axb6} \text{\$c}5 22 \text{\$f3} \text{\$xb6} 23 \text{f5?!} \) (23 \( \text{\$e}2 \)
intending \( \text{\$g3} \) is similar to Christiansen's suggestion mentioned above, and in my opinion is a more promising way to continue) \text{exf5} 24 \( \text{\$xf5} \text{\$d8!} \) is given by Seirawan in *Inside Chess.* The point of Black's last move is to prevent \( \text{\$g5} \). After Black's last move Seirawan concludes, "White's compensation isn't convincing." I agree.

b) Another way to play on the kingside is 19 \( \text{\$f3} \text{\$d7} 20 \text{\$af1} \) (20 \( \text{\$xc6} \text{bxc6} 21 \text{\$a4} \) [21 \( \text{\$g1} \text{\$c5 =} \) 21 ... \( \text{\$d8 =} \) 20 ... \( \text{\$xb6} 21 \text{axb6} \text{\$c5} 22 \text{\$xc6} \text{\$xh6} (22 ... \text{\$bxh6} 23 \text{\$g3} \) or 23 \( \text{\$h3} \) is unclear) and White should continue 23 \( \text{\$h3} \) or 23 \( \text{\$g3} \). White has lost the game on the queenside, and now the question is whether he has enough material to crash through where Black's king lives. My guess is no, but I'm not confident enough to call this position anything other than unclear.

c) An interesting suggestion was made by Seirawan: 19 \( \text{f5?!} \text{c5} \) (19 ... \text{exf5?} 20 \( \text{\$xf5} \text{dx}4 21 \text{\$d4!} \) is good for White, but 19 ... \text{dx}4 20 \text{\$xe6}\text{f6} \text{might be okay, although of course the best Black could hope for against good play would be equality) 20 \( \text{\$xc6} \text{bxc6} 21 \text{\$a4 [3], and Seirawan stops here, saying White has "pressure against Black's queenside." My analysis continues:}

c1) 21 ... \( \text{\$d7} 21 \text{\$f1c1} \text{\$d8} 22 \text{\$c3?!} \) could be quite nice for White, as he protects the b6 square indirectly by the possibility of pinning a piece that would land there, and also enables the rooks to double along the c-file.

c2) Therefore, more promising for Black is 21 ... \text{c5?! with the idea of 22 ... \text{c4. White can meet this by:}

c21) 22 \( \text{\$e3} \text{d4!} 23 \text{\$a4} \) (23 \( \text{\$d1} \text{\$d7} \) and 23 \( \text{\$d5} \text{\$xd5} 24 \text{ex}d5 \text{\$d8 are good for Black) 23 ... \text{c4!} 24 \text{\$xc4} \text{\$b7} 25 \text{\$ae1} \text{\$b4 wins the e-pawn and gives Black a massive center, as after 26 \( \text{\$d3} \text{\$c6} 27 \text{\$b3} \text{\$xe1} 28 \text{\$xe1} \text{\$d7} (28 ... \text{\$g4?!} \) I don't think White has quite enough for the exchange.

c22) 22 \text{\$b3} \text{\$b7} 23 \text{\$ae1} \text{\$xe4} 24 \text{\$xe4} \text{c4!} 25 \text{\$xc6} \text{\$d6} is better for Black.

c23) 22 \text{\$ex}d5 \text{c4?!} (22 ... \text{\$xd5} 23 \text{\$ae1 looks fine for White, e.g., 23 ... \text{\$bx}6 24 \text{\$xb6} \text{\$c6} 25 \text{\$c4!} \text{\$d6} 26 \text{\$f3} \) and now White has another choice:

c231) 23 \text{\$ae1} \text{\$d6!} (23 ... \text{\$xd3 24 \$xd3 \$g4 25 \$h3 dampens Black's initiative) 24 \text{\$xc6} \text{\$c5?!} (also 24 ... \text{\$xh2 is unclear) 25 \text{\$xc5 \$b5 26 \$b4 \$exd3 27 \$f3 \text{\$e4 28 \$cd1} \text{\$d2 ties White up.}

c232) 23 \text{\$xe4} \text{\$d6 24 \text{\$c3 \$xh2 and 25 ... \text{\$e5 gives Black two juicy targets: White's king and his center.}
Anand-Kasparov

... c23) 23 ... d3 (23 ... d6 24 xe4) 24 bxc3 d6 is unclear, but offers White the best chance of the three choices to avoid being worse.

19 ... d7 20 xc6
20 exd5 exd5 21 xc5 d6 22 h5 d6 (24 ... d6? Seirawan) 25 xe5 xb6 is better for Black.
20 ... bxc6 21 a4 e6!
Kasparov pointed out after the game that 21 ... d8 gives White too much play against the center and on the kingside.

22 e3 b4 23 fc1 c5 24 f3 d6 25 c3 e8!

Alternatives:

a) 25 ... b2 26 exd5 exd5 27 d5 d5 28 d5 =.

b) 25 ... d4 26 e5! d7 (26 ... dxc3 27 bxc3 and 28 exf6 is about equal) 27 c4 c4 28 dxc4 dxc4 29 c8 c8 30 c3 xa5 (30 ... xa4?? 31 c1+ 32 a1 c5 33 d4 --; 30 ... c4 31 c3 b5 32 b6!) 31 b3 is about equal, but not 31 c3! b5 32 d1 c5! which wins a pawn for Black.

26 exd5 [4] exd5?

In the press conference after the game, Kasparov pointed out that he missed a way to play for more: 26 ... b6 27 bxc3 c8 28 b5! (28 ... d6 29 b6 c4 30 b4!) 29 c4 b5 30 d4 c4 31 d5 (I tried to make 31 b3 work, but after 31 ... ec6 32 c4 [32 c3 cb3!] 32 c4 c5 33 c4 c4 x4 Black is better, e.g., 34 b6 c1+ 35 c1 f1+ 36 f1 b8) 31 ... d6 32 c3 cd8 [5] and Black has the more active pieces and lots of white weaknesses to hit. This would have given Anand a tough uphill battle for a draw. Fortunately, Kasparov missed 28 ... b5 in his calculations, so Anand drew easily.

27 d5 d5 ½–½

A draw was agreed on Kasparov’s proposal because after 28 x5 Axb6 29 b6 c4 the game is level.

Solid play and a little luck allowed Anand to escape from a bad opening. We were put to work to make sure that he would get more from game 7.

After 5 games: Kasparov 2½, Anand 2½
Tuesday, 19 September 1995

After the boring, rather ordinary short draw of game 5 came ... another short draw. But this game was anything but ordinary or boring. The players reached a very difficult, unclear middlegame that quickly became a very difficult, unclear endgame—which was quickly agreed drawn.

At the time I was very unhappy that the game was drawn so quickly. Specifically, I was unhappy that Anand agreed to the draw in a position that seemed to me to be promising for him. A world championship match is a fight. If you have a position that could be good, then you should not be afraid to play it out even if it is complicated. At least, that was how I felt when this game was drawn.

But now we come to an interesting question. On what basis should a player judge whether to continue the game or not, if his opponent offers him a draw? Assuming that there is no special significance to a draw, the answer has to be that it depends upon his evaluation of the position. (A more sophisticated calculus might try to take into account the probability that his opponent, if forced to fight, will play badly, but for now let's leave that issue aside by claiming that it is almost impossible to make such a judgment accurately except in special situations that need not concern us here.) If you believe that you have better winning chances than losing chances, then you should continue. A player who thinks that his winning chances are at least as good as his losing chances but takes a draw anyway is a coward, and foolish to boot. But on what is a player's evaluation based?

It would be nice to say that one's evaluation is based only on "objective factors" of a position. However, if we think about it for a moment, it becomes clear that it is difficult to define what that could mean. Perhaps
you think that objectivity comes from calculating variations. But according to what criteria does one choose which variations to calculate, and according to what criteria does one choose how to evaluate the positions that arise? Evaluating positions and choosing candidate moves is essentially a subjective process.

So let us agree that chess judgment is an inherently subjective enterprise. It follows that Anand and Kasparov each had to make the best subjective judgment possible. Restating what I thought at the time in the terms we are now using, I can say that I thought Anand's judgment was wrong. That is, it is not that Anand thought he had better winning chances than losing chances, but decided to take the draw. Instead, his judgment was adversely affected by the tension at the time; he was overestimating Kasparov's chances and underestimating his own.

Does this mean there is no way to establish relatively objective criteria for evaluating a position? Of course not. The more analysis that is done, the more a position can be reduced to simpler and simpler judgments, which cannot be swayed by one's mood at the time. Furthermore, one can do analysis at a time when one is mainly motivated by the desire to find the truth, rather than in the heat of the moment, when one is largely motivated by ego, or by nervousness, or by the desire to prove somebody (or oneself) right or wrong.

I have spent more than two days analyzing this game, in the tranquility of my home, far removed from the match in space and time. I now think that I was both right and wrong. I was wrong to think that Anand had the better game in the final position. I must say that while Black had chances no worse than White's, neither were they any better. The game was just a mess. Therefore, Anand's judgment was correct in taking the draw, and may have been better than that of Kasparov, who offered a draw in probably the best position he had had throughout the game. (Even so, the final position is still very murky.)

Having said all this, I am sure that Anand would have happily continued this game against almost anyone at any other time, because he would have been trying to win rather than trying not to lose. The same goes for Kasparov. If you are trying not to lose, you tend to find different moves and evaluate positions differently than if you are trying to win. Both players were uncomfortable after Anand sacrificed the exchange, because it is a position that does not suit someone who wants to win without taking the risk of losing. Rather, it is a position that only suits someone who is trying to win. That each player was eager to draw shows that each player was more afraid of losing than eager to win.

It is hard to account for what causes such a mentality. In a sense, each player locked himself into that mentality and reinforced it in the other. I cannot speculate about what it is in Kasparov that made him feel this way, and I will not speculate about Anand. But the effects were clear.
to all who watched this match. (By the way, this mindset is not at all normal or necessary to a world championship match. For example, I don't think anyone who has looked at the games from Tal–Botvinnik 1960 or Fischer–Spassky 1972 can say that the same dynamic was at work.) Not only did this mentality produce the first eight draws, but once the equilibrium was broken, it also produced the tornado of decisive results from games 9–14.

I think it would have been better for each player to have been less concerned with losing, less afraid of being one or two points down. I think this game shows that Kasparov was at least as afraid as Anand—since Kasparov's judgment seems to have been less correct than Anand's—but one must acknowledge that Kasparov handled the second phase of the match, from games 9–14, much better than did Anand. For that reason, it was more important for Anand to be less afraid.

I must also admit that during the game I was too optimistic for Anand, because my own subjective judgment was affected by my desire to see him win. It's a lot easier to be brave on the sidelines.

What follows is the best "objectively subjective" analysis I could do of game 6. It will not be sufficient because this game was so complex. I hope at least that this analysis does not contain too many mistakes, and that it is a good foundation on which to base whatever final judgment will be made about this terribly difficult, unfortunately incomplete struggle.

**KASPAROV–ANAND, NEW YORK (M/6) 1995**

**SPANISH GAME C80**

1 e4

Kasparov shows that he is out for blood in this game. Since he got nothing in games 2 and 4, he switches to his other main weapon, with which he stays for the rest of the match.

1 ... e5 2 d3 d6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 d5 5 0–0 dxe4

Anand has played almost every opening against 1 e4, but in the last few years he has favored double king-pawn openings in general, and the Open Spanish in particular.

6 d4 b5 7 b3 d5 8 dxe5 A e6 9 A bd2 d6 10 c3 d4 [1]

All of this is well-known opening theory. In particular, Black's last move tries to use Black's active pieces to solve some of his positional problems, such as the weak d-pawn and his general lack of space. In game 10 of the 1978 World Championship match, Karpov unleashed an amazing novelty against
Kasparov–Anand

Korchnoi, a move that has remained critical for the variation as a whole, but that has never been popular with grandmasters because the complications it introduces are so wild and difficult to assess.

11...\(\texttt{Qg5}\)!

By playing this move, Kasparov signals that he has done a lot of homework for this game. Black has three main options now:

a) 11...\(\texttt{Qxg5}\) 12\(\texttt{Qf3}\)! is the tactical justification for putting the knight on g5. Play is very complex now, and the main line is bizarre:

a1) 12...\(\texttt{Qd7}\) 13\(\texttt{Ad5}\)! \(\texttt{hxh5}\) 14\(\texttt{Qxd5}\+\) \(\texttt{Ad6}\) 15\(\texttt{cxex5}\) \(\texttt{Qxd4}\) 16 \(\texttt{Dc4}\)! \(\texttt{Qe2+}\) 17\(\texttt{Qh1}\) \(\texttt{Qf5}\) 18 \(\texttt{Qxd6}\) was very good for White in the game Brondum–Brinck-Clausen, Denmark 1979.

a2) 12...\(\texttt{Qd7}\) 13 \(\texttt{Axf7+}\) \(\texttt{Qe7}\) 14 \(\texttt{Ad5}\)! \(\texttt{Qxe5}\) 15 \(\texttt{Qe2}\) d3 16 \(\texttt{Qe1}\) c6 17 f4 \(\texttt{Qh6}\) was an old recommendation, but I played a game in London, 1990 against Glenn Flear where I showed that 18 \(\texttt{fxe5}\)! followed by 19 \(\texttt{Qf3}\) is actually good for White, because Black’s king is so weak.

a3) 12... \(\texttt{0–0–0}\) is now considered the main line based on one game: 13 \(\texttt{Axex6}\) (13 \(\texttt{Qxc6}\) \(\texttt{Qxe5}\) 14 \(\texttt{Qf3}\) \(\texttt{Qd5}\) 15 \(\texttt{Qxd5}\) \(\texttt{Qxd5}\) is okay for Black, as given by Stean) 13...\(\texttt{fxe6}\) 14 \(\texttt{Qxc6}\) \(\texttt{Qxe5}\) 15 b4 \(\texttt{Qd5}\) 16 \(\texttt{Qxd5}\) exd5 17 \(\texttt{bxc5}\) dxc3 18 \(\texttt{Qb3}\) d4 19 \(\texttt{Axe5}\) \(\texttt{Qe7}\) 20 \(\texttt{Ab4}\) \(\texttt{Qf6}\) 21 a4 \(\texttt{Qd7}\) 22 \(\texttt{axb5}\) axb5, from the game Timman–Smyslov 1979. Now Lillenthal gives 23 \(\texttt{Qfd1}\) \(\texttt{Qe6}\) 24 \(\texttt{Qac1}\) \(\texttt{Qf5}\) 25 f3! \(\texttt{Qhe8}\) 26 \(\texttt{Qd3}\) as clearly better for White, but in such a crazy position, who knows whether this is correct without more practical tests?

b) 11...\(\texttt{Qd5}\) was played by Ivan Sokolov against Anand himself in a game in 1994. In that game, Anand played 12 \(\texttt{Qxd5}\) (12 \(\texttt{Qxf7}\)?? is critical) 12...\(\texttt{Qxex5}\) 13 \(\texttt{Qb3}\) \(\texttt{Qxb3}\) 14 axb3 \(\texttt{Qe7}\) 15 \(\texttt{Qf3}\) \(\texttt{Qxe5}\) (15...\(\texttt{d3}\)?? is critical) 16 \(\texttt{Qxd4}\) \(\texttt{Qg6}\) 17 \(\texttt{Qf3}\) \(\texttt{Qxf3}\) 18 \(\texttt{Qxf3}\) and White had a slight edge, although he later lost the game.

The third option is that played by Anand in this game, also chosen by Korchnoi the first time he faced this position:

11...\(\texttt{dxc3}\) 12 \(\texttt{Qxe6}\) \(\texttt{fxe6}\) 13 \(\texttt{bxc3}\) \(\texttt{Qd3}\) 14 \(\texttt{Qf3}\)

The best move here is 14 \(\texttt{Qc2}\)! as suggested by Tal during the Karpov–Korchnoi match, and as played by Kasparov himself later in game 10.

14... \(\texttt{0–0–0}\)!

Korchnoi played 14...\(\texttt{Qxd1}\), but after 15 \(\texttt{Qxd1}\) \(\texttt{Qe7}\) 16 \(\texttt{Qc3}\) \(\texttt{Qd3}\) 17 \(\texttt{Qb3}\) Karpov was better, although he was actually outplayed in this game and was finally somewhat lucky to draw. Anand’s move is a prepared improvement but the game quickly gets out of foreseen territory.

15 \(\texttt{Qe1}\)!! \(\texttt{Qxb3}\) 16 axb3 \(\texttt{Qb7}\) [2] 17 \(\texttt{Qc3}\)

17 \(\texttt{Qg5}\) right away allows 17...\(\texttt{Qd5}\) 18 b4 (18
c4 bxc4 19 bxc4 ♕xc4 is more dangerous for White than for Black. White loses all the endgames, and Black has an important defensive resource in ... h5) 18 ... h6 19 ♕e3 as suggested by the match bulletin. We can continue:

a) 19 ... g5 (given by the bulletin) 20 ♕a2, and now best is 20 ... ♕g7 with an unclear position, but not 20 ... ♕xe5? 21 ♕xe5 ♕xe5 22 ♕a1 +, or 20 ... g4 21 ♕d4 ♕e5 22 ♕xe6 ♕f3+ 23 ♕xf3 ♕xf3 24 ♕f4 ♕f5 25 ♕h1 +–.

b) But I think better is 19 ... ♕e7 20 ♕a2 ♕f8! 21 ♕a1 (21 ♕d2 ♕xh3) 21 ... ♕xf3 22 ♕xf3 ♕g6+ 23 ♕h1 ♕h5.

17 ... ♕e7 18 ♕g5?! Kasparov’s idea is to force the exchange of bishops, thus weakening the c5 square.

18 ... h6
18 ... ♕he8?!
19 ♕xe7 ♕xe7 20 ♕d4 ♕xd4!

This is absolutely forced because passive defense would lead to disaster, e.g. 20 ... ♕g6? 21 b4! ♕d5 22 ♕b3 ♕f4 23 ♕c5+ ♕c8 24 g3 ♕d3 25 ♕e3 +–. Anand’s understanding is far too good for him to fail to realize that he must sacrifice the exchange, and of course he had foreseen this necessity several moves earlier, but it still takes a lot of energy to play such sharp chess. And this was only a few moves out of preparation. Now the game gets really tough for both players ...

21 ♕xd4 ♕xb3! [3]

This is the correct pawn to take. It would be a disaster to capture on d4: 21 ... ♕xd4? 22 ♕d1! (The important thing for White is to break through to the d7 and e4 squares.) 22 ... ♕f4 (22 ... ♕c5 23 ♕e4+ ♕d5 24 ♕c1! [24 ♕g6 ♕e7] 24 ... ♕e7 [24 ... ♕b4 25 ♕c2 +] 25 ♕fd1 +) 23 ♕d7 ♕e8 (23 ... ♕f5? 24 ♕c3 ♕c8 25 ♕c1 +–) 24 ♕c1! ♕xc1 (24 ... ♕xe5 25 ♕e1 +–) 25 ♕xc1 ♕d5 26 ♕xg7 +.

There are also very good general reasons to capture the b3 pawn. Black wants the two connected passed pawns on the queenside, and it is very much in Black’s interest to keep as many files closed for as long as possible, so it makes sense not to open the d-file. But such general considerations need to be supplemented by a lot of calculation.

Now what should White play? He has a very difficult choice, and Kasparov spent over half an hour making it.

22 ♕e3?!

Kasparov decides to go for an extremely tricky endgame. There were also two tempting ways to try to prosecute his initiative in the middlegame:
a) 22 \( \text{c1?!} \) and now Black has three interesting moves (22 ... \( \text{d5?!} \) 23 \( \text{a3} \) – is not one of them):

\[ a1 \] 22 ... \( \text{d5} \) at first looks like a mistake, but it turns out to be much less clear than it seems. 23 \( \text{x}a6 \) (23 \( \text{c5} \) \( \text{b4}! \) If Black can reach an endgame then in general he has a good position because White’s rooks are passive. Jumping ahead a bit, we can see that Kasparov was only willing to trade queens because in recapturing with the f-pawn, White opens the f-file for his rook and also creates another e-pawn to drive the knight away from the d5 square) 23 ... \( \text{x}a6 \) (23 ... \( \text{c3} \)? 24 \( \text{a}1 \) \( \text{a}4 \) 25 \( \text{b}1 \) ! \( \text{x}b1+ \) 26 \( \text{x}b1 \) \( \text{x}a6 \) 27 \( \text{g}6 \) is winning for White, because the b-pawn is much less good for generating counterplay than the a-pawn that results in the main line) 24 \( \text{c}6+ \) \( \text{a}5 \) (24 ... \( \text{b}6 \) 25 \( \text{a}1+ \) \( \text{a}4 \) 26 \( \text{x}a4+ \) \( \text{b}xa4 \) 27 \( \text{x}e6 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 28 \( \text{f}4! \) \( \text{x}d4 \) 29 \( \text{f5} \) a3 30 \( \text{f}6 \) \( \text{c}4 \) 31 \( \text{f}7 \) a2 32 \( \text{f}8/\text{e}7 \) \( \text{a}1+ \) \( \text{f}1 \) ++) 25 \( \text{a}1+ \) (25 \( \text{xe}6 \) is unclear) 25 ... \( \text{a}4 \) (25 ... \( \text{b}4 ?? \) 26 \( \text{c}5 \) mate) 26 \( \text{a}4+ \) \( \text{b}4 \) 27 \( \text{c}5+ \) (27 \( \text{xe}6 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 28 \( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 29 \( \text{c}5+ \) \( \text{b}3 \) is unclear) 27 ... \( \text{a}6 \) 28 \( \text{c}4+ \) \( \text{a}5 \) 29 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{b}8 \) ![4] is again unclear.

It looks very dangerous to give the queen and several pawns for two rooks, but the resulting a-pawn is a force to be reckoned with.

I would not be surprised if White had some way to prove an advantage, but it’s not obvious what it is.

\[ a2 \] 22 ... \( \text{a}8 \) and:

\[ a21 \] 23 \( \text{c}5?! \) \( \text{c}6 \) (23 ... \( \text{d}5 \)? 24 \( \text{e}c1 \) 24 \( \text{e}c1 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 25 \( \text{x}d5 \) \( \text{exd5} \) is unclear.

\[ a22 \] 23 \( \text{a}3 \) \( \text{b}4 \) (23 ... \( \text{d}5 \) 25 \( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{x}d4 \) 26 \( \text{x}e6 \) \( \text{c}3 \) 27 \( \text{h}1 \) a5 and “Black is doing fine.” I think that assessment is correct, as can be illustrated by the following variation in which both sides directly push their passed pawns: 28 \( \text{f}4 \) a4 29 \( \text{f}5 \) a3 30 \( \text{f}6 \) a2 and now:

\[ a221 \] 31 \( \text{b}2 \) \( \text{c}4! \) – ++ .

\[ a222 \] 31 \( \text{a}1 \) \( \text{c}4 \) 32 \( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{x}e6 \) 33 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{c}4 \) ! 34 \( \text{d}3+ \) (34 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{x}c1+ \) 35 \( \text{x}c1 \) a1/\( \text{c} \) ++) 34 \( \text{x}c4 \) \( \text{bxc}4 \) 35 \( \text{a}1 \) \( \text{gxf}6 \) 36 \( \text{exf}6 \) c3 37 \( \text{f}7 \) c2 ++) 34 ... \( \text{c}6 \) 35 \( \text{a}1 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 36 \( \text{h}1 \) \( \text{gxf}6 \) 37 \( \text{exf}6 \) b4 38 \( \text{f}7 \) b3 – ++ .

\[ a223 \] 31 \( \text{x}g7 \) a1/\( \text{c} \) 32 \( \text{x}a1 \) \( \text{a}1 \) 33 \( \text{x}a1 \) \( \text{c}4 \) ! – + with the threat of 34 ... \( \text{d}2+ \) 35 \( \text{h}1 \) \( \text{h}3+ \) and mate.

\[ a224 \] 31 \( \text{f}7 \) a1/\( \text{c} \) 32 \( \text{f}8/\text{c} \) \( \text{x}c1 \) 33 \( \text{f}3+ \) \( \text{c}4 \) 34 \( \text{xc}1 \) \( \text{a}3 \)!! and Black wins.

\[ a222 \] 24 \( \text{a}1 \)?! and now:
a2221) 24 ... Qd5 is possible, but after 25 Bb1 Qc4 Black is hanging on by just a thread. Still, I do not see any clear way for White to increase his advantage.

a2222) 24 ... Qc6?! is sharper: 25 d1 (25 d5?! exd5 26 e6 is unclear) 25 ... Bf8 26 Bxa6 (26 d5 Bxd5 27 Bxd5 exd5 28 Bxa6 [28 e6 a5?] 28 ... Bxd4 [28 ... Bxe7 29 a8] 29 e6 [29 Bxd4 Bxd4 30 a1 b4 31 f1 c5 unclear) 29 ... Bxa1+ 30 Bxa1 Bxe7 31 f4? c5 32 g4 c4 f5 b4 is unclear) 26 ... Bxd4 (26 ... Qxd4?? 27 a7+ wins) 27 a7+ (27 Bb1 Bxb1+ 28 Bxb1 Bxa6 and 27 c1 c4 28 Bb1 [28 Bxc4 Bxc4 29 a8 b4 =] 28 ... Bxb1+ 29 Bxb1 Bxa6 are unclear) 27 ... Qxa7 28 Bxd4 (28 Bxd4? Bxd4 29 Bxd4 c5! is good for Black) 28 ... Bf4 (28 ... Qc5 29 Bd7 Qc6 30 Bg7 Bxe5 [30 ... b4?!] 31 Bxe5 Bxe5 32 f1 b4 33 Bc2 Bb6 [33 ... b3 34 Bb2] 34 f4 =) 29 Bd1 (29 Bb1 c5) 29 ... Bc6 30 Bd7 Bg5! is unclear.

a23) 23 Qf4! is a very strong idea suggested by Anand in New In Chess. His analysis continues 23 ... Bd5 (23 ... Qd5 24 Bd7 Bc3 25 Bf3! 24 Bd7 Bc6 25 ac1 Bd8 (25 ... Bc8 26 Bc5 Bxd4 27 Bf1 ++) 26 Bc5 Bxd4 27 Bxc6 Bc6 28 Bc1+ Bb7 (28 ... Qd5 29 Qc7 Bc6 30 Bf1+ f5 31 Bxg7) 29 Bxc7+ Aa8 30 h3 [5]. with the implication that Black is worse here. Certainly Black’s king is exposed, and his position is very dangerous. If Anand’s analysis and conclusion is right, then Black should avoid 22 ... Ba8.

a3) 22 ... Bb4 23 Bd1 (23 Bc2?!) Bxd4 24 a2 [24 Bfd1 Be5 25 Ba2 Ba8 26 Be1 Bd5] 24 ... Bb6 allows Black to get away with taking a pawn; Anand pointed out in New In Chess that now 23 Qf4 can be met by 23 ... Qd4 24 Bd7 Be7) 23 ... Bb8 (23 ... Qd5 24 a3! [24 Bf2 Bf8 is unclear] 24 ... Bf8 25 Ba1 is dangerous for Black) 24 Bb1 Ba4 25 c5 (25 Bf4 Bf5) 25 ... Qd5 (25 ... Bf7? 26 Ba1 Bb3 27 Bd1 Bf5 is unclear) 26 Bc1 b4 and now:

a31) 27 Bc4 Bb6!! is an amazing resource found by the chessplaying program Fritz. (No good is 27 ... a5 28 Bc1 and the threat of 29 Ba1 is deadly.) Now 28 h3 (28 Bxb4+ Bxb4 29 Bxb4+ Ba8! is okay for Black, since White’s weak back rank prevents the capture of the queen) 28 ... a5 29 Bc1 Ba6! 30 Ba1 Bb5! is unclear.

a32) 27 Ba1 Bb5 (27 ... Bf7 28 Ba5 Ba8 29 Bc5 =) 28 Bxb5+ axb5 is unclear.

I hope you are not too confused by all this, which is to say not more confused than I still am! I can offer no firm conclusions about this position. I only claim that it is very difficult for White to demonstrate an advantage beyond doubt, and that Black has several ways to continue
after 22 \( \text{c1?!} \) My hope is that if anybody wishes to continue the analysis of this position, the analysis here will at least serve as a useful beginning.

\( b) \) 22 \( \text{a5?!} \) is also possible. For some reason this direct and dangerous attacking move did not receive much attention in the press room and was not mentioned even in the bulletin, but it looks quite interesting. Black must defend \( a6 \), so play might continue: 22 ... \( \text{a8} \) 23 \( \text{fc1} \) (23 \( \text{fb1} \) \( \text{d5} \) 24 \( \text{c1} \) \( \text{c6} \) 25 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{b4} \) and either Black captures on \( d4 \), or he trades queens into a good endgame, e.g., 26 \( \text{c4} \) [26 \( \text{ab1?!} \) a5] 26 ... \( \text{xc4} \) 27 \( \text{xc4} \) \( \text{a5} \) 28 \( \text{eac1} \) \( \text{a6} \) 29 d5 [White needs counterplay quickly] 29 ... \( \text{exd5} \) 30 \( \text{c5} \) \( a4 \) 31 \( e6 \) \( b3 \) 32 \( e7 \) \( \text{xc7} \) 33 \( \text{xc7}+ \) \( \text{b6} \) 34 \( \text{xc7} \) \( b2 \) 35 \( \text{b1} \) \( a3 \) and White's extra rook is probably not enough to salvage even a draw) 23 ... \( \text{d5} \) (23 ... \( \text{c6}?! \) 24 \( \text{xc6!} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 25 \( \text{c1}+ \) \( \text{d5} \) 26 \( \text{xc7}+ \) ; 23 ... \( \text{c6} \) is possible, but it's a big concession) 24 \( \text{c5} \) (24 \( \text{cb1} \) \( \text{c4} \); 24 \( \text{ab1} \) \( \text{d3} \)—both unclear, the recurring mantra!) 24 ... \( \text{b2}?! \) (24 ... \( \text{b4}?! \) 25 \( \text{xc7}+ \); 24 ... \( \text{c6} \) 25 \( \text{d2} \) should be better for White—once Black has played ... \( \text{c7-c6} \), it's much harder to defend all the squares; and if 24 ... \( \text{d3} \) then 25 \( \text{ac1} \) \( \text{c8} \) 26 \( \text{a1} \) looks dangerous, because 26 ... \( \text{f4} \) can be met by 27 \( \text{c6} \) \( \text{e2}+ \) 28 \( \text{h1} \) \( \text{c1} \) 29 \( \text{xa6}+ \) \( \text{b8} \) 30 \( \text{c1} \) [30 \( \text{b6}+ \) is a draw of course] 30 ... \( \text{xd4} \) 31 \( \text{xb5}+ \) and White is clearly better) 25 \( \text{ac1} \) \( \text{c8} \), and Black may be holding on by the skin of his teeth, e.g., 26 \( \text{c6} \) \( \text{b6} \).

Kasparov's choice demonstrates an intriguing conception of the position. Whereas during the game most of the grandmasters (including me) thought that White's best chances lay in the middlegame with a direct attack against Black's king, and especially in keeping the queens on, Kasparov decides that White ought to aim for the endgame. As I have already mentioned, this endgame is more favorable than some of the ones reached in the analysis above, because White has an open f-file for his rook to penetrate into Black's position, and the possibility of playing \( e3-e4 \) at the right moment to kick the knight out of \( d5 \). Still, if my analysis of the game is correct, Black's chances in the endgame are not worse, so it may have been correct to keep the queens on after all.

22 ... \( \text{x}3 \) 23 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{d5}! \)

There was some discussion of 23 ... \( \text{f5} \) in the press room, but the move Anand plays is correct: bringing the knight toward the queenside to help with the advance of his connected passed pawns.

24 \( \text{f2}! \)

White correctly brings his king towards the queenside to help blockade the pawns. White's only pieces are rooks and king; rooks are terrible pieces for blockading pawns, so the king is desperately needed.

24 ... \( \text{b6} \)

And of course Black needs his king too.

25 \( \text{e2} \)
I see two other reasonable moves, but the move Kasparov played looks best.

a) 25... Ef1 a5 and now:

a1) 26 e4 Db4 (26... Ef8+ 27 Ec2 [27 Exg3 Ed4 28 Ec1 g5 is unclear] 27... Ed4+ 28 Ed2 Exg2 29 d5 [29 Ef1 Ef4; 29 Eg1 Ef2+] 29... Ed8! 30 Eg1 Ef4 31 Exg7 Exd5 is also good for Black) 27 Ef3 a4 28 Eab1 Ec6 (28... Ec6? 29 Ef1 Ed8 30 Ec7 c5) 29 Ef1 (29 Ec5? Exd4! 30 Exd4 Exd8+ 31 Ec5 c5+; 29 Ec1 Ed8) 29... Ed8 30 Ebd1 Eb4 31 Ec2 a5 is good for Black.

a2) 26 Exe2 a4 (26... Ed8!) 27 Ec5 (27 e4 Eb4 is unclear; 27... Exf4+ 28 Ebd2 Ed8 29 g3 Exg6 30 Ec3 Ec7 is also fine for Black) 27... Ec6 (27... Ee8?? 28 Eac1 Eb4 29 Ee4 a3 is unclear) 28 e4 Eb4 29 Ef1 (29 Ebd2 Ed8 30 Ec1 Ec5 31 Ec3 a5! 32 Exb4 a2 33 Exb2 Ec2+ 34 Ea1 Exb4 35 Ee6 Ec3 ++) 29... Ed8! 30 Ec3 a5=.

b) 25 e4 Db4 26 Exe2 (26 Ef1d1 c6 27 Eac1 a5 28 Ec3 Ed8 29 Ef1 a4) 26... Ed8 27 Ead1 (27 Ef1d1? Exc2) 27... Ec6 28 Ec3 (28 d5 Exe5 29 dxe6 Ec8) 28... a5 is unclear, but seems to give Black enough counterplay, e.g., 29 Ec7 Exe5 30 Exg7 Exc4+ 31 Exe2 a4 32 Gg6 b4 33 Exe6+ Exb5 34 Ec6 Ee8. 25... Ed8! 30 Ec3 a5=

In the press conference after the game, Anand said he had been nervous about 27 e4, and gave the following line: 27... Exb4 (27... Exc3? 28 Exd3 b4 29 Exc4 +--) 28 Exe7 Exc2 29 Ed1 a3 30 Exe6+ Exb7! (30... c6? 31 d5; 30... Exa5 31 Eb6) 31 d5 (31 Exd3 Exd4) 31... a2 32 Exd3 (32 d6? Exd4) 32... a1/Ex 33 Exa1 Exa1 34 Eb3 Eb8 35 Ec7, and Anand said he was worried because his knight seems so out of play, but Seirawan in Inside Chess says that the assembled analysts thought Black was not worse after 35... Exb6, and I think that is right: 36 Exe6+ (36 Exg7 c5!) 36... Exb7! (36... Exc5? 37 Ec6 mate; 36... Exa5 37 Ec6 Eb4 is unclear) 37 Exb2 (37 Ec7 Exb6 =) 37... b4! 38 Exc7 (38 d6 Exd6 39 Exd6 b3) 38... Exb6 39 d6 Exd6 40 Exd6 b3 and Black's play gets there before White's.

27... c5?

In such a difficult position, it is rather harsh to question this move—I only mean to highlight that it seems to turn a position that is at least equal for Black into one that, with best play, is better for White. The correct move seems to be 27... Ed8! and now:

a) 28 e4? Db4 29 Ec3 Ed6! 30 Ed1 b4+ 31 Exe5.

b) 28 Ec1 a5 and now:

b1) 29 Ea1 b4 30 Exg7 c5!

b2) 29 e4 Db4 30 Exc7 (30 Ef3 Ea2++; 30 Exe3 a2) 30... a2 31...
Kasparov–Anand

b7+ (31  a7  a6; 31  c1  x4+ 32  c3  c2+) 31  ...  a5  32  a7+  
a6 33  f1  x4+ 34  c3  a4  35  b2  (35  a1  b6  36  x7  c5)  
35  ...  b6  36  x7  c5.

b3) 29  x7  b4 and now:

b31) 30  g6  (30  b1  c5!)  30  ...  b3  31  x6+  b5  32  c5+  
a4  33  a6  b2  34  c2  f8! and the b-pawn is scoring.

b32) 30  c2  f8! (30  ...  x3+  31  b3  x4+  32  x7  d5  
33  c6+  b7  34  x6  d3+  35  c4  a2  36  x3  b3  37  f6!  x6  
[37  ...  b2  38  f1]  38  c3  ++)  31  b3  (31  g6  f2+  32  d3  b3  
c6+  b7)  31  ...  f2  32  c2  f1! is strong, e.g., 33  a2  c3+  34  
cxc3 bxc3 and one of the pawns queens.

c) 28  x7  c5  29  x5+  (29  g6  c7!  30  c3  x4+  [Anand  
suggests 30  ...  c4!  31  e4  a5  32  xh6  c8! in  New  In  Chess]  31  
x4  a5  seems to give Black good play, e.g., 32  xh6 [32  g7  b4+  33  c4  
c5]  32  ...  b4+  33  c4  b3  34  c3  (34  b1  c5]  34  ...  b5+  35  b2  
x4)  29  ...  x5  30  c1+  (30  g4  b6+  31  d4  [31  c3  b4+!]  31  
x4+  32  d4  x4 and Black's passed pawns are very dangerous)  30  ...  
a6  (30  ...  b4+? is interesting, e.g., 31  b1+  (31  g4+  
a5  32  d4  f8  33  d1  a3)  31  ...  a5  32  g4  b4  33  d4  b8)  31  g4  f4+?!  32  c2  
[?] and now:

c1) 32  ...  c8+?  33  b1  x1+  34  x1 is good for White, and after 34  ...  d3+  
either 35  c2  a3  36  b3! or 35  b1  c5  36  g6  d5  37  xh6  b4  38  h4  c5  39  d4  
xe5  40  b4  c4  41  b5 wins.

c2) Better is 32  ...  d5!, which of course invites a draw with 33  
d2. I see nothing better for White: c21) 33  e4  a5 is unclear; c22)  
33  x4  x3+  34  d3  d5; c23) 33  b1  a5 is unclear; c24) 33  b1  
x3  34  g6  c4  35  x6+  a5 (35  ...  c5  36  d6!)  36  xh6  b4  
37  h3  d2  38  e6  e2 can only be better for Black.

28  e4  [8] 1/2–1/2

Kasparov offered a draw with this move, which Anand accepted 
after only ten minutes. It seems that White can show an advantage 
after either knight move, although it is by no means cut and dried:

a) 28  ...  c7  29  d7 (Anand suggests in New In Chess that 29  
x5+! c6 30  c3 is even stronger, e.g., 30  ...  a6 [30  ...  d8  31  e7!  
=] 31  c7  x5 [31  ...  x5  32  x6]  32  d1!  =, and Daniel King in 
his book on the match completes this analysis by pointing out that 30  
xc8  31  c7  x5  32  c1! b4+  33  b2+  b6  34  c4 is winning for  
White) 29  ...  x4 (29  ...  c4 is possible, but I have no faith in Black's 
position; his pawns and pieces are badly placed now) 30  c1  a6 (30  
xc8  31  d6+  b7  32  x4 should be good for White, as Black's pieces
are awkward and passive along the c-file and the seventh rank) 31 \( \text{d6} \) + \( \text{a5} \) 32 \( \text{\&xe6} \) is messy, but if I had to I would bet on White. Compare to variation b2 below.

b) 28 ... \( \text{\&b4} \) is better, and now:

b1) 29 \( \text{dxc5} \) + \( \text{\&xc5} \) (29 ... \( \text{\&c6} \)? is an important idea, the more so since the main line looks good for White; the game might continue 30 \( \text{\&c3} \) [30 \( \text{\&e7} \) \( \text{\&d8} \) + 31 \( \text{\&c3} \) \( \text{\&xc5} \) 32 \( \text{\&c7} \) + \( \text{\&b6} \) [32 ... \( \text{\&c6} \)? looks promising] 33 \( \text{\&xb4} \) \( \text{\&xc7} \) 34 \( \text{\&xb5} \) \( \text{\&b8} \) + is given by the match bulletin as better for Black] 30 ... \( \text{\&xc5} \) [30 ... \( \text{\&a6} \) 31 \( \text{\&c7} \) + \( \text{\&c6} \) unclear] and two roads diverge:

b11) Not strong enough is: 30 \( \text{\&c1} \) + \( \text{\&b6} \) (30 ... \( \text{\&d4} \) 31 \( \text{\&d7} \) 31 \( \text{\&e7} \) (31 \( \text{\&d7} \) a3 32 \( \text{\&d6} \) + \( \text{\&a5} \) is unclear) 31 ... \( \text{\&d8} \) + 32 \( \text{\&e2} \) a3 33 \( \text{\&c3} \) (33 \( \text{\&xe6} \) + \( \text{\&a5} \) 34 \( \text{\&c3} \) \( \text{\&a4} \) 35 \( \text{\&e7} \) \( \text{\&a8} \) as played in an exhibition 10-minute game between Walter Browne and Maxim Dlugy after Anand and Kasparov had agreed to a draw, so that the spectators could see the endgame tested in practice. I think that Dlugy's response with Black (33 ... a2) was not correct:

b111) 33 ... a2 34 \( \text{\&xe6} \) + \( \text{\&b7} \) 35 \( \text{\&e7} \) + \( \text{\&b7} \) 36 \( \text{\&e6} \) + \( \text{\&b7} \) 37 \( \text{\&a3} \) \( \text{\&d4} \) 38 \( \text{\&a5} \) \( \text{\&xe4} \) + 39 \( \text{\&d2} \) \( \text{\&d4} \) + 40 \( \text{\&c3} \) =.

b112) Interesting is 33 ... \( \text{\&d3} \)? 34 \( \text{\&xe6} \) + \( \text{\&b7} \) 35 \( \text{\&e7} \) + \( \text{\&b6} \) 36 \( \text{\&c8} \) (36 \( \text{\&e6} \) + \( \text{\&b7} \) = [36 ... \( \text{\&a5} \)? 37 \( \text{\&xd3} \) \( \text{\&xd3} \) 38 \( \text{\&xd3} \) a2 39 \( \text{\&e8} \) + ] 36 \( \text{\&xd3} \) \( \text{\&xd3} \) 37 \( \text{\&f7} \)? \( \text{\&c1} \)! + 38 \( \text{\&d2} \) a2 +) 36 ... a2 37 \( \text{\&a8} \) \( \text{\&d8} \) 38 \( \text{\&xd8} \) a1/\( \text{\&w} \) 39 \( \text{\&d6} \) + \( \text{\&c6} \) 40 \( \text{\&e6} \) with an unclear position.

b113) However, 33 ... \( \text{\&a8} \)? looks fine for Black: 34 \( \text{\&xe6} \) + \( \text{\&b7} \) 35 \( \text{\&e7} \) + (35 \( \text{\&c1} \) a2 36 \( \text{\&a1} \) \( \text{\&c2} \); 35 \( \text{\&f3} \) \( \text{\&c6} \) 36 \( \text{\&f7} \) + \( \text{\&b6} \); 35 \( \text{\&g3} \) \( \text{\&c6} \) 36 \( \text{\&xg7} \) + \( \text{\&b6} \) 37 \( \text{\&g6} \) \( \text{\&c8} \) 38 \( \text{\&g6} \) [38 \( \text{\&d6} \) b4] 38 ... b4 39 \( \text{\&d2} \) a2 40 \( \text{\&f1} \) \( \text{\&b5} \) unclear) 35 ... \( \text{\&b6} \) 36 \( \text{\&e6} \) + (36 \( \text{\&xg7} \) a2 37 \( \text{\&c1} \) a1/\( \text{\&w} \) 36 \( \text{\&c1} \) a2 37 \( \text{\&c2} \) \( \text{\&c2} \) 36 ... \( \text{\&b7} \) =.

b12) But quite good for White is: 30 \( \text{\&d7} \) ! \( \text{\&f8} \) 31 \( \text{\&d6} \) (31 \( \text{\&c1} \) + \( \text{\&b6} \) 32 \( \text{\&d6} \) + \( \text{\&a5} \) 33 \( \text{\&c7} \) [33 \( \text{\&xe6} \) a3 34 \( \text{\&c7} \) \( \text{\&a4} \) 35 \( \text{\&c3} \) \( \text{\&a2} \) + 36 \( \text{\&c2} \) \( \text{\&b4} \) + 33 ... \( \text{\&a2} \) 34 \( \text{\&xe6} \) is messy, but probably also good for White) 31 ... \( \text{\&c4} \) 32 \( \text{\&xe6} \) \( \text{\&f2} \) + 33 \( \text{\&e3} \) \( \text{\&xg2} \) 34 \( \text{\&d6} \) \( \text{\&c2} \) + (34 ... \( \text{\&g5} \) 35 \( \text{\&d4} \) + \( \text{\&c3} \) 36 \( \text{\&a3} \) + \( \text{\&b2} \) 37 \( \text{\&xb4} \) \( \text{\&xa3} \) 38 \( \text{\&xb5} \) is good for White because the Black king is stuck on the edge, and the e5 pawn is extremely dangerous) 35 \( \text{\&b3} \) \( \text{\&g5} \) 36 \( \text{\&c1} \) \( \text{\&b3} \) 37 \( \text{\&b1} \) wins the b-pawn, as 37 ... \( \text{\&c3} \) 38 \( \text{\&c6} \) + \( \text{\&d2} \) (38 ... \( \text{\&d3} \)!? 39 \( \text{\&d1} \) mate) 39 \( \text{\&b2} \) snare the knight.

b2) 29 \( \text{\&e7} \)? might be even better: 29 ... \( \text{\&xc4} \) 30 \( \text{\&xe6} \) + \( \text{\&a5} \) 31 \( \text{\&d6} \) \( \text{\&e8} \) (31 ... \( \text{\&f8} \) 32 \( \text{\&e6} \) \( \text{\&f2} \) + 33 \( \text{\&d1} \)! [33 \( \text{\&e1} \) \( \text{\&d3} \) + 34 \( \text{\&d1} \) \( \text{\&b2} \) + =] 33 ... \( \text{\&f1} \) + 34 \( \text{\&e2} \) \( \text{\&xa1} \) 35 \( \text{\&e7} \) d3 + 36 \( \text{\&xd3} \) \( \text{\&xh3} \) 37 \( \text{\&xd3} \) !+?;
Keene in his book on the match suggests 31 \( \text{Qa6!?} \) to reroute the knight to c5, which looks to me like a good idea and perhaps Black's best move) 32 e6 e7 33 a3 and White's forward e-pawn is very dangerous while Black's pieces are awkwardly placed. I would favor White although I could not say that matters are clear.

But none of this was played.

*After 6 games: Kasparov 3, Anand 3*
GAME 7

Thursday, 21 September 1995

We had decided that Anand would play 12 \( \text{d3} \) against the Scheveningen Variation one more time before switching to 12 \( \text{f3} \) as later played in game 9. We wanted to explore a particular idea. However, only a few hours before the game, we realized that our idea in the 12 \( \text{d3} \) line was not as promising as we had thought. That left us without a good line because it was too late to prepare 12 \( \text{f3} \) properly.

Of course we were not without a contingency plan, and the line played in this game was it. Correctly played, it holds out reasonable chances for an edge. Unfortunately we lacked time to work out all the kinks, and Anand did not have enough time to adjust his attitude. The line we had been hoping to play was much sharper; in addition to looking at the details of the new position, Anand also had to adapt himself to a wholly different style of play.

As one can tell from the game, he did not manage to make that adjustment. This fact, coupled with accurate play by Kasparov, led to yet another short draw.

**ANAND–KASPAROV, NEW YORK (M/7) 1995**

**Sicilian Defense B85**

1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{d}3 \) d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 \( \text{d}x\text{d}4 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 5 \( \text{c}3 \) a6 6 \( \text{e}2 \) e6 7 0–0 \( \text{e}7 \) 8 a4 \( \text{c}6 \) 9 \( \text{e}3 \) 0–0 10 f4 \( \text{c}7 \) 11 \( \text{h}1 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 12 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 13 a5 \( \text{d}7 \) 14 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{a}c8 \) 15 \( \text{b}6 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 16 e5!? \( \text{d}x\text{e}5 \) 17 \( \text{f}x\text{e}5 \) \( \text{d}f5 \) 18 \( \text{d}x\text{d}5 \) exd5! 19 \( \text{e}1 \)

The idea of this move is to allow White to recapture on d3 with the queen, which is impossible after, e.g., 19 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{d}x\text{d}3 \), as 20 \( \text{b}5 \) skewers the queen and rook.

19 ... h6!? 20 c3 \( \text{d}x\text{d}3 \) 21 \( \text{c}x\text{d}3 \) \( \text{c}5 \) [!] 22 \( \text{x}d5 \)
If White wants to try for an advantage, he must refrain from this capture. Now the position peters out to dead equality.

22 ... \( \text{Le6} 23 \text{d2} \\
23 \text{xc5 xc5 24 xc5 d5 25 d6 c8} \) is good for Black, as his bishop is stronger than White's. Black has the easy plan of playing against White's weakened kingside, while White has no corresponding clear plan.

23 ... \( \text{xb6 axb6 c6 a4} \\
25 \text{d4 d8} =. \\
25 ... \text{xb6} \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \\
Anand accepted Kasparov's draw offer. After 26 \text{d4}, for example, the game is level and neither side has any play to speak of.

After 7 games: Kasparov 3½, Anand 3½
Friday, 22 September 1995

Game 8 has some curious similarities to game 6, as well as some interesting differences. Once again Kasparov played 1 e4, and again Anand defended with 1 ... e5—but this time the opening was a Scotch Game rather than a Spanish Game. Just like game 6, a tough fight ensued in which one side sacrificed the exchange—but this time Anand was ahead the exchange rather than behind. Just like game 6, a position with a lot of play was soon agreed drawn—but this time the final position was actually equal.

This game featured a hard-fought battle in a difficult endgame. It was also another triumph for Anand's opening preparation. Twice now he had defended against Kasparov's most aggressive white openings and twice he had reached perfectly satisfactory positions. I personally was slightly disappointed that Anand did not push his position a little harder (see the note to Black's 19th move), but overall I was happy.

Many observers were chagrined that another battle had ended in a draw. Indeed this game set the record for the most consecutive draws at the start of a world championship match. (It should also be noted that the previous record was from Karpov-Korchnoi 1978, which was played under the unlimited-games format, with the winner being the first to win six games. An unlimited match encourages caution, because neither player is hurt by a draw.)

I was not worried, though. Anand was showing considerable energy with the black pieces, and I knew that Anand's play with white would sharpen considerably in the next game. This game was drawn in 22 moves, yes, but what a draw! With so much energy in the air, it was inevitable that somebody would win soon. When that happened I felt that a storm would break.
Kasparov–Anand, New York (m/8) 1995
Scotch Game C45
1 e4 e5 2 d4 c6 3 d4?

Until 1990, the Scotch was an obscure, even archaic opening. Then
Kasparov adopted it against Karpov in their world championship match
and continued to use it consistently in tournaments. Now, although it is
not considered as dangerous for Black as the Spanish Game, it must be
taken seriously. This is the third world championship match in
which Kasparov has used the Scotch, so we may count it as a permanent part of
his repertoire.

3 ... e4 d4 4 d4 d6 5 dxc6 bxc6 6 e5 d7 7 d2 d5

This is considered Black’s best response. If White plays 5 d3, then
5 ... d4 is supposed to be all right for Black, so Kasparov has made this
extremely murky line his specialty.

8 c4 a6 9 b3

Kasparov has consistently played this line, maximizing his struc-
tural advantage but falling farther behind in development. Black has
previously played 9 ... 0–0–0, 9 ... dh4, and 9 ... g6 in this position, but
Anand now springs a novelty that he had analyzed at home.

9 ... g5? [1]

During the game, people were speculating that
this move was the child of Jonathan Speelman. While
that is certainly a good guess, it ignores the other
creative specialist on our team, Elizbar Ubilava, who
was in fact the true father of this move. The move is
obviously similar to 9 ... g6 in many respects, and one
should compare it to the lines that arise from that
move. But it also has its own points, namely that it
controls the f4 square, and also allows Black to play
df4–g6 at times.

10 d3

This move provokes a forced sequence through
move 15. Kasparov thought only 10 minutes before
playing this move, so it seems that he was playing the
same preparation he had against 9 ... g6 (and indeed in the brief post
mortem with Anand he made reference to a game played with 9 ... g6).
However, the position is not exactly the same, and the sequence that
Anand plays in the game works better with the pawn on g5 than with
the pawn on g6.

10 ... d6 11 e6 fxe6 12 c3c2 c5 13 cxd5 cxe2 14 cxe2
cxd1 15 c1! [2] 0–0–0!!

Although both sides have two pawns under attack, Black chooses to
ignore all the attacks and castle into his shattered queenside! But the
move makes perfect sense. The variations below show that Black ought not to capture either pawn, and he needs to bring his rooks into the game as quickly as possible. Furthermore, although his king will be a little unsafe, it will also be active, and that is more important in this position.

a) 15 ... cxd5 16 bxc7 Qf6 (16 ... 0-0 17 d7 +) 17 Qc3 (17 d7+? Qd8 18 Qb7 is also interesting) is clearly better for White, for example 17 ... Qxc3 18 bxc3 Qd7 19 Qc7+ Qe6 20 Qe7+.

b) 15 ... cxd6 16 bxc6! (after 16 bxc6 0-0 0-17 Qd2 Qe5 18 Qc4 Qhe8 Black stands well, because the c-pawn is as much a weakness as a strength) 16 ... Qe5 (16 ... 0-0 was played in one game, Kuksov–Aleksandrov, 1991, except in that game Black's g-pawn was on g6. The game continued 17 Qxd6 Qfd8 18 Qd2 Qd7 19 Qd3 and White was much better. Note how out-of-play Black's king is on the kingside.) 17 Qd2! Qd7 18 Qc4 Qhc8 19 Qxd6 is a line given by Seirawan in *Inside Chess*, and correctly evaluated as clearly better for White. Note how passive Black's rooks are. They are effectively killed by White's d5 pawn, knight on c4, and a2, b3 pawn structure.

Until Anand played this move, the assembled grandmasters had thought that White was better. After seeing this move, they all realized that Black was playing for the advantage.

16 Qxc6 Qhe8+ [3]

This is certainly a natural move, but after the game Yusupov suggested that since Black can give this check later, and since White in the game plays 17 Qd3 and 19 Qxc3, perhaps Black could usefully refrain from giving the check now and play just 16 ... Qd7?!

At any rate, after this check it is not obvious where White should move the king. Kasparov thought 37 minutes on that question. He was quite right to think long and hard here. The position is critical, and White must choose not just a response to check, but a whole plan. It's important to get that plan right.

17 Qd3

There was some point to moving the king to f3 instead: 17 Qf3 and now

a) 17 ... Qe5? 18 Qxc7+ Qb8 19 Qe7! ±.

b) 17 ... Qd7 and again we diverge:

b1) 18 Qxc7+? is not good and after 18 ... Qxc7 19 bxc7 Qxc7 20 Qd2 f5? (20 ... Qd8 21 d6+[21 Qe4?? f5+!] 21 ... Qc6 is a type of position we will see often in this game. Generally, Black is better when
he trades one pair of rooks and provokes White's pawn to d6, because on
d6 it loses control of important light squares, thereby coordinating
badly with the bishop, and also is vulnerable to capture. The fact that
Black has his bishop against White's knight helps even more, because
the bishop is a stronger piece and in particular can attack the d6 pawn.
21 \( \text{d}c4 \) (21 \( g4? f\times g4+ 22 \( \text{g}x\text{g}4 \text{\text{e}2} = \)) 21 ... \( \text{e}4 = \), e.g., 22 \( \text{a}5 \text{a}d4! \)

b2) Correct is 18 \( \text{d}d2 \), and this is not surprising. Why should
White want to exchange his powerful rook on c6 and aggressive pawn
on d6 for Black's passive rook on d7 and pawn on c7? Now Black has to
find a good move.

\( b21) 18... \text{ae}5? \) (18 ... \( f5 \) ? 19 \( \text{d}c4 \) is also good for White;
notice that 19 ... \( \text{ae}5 \) simply transposes to the main line of this varia-
tion) 19 \( \text{d}c4 \text{f5} \) (We will see 18 ... \( \text{ae}5 \) again in the analysis of 17 \( \text{d}d3 \)
\( \text{e}7 \) 18 \( \text{d}d2 \), but in that position Black can capture on h2, which
makes all the difference. Here if Black plays 19 ... \( \text{a}xh2 \) White just plays
20 \( g3 \) and then 21 \( \text{g}xg2 \) to win the bishop) 20 \( g3 \) (20 \( h3 \text{h}5 \)) 20 ... \( g4+ \)
21 \( \text{g}g2 \). Black is practically in zugzwang, i.e.,
\( b211) 21 ... \text{g}b8? \) 22 \( \text{d}x\text{e}5 \text{\text{e}5} \) 23 \( \text{dx}\text{c}7+ \text{xc}7 \) 24 \( \text{d}d6 + -- . \)
\( b212) 21 ... \text{g}b7? \) 22 \( \text{d}x\text{e}5 \text{\text{e}5} \) 23 \( \text{dx}\text{c}7+ \text{xc}7 \) 24 \( \text{d}d6 + -- . \)
\( b213) 21 ... \text{d}d8 22 \text{dx}\text{c}7+ \text{xc}7 \) (22 ... \( \text{a}x\text{c}7 \) 23 \( \text{d}d6 \) \( \pm \) 23
\( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{d}d7 \) 24 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \pm . \)

\( b214) 21 ... \text{ad}4 22 \text{dx}\text{c}7 \text{\text{e}2} \) (22 ... \( \text{\text{e}5} \) 23 \( \text{d}d6+ \) \( \text{d}d6 \)
24 \( \text{xd}6 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 25 \( \text{d}5 \) \( \pm -- ) 23 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{xf}2+ \) 24 \( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{d}d5 \) (24 ... \( \text{xa}2
25 \( \text{d}d6+) 25 \( \text{d}d6+ \) \( \text{xd}6 \) 26 \( \text{d}d6 \) \( \text{xa}2 \) 27 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 28 \( \text{f}6 \) \( \pm . \)

\( b22) \) Much better (and the only good move I see) is 18 ... \( \text{e}5 \)
19 \( \text{d}c4 \) \( \text{d}d5 \) 20 \( \text{e}4 \), and we transpose to a crucial variation from 17
\( \text{d}d3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 18 \( \text{d}d2 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 19 \( \text{d}c4 \), etc. The bulletin gives the
following variation: 20 ... \( \text{d}d4+ 21 \text{f}3 \) (21 \( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{d}d5+) 21 ... \( \text{e}1 \) (I
might add that 21 ... \( \text{e}5 \) 22 \( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 23 \( \text{a}7 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 24 \( \text{dx}\text{c}7 \) \( \text{xc}7 \) 25
\( \text{xc}7+ \) \( \text{xc}7 \) 26 \( b4 \) is better for White.) 22 \( \text{a}5 \) and the bulletin stops
here, concluding that White is better. But Black can still play 22 ... \( \text{a}3 \),
and after 23 \( \text{a}7 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 24 \( \text{dx}\text{c}7 \) \( \text{xc}7 \) 25 \( \text{xc}7+ \) \( \text{xc}7 \) it's hard to assess
this position. Black is better placed than in the variation starting with 21
... \( \text{d}5 \), because the bishop is more active on c3 and the rook is danger-
ous on d1—it threatens to go to g1 or h1 and harass White's kingside. I
have to call this position unclear. By the way, another theme we will
encounter time and again in this endgame is that White has "too much
kingside." That is, if he had only an f-pawn and g-pawn, he could
protect all his pawns easily by putting them on f2 and g3—but with an
h-pawn, it is difficult to protect that third pawn. This is particularly true
with Black's g-pawn on g5, and this is one important reason that the
pawn is better on g5 than on g6.

c) But the most ambitious move, and the move to try to exploit the
position of the White king on f3 instead of d3, is 17 ... \( e5?! \) This move
is mentioned by the bulletin, but the analysis that follows is all my own: 18 $\text{Exc}7+$ $\text{Db}8$ 19 $\text{Exf}7$ $\text{Ex}d5$ [4] and now White must meet the threat of 20 ... $\text{Ed}1$:

c1) 20 $\text{Ee}2$? $\text{Ee}8+$ 21 $\text{Ed}3$ $\text{Ee}1$! (21 ...
$\text{Ed}1$ 22 $\text{d}7$ $\text{Ed}8$ 23 $\text{Ab}4!$ forces 23 ...
$\text{Ex}8\times\text{d}7$, as 23 ...
$\text{Ex}b1$ 24 $\text{Aa}5$ is a disaster) 22 $\text{d}7$
$\text{Ex}b1$ 23 $\text{Ab}4$ (23 $\text{Ex}8+$ $\text{Ec}7$) 23 ...
$\text{Ed}1$ --.

c2) 20 $\text{d}7$ $\text{Ex}8\times\text{d}7$ (20 ...
$\text{Ee}7$?) 21 $\text{Ab}4$
$\text{a}5$ 22 $\text{Ad}2$ $\text{Ex}8\times\text{d}7$ 23 $\text{Ex}d7+$ $\text{Ex}d7$ 24 $\text{Ee}2$
$\text{=}$. Actually, it is hard to give a completely
accurate assessment of this endgame; I call it "equal" because I think
that neither side has a serious chance to win.

c3) 20 $\text{Ab}4$? $\text{a}5$ (20 ...
$\text{Eb}5$? 21 $\text{Ac}3!$ $\text{Ac}3$ 22 $\text{Ex}c3$ and 23 $\text{Ec}4$
$\pm$) 21 $\text{Ad}2$ (21 $\text{Ac}3$? $\text{Ac}3$ 22 $\text{Ex}c3$ $\text{Ed}3$+$;$ 21 $\text{Aa}3$? $\text{Ed}1$; 21 $\text{Ae}1$?
$\text{Ex}8\times\text{d}6$ [21 ...
$\text{Ed}1$? 22 $\text{Ex}a5$] 22 $\text{Aa}3$ $\text{Ee}6$ 23 $\text{Ec}2$ unclear) 21 ...
$\text{Ex}8\times\text{d}6$ 22 $\text{Ee}2$ $\text{h}6$ is unclear. I guess I should say that it is "dynamically
equal," which means that I would be about equally happy to take either
die, yet I don't think the position is a clear draw.

Did Kasparov make the right decision? That depends upon how
one compares the positions that come from 17 $\text{Ef}3$ $\text{Ee}5$? with the
analysis of the game continuation. I am not confident enough in my
assessments to say for sure which move is correct—and certainly the way
Kasparov played shows that he saw very deeply into the position. But
the curious reader should make the comparison for him or herself. It is
possible that Kasparov did not make the best choice, and that he could
have had some problems in the game.

17 ...
$\text{Ed}7$ 18 $\text{Ec}3$!

This was Kasparov's idea behind 17 $\text{Ed}3$.
If White plays 18 $\text{Ed}2$, then 18 ...
$\text{Ae}5$! [5]
(18 ...
$\text{Ee}5$ 19 $\text{Ee}4$ $\text{Ex}d5+$ 20 $\text{Ec}4$ trans-
poses to note b22 to move 17 above), as found
and analyzed by Ilya Gurevich in the match
bulletin.

Now White has two possible lines:

a) 19 $\text{Ec}4$ (the only move analyzed in
the match bulletin) 19 ...
$\text{Ah}2!$ 20 $\text{g}3$ $\text{h}5!$ 21
$\text{dx}c7$ (21 $\text{Ee}4$ $\text{Ae}1$) 21 ...
$\text{Ex}d5+$ 22 $\text{Ec}3$ $\text{h}4$ and now:

a1) 23 $\text{Ed}6+$ (again the only move analyzed in the bulletin) 23 ...
$\text{Ex}d6$ (the bulletin stops here, correctly stating that "Black has all the
chances") 24 $\text{Ex}d6$ (24 $\text{Ex}d6$ $\text{Ee}6$ is clearly better for Black, and also 24 ...
$\text{h}5?$ is interesting, as White will have trouble stopping the h-pawn
from queening) 24 ...
$\text{hxg}3$ 25 $\text{fxg}3$ $\text{Ae}5$.

a2) 23 $\text{Ee}3$ $\text{Ed}7$ 24 $\text{Ed}6$ $\text{hxg}3$ --.
a3) 23 \textit{Exd6} \textit{Exf5} (23 \ldots \textit{hxg3}? is a mistake simply because of 24 \textit{fxg3}; Black should keep the White f-pawn on the board as a target) 24 \textit{Exd3} (24 \textit{Ed2} \textit{f3+} 25 \textit{Ec2} \textit{Exc7} \textit{+}) 24 \ldots \textit{Ec6}? (24 \ldots \textit{Exc7} 25 \textit{Ed6} \textit{Exf5} 26 \textit{Exf5} \textit{Exf5} 27 \textit{gxh4} \textit{gxh4} is better for Black, but White may be able to draw) 25 \textit{Ed6}+ \textit{Exd6} 26 \textit{Axh4} \textit{h3} (26 \ldots \textit{Exf2}? 27 \textit{Ec5} \textit{+}) and the position is very double-edged, but Black’s h-pawn looks more dangerous than White’s c-pawn.

b) 19 \textit{Ed4}? may improve: 19 \ldots \textit{f5} (19 \ldots \textit{h6} 20 \textit{g4} is unclear) 20 \textit{Exg5} (20 \textit{Ed5} \textit{Exd6} =) 20 \ldots \textit{Exd6} 21 \textit{Exd6} \textit{Exd6} 22 \textit{Exd6} \textit{Exd6} 23 \textit{Ed6} (23 \textit{Exh7}? \textit{Exh8}) 23 \ldots \textit{Ed7} is unclear. I think that if I had to choose a side here, I would take Black. If the blank rook ever gets active, it can be a monster. Meanwhile, White does not have a dangerous passed pawn just yet. But White has two pawns and active pieces, and Black has bad pawns, so “unclear” it is.

18 \ldots \textit{Axc3}

In \textit{New In Chess} Anand suggests that this move was dubious, and gives the interesting line 18 \ldots \textit{Exd5}+ 19 \textit{Ec4} \textit{Axd2} and suggests that Black stands well, e.g., 21 \textit{Ac5} \textit{Exe5}.

Anand finishes here without giving an evaluation. The position is messy, but it does look good for Black. For example, 22 \textit{Exc7}? \textit{Ed7}! (even 22 \ldots \textit{Exh2}? is possible) 23 \textit{Axa7} \textit{Exd6} 24 \textit{Exa7}+ \textit{Ed6} 25 \textit{Exd6} \textit{Exa7} 26 \textit{Exa7}+ \textit{Ed7} 28 \textit{Ed5} \textit{Ed2} \textit{+}; or 22 \textit{dxh7} \textit{Ec7} 23 \textit{Ed7} (23 \textit{Exa7}+ \textit{Ed7} and White will lose something because his pieces are all tangled up; 23 \textit{Eda7}+? \textit{Ec2}+ is a disaster) 23 \ldots \textit{Ec2}+ and 24 \ldots \textit{Ed7} =.

So if White has nothing better at move 21 of this variation, then Anand missed a big opportunity here, and Kasparov made the wrong choice on move 17!!

19 \textit{Exc3}? [6]

This is clearly better than 19 \textit{Exc3} \textit{Ed7}! (19 \ldots \textit{Ec5} =, according to Anand in \textit{New In Chess}) and now:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{a)} 20 \textit{Cc6} \textit{Exd6} 21 \textit{Exd6} (21 \textit{Exd6} \textit{Exd6} 22 \textit{Exd6} \textit{Exd8}; 21 \textit{Exd4} \textit{Ec2}; 21 \textit{h3} \textit{Ec8}) 21 \ldots \textit{Ed8}.
\item \textbf{b)} 20 \textit{Exc7}+ (20 \textit{dxg7} \textit{Exd5}+ 21 \textit{Ec2} \textit{Ed7} =)
\end{itemize}
20 ... $\text{Ex}c7$ 21 $\text{dx}c7$ $\text{Ex}c7$ 22 $\text{Ac}5$ a6 and Black, with the help of his pawn on $g5$, keeps an edge:

b1) 23 $\text{Ab}4$ $\text{He}5$! 24 $\text{d6}+ (24$ $\text{Ec}4$ $\text{Ee}2)$ 24 ... $\text{Ec}6$ is very good for Black.

b2) 23 $\text{Ed}2$ $\text{He}5$ 24 $\text{d6}+$ $\text{Ec}6$ 25 $\text{b4}$ $g4!$ and the threat of ... $\text{Hh}5$ is hard to meet.

b3) 23 a4 $\text{He}1$ and Black will attack White's pawns from behind.

All in all, it is not surprising that it is good for White to keep his rook in its active position, especially since the main drawback of this move—that it allows Black to invade the seventh rank—cannot be exploited. (See note a to the analysis of 19 ... $\text{He}5$ below.)

We have reached the game's last critical position.

19 ... $\text{He}5$

This move forces a draw, clearly Anand's intent. We will examine two alternatives he could have chosen. The position is dangerous for both sides as the analysis to 19 ... $\text{He}2$ in note a shows. However, Black could have chosen to play for more by 19 ... $\text{Hb7}!$ as analyzed in note b.

a) 19 ... $\text{He}2$ 20 $\text{Lc}5$! $\text{Hxa}2$ 21 $\text{b4}$ gives White enough play for his material deficit, because he will capture on $c7$ and then swing the rook to $f6$. For example 21 ... $\text{Hb7}$ (21 ... a5? 22 $\text{bxa5}$ $\text{Hxa5}$ 23 $\text{Ab6}$ $\text{Hxd5}$ 24 $\text{Lxc7} \pm$) 22 $\text{dx}c7$ $\text{Hxc7}$ and now:

a1) 23 $\text{b5}!$ is a mess. There is no need for this move because 23 $\text{Hf6}$ is simple and sufficient for White, but we can examine the more esoteric ideas, right? Black's possible responses:

a11) 23 ... a6? 24 $\text{bxa6}+$ $\text{Hxa6}$ 25 $\text{Hxa6}$ $\text{Hxa6}$ 26 $\text{Lc}4$! is strong for White, because Black's pieces are forced onto such passive squares. But maybe Black can hold: 26 ... f5!? (26 ... $\text{Hb7}$ 27 $\text{d6}$ $\text{Ec}8$ [27 ... $\text{Hd}7$ 28 $\text{Ld}5 \pm$] 28 $\text{Ld}5$ $\text{Hd}8$ 29 $g4 \pm$) 27 $\text{d6}$ $\text{g7}$ 28 $\text{Ld}5$ $\text{Hb7}$ 29 $\text{Lc}6$ $\text{Hc}6$ 30 $\text{Ld}4$ $\text{g6}$+ 31 $\text{Hxf5}$ $\text{Hxd6}$ 32 $\text{Lc}3$ $h6$ and Black might defend. This line is speculative, but anyway it is obvious that only White can be better after 23 ... a6.

a12) 23 ... $\text{Hxc6}$ (23 ... $\text{Hc}1$!? might be a good move. What is White threatening, after all?) 24 $\text{bxc6}+$ $\text{Hc}7$ 25 $\text{Ld}4$ $\text{He}1$ (25 ... $\text{Hd}6$? 26 $\text{Le}5+$ wins for White; 25 ... $\text{Hc}2$ 26 $\text{Hxa7}$; but 25 ... a6 is a reasonable alternative) and now White can force a draw with 26 $\text{Le}5+$ $\text{Hb}6$ (26 ... $\text{Hc}8$? 27 $\text{Hc}4$ is suicide; Black needs to keep the king next to White's pawns) 27 $\text{Hd}4+$ $\text{He}7$ 28 $\text{Le}5+$ etc., because 27 ... $\text{Hb}5$? loses to 28 $\text{Hb}2!$ $\text{Hc}4$ (28 ... $\text{Hd}1$ 29 $c7$ ++) 29 $c7$ $\text{Hb}4+$ 30 $\text{Ha}1$ $\text{Hd}4+$ 31
\( \text{\&}b1 \text{\&}b4+ 32 \text{\&}b2 \text{\&}c4 33 \text{\&}d6 \text{\&}b6 34 \text{\&}e5 \text{\&}b7 35 \text{\&}d7 +–. \)

a2) But anyway, the sanest and probably best move, in light of 23 ... \text{\&}a1, is 23 \text{\&}f6. Now if Black is to avoid complete passivity he must play 23 ... a5 to try to break out, but after 24 d6! White keeps equality:

a21) 24 ... a\times b4 + 25 \text{\&}b3 (25 \text{\&}x b4 \text{\&}d7 is not worse for Black, because the king will get to c6 and the bishop will be driven from c5, costing the d6 pawn. But if White wins the g5 pawn and then plants the bishop on e3, he should keep equality.) 25 ... \text{\&}a6! (25 ... \text{\&}x c5 26 \text{\&}x a2 \text{\&}c6 27 \text{\&}b3 h5?! 28 \text{\&}x b4 \text{\&}d5 is worse for Black, but should also be drawn. White will have to trade the d-pawn for the f-pawn, and then Black should be able to defend the kingside pawns, although it won’t be a pleasant defensive task and there are losing chances. Anyway, the main line is a better way to reach a drawn rook endgame.) 26 \text{\&}f5 (26 \text{\&}x b4 \text{\&}d7 is unclear) 26 ... \text{\&}x c5! (26 ... \text{\&}d7 27 \text{\&}x g5 \pm) 27 \text{\&}x c5 \text{\&}x d6 28 \text{\&}x g5 \text{\&}f6 29 \text{\&}f3 \text{\&}e6 30 \text{\&}x b4 \text{\&}d6 is only \pm.

a22) 24 ... \text{\&}d7 25 \text{\&}b3 (25 b5?!?) 25 ... \text{\&}a1 26 b5 is very unclear. White keeps a total bind on the queenside, but Black’s a-pawn is a source of counterplay. Note that a draw can result in this position (because of the interpolation of 25 \text{\&}b3) from 26 ... \text{\&}b1 + 27 \text{\&}a4 (27 \text{\&}c4 a4 might be dangerous for White) 27 ... \text{\&}a1 + 28 \text{\&}b3 \text{\&}b1 + etc.

b) A better try for Black is 19 ... \text{\&}b7??. As usual Black is threatening ... \text{\&}x d6, so White should take on c7; 20 dxc7 \text{\&}x c7 21 \text{\&}x c7 + \text{\&}x c7 22 \text{\&}c5 (22 \text{\&}d4 \text{\&}e2; 22 \text{\&}d2 \text{\&}e5 23 \text{\&}d6 + \text{\&}c6 24 \text{\&}b4 a5 25 \text{\&}a3 g4?! \pm) 22 \text{\&}d3 \text{\&}e5 23 \text{\&}d6 + [23 \text{\&}c4 \text{\&}e2] 23 ... \text{\&}x c6 =) 22 ... a6 23 a4 \text{\&}e1 24 b4 \text{\&}a1 25 \text{\&}b3 \text{\&}h1 [7] was analyzed after the game. Kasparov felt that this position was a draw, but I agree with Seirawan that Black is slightly better. After all, Black can virtually force the draw by tickling White’s queenside pawns, or he can choose to go for the kingside pawns. I will not analyze this position in any more depth, but perhaps you will test it or play it against a friend. What do you think?

20 \text{\&}c4 \text{\&}e4+

Now 20 ... \text{\&}e2 21 \text{\&}c5 is similar to note a above, but even better for White because his king is more active, while 20 ... \text{\&}b7?? 21 dxc7 \text{\&}x c7 22 \text{\&}d6 just loses, so Black is correct to force the draw.

21 \text{\&}d3! \text{\&}e5 22 \text{\&}c4

Not 22 \text{\&}d4?? \text{\&}e2 when 23 \text{\&}c5 no longer protects f2.

22 ... \text{\&}e4 + \frac{1}{2}–\frac{1}{2}

By agreement.

After 8 games: Kasparov 4, Anand 4
GAME 9

Monday, 25 September 1995

Game 8 had set a record for the most consecutive draws at the start of a world championship match. Press, fans, and even grandmaster observers were getting impatient. In a BBC interview I was asked, “What has gone wrong in this match?” as though the lack of a decisive result represented a failure on the part of the players. Disgruntlement also was spreading in the press room. People were grumbling more loudly that the players were being too cautious.

Game 9 changed all that. Anand produced a masterpiece of positional squeezing and capped it off with a lovely exchange sacrifice. There was an almost palpable excitement during play as observers understood early on that this game could go Anand’s way. When he sacrificed the exchange, the press room buzzed with the noise of grandmasters analyzing the position, confirming their feeling that White had an overwhelming position. Finally Kasparov resigned, and the press room broke into a round of spontaneous applause. Partly the applause was for the first decisive game of the match, but partly the applause was for Anand—almost everyone wished him success.

Except Anand himself, no one was happier than those of us on Anand’s team. That evening we all went out for a celebratory dinner. First blood was ours.

ANAND–KASPAROV, NEW YORK (M/9) 1995

Sicilian Defense B85

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 xd4 f6 5 c3 a6 6 e2 e6 7 0-0 c7 8 a4 c6 9 e3 0-0 10 f3 c7 11 h1 e8 12 f3! [1]

We decided it was finally time for this move, the main line and most difficult move for both sides.
12 ... \(\text{Ad7}\)

An interesting choice. It was Kasparov himself who popularized the move 12 ... \(\text{Ab8}\), and it is the only move he played against Karpov when they debated this position in their world championship matches. Yet Kasparov has also played this move once before, against van der Wiel in Amsterdam 1988.

13 \(\text{Ob3} \text{a5}\)

White threatened 14 a5, cramping Black terribly on the queenside. Black can also stop this move by playing 14 ... b6, but Kasparov does not seem to like this option. Against van der Wiel he also continued 13 ... \(\text{a5}\).

14 \(\text{Oxa5} \text{Oxa5}\) 15 \(\text{Od3} \text{Ed8}\)

As Kasparov himself explained in his notes to the van der Wiel game, Black cannot play the more natural 15 ... \(\text{Ac8}\) because 16 e5! \(\text{dxe5} 17 \text{fxe5} \text{Oxe5} 18 \text{Ab7}\) is very strong for White.

16 \(\text{Fd1}\)!

In the van der Wiel-Kasparov game, White played 16 \(\text{Dd2}\), whereupon Black responded 16 ... \(\text{Ac8}\), and it turned out that 17 e5! \(\text{dxe5} 18 \text{fxe5} \text{Oxe5} 19 \text{Ab7} \text{Ac8}\) was not so good for White, because now White's queen was not attacking the a6 pawn. In his notes, Kasparov suggested 16 g4 might be good, but gave a long variation to show how Black could defend himself. Later, van der Wiel played a game against Lev Polugaevsky, where he improved upon Kasparov's analysis and gained the advantage with 16 g4, although the game was later drawn. But in his notes, van der Wiel suggested that White might try 16 \(\text{Fd1}\). We looked at it and decided it was a good suggestion after all.

16 ... \(\text{Ac6}\)

Black might also play 16 ... e5, and Seirawan suggested 16 ... h6 in *Inside Chess*.

17 b4!

It may look strange for White to push his b-pawn, but the move is justified by the gain of time White achieves by attacking first the queen and then the bishop. White creates weaknesses on his queenside, but he also seizes a lot of space and pushes Black back into a passive position. In particular, Black's b-pawn is targeted as a weakness. As the game and the subsequent variations will show, the idea is correct: Black is constantly striving to equalize, while White is pressing his advantage.

17 ... \(\text{Cc7}\)

17 ... \(\text{Obxd4??} 18 \text{ab1} \text{a5} 19 \text{Ab6}\) traps the queen.

18 b5 \(\text{Ad7}\)

It would be a mistake for Black to capture first with the a-pawn, as this gives White the a4 square, i.e., 18 ... \(\text{axb5} 19 \text{axb5} \text{Ad7} 20 \text{a4}\)!
19 $\text{Axb}1$!

There was one earlier game, Cuijpers–DeBoer, 1988, in which White played the much weaker 19 $\text{Qe}2$? After 19 ... $\text{Ec8}$ 20 $\text{bx}a6$ $\text{bx}a6$ 21 $\text{Qxa6}$ $\text{Axa8}$ 22 $\text{Qd}3$ $\text{Exa}4$ Black had no problems and drew easily. Obviously it makes little sense for White to withdraw pieces from the center, because it is precisely the activity of his pieces that makes his gain of space worth more than the weaknesses he has created in his own position.

19 ... $\text{axb}5$ [2]

Not good is 19 ... $\text{Ec}8$ (Seirawan also mentions that 19 ... a5 20 b6! and 21 $\text{Qb}5$ gives White a tremendous grip on the queenside) 20 $\text{e}5!$ $\text{dx}e5$ (20 ... $\text{Qxc}3$ 21 $\text{exe}6$ and 22 $\text{Qxb}7$ +) 21 $\text{fxe}5$ $\text{Qxe}5$ (21 ... $\text{Qd}5$ 22 $\text{Qxd}5$ $\text{exd}5$ 23 $\text{Qxd}5$ =) 22 $\text{Qd}4$ $\text{Qd}6$ (22 ... $\text{Qc}7$ 23 $\text{Qxf}6$ and 24 $\text{Qxd}7$) 23 $\text{Qf}6$ $\text{Qxd}3$ 24 $\text{Qxd}3$ $\text{Qxf}6$ 25 $\text{Qe}4$ (also 25 $\text{Qxd}7$ $\text{Qc}3$ 26 $\text{b}6$ is good for White, because White's b-pawn will be a monster in the endgame) 25 ... $\text{Qxb}5$ (25 ... $\text{Qe}7$ 26 $\text{Qxf}6+$ $\text{Qxf}6$ 27 $\text{Qxb}7$ $\text{Qxc}2$ 28 $\text{bxa}6$ +=; 25 ... $\text{Qcd}8$ 26 $\text{Qxf}6+$ $\text{Qxf}6$ 27 $\text{Qbd}1$ $\text{Qe}7$ 28 $\text{Qxb}7$ += 26 $\text{Qxf}6+$ $\text{Qxf}6$ 27 $\text{Qxd}7$ $\text{bxa}4$ 28 $\text{Qe}4$ +=.

20 $\text{Qxb}5$

If 20 $\text{Qxb}5$ $\text{Ec}8$ (also 20 ... $\text{Qa}8$ is possible, but the main line is more forcing) 21 $\text{Qa}4$ $\text{Qxc}2$ 22 $\text{Qb}6$ (22 $\text{Qc}2$! $\text{Qxc}2$ 23 $\text{Qb}6$ is unclear) 22 ... $\text{Qxd}3$ 23 $\text{Qxd}3$ $\text{Qc}7$ 24 $\text{e}5$ $\text{dx}e5$ 25 $\text{fxe}5$ $\text{Qd}5$ 26 $\text{Qxd}5$ $\text{ex}d5$ 27 $\text{Qxd}5$ $\text{Qf}5$ (or if Black is more ambitious, 27 ... $\text{Qcc}8$?) 28 $\text{Qd}7$ $\text{Qxd}3$ 29 $\text{Qxe}8$ (29 $\text{Qd}1$ $\text{Qd}8$) 29 ... $\text{Qxb}1$ 30 $\text{Qd}6$ $\text{Qxd}6$ 31 $\text{ex}d6$ $\text{Qf}5$ =.

Now Kasparov faced a big choice. Should he capture on b5 or move the queen?

20 ... $\text{Qxb}5$

The other choice was 20 ... $\text{Qa}5$. Some of the possibilities are:

a) 21 $\text{Qd}2$ $\text{Qxa}4$! (21 ... $\text{Qa}6$ 22 $\text{c}4$!) 22 $\text{Qc}7$ (22 $\text{c}4$ $\text{Qc}8$ 23 $\text{e}5$ $\text{dx}e5$ 24 $\text{fxe}5$ $\text{Qxb}5$ 25 $\text{Qxb}5$ $\text{Qed}8$ 26 $\text{Qb}1$ $\text{Qd}7$ 27 $\text{Qxb}7$ $\text{Qxc}4$ 28 $\text{Qa}5$ $\text{Qf}8$ and Black is clearly better, because 29 $\text{Qxd}7$ fails to 29 ... $\text{Qxb}5$!) 22 ... $\text{Qf}8$ 23 $\text{Qxb}7$ $\text{Qc}6$ is fine for Black.

b) 21 $\text{Qxd}6$ ultimately turns out to be all right for Black, but the complications are fascinating. Black should play 21 ... $\text{Qxa}4$, because 21 ... $\text{Qxd}6$? allows 22 $\text{Qb}6$! $\text{Qxa}4$ 23 $\text{Qxd}8$ +=; so, after 21 ... $\text{Qxa}4$ White has to choose between three moves:

b1) 22 $\text{Qxe}8$? $\text{Qxd}3$ 23 $\text{Qxf}6+$ $\text{Qxf}6$ 24 $\text{Qxd}3$ $\text{Qxc}2$ is easy to dismiss for White.

b2) 22 $\text{Qb}6$? looks good at first, but Black can reach a drawn endgame, as analyzed by Speelman: 22 ... $\text{Qxd}6$ 23 $\text{Qxd}6$ (23 $\text{Qxa}5$ $\text{Qxd}3$ 24 $\text{c}3$ $\text{Qd}1$ 25 $\text{Qxd}1$ [25 $\text{Qd}1$ $\text{Qa}8$ 26 $\text{Qc}3$ $\text{Qa}3$] is unclear)
23 ... \textbf{Ax}d6 24 \textbf{A}xa5 \textbf{Axf}4 (24 ... \textbf{Axc}2? 25 \textbf{e}5 +-) 25 \textbf{Bxb}7 \textbf{Axc}2 26 \textbf{B}d8 (26 \textbf{e}1 is slightly better for White, but certainly fine for Black) 26 ... \textbf{Bxd}8 27 \textbf{A}xd8 \textbf{A}xe4! 28 \textbf{B}b4 \textbf{Axf}3 29 \textbf{Bxf}4 \textbf{A}d5 30 \textbf{Bxf}6 \textbf{gxf}6 31 \textbf{B}xf6 and the position is drawn.

\textbf{b3)} 22 \textbf{e}5 \textbf{A}xd6 23 \textbf{A}b6 (23 \textbf{ex}d6 \textbf{B}d5! 24 \textbf{A}xd5 [24 \textbf{Bxb}7 \textbf{A}xc2! 25 \textbf{B}xc2 \textbf{A}x}e3 26 \textbf{B}d2 [26 \textbf{Bc}1 \textbf{Bxd}1 27 \textbf{B}xd1 \textbf{B}xd6] 26 ... \textbf{B}xd2 27 \textbf{B}xd2 \textbf{B}c4) 24 ... \textbf{B}xd6! 25 \textbf{B}a3 \textbf{B}xd5 26 \textbf{B}xd5 \textbf{B}xd5 and Black is better) 23 ... \textbf{A}c7! (23 ... \textbf{B}a6 24 \textbf{A}xd8 \textbf{B}xd3 25 \textbf{B}xd3 \textbf{B}xe5 26 \textbf{fxe}5 \textbf{A}xc2 27 \textbf{B}b1 +-) and now White has two plausible moves, but neither one brings an advantage:

\textbf{b31)} 24 \textbf{A}xa5 \textbf{B}xd3 25 \textbf{B}xd3 (25 \textbf{B}xc7 \textbf{A}xc2 26 \textbf{B}xd3 reaches the same position) 25 ... \textbf{A}xc2 (25 ... \textbf{A}xa5? 26 \textbf{B}c3 \textbf{B}c3! (26 ... \textbf{Bxb}1? 27 \textbf{B}d1 \textbf{B}c2 28 \textbf{B}c1 [28 \textbf{exf}6? \textbf{B}xb1 29 \textbf{B}xb1 \textbf{B}c8 -+] 28 ... \textbf{B}c8 29 \textbf{exf}6 [29 \textbf{B}xc2? \textbf{B}c8] 29 ... \textbf{B}xa7 30 \textbf{B}d1! [30 \textbf{fxg}7 \textbf{B}xg7 31 \textbf{B}d1 \{31 \textbf{B}e4 \textbf{B}c4! 32 \textbf{A}xc2 \textbf{b}5!, and Black just pushes the b-pawn down the board\} 31 ... \textbf{B}d7! 32 \textbf{A}xc2 \textbf{B}c7 33 \textbf{B}g1 \textbf{b}5! and Black is just in time by pushing the b-pawn] 30 ... \textbf{B}xd1 [30 ... \textbf{B}d7 31 \textbf{B}xc2 \textbf{B}c8 32 \textbf{B}d1\} 31 \textbf{B}xc7 \textbf{gxf}6 32 \textbf{B}b7 and this endgame should give White some winning chances, although probably the correct result is a draw) 27 \textbf{B}d1 (27 \textbf{B}xb7 \textbf{B}d5 =) 27 ... \textbf{B}e4! 28 \textbf{B}g1 (28 \textbf{B}b6 \textbf{B}c2 29 \textbf{B}c1 \textbf{B}d3 30 \textbf{B}d1 \textbf{B}c2 =) 28 ... \textbf{A}c2 29 \textbf{B}c1 \textbf{B}d3 30 \textbf{B}d1 \textbf{B}d2 =.

\textbf{b32)} 24 \textbf{B}xd8 \textbf{B}xd8 (24 ... \textbf{B}xd8? 25 \textbf{B}xd8+ \textbf{B}xa5 26 \textbf{B}xa5 27 \textbf{B}xb7 \textbf{B}c8 28 \textbf{B}c7 ±; 24 ... \textbf{B}xb6? 25 \textbf{B}d2 and 26 \textbf{exf}6 \textbf{B}c3 (25 \textbf{B}xa5 \textbf{B}a5 (25 ... \textbf{B}xc2? 26 \textbf{B}xd8 ++) 26 \textbf{B}xb7 (26 \textbf{exf}6 \textbf{B}xc2; 26 \textbf{B}a1 \textbf{A}xc2 27 \textbf{B}c1 \textbf{B}c3 28 \textbf{B}a7 There is nowhere else to go! 28 ... \textbf{B}d4 29 \textbf{B}xb7 \textbf{B}e4 30 \textbf{B}b4 \textbf{B}d4! and Black has squirmed out; he will play 31 ... \textbf{B}xf3 and 32 ... \textbf{B}d5 unless White attacks the \textbf{e}3, but whether he does it by 31 \textbf{B}c3 or 31 \textbf{B}e1, Black can play 31 ... \textbf{B}d2) and now Black can equalize by either 26 ... \textbf{B}xc2 or 26 ... \textbf{B}d5:

\textbf{b321)} 26 ... \textbf{B}xc2 27 \textbf{B}c1 \textbf{B}e4 28 \textbf{B}a7 \textbf{B}d2 29 \textbf{B}d1 \textbf{B}xf3 (29 ... \textbf{B}xf4?? 30 \textbf{exf}6 \textbf{B}xf3 31 \textbf{B}xf3 \textbf{gxf}6 =) 30 \textbf{B}xd2 (30 \textbf{gxf}3 \textbf{B}xf4 31 \textbf{exf}6 \textbf{gxf}6 32 \textbf{B}d7 \textbf{B}f8 =) 30 ... \textbf{B}d5 31 \textbf{gxf}3 \textbf{B}xf4 32 \textbf{B}d7 \textbf{B}f8 =.

\textbf{b322)} 26 ... \textbf{B}d5 27 \textbf{B}a7 \textbf{B}xc2 (27 ... \textbf{B}d3 28 \textbf{B}a1 \textbf{B}b6 29 \textbf{B}xa4 \textbf{B}xa4 28 \textbf{B}xa4) 28 \textbf{B}c1 \textbf{B}b6 29 \textbf{B}b7 \textbf{B}e3 30 \textbf{B}xc2 \textbf{B}xf4 and yet again we have reached an equal endgame.

\textbf{a)} 21 \textbf{c}4? may be best, as the more forcing lines turn out okay for Black. Of course Black cannot capture on a4, e.g. 21 ... \textbf{B}xa4?? 22 \textbf{B}a1 \textbf{B}b4 23 \textbf{B}d1 +-. He must also pay attention to the threat of \textbf{B}d2, e.g., 21 ... \textbf{B}c6? 22 \textbf{B}d2 and White will win the exchange with \textbf{B}c7, as 22 ... \textbf{B}xa4? 23 \textbf{B}a1 traps the queen, and 22 ... \textbf{B}b6 23 \textbf{a}5 doesn't solve Black's problem. Nor can Black meet the threat by activating his rook: 21 ... \textbf{B}c8?? 22 \textbf{e}5!

So I believe Black has to play 21 ... \textbf{B}b5, and now all three recaptures are interesting, and give White hope for an advantage. Perhaps the
most ambitious move for White is 22 cxb5 [3], with the plan of driving back the queen and playing a4-a5. It is difficult to say whether Kasparov should have chosen this position over the game continuation, but it is understandable that he decided against it.

21 $\textit{cxb5}$

21 $\textit{bxc5}?!$ is also interesting, e.g., 21 ... $\textit{d7}$ (21 ... $\textit{c8}$ 22 $\textit{db1}$ $\textit{c2}$ 23 $\textit{xc2}$ $\textit{xc2}$ 24 $\textit{xb7}$) 22 $\textit{db1}$ $\textit{c5}$ 23 $\textit{c4}$ is quite nice for White. But the move Anand played is strong.

21 ... $\textit{a8}$

21 ... $\textit{xc}2$?? 22 $\textit{dc1}$ $\textit{a2}$ 23 $\textit{a1}$ traps the queen.

22 $\textit{c4}$ [4]

White has emerged from the opening with a pleasant position. He has the bishop pair in a fairly open position which could easily open up further. He has strong pressure against Black's b-pawn. If White gets a passed c- or a-pawn, it will be very dangerous. At the moment there is a strong threat of 23 $\textit{e5}$, so Kasparov stopped that move directly.

22 ... $\textit{e5}$

22 ... $\textit{a5}$? 23 $\textit{xb7}$ $\textit{xc}4$ (23 ... $\textit{xb7}$ 24 $\textit{xb7}$ $\textit{xa}4$ [24 ... $\textit{e5}$ 25 $\textit{a1}$ --] 25 $\textit{e5}$! --) 24 $\textit{e5}$! $\textit{xe5}$ (24 ... $\textit{d5}$ 25 $\textit{xd}5$ $\textit{xd}5$ 26 $\textit{xd}5$ and 26 $\textit{xe7}!$) 25 $\textit{xc6}$! --.

23 $\textit{b6}$ $\textit{c8}$

Also good for White is 23 ... $\textit{c6}$ 24 $\textit{f5}$ (24 $\textit{c5}$ $\textit{ac8}$! Anand points out in New In Chess that 24 $\textit{h2}$ $\textit{xc}6$ $\textit{bxc}6$ 25 $\textit{c5}$! is also strong.) 24 ... $\textit{xe}5$ 25 $\textit{cxe6}$ (25 $\textit{f5}$?) 25 ... $\textit{bxc6}$ 26 $\textit{a5}$. Notice that Black cannot free himself now with 26 ... $\textit{d8}!$? because 27 $\textit{xd}8$ $\textit{xd}8$ 28 $\textit{xd}8$ $\textit{d8}$ 29 $\textit{f6}$ simply wins, e.g., 29 ... $\textit{f8}$ (29 ... $\textit{a8}$ 30 $\textit{a7}$ $\textit{d7}$ 31 $\textit{b7}$) 30 $\textit{a7}$ $\textit{d7}$ (30 ... $\textit{a8}$ 31 $\textit{b8}$+) 31 $\textit{g4}$! --.

24 $\textit{fxe5}$ $\textit{dxe5}$ 25 $\textit{a5}$ $\textit{f8}$

Bad is 25 ... $\textit{e6}$ 26 $\textit{c7}!$. White will take Black's b-pawn and push his a-pawn. However, a critical alternative was 25 ... $\textit{d8}!$ and now:

a) 26 $\textit{xd}8$ $\textit{xd}8$ 27 $\textit{xd}8$ 28 $\textit{xb7}$ $\textit{xa}5$ (28 ... $\textit{xa}5$? 29 $\textit{c5}$ =) 29 $\textit{b8}$ $\textit{f8}$ 30 $\textit{h3}$ $\textit{g6}$ is just fine for Black.

b) 26 $\textit{c5}$?! is interesting, leading to a position difficult to analyze and assess.

c) But by far the most complex and interesting variations come from 26 $\textit{xc8}!$? $\textit{e8}$ 27 $\textit{xd}8$ $\textit{xd}8$ 28 $\textit{xd}8$ $\textit{xd}8$ 29 $\textit{xb7}$ $\textit{a8}$! [5] (29 ... $\textit{d6}$? 30 $\textit{c7}$ $\textit{xe}4$ [30 ... $\textit{a8}$ 31 $\textit{c6}$! $\textit{xa}5$ 32 $\textit{xd6}$ $\textit{a1}+$ 33 $\textit{d1}$ --] 31 $\textit{a6}$! is a winning endgame for White).
In this position there seems to be a paradoxical symmetry. White has two plausible moves, and Black has the same two plausible responses to each of the moves, yet a different response is correct against each move! To wit:

1) 30... $\texttt{e}7$ and now:

11) Not 30... $\texttt{c}6$ (30... $\texttt{c}8$ 31 $\texttt{c}5$ $\texttt{c}5$ 32 $\texttt{c}5$ $\texttt{c}5$) 33 $\texttt{d}6$ 34 $\texttt{d}6$ $\texttt{d}6$ 35 $\texttt{d}6$ $\texttt{d}6$ $\texttt{d}6$ 36 $\texttt{d}6$ 37 $\texttt{d}6$ $\texttt{d}6$.

12) Correct is 30... $\texttt{f}6$! 31 $\texttt{h}5$ (31 $\texttt{g}4$ $\texttt{f}8$ 32 $\texttt{d}7$ $\texttt{e}5$ 33 h3 $\texttt{e}5$ 34 $\texttt{e}6$ $\texttt{e}7$) 31... $\texttt{g}6$ (31... $\texttt{d}6$ 32 $\texttt{c}5$! $\texttt{e}4$ 33 $\texttt{a}6$ wins for White) 32 $\texttt{g}4$ $\texttt{f}8$ 33 $\texttt{h}7$ $\texttt{x}a5$ 34 h3 $\texttt{d}6$ and White should be happy to make a draw by this point.

2) 30 $\texttt{b}5$! is a better move, and now of course not:

21) 30... $\texttt{f}6$? 31 $\texttt{g}4$! $\texttt{f}7$ (31... $\texttt{d}6$ 32 $\texttt{e}6$ $\texttt{x}6$ $\texttt{x}6$ 33 $\texttt{d}5$ $\texttt{a}7$ 33... $\texttt{x}b5$ 34 $\texttt{x}a8$ $\texttt{d}8$ 35 c5 should be winning for White. Black's king cannot attack the queenside pawns, so White has time to bring his own king to the queenside] 34 $\texttt{e}5$ $\pm$) 32 $\texttt{g}1$ $\texttt{d}6$ (32... $\texttt{a}7$ 33 $\texttt{e}5$ $\texttt{e}7$ 34 $\texttt{c}5$ $\texttt{a}8$) 33 $\texttt{x}f8$ 36 $\texttt{c}6$ $\texttt{e}6$ $\pm$) 33 $\texttt{e}6$! $\texttt{e}7$ (33... $\texttt{x}c4$ 34 $\texttt{e}6$ $\texttt{e}6$) 33... $\texttt{x}e4$ 34 $\texttt{e}6$ $\pm$ 35 $\texttt{d}5$ 34 $\texttt{c}5$ $\texttt{d}6$ $\texttt{d}6$ $\texttt{c}5$ 37 $\texttt{b}7$ $\texttt{f}8$ 38 $\texttt{c}5$ 38 $\texttt{b}7$ $\texttt{c}5$ 39 $\texttt{b}5$ $\texttt{f}7$ 40 $\texttt{c}6$ $\texttt{d}6$ $\texttt{d}6$ $\texttt{d}6$. $\texttt{d}6$ is not certain to be winning for White because he has so few pawns left, but White has all the chances.

22) Now, correct is 30... $\texttt{d}6$! 31 $\texttt{a}6$! (31 $\texttt{x}c5$ $\texttt{x}c4$ 32 $\texttt{e}5$ $\texttt{e}5$ 33 $\texttt{b}3$!; 31 $\texttt{e}4$ $\texttt{f}8$ 32 $\texttt{a}4$ [32 $\texttt{c}5$? $\texttt{x}a5$! 32... $\texttt{b}7$ 33 $\texttt{a}6$ $\texttt{c}5$ 34 $\texttt{e}5$ $\texttt{d}6$]) and now:

221) 31... $\texttt{b}6$?? 32 $\texttt{b}8$.

222) 31... $\texttt{b}6$!! 32 $\texttt{a}7$ $\pm$

223) 31... $\texttt{x}b5$?? 32 $\texttt{x}b5$ $\texttt{f}8$ 33 $\texttt{e}2$ $\texttt{c}8$ (33... $\texttt{e}7$ 34 $\texttt{c}6$ $\texttt{d}6$ 35 $\texttt{b}7$ $\texttt{b}8$ 36 $\texttt{g}1$ $\texttt{c}7$ 37 $\texttt{a}7$ $\pm$) 34 $\texttt{g}1$ $\texttt{c}1$+ 35 $\texttt{f}2$ $\texttt{c}7$ 36 $\texttt{a}7$ $\texttt{a}1$ 37 $\texttt{b}6$ $\texttt{d}6$ 38 $\texttt{b}7$ $\pm$. It seems obvious that Black could not possibly give White two connected passed pawns so far advanced, but White's weak king gives Black a little bit more time; notice that these variations only won for White by one tempo.

224) Correct is 31... $\texttt{f}8$ 32 $\texttt{e}5$ $\texttt{d}4$ 33 $\texttt{a}2$ $\texttt{e}7$ 34 $\texttt{c}2$ $\texttt{d}6$ with an unclear position, but it seems that Black's king will come over to the queenside quickly enough to stop the a-pawn from

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being a real threat.

All of this suggests that Black should have tried 25 ... ♕d8, and perhaps White should respond by the least pretentious move, 26 c5?

26 h3 ♖e6 27 ♕d5! [6]

Black wants to play 27 ... ♗c8, so White stops it by attacking the e-pawn, and offers the exchange in so doing. This sacrifice may look spectacular, and it is. The funny thing is that when Anand played the move, it looked routine to me. When we had prepared the Scheveningen, this motif had occurred time and again. At this point in the game, it was probably the first move Anand looked at. It is common in this opening for White to give up the exchange to get his queenside pawns rolling down the board. Kasparov should not have accepted the sacrifice, but it is easy to understand why he did. He could not have failed to recognize the danger, but by taking the exchange he seems to get some active counterplay. It is Kasparov's style to prefer active play—even when, as in this position, it was correct to defend passively. It turns out that Black's prospects for active play are only an illusion. By dint of imaginative play, Kasparov manages to set one clever trap before he has to resign, but that's it. Much better would have been a move like 27 ... h5?! when White would have only a normal advantage.

27 ... ♘xd5? 28 exd5 ♖g6
28 ... ♘f5 29 ♗g4 ♗c2 (29 ... ♕d3 30 ♕d1 ♗c2 31 ♗d6 ±; 29 ... ♖g6 30 ♘f1 e4 31 c5 ±) 30 c5 ♗f5 31 ♕d1 ♗d2 32 d6 ♖h8 33 ♘b3 ±.
29 c5 e4 30 ♘c2 [7] ♖e5

Black is trying desperately to get pieces over to the kingside to aid his lone queen in the attack, which needs to crash through quickly before White's queenside pawns become overwhelming. Notice, by the way, how passive the black bishop is; this is a key element in White's play. If it were active—say on ♗f4—Black might be better with his kingside attack.

There are other possibilities, but none of them seems to help Black:

a) 30 ... ♗f5 is mentioned by Seirawan. He quotes Anand as saying that simply 31 ♘f1 would give a clear advantage. Notice that once the f-pawn is on f5, it is much harder for Black to bring his rook into the attack.

b) 30 ... ♜e7—trying to activate that bishop—was suggested by Anand when all of the seconds looked at the game afterward. Yusupov found 31 d6 ♗f6 (31 ... ♘xd6 32 cxd6 ♖xd6 33 ♕d1 is very strong for...
White, because the bishops dominate the board) 32 d7 \( \text{xf8} \) 33 \( \text{xc7!} \) and Black's queenside crumbles.

c) 30 ... c3! was suggested by Chernin in the press room:

c1) Chernin's idea can be seen from the following variation: 31 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{e5} \) 32 \( \text{d7} \) \( \text{g5} \) 33 \( \text{d3!!} \) (33 \( \text{g1} \) just loses a tempo when compared to the game, and 33 g4? not surprisingly is bad because of 33 ... \( \text{e4+} \) 34 \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{e2} \) +) 33 ... \( \text{e2!} \) 34 \( \text{xe2} \) \( \text{xe2} \) 35 \( \text{h5} \) (35 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{g1+} \) 36 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{xd3} \) is unclear, because White's king is now seriously exposed) 35 ... \( \text{xe2} \) 36 \( \text{xe2} \) 37 \( \text{f2} \) \( \text{e4+} \) is perpetual check.

But White has two more promising continuations:

c2) 31 \( \text{g1} \) \( \text{e5} \) 32 \( \text{d7} \) \( \text{c2} \) (32 ... \( \text{g5} \) 33 \( \text{d6} \) would transpose to the game, but of course there is no point to ... \( \text{g5} \) once the white rook is already on \( \text{g1} \); 32 ... \( \text{h7} \) 33 \( \text{g4!} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 34 \( \text{xh4} \) \( \text{e5} \) 35 \( \text{d6} \) 36 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{e2} \) 37 \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 38 \( \text{g1} \) is very promising for White, e.g., 38 ... \( \text{g6} \) 39 \( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{g7} \) 40 \( \text{c6} \) +) 33 \( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xe2} \) 34 \( \text{xa8} \) \( \text{d2} \) 35 \( \text{c6} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 36 \( \text{b7} \) \( \text{e2} \) 37 \( \text{c7} \) \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{c8} \) 38 \( \text{c8} \) \( \text{e} \) reaches an amusing position. If White simply continues to play on the queenside, he should have a large advantage. The reader may work out for himself that 38 ... \( \text{g2} \) 39 \( \text{xg2} \) does not work because White can defend against perpetual check. So Black should probably play 38 ... \( \text{b4} \), whereupon 39 \( \text{a6} \) is clearly better for White. Maybe White will get three queens against two!

c3) Also good is 31 \( \text{d6} \) \( \text{e5} \) 32 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{g5} \) 33 \( \text{d3!} \), which shows how much White is willing to give to get the queens off. After 33 ... \( \text{xe2} \) 34 \( \text{xe6} \) 35 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{h6} \)
(35 ... b8 36 c7 a8 37 d7 +--; 35 ... g3 36 xxb7 +--) 36 g2 (36 xxb7? e2) 36 ... g6+ 37 f1, Black's queenside completely collapses—and with it, the game.

The move Kasparov plays fares no better, but at least he does find a very nice trap.

31 d7! g5 32 g1 e3 33 d6 g3 34 xxb7 e6

Black threatens 35 ... xh3+! and mate next move. How should White meet the threat?

35 h2! [8]

35 g4? xg4 36 xg4 e2 37 e1 g3! gives Black far too much counterplay. But what was wrong with 35 f1, since 35 ... xh3+ 36 xh3 xh3+ 37 g1 g3+ 38 g2 doesn't work?

After 35 f1?? Kasparov had prepared 35 ... b8! 36 xb8 (36 c6 c8 doesn't help White at all) 36 ... xh3+ 37 g1, and now just as it seems that White has beaten Black back, Black uncorks 37 ... e5!

White has nothing better than to take on h3 and the game ends in a draw: 38 g3+ 39 h1 xh3+ 40 g1 g3+, etc. A devilish trap!

But Anand's move finishes the game, as after 35 ... e5 36 xxa8, Black doesn't have a good discovered check.

Therefore, Black resigned.

1–0

After 9 games: Anand 5, Kasparov 4
Tuesday, 26 September 1995

After eight draws and a loss, Kasparov could not have been happy on the morning of this game. When he showed up to play he looked nervous and excited—a feeling no doubt heightened when the arbiter, Carol Jarecki, set the digital clock to the wrong time, then dropped the clock onto the board in the process of resetting it.

We soon understood why Kasparov’s energy level was so high. His opening was obviously home preparation and he quickly got a winning attack. That he was playing home analysis was shown by his taking no more than five minutes to reach move 20. It seems that the attack on the board was not violent enough to consume all his energy, because he was huffing and puffing very loudly at the board. After every move he left the playing booth, slamming the door behind him. The scene became ludicrous after a while; everybody in the press room was talking about Kasparov's rudeness. In his defense, it seems that Kasparov was not acting this way on purpose but just couldn't contain his emotions. Even so, it was annoying for Anand to hear this huffing, puffing man slam the door after every move.

Later Kasparov admitted that his emotions had been too strong for him to control. He even claimed that he had been so excited about the prospect of playing his preparation that he had been unable to focus during game 9. It is true that he played game 9 without much energy. Kasparov said that he had spent the entire weekend preparing his opening for game 10, falling in love with all the possibilities.

Be that as it may, I must say that this game is impressive. Once again, Kasparov demonstrated his phenomenal ability to demolish an opening by finding a powerful plan against it.
KASPAROV–ANAND, NEW YORK (M/10) 1995
SPANISH GAME C80
1 e4 e5 2 d3 d6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 d6 5 0–0 dxe4 6 d4 b5 7 
Ab3 d5 8 dxe5 d6 9 bd2 c5 10 c3 d4 11 g5! dxc3 12 xe6 
exf6 13 bxc3 d7 14 Ac2!

This move was first suggested by Mikhail Tal, who simply said that White would have “compensa-
tion” for the sacrificed pawn on c3.
14 ... dxc3 15 b3! [1]

This is the key to White’s plan. Now Black has a
terribly difficult task in choosing his next move. What
to do?
15 ... b3

After thinking for 45 minutes, Anand trades pieces 
and removes the defender of the queen rook, at the
cost of stabilizing White’s bishop on a monstrously 
strong square. Anand had seen up to move 18, but 
had missed Kasparov’s 19th move. From a practical 
standpoint it is an impossible task to see through this 
position at the board. Nor is it easy to do so even now. It seems that 
Black is already much worse after the move Anand played. Therefore we 
should analyze the critical position after White’s 15th move. Here are 
some other possibilities for Black:

a) 15 ... c5? 16 e1 looks too dangerous.
b) 15 ... b4 16 h5+ g6 (16 ... d7 17 f7+ c8 18 xc5!}

Game 10
... Kasparov–Anand

\[ \text{Ax}c5 19 \text{Ax}e4 \pm \] 17 \text{Ax}g6+ hxg6 18 \text{Ax}h8 \text{Ax}xh8 19 axb3 \pm.

c) 15 ... \text{Ad}4 16 \text{Ah}h5+ g6 (16 ... \text{Ad}d7 17 \text{Af}f7+ \text{Ag}8 18 \text{Ex}d4 \pm) 17
\text{Ax}g6+ hxg6 18 \text{Ad}h8 \text{Ax}xh8 19 \text{Ah}h6 0–0 20 axb3 \pm.

d) 15 ... \text{Ad}d8 16 \text{Ad}d2 \text{Ax}xe5 17 \text{Ag}1 \text{Ad}5 has actually been played in a correspondence game. Anand saw this line and rejected it because of the same move that White played in that game: 18 \text{Ax}c5 \text{Ax}c5 19 \text{Ab}3. Here Anand saw only 19 ... \text{Ax}d2 20 \text{Ah}h5+ g6 21 \text{Ax}c5 +- and 19 ...
\text{Ax}f2+ 20 \text{Ah}1! \text{Ax}d2 21 \text{Ex}x6+ \text{Ad}7 22 \text{Ah}h5+ g6 23 \text{Ex}e7+ \text{AX}e7 24
\text{Ex}e5+ --, but in Berg–Nevesteit, 1990, Black found an important resource in 19 ... \text{Ad}4! After 20 \text{Ex}x6+ \text{Ad}7 21 \text{Ah}1 \text{Ax}f2 22 \text{Ex}x6 h5!
(22 ... \text{Ad}d2 23 \text{Ad}a8+) the position was unclear. But going back to the position after move 17, I think White can play 18 \text{g}4! and have a strong attack, so this line does not look so good.

Are there any other more promising lines? Time will tell, but people may be so scared off by this game that we will not know for many years.

16 \text{Ax}b3 \text{Ad}4

a) 16 ... \text{Ax}e5 17 \text{Af}4 \pm.

b) 16 ... \text{Ad}d8 17 \text{Ah}h5+ g6 18 \text{g}4 is winning for White:

b1) 18 ... \text{Ax}e5 19 \text{Ax}e6+ \text{Ad}7 20 \text{Af}4+.

b2) 18 ... \text{Ad}d4 19 \text{Ag}5 \text{Ad}7 (19 ... \text{Ad}d7 20 \text{Ax}e6) 20 \text{Ax}e7 \text{Ax}e7
(20 ... \text{Ax}b3 21 \text{Ax}e6 --) 21 \text{Ac}1 \text{Ab}5 22 \text{Ad}6.

b3) 18 ... \text{Ax}e5 19 \text{Ab}2! \text{Ad}d4 (19 ... \text{Ax}b2 20 \text{Ax}e6+ \text{Ad}7 21
\text{Af}7+ \text{Ad}d7 22 \text{Ad}d1+ --) 20 \text{Ac}1 \text{Ab}5 21 \text{Ad}6! (21 ... \text{Ad}7 22
\text{Ax}e7+ \text{Ax}e7 23 \text{Ah}4+ g5 24 \text{Ad}1+ --) 22 \text{Ax}f5 \text{Ax}f5 23 \text{Ax}e6 +-
.

b4) 18 ... \text{Ax}a1 19 \text{Ax}e6+ \text{Ad}7 (19 ... \text{Ad}7 20 \text{Az}c6+ \text{Af}8 21
\text{Af}6 --) 20 \text{Az}c3! (also 20 \text{Af}6 is very strong; White threatens 21 \text{Az}f7+
\text{Ad}7 22 \text{Ad}6 mate, so Black has to give up the rook on h8 and White
will have an enormous advantage) and now:

b41) 20 ... \text{Az}c3 21 \text{Ac}1 (21 \text{Af}7+ \text{Ad}7 22 \text{Ad}1+ \text{Ac}8 23 \text{Az}e6+
\text{Ab}7 24 \text{Ad}d8 allows the embarrassing response 24 ... \text{Az}c1 mate) 21 ...
\text{Az}c1+ 22 \text{Ad}c1 \pm.

b42) 20 ... \text{Ab}2 21 \text{Az}f7+ \text{Ad}7 22 \text{Ad}1+ \text{Ac}8 23 \text{Az}e6+ \text{Ab}7 24
\text{Ad}d8 +-
.

b43) 20 ... \text{Az}f1+ 21 \text{Az}f1 \pm.

c) 16 ... \text{Ax}a1 17 \text{Ah}5+! g6 18 \text{Af}3 and Black is helpless:

c1) 18 ... \text{Ad}d8 19 \text{Af}6 \text{Ag}8 20 \text{Ax}e6 \pm, e.g.,

c11) 20 ... \text{Ag}7 21 \text{Az}f7+! \text{Ax}f7 (21 ... \text{Af}8 22 \text{Az}a3+) 22 \text{Az}e6+.

c12) 20 ... \text{Az}e7 21 \text{Ad}7+! \text{Ax}d7 22 \text{Az}e6! \text{Ax}e6 23 \text{Ax}a1 \pm.

c2) 18 ... \text{Ad}7 19 \text{Ax}e6+! \text{Ax}e6 20 \text{Ax}c6+ is a massacre:

c21) 20 ... \text{Ax}c6 21 \text{Ag}7 21 \text{Az}f6+ \text{Ag}8 (21 ... \text{Ac}8 22 \text{Az}e6+ \text{Ad}7 23
\text{Ag}5) 22 \text{Az}e6+ \text{Ag}7 23 \text{Ah}6+ \text{Ax}h6 24 \text{Ax}a1 +-
.

c22) 20 ... \text{Ax}e5 21 \text{Af}4+.

c23) 20 ... \text{Ac}7 21 \text{Ag}5+.

c24) 20 ... \text{Af}5 21 \text{Af}6+ \text{Ac}4 22 \text{Af}3+ \text{Ad}4 23 \text{Az}e3+.
25) 20 ... \( \text{d6} \) 21 \( \text{exd6} \) \( \text{\textit{e5}} \) (21 ... \( \text{\textit{d4}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{e1+}} \) is brutal) 22 \( \text{\textit{dxc7+}} \) and so on.

17 \( \text{\textit{g4!}} \) \( \text{\textit{xal}} \)

What else? Otherwise White will have a tremendous attack for nothing.

18 \( \text{\textit{e6}} \) \( \text{\textit{d8 [2]}} \)

White threatened 19 \( \text{\textit{d7+}} \) and 19 \( \text{\textit{e3}} \), so it is hard to think of a reasonable alternative. The bulletin gives two losing alternatives: 18 ... \( \text{\textit{c5}} \) 19 \( \text{\textit{d7+}} \) \( \text{\textit{f8}} \) 20 \( \text{\textit{h6!}} \) \( \text{\textit{xf1+}} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{xf1}} \) \( \text{\textit{gxh6}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{h4!}} \) with a winning attack, and 18 ... \( \text{\textit{e7}} \) 19 \( \text{\textit{d7+}} \) \( \text{\textit{f7}} \) 20 \( \text{\textit{e3}} \) ++.

I agree with the analysis of 18 ... \( \text{\textit{c5}} \) and the assessment of the resulting position, e.g., 22 ... \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 23 \( \text{\textit{xf6+}} \) \( \text{\textit{g8}} \) 24 \( \text{\textit{c6!}} \) \( \text{\textit{xc6}} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{xc6}} \) \( \text{\textit{f8}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{xe5}} \) — Black will lose the c-pawn and is simply lost. The bulletin's analysis of 18 ... \( \text{\textit{e7}} \) is correct as far as it goes, but is incomplete: 18 ... \( \text{\textit{c7}} \) 19 \( \text{\textit{c7}} \) (19 ... \( \text{\textit{e3}} \) \( \text{\textit{f2+!}} \) 20 \( \text{\textit{xe2}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe5}} \) 19 ... \( \text{\textit{d8}} \) (19 ... \( \text{\textit{f7}} \) 20 \( \text{\textit{e3}} \) is excellent for White, as the bulletin says) 20 \( \text{\textit{g5!}} \) (20 \( \text{\textit{e3?? h5!}} \) —) 20 ... \( \text{\textit{xexa2}} \) (20 ... \( \text{\textit{c5}} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{xe1}} \); 20 ... \( \text{\textit{xf1+}} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{xf1}} \) \( \text{\textit{xc5}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{xd4!}} \) ±) 21 \( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) \( \text{\textit{c4}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) ++.

In \textit{New In Chess} Kasparov mentions another move, 18 ... \( \text{\textit{c3}} \). He declines to analyze the position deeply, saying that chess lovers should find the wins for themselves. I will not cross his intentions by presenting my own analysis, but will merely report that he gives 19 \( \text{\textit{d7+}} \) \( \text{\textit{f7}} \) (19 ... \( \text{\textit{d8}} \) 20 \( \text{\textit{c5+}} \) \( \text{\textit{e7}} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{xe7+}} \) \( \text{\textit{c7}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{xc7+}} \) 20 \( \text{\textit{e3}} \) and implies that Black will not be able to defend himself against best play by White.

19 \( \text{\textit{h6!}} \) \( \text{\textit{c3}} \)

19 ... \( \text{\textit{xex6+}} \) 20 \( \text{\textit{xf1 g6}} \) (20 ... \( \text{\textit{xe6 h5+}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe7}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{f7}} \) mate; 20 ... \( \text{\textit{xe6}} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{xe6+}} \) \( \text{\textit{xc7}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{xc7}} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{e3!}} \) wins, e.g.,

a) 21 ... \( \text{\textit{xe6}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{xe6+}} \) \( \text{\textit{xc7}} \) 23 \( \text{\textit{g5}} \) \( \text{\textit{b7}} \) 24 \( \text{\textit{xe7}} \) \( \text{\textit{f7}} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{c6+}} \)

b) 21 ... \( \text{\textit{c5}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{xc4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xc6}} \) 23 \( \text{\textit{f7+}} \) \( \text{\textit{e7}} \) (or else the \( \text{\textit{h8}} \) is lost to \( \text{\textit{f6+}} \) 24 \( \text{\textit{a8+}} \) \( \text{\textit{d8}} \) (24 ... \( \text{\textit{d8}} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{c6+}} \) \( \text{\textit{xc7}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{xe5}} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{xc6+}} \) \( \text{\textit{f8}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{f3+}} \) \( \text{\textit{h7}} \) 27 \( \text{\textit{f7+}} \) \( \text{\textit{h6}} \) 28 \( \text{\textit{xc7}} \) —.

c) 21 ... \( \text{\textit{c5}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{xe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xc4}} \) (22 ... \( \text{\textit{xe4}} \) 23 \( \text{\textit{d5!}} \) —) 23 \( \text{\textit{f3}} \) (White threatens \( \text{\textit{c6+}} \) and \( \text{\textit{f7-f6+}}, \) so there is only one plausible move:) 23 ... \( \text{\textit{c7}} \) 24 \( \text{\textit{a8+}} \) \( \text{\textit{e8}} \) (24 ... \( \text{\textit{d8}} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{c6+}} \) \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{c5+}} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{c6+}} \) \( \text{\textit{f8}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{f3+}} \) and wins.

20 \( \text{\textit{xe7}} \) \( \text{\textit{d3!}} \)

This is the only move to continue the game, although it fails because of White's 25th move. Other moves lose trivially:

a) 20 ... \( \text{\textit{xe6}} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{xe6+}} \) \( \text{\textit{f7}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{h2+}} \) —

b) 20 ... \( \text{\textit{xe7}} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{h5+}} \) and 22 \( \text{\textit{f7}} \) mate.

21 \( \text{\textit{f8}} \) \( \text{\textit{g6}} \)

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25 \( \text{d}h5+ \text{d}d8 \) 26 \( \text{f}f6+ \text{e}e7 \) 27 \( \text{x}x7+ \text{d}x7 \) 28 \( \text{f}f7+ \text{d}d8 \) 29 \( \text{f}f8 \) mate) 25 \( \text{f}f6! +. \)

22 \( \text{f}f6 \text{e}e7 \) 23 \( \text{d}x7 \) \( \text{x}xg4 \)

23 ... \( \text{d}x7 \) 24 \( \text{h}h4+ \text{e}e8 \) 25 \( \text{g}g4 +. \)

24 \( \text{x}xg4 \) \( \text{x}xe7 \) 25 \( \text{c}c1! [3] \)

If Black could play ... c7–c5 without hindrance, he would have compensation for the pawn because of his queenside play. But White's move kills Black's chances, and now it's just a matter of technique.

25 ... c6 26 \( \text{f}f4 \text{a}5 \)

26 ... \( \text{d}d5 \) 27 \( \text{f}f2 \) c5 28 \( \text{c}c8 \) a5 29 \( \text{b}b7 \) \( \text{d}d7 \) 30 \( \text{c}c4 +. \)

27 \( \text{f}f2 \text{a}4 \) 28 \( \text{e}e3 \) b4?.

White has played simple and strong chess, bringing the king to the center and mobilizing the kingside pawns. If Black waits, he will be inexorably crushed on the kingside and in the center. He must try to get some queenside play going. But his pawns are backward—the c-pawn should be on c4 and the a-pawn on a6—so White can exploit any queenside advances.

29 \( \text{d}d1! \) a3

29 ... b3 30 \( \text{x}x3 \) a \( \text{x}b3 \) 30 ... \( \text{x}x3 \) b3 31 \( \text{x}x3 \) a \( \text{x}b3 \) 32 \( \text{b}b1 \) \( \text{b}b8 \) 33 \( \text{d}d4 +) 31 \( \text{b}b1 \) \( \text{c}c2+ \) 32 \( \text{x}x2 \) \( \text{x}c2 \) 33 \( \text{c}c1 +. \)

30 \( \text{g}g4! \)

Very simple. White's advantage is his extra pawn, so he has to use it. Also it is important to take the f5 square away from the knight.

30 ... \( \text{d}d5 \) 31 \( \text{c}c4! \) c5

31 ... \( \text{d}d5+ \) 32 \( \text{x}x5 \) \( \text{x}d1 \) 33 \( \text{x}b4 +; 31 ... \( \text{d}d6 \) 32 \( \text{b}b3 \) c5 33 \( \text{c}c4 \) \( \text{x}b4 \) 34 \( \text{x}d5 \) \( \text{d}d5 \) 35 \( \text{d}d4 \) b3 36 \( \text{c}c5 +. \)

32 \( \text{d}d4 \) 33 \( \text{c}c5 \) \( \text{e}e6 \)

33 ... b3 34 \( \text{x}b3 \) \( \text{x}b3 \) 35 \( \text{x}b3 \) \( \text{a}a8 \) 36 \( \text{c}c1 \) a2 37 \( \text{c}c1 +. \)

34 \( \text{d}d5 \) \( \text{d}d8 \)

34 ... \( \text{x}d5 \) 35 \( \text{x}d5 \) \( \text{x}f4+ \) 36 \( \text{c}c4 +. \)

35 \( \text{f}f5 \) \( \text{c}c4+ \) 36 \( \text{c}c3 \) \( \text{c}c5 \) 37 \( \text{g}g5 \) \( \text{c}c1 \) 38 \( \text{d}d6 [4] \)

Anand told me later that 38 \( \text{f}f6+ \) would also have forced his resignation, because there was no way that he was going to allow 38 ... \( \text{c}c6 \) 39 \( \text{d}d6+ \) \( \text{d}d5 \) 40 \( \text{f}f7 \) to be published all over the world. But Kasparov's move, though not as cute, is more efficient. White threatens 39 \( \text{f}f6+ \) and 40 \( \text{h}h5 \). It's time for Black to call it a day.

1–0

*After 10 games: Kasparov 5, Anand 5*
GAME 11

Thursday, 28 September 1995

After game 9, all of us in Anand's camp were elated. After game 10, we were dejected. Such strong passions play an important role in a match. A match is not a test of one's absolute ability to play chess—whatever that is—but of how well one has played those particular games. Therefore, the ability to monitor and control one's mood is of great importance in determining the match outcome.

This issue receives a superb examination in Mikhail Tal's book on his 1960 world championship match against Botvinnik. The entire book is wonderful, and in my opinion counts as one of the classics of chess literature. It is one more indication of Tal's genius that he could produce such a book. Tal writes:

In tournaments, the games that decide the final places are almost always played in the closing round. The specifications of a match are such that the result is determined not by the last match game, but by each game, and often, not by the concluding games. Even the games which do not exert such a decisive influence on the match's outcome have their place. Their significance is not simply limited by the fact that they may increase one player's edge. Let us take perhaps the most famous example—the titanic duel between Alexander Alekhine and José Capablanca. Alekhine himself thought that the match, which was played until six games were won, was decided by the score of three to two in his favor. Is it possible that such an outstanding chessplayer as Capablanca was not able to equalize the score? No. The question is not of a sporting nature. A much more important role was played by the feeling of confidence in his abilities by one of the combatants and a feeling of haughtiness by the other. At the time, this feeling was responsible for some very important points. No less a player
than Emanuel Lasker resigned his match with Capablanca when there were still ten games left, since he well knew that he would not be able to win back the four games in that situation. Thus, the deciding games in this match were likewise played somewhere in the middle of the competition.

Tal is making a very important point. A match is a struggle between two opposing wills. Each victory or loss makes itself felt not just in the numerical score, but in the ability of each player to conduct the next game. Remember that Kasparov–Anand had started with eight consecutive draws, setting a new record for world championship matches. Then
at the start of the third week the players traded victories. Although
numerically the balance was retained, psychologically the situation had
become much less stable. Whereas before, both Anand and Kasparov
had the feeling of safety and tranquility, now each player felt less secure,
more excited. Each one knew that any position had the potential to be
won or lost. Each one was also aware that in the next several games the
match could be decided, psychologically if not numerically.

Game 11 is not very interesting from a chess point of view. A slight
opening improvement—not even a new idea, really—leads to near-
equality. Mutual blunders turn a probable draw into a clear advantage
for White, then into a clear advantage for Black, and finally into a win
for Black. This is the kind of game one might expect from a rapid
tournament, not between the strongest players in the world at a slow
time control. Yet it makes much more sense when seen in the light of the
strain felt by each player. If its chess interest is not high, its sporting
significance is enormous: this game had a decisive influence on the next
several games, and thus on the world championship match as a whole.

ANAND–KASPAROV, NEW YORK (M/11) 1995
SICILIAN DEFENSE B78

1 e4 c5 2 f3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 xd4 f6 5 c3 g6!

This was a surprise, but not a shock. We assumed Kasparov had
something else beside the Najdorf prepared for this match. But we had
not anticipated a Dragon—other Sicilians had occupied our thoughts.
Also, the opening suits Kasparov's style. Positionally it is excellent for
Black, so if White wants an advantage he must play with the utmost
energy. Kasparov would have guessed that this course might be difficult
for Anand to follow: the tendency when you are surprised is to play a
quiet game, rather than burn your bridges in seeking an advantage. So
Kasparov's opening choice at this psychologically tender moment was
very clever. Finally, Kasparov could have a reasonable amount of confi-
dence in predicting Anand's response. Since he was well-prepared for
this line, it is an excellent choice for purely technical reasons.

Still, it is no big deal. Despite all the factors mentioned above,
Anand still achieved a tiny edge—not bad considering the circumstances.

6 Ac3 Ag7 7 B 0–0 8 Ad2 Ac6 9 Ac4 Ad7 10 0–0–0 Ce5 11
Ab3 Ec8 12 h4 h5 13 Bb1

Anand was quite right to play this line, even though he must expect
that Kasparov had some improvement in mind. First of all, it is what he
knows best, so unless he has no confidence in the line, he should choose
to fight on this turf. Furthermore, this line is quite solid for White. It is
based upon a positional idea (trading off the dark-squared bishops and
then playing Bd5), rather than a wild sacrificial lunge that could re-
bound somehow.
13 ... \( \text{Qc4} \) 14 \( \text{Axc4} \) \( \text{Axc4} \) 15 \( \text{Ade2} \) b5 16 \( \text{Ah6} \)

\[ [1] \text{Qa5!} \]

Previous games, including two of my own, have continued 16 ... b4 17 \( \text{Axe7} \) \( \text{Axe7} \) 18 \( \text{Ae5} \) dx5 19 exd5 \( \text{Qa5} \) 20 b3. Wolff–Kudrin, Eastern Open 1991, went 20 ... \( \text{Axe5} \) 21 g4 \( \text{Ah8} \) 22 \( \text{Qg3} \) \( \text{Axe8} \) 23 \( \text{Ah2} \) e5 24 dxe6 \( \text{Axe6} \) 25 \( \text{gxh5} \) \( \text{Axe6} \) · · · (1–0, 61); Wolff–Kiril Georgiev, Biel (izt) 1993, continued instead 20 ... \( \text{Axe5} \) 21 g4 \( \text{Efc8} \) 22 \( \text{Ad4+} \) \( \text{Qg8} \) 23 \( \text{Exd2} \) hxg4, and here instead of 24 fxg4 e5 25 dxe6 \( \text{Axe6} \) (drawn after 47 moves), White could have gotten a winning attack by 24 h5.

In Glek–Kveinys, Bad Godesberg 1995, Black played 19 ... \( \text{Axb6} \) instead of 19 ... \( \text{Qa5} \). Glek suggests that Black can thus equalize, but I don't believe this is true.

As you have probably noticed by now, I have more than a passing interest in this line. This is because I worked with Anand to develop this variation several years ago. Obviously we did not pay enough attention to 16 ... \( \text{Qa5} \), even though the move has been known for many years (for example, it was played in the game Suetin–Szabo, Leningrad 1967). It seems to be a clear improvement over 16 ... b4, and in the game Kasparov achieves a perfectly satisfactory position. Will the re-emergence of this move force White to look elsewhere? Time will tell ...

17 \( \text{Axe7} \) \( \text{Axe7} \) 18 \( \text{Af4}! \)

Played after considerable thought, and probably the best choice under the circumstances. The critical move must be 18 g4, but such a complicated move cannot be played without deep analysis, the more so since Kasparov would obviously have looked at this move most carefully. Another possibility is 18 \( \text{Gg5} \), trying to block Black's queenside play, but after 18 ... \( \text{Ec5} \) 19 \( \text{Qd5} \) \( \text{Axe5} \) 20 exd5 \( \text{Axc2} \) 21 \( \text{Efc2} \) \( \text{Qf5+} \) 22 \( \text{Ed3} \) (22 \( \text{Ab3} \) \( \text{Qa4+} \) 23 \( \text{Ec3} \) \( \text{Ec2+} \) 24 \( \text{Ab4} \) [24 \( \text{Ed4} \) \( \text{Ec5} \) mate] 24 ... \( \text{Ed4+} \) and 25 ... \( \text{Qa4} \) mate) 22 ... \( \text{Ec8+} \) 23 \( \text{Ec3} \) b4, it is apparent that White has not done a good job of blocking Black's play at all.

18 ... \( \text{Afc8} \) 19 \( \text{Qd5} \) \( \text{Qxd2} \)

Kasparov offered a draw after taking the queen, but Anand refused. This refusal took on enormous significance. Was it correct?

From a chess point of view, it is certainly permissible. Although White does not have enough to claim a significant edge, Black has not yet quite equalized. The slight weakness of the kingside (i.e., the g6 and h5 pawns are fixed on light squares) and the slight weakness of the b-pawn give White just a little to play for.

From a sporting point of view, it is entirely correct. So long as one is not unhappy, why not continue to play? After all, it is a common phenomenon that one can achieve all one wants from opening preparation,
and then think that the game should simply be “declared” a draw—and in such a moment, one is always vulnerable to an error.

From a psychological point of view, the decision can be correct, but it demands a strong sense of responsibility. When one declines a draw, one must then be ready to fight. Such a decision cannot help but heighten the tension for both players. Even more so, since this was the first draw offer that Anand had rejected in the match.

20 cxd2 cxd5 21 cxd5 cxf8 22 h1 b8 23 c3 e5 24 f4 bxc8 25 @b2 a5 26 a3 g7 27 d5 [2]

So far not much has happened, but now there follows an extraordinary sequence of moves.

27 ... c6?! 28 b4?

Kasparov’s last move blunders a pawn, which Anand should have taken: 28 cxe7 b8 29 d5 cxd5 30 b4 axb4 31 axb4 c4 32 d5 [3] and now there are two plausible moves:

a) 32 ... c8? was suggested by Kasparov after the game, so we can assume that this is what he intended to play. He gave the following variation: 33 c2 b4+ 34 c1 c6 35 ed2 a6! and Black gets good counterplay. But this variation is flawed, because White has a simple refutation in 33 c3! xcx3 34 c2, whereupon the b-pawn is lost. In fact, Anand showed this line to us immediately after the game.

b) 32 ... cxb4+ 33 c3! c4+ 34 b3 (34 d3 c8) 34 ... f5! (34 ... c8 35 e2 takes a solid pawn for nothing) is Black’s best line, and should probably hold the draw. After 35 b5 (35 e5 dx5 36 cxe5 c8 is fine for Black) 35 ... d4 (35 ... c8 36 e2 fxe4 37 fxe4 would also be a difficult ending for White to win) 36 c3 (to stop ... d2) 36 ... a4 37 d3 a3+ 38 d2 (38 c3 a2) 38 ... fxe4 39 cxe4 (39 fxe4 g3 40 e2 g4) 39 ... xxe4 40 fxe4 f6 should probably be drawn. Still, this line yields White some practical chances at no risk.

Unfortunately, Anand was seduced by another line, which seemed to hold out the promise of an extra exchange.

28 ... axb4 29 axb4 c4 [4] 30 b6?

This was Anand’s idea behind 28 b4, but it is a mistake that loses immediately. Black already has the advantage, but the game did not have to end in two more moves! White has three alternatives.
a) The match bulletin mentions only 30 \( \text{Qxe7}. \) After 30 ... \( \text{Bxb4+ 31 \text{Qe1 Aa2 32 Axd6 (32 A.de2 Ac7 33 Ac5 Axd5 34 exd5 Bxh4 =) 32 ... Bb1+ 33 Ab2 Bc2+! (33 ... Axe1 34 Axe8 Bg1 35 Ac3 Axb2 36 A.d2 Axd2 37 Bxd2 is fine for White) 34 Bxc2 Bc1 the bulletin assesses the position as slightly better for Black, and I would certainly be very unhappy as White here.

b) An earlier version of these notes suggested that 30 c3 would be satisfactory for White, but now I think that is not so. After 30 ... AxD5 31 AxD5 Ac3 32 Ac2 Bc1 33 Axb5 Bxb1 Black seems to have enough time to destroy White's kingside and push his h-pawn. White's counterplay with the b-pawn looks too slow.

I have not done an exhaustive analysis, but the following variations illustrate White's difficulties:

\( b1) 34 Ab2 Bc2+ 35 Bc2 Bh4 36 Bb8 Bb2 37 Bc5 Bg2+ 38 Ac3 Bh1 39 Bc2 and in my original analysis I gave only 39 ... Bg2+ with an eventual perpetual check. But as New In Chess reader Karl Tikkanen pointed out, Black can push his own passed pawn with 39 ... h4! and win easily.

\( b2) \) Thus, I tried to improve with 34 Bb7 Bf6 35 Bc2, with the idea that now at a crucial moment White will be able to play Bh8 and win a valuable tempo. However, it seems that Black can still win despite this improvement: 35 ... Bc2+ 36 Bc2 Bh4 37 Bb5 Bg2 38 b6 Bh2 39 Ac3 h4 40 Bb8 Bh5! 41 Bc4 (White must stop ... Bb5, which would hold up the b-pawn and cut off White's king), and now the simplest way to win is 41 ... h3 42 Bb7 (42 Bh8 Bh5; 42 Aa8 h2 43 Aa1 Bh1) 42 ... Bh5 when both sides will queen, but Black will have two extra pawns.

So this interesting attempt to get counterplay appears to fail.

c) This leaves 30 Ab3, which puts the king in an awkward pin but at least protects the b-pawn. For the moment Black should not play 30 ... f5 because 31 exf5 does as much damage to Black's pawns as it does to White's. Black can try to prepare the ... f5 break with 30 ... Bf8, when White might have to play 31 Ae2 to protect the c2-square again. But it is not obvious how Black can break through in this case. So probably Black should exploit the fact that the rook on d2 is overworked by playing 30 ... Axd5! 31 exd5 Bf6 [5]. I don't know whether White can hold this position, but it is certainly unpleasant, and an evaluation of ± is called for.
White’s pawns are weak and Black’s rooks are far more active than their counterparts.

None of these options are appealing, so we can see that after Anand’s 28th move, things were already coming apart. After his 30th move, however, his position completely explodes.

30 ... $\text{b}x\text{b}$+ 31 $\text{a}a$3 [6] $\text{c}x\text{c}2$! 0–1

Anand resigned. No matter which rook White takes, Black emerges with a crushing advantage, e.g., 32 $\text{c}x\text{c}2$ $\text{b}3+$ 33 $\text{a}a$2 $\text{e}3+$ and 34 ... $\text{e}x\text{e}1$.

After 11 games: Kasparov 6, Anand 5

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Game 11

Anand–Kasparov (11) • 31 $\text{a}3$
Friday, 29 September 1995

This was the last game of the rollercoaster third week of the match. Anand was on a two-game losing streak, and had just had a hole the size of a truck punched in his main defense to 1 e4. We desperately needed a change of pace.

In addition to the Open Spanish, we had some other ideas prepared in case of emergency. Anand wanted something a little offbeat, still within the double king's pawn complex, that would change the kind of game Kasparov was playing. He decided to play a sort of "hyper-Classical," that is, a line of the Spanish Game in which Black plays ... O-o6 and ... Lc5. Instead of playing it without touching the queenside pawns, as is usually done, he would play it after moving ... a6 and ... b5. Until very recently this line had been dismissed by theory as unsound, but it turns out that the dismissal had been based on a superficial assessment. Therefore in the year before this game, some of the top grandmasters had been experimenting with the line as Black.

We had hoped to catch Kasparov off-guard and to pose him some new problems, but we also knew there was a good chance he would play the line he actually chose in this game. The position that arose is structurally similar to the positions occurring in Kasparov's "anti-Marshall" treatment of Short's defense to the Spanish in their 1993 match. Kasparov showed that he likes the closed Spanish positions and plays them well.

We had to make sure that Anand would get a reasonable position from the opening, but we only half succeeded. Kasparov achieved a pleasant edge with White out of the opening; Anand had to fight hard not to fall into a very bad position. In our preparation we had missed a key line as early as move 12. Still, with very good play by Anand and a
little help from Kasparov, Anand steered the position to a likely draw.

Then disaster struck. One careless move by Anand just as the draw was within his grasp, and suddenly he was much worse again. I was practically tearing my hair out of my head I was so worried. To burn off some of this nervous energy, I analyzed the endgame in the press room with Jon Speelman and international master Mark Dvoretsky, a friend of Artur Yusupov and one of the world’s top chess trainers. Anand put up stiff resistance; fortunately Kasparov fell into a trap that Anand set. I am proud to say that Speelman, Dvoretsky, and I foresaw the trap.

Kasparov could still have played for a win, but must have decided it was too risky. Perhaps he was so disgusted with himself that he could not find the energy. So Anand drew the game twice, and the second time it stuck.

There were good and bad omens in this game. It was good that Anand had fought so hard and well, but it was bad that he had blundered yet again. It was good that he had held a bad position, but it was bad that he had gotten a bad position from the opening.

My hope was that he would gain confidence from having withstood such heavy pounding from Kasparov and emerged with a draw. Looking back, I can see this must not have been Anand’s feeling. Although he gave no indication of it during the weekend between this game and the next, he must have been upset. It seems that his normally cool cognitive faculties were overheated by the strain of losing games 10 and 11 and of being so close to the precipice for so long in this game.

I had hoped that this draw would break the wave of Kasparov’s initiative. Instead, this bit of good news was swamped in the onslaught of games 13 and 14.

**KASPAROV–ANAND, NEW YORK (M/12) 1995**

**SPANISH GAME C78**

1 e4!

Always follow strength with strength. Kasparov is justifiably confident that he has knocked out one of Anand’s main openings, so he wants to see what we have waiting for him next.

1 ... e5 2 d4 c6 3 a3 b6 4 a4 d5 5 0–0 b5 6 b3 c5?! 7 a4! b7 8 d3 d6 9 c3 b4 10 d5 a5 11 dxf6+ gxf6 12 a2 [1] h6!

In our analysis, we had carelessly analyzed only 12 ... 0–0?? Fortunately Anand noticed at the board that this move would be very bad because of 13 g5 g6 14 e7 fxe8 15 h4 h6 16 f5, which is certainly very good for White but not losing for Black. But White has an even stronger way to play, as found by Maurice Perea: 15 dxe5!

So Anand had to vary from his preparation. He was right to do so, but now the position can hardly be called satisfactory for Black.
13 c3

This move was criticized after the game for taking a tempo to dissolve Black’s biggest weakness. The move has strengths as well, such as opening the b-file and fighting for the center, and it does not deserve criticism.

Still, Anand was even more afraid of 13 Axe3?, and this is also a strong move: 13 ... Ad8 (13 ... Axe3 14 fxe3 loses time because Black has to move the queen yet again, and opens lines on the kingside for White. Therefore White has a clear advantage after this exchange. Note that the doubled pawns are in no way a weakness for White, as they open the valuable f-file and control important squares in the center.) 14 Ad2! (14 Axe5 dxc5 is not bad, but the main line, given by Yasser Seirawan, is stronger) 14 ... 0-0 15 Wh5! Ac8 (15 ... Ac6 16 Ad5 ±) 16 Axe5 dxc5 17 f4! ±. Of course, this line is not forced, but it indicates the danger for Black in this position. White has active play and Black does not; whereas Black has weaknesses and White does not.

13 ... bxc3 14 bxc3 0-0 15 Axc3 Aad8!

Black cannot afford to open the f-file against his king, but must deal with the possibility of White taking the bishop on c5. He also needs to bring his queenside pieces into play and to prepare counterplay in the center. With one move Anand accomplished all of this.

16 Ab1 [2]
16 Axe5 dxc5 17 Ae2 c4! 18 Axe4 (18 d4 exd4 19 cxd4 [19 Axe4 c5] 19 ... Ae8 gives Black active counterplay) 18 ... Axe4 19 dxc4 Whf4!
20 Ae1 f5! 21 exf5 Axe3 22 Whx3 Axe3 23 gxh3 Af4 24 Ae2 Whf4 =.

16 ... Ae3
16 ... Axe3 17 Axe3 d5 is a logical try, to use all of Black’s pieces in their current placements to get some central counterplay right away. I see two interesting ways for White to react:

a) 18 Axe7? (18 Axe4 Whg5!) 18 ... Axe7 19 Axe5 c6 20 Axh4 (20 Axe4 Axd6 looks fine for Black) 20 ... Axe1+!? (20 ... Whg5 20 Axe6 Whx3+ 21 Ah1 Axe8 gives White a pleasant choice. White can play the calm 22 Axe3 Axe6 23 Axe1 Whg7 24 d4 with plenty of compensation, or the more violent 22 Axe5 Axe5 23 Axe7 Axe8? 24 Axe5 Axe8d5 25 Axe5 Axe5, where White is up a pawn but Black is so active that it seems likely he should hold. Probably the first choice is better, giving White the advantage) 21 Axe1 exd4 22 Axe2! (22 Axe6? Whd5 23 Axe5 dxc3 opens the c-file
for Black, which makes the c3 pawn very dangerous) and whichever pawn Black takes, White will win it with the queen before Black activates his rooks. It seems to me that White is better, but the position is not totally clear.

b) 18. exd5 \( \triangle \times d5 \) 19. \( \triangle \times d5 \) \( \approx \times d5 \) 20. e4 \( \approx \times d8 \) (20 ... \( \approx d6 \) 21 d4! \( \triangle c6 \) 22. \( \triangle x e 5 \) \#e7 [22 ... \( \triangle e 6 \) 23. \( \triangle x c6 \) \( \approx \times c6 \) 24 d5] 23. \( \triangle c4 \) ++) and I presume that White is still better after 21 \( \approx e 2 \), but Black has at least traded off some pieces and opened the d-file. Here I don't like 21 d4 so much, because after 21 ... e\( \times d4 \) 22 \( c \times d4 \) it seems to me that Black should be able to generate counterplay against e4 and d4.

Perhaps in neither case is Black's position much worse than in the game, but in both cases Black takes the risk of worsening his position without any real gain in the offering, so Anand's choice is very sensible.

17. \( \approx e 2 \)

Once again it is not to White's advantage to exchange the bishops on c5 because it gives Black too much active play, i.e., 17. \( \triangle x c5 \) \( d \times c5 \) 18. \( \approx e 2 \) (to stop 18 e4) 18 ... \#g4 =. However, an interesting alternative to the move Kasparov played is 17. d4! \( \triangle b 6 \) 18. \( \approx d 3 \) (18 h3 \#g6! hits e4 and h3) to gain space in the center. If now 18 ... \#g4 19. \( \triangle d 2 \) \( e \times d 4 \) 20. \( \triangle x d 4 \) (20 \( c \times d 4 \) \( \triangle c 6 \) 21. f3 \( \triangle d 7 \) 22. \( \approx f c 1 \) a5! gives Black counterplay against d4 and a4 using b4 for the knight, while 21 \( \approx f c 1 \) \( \triangle x d 4 \) and 21 \( \triangle x a 6 \) \( \triangle x d 4 \) are just good for Black) 20 ... \( \triangle x d 4 \) 21. \( c \times d 4 \) \( \triangle c 6 \) 22 \( \approx f c 1 \) seems to be better for White no matter which way White takes on d4, once the rook penetrates to c7.

It is understandable that Kasparov did not want to take the chance that this line could be worked out to a draw at the board. The move he played keeps an advantage.

17 ... \#e6

Two alternatives:

a) 17 ... \#g4 18 h3! \( \triangle \times f 3 \) 19. \( \approx x f 3 \) \( \approx x f 3 \) 20. \( g \times f 3 \) is clearly better for White. His plan is to play f3-f4, which will change the pawn structure to his advantage whether or not Black takes on e3. White's light-squared bishop is a monster, and Black's knight on a5 is terrible. This would be a difficult endgame for Black to play.

b) 17 ... \( \approx f c 8 \) makes sense to further restrain d3-d4, but after a move like 18 h3 the ball is back in Black's court and it's not easy to see how to build on his last move with another strong move.

18 h3

It's not so good for White to play 18 d4 \( \triangle x a 2 \) 19. \( \approx x a 2 \) \#b6!, because by playing d3-d4 White has given Black's bishop and knight reason to live again by weakening the d4 and e4 squares. However, Seirawan's suggestion of 18. \( \triangle x e 6 \) !? \#x6 (18 ... \( f x e 6 \) !? 19. \( \triangle x c 5 \) \( d \times c 5 \) 20 \( \approx e 2 \) ++) 19 d4! makes sense, because 19 ... \#b6? now just loses a pawn to 20 d5. So Black must play 19 ... e\( \times d 4 \) 20. c\( c \times d 4 \) \#b6 and now play
could continue: 21 \( \texttt{Qd2} \) d5! (21 ... \( \texttt{a8} \) \( \texttt{a8} \) 22 d5; 21 ... \( \texttt{a2} \)? 22 \( \texttt{a1} \) \( \texttt{b2} \) 23 \( \texttt{x6} \) \( \texttt{x4} \) 24 \( \texttt{a1} \) \( \texttt{e3} \) 25 \( \texttt{e1} \) ++) 22 e5 (22 exd5 \( \texttt{x4} \) 23 \( \texttt{x4} \) \( \texttt{x6} \) 24 \( \texttt{xe6} \) \( \texttt{fxe6} \) =) and now:

a) 22 ... \( \texttt{c4} \) was the move Seirawan gave for Black. After 23 \( \texttt{fc1} \) (23 \( \texttt{x4} \) dx4 24 \( \texttt{fd1} \) f6 is unclear; Seirawan gives only "23 f4! with advantage" which looks like a fair assessment) 23 ... \( \texttt{xd2} \) (23 ... \( \texttt{x4} \) 24 \( \texttt{exe3} \) f6 25 \( \texttt{f5} \) =) 24 \( \texttt{xd2} \) and White must be stopped from playing 25 a5, which would increase his advantage on the queenside, but after 24 ... a5 a move like 25 \( \texttt{b5} \) gives White a clear advantage.

b) Perhaps a better way for Black would be 22 ... \( \texttt{a8} \) to reserve the option of ... \( \texttt{c4} \) until White's knight has left d2, while preserving the idea of ... f7-f6 for next move so as to gain some counterplay. If White plays a move like 23 \( \texttt{fc1} \) then 23 ... f6 looks okay for Black, so I think 23 f4 is best. Now after 23 ... f5 24 \( \texttt{fc1} \) \( \texttt{d7} \) Black is passive—and worse—but may not be lost.

So 18 \( \texttt{x6} \) \( \texttt{x6} \) 19 d4 is an interesting option. Whether it is better than the game continuation depends upon the analysis to move 21.

18 ... \( \texttt{x6} \) 19 \( \texttt{x6} \) 20 f6 \( \texttt{e3} \) 21 \( \texttt{xe6} \) [3] 21

This move allows Black to equalize. The critical move is 21 \( \texttt{d5} \) which I and most grandmaster observers expected to be played. Because the position that results is critical to understanding this game—and because it is a fascinating endgame in its own right—I have done an unusually deep analysis of the possibilities for both sides. I must warn the reader that you can get lost in the thicket of analysis. I certainly did several times myself. Even after all this analysis I am not confident that my assessments are correct, simply because the position is extremely complex. More analysis is always possible. It may be possible to find hidden resources that force an assessment to be overturned for one side or the other in these variations.

For those readers willing to take some time to study these variations carefully, and even to carry the analysis further, I recommend it as an extremely instructive exercise. So often we pass over these simple-looking endgames without realizing how much complexity lies beneath the surface. The chessplayer who can recognize and use some of that complexity during a game will be a much stronger in the endgame.

After 21 \( \texttt{d5} \) Black must capture the queen because 21 ... c5 22 \( \texttt{b6} \) (or 22 \( \texttt{x6} \) \( \texttt{f6} \) 23 \( \texttt{b6} \)) is too strong. Then after 21 ... \( \texttt{x4} \) 22 exd5 Black is faced with a momentous choice. He can contest the b-file and play quietly with 22 ... \( \texttt{a5} \), or he can sacrifice a pawn for active play with 22 ... c4.
a) 22 ... Bb8 23 Qd2 [4] (23 Bb4 c5! 24 dxc6 Qxc6 25 Bc4 Qf6 =) gives Black a wide choice:
   a1) 23 ... Bb6? 24 Bxb6 cxb6 25 Bb1 Bb8 26 Be4 +–.
   a2) 23 ... c5? 24 Qe4 Qfd8 25 c4! is very strong for White, but not 25 Bxb8 Bxb8 26 Qxd6 Qd8, or 26 c4 Bb6.
   a3) 23 ... Bb7 24 Bxb7! (24 Bb4 Bfb8 25 Bf1 Bf8 26 Qc4 Qxb4 27 Qxb4 Bb4 28 Qxb4 Qxc4 29 dxc4 f5 30 a5 Qe7 31 b5 Bd7 and Black should hold the draw) 24 ... Qxb7 25 d4 keeps an advantage for White, although how large this advantage could be disputed.
   a4) 23 ... c6 (suggested by Christopher Chabris) and now:
      a41) 24 e4? c5! is about equal, because now Black can just sit tight. White has no way to infiltrate along the b-file and the knight on a5 is actually well-placed to control c4. The weakness of d6 is very difficult to exploit without the e4 square for the white knight.
      a42) 24 dxc6 Qxc6 25 e4 Qfd8 26 Qc4 (26 Bxb8 Bxb8 27 Qc4 Bb3 28 Qc1 Qf8 29 Qxd6 Bc3 30 Bb1 Qxc3 31 Bb7 Qd3) 26 ... Bxb1! (26 ... d5? 27 Bxb8 Qxb8 28 Qxe5 dxe4 29 dxe4 Qe8 30 Bb1! f6 31 Bd3 =) 27 Bxb1 d5 28 exd5 Qxd5 29 Bb6 c5 and Black is okay as White cannot capture on a6 because of 30 ... e4.
   a43) 24 c4! is stronger. The opening of the c-file seems to favor White: 24 ... cxd5 (24 ... f5 25 Bxb8! Bxb8 26 Qxb5 will probably soon transpose to 24 ... cxd5, as the options of dxc6 and c4-c5 are dangerous for Black) 25 cxd5 f5 (25 ... Qf6 26 Qd4) 26 Bxb8 (also 26 Bf1!) Qf8 27 Bf1! [27 Bxc8+ Bxc8 28 Bb6 Qc3] is quite good for White) 26 ... Bxb8 27 Qf5 Bb4 28 Qd4 Qb7 29 Qf2 Qxa4 30 Bb2 Qc5 31 Qd6! (31 Qxc5 dxc5 32 Bb7 Qa3 gives Black enough play to draw) 31 ... Qxd3 32 Bb7 is better for White.
   a5) 23 ... f5! and now:
      a51) 24 Bxb8 Bxb8 25 Qxf5 Bb2 gives Black enough play for the pawn:
         a511) 26 Qe4 Bc2 27 Qf3 (27 Bf2 Qxe3 28 Bf2 Qc4!; 27 Bf1 Qxe3 28 Qd1 Qe2 29 Bb1 Qe3! 30 Qf2 e4!) 27 ... Qb3 and White is tied up.
         a512) 26 Qf2 Qb3! 27 Qe4 (27 Qc4 Bb1+ 28 Qf1 Qxf1 + 29 Qxf1 Qc5; 27 Qf3 Qb3 28 Qc2 Qa3) 27 ... Qb1+ 28 Qf1 Qb2 and Black is fine.
      a52) 24 Bb4! is stronger:
         a521) 24 ... Bxb4? 25 cxb4 Qb7 26 a5! ±.
         a522) 24 ... c6? 25 Bf1! Qc8 26 Bb6 ±.
      a53) 24 ... c5! 25 dxc6 (also 25 Bxb8 Qxb8 26 Qxf5 is
probably very good, now that d6 is weak) 25 ... \( \diamond x c 6 \) 26 \( \mathbb{B} x b 8 \) \( \diamond x b 8 \) (26 ... \( \mathbb{B} x b 8 \) 27 \( \mathbb{B} x f 5 \) 27 \( \mathbb{B} b 1 \) \( \pm \).

\( a 524 \) 24 ... \( \mathbb{B} b 7 \) 25 \( \mathbb{B} x b 7 \) \( \diamond x b 7 \) 26 d4 exd4 (26 ... e4 27 c4 g6 28 \( \mathbb{B} b 1 \) is quite nice for White) 27 cxd4 \( \mathbb{A} a 5 \) 28 \( \mathbb{B} c 1 \) \( \mathbb{B} c 8 \) 29 \( \mathbb{A} c 4 \) \( \diamond x c 4 \) 30 \( \mathbb{B} x c 4 \) \( \mathbb{G} f 7 \) 31 \( \mathbb{B} c 6 \) is clearly better for White.

\( a 525 \) 24 ... \( \mathbb{B} b 6 \) 25 \( \mathbb{B} x b 6 \) (25 \( \mathbb{B} b 1 \) \( \mathbb{B} b 8 \) 26 \( \mathbb{G} c 4 \) [26 e4?; 26 \( \mathbb{B} x b 6 \) \( \mathbb{B} x b 6 \)!] 26 ... \( \diamond x c 4 \) 27 dxc4 a5?! is better for White after 28 \( \mathbb{B} b 5 \), but Black should hold the draw) 25 ... \( \mathbb{B} x b 6 \) 26 \( \mathbb{B} b 1 \) (26 d4?) 26 ... \( \mathbb{B} b 8 \) 27 d4 exd4 (27 ... f4 28 \( \mathbb{G} f 2 \) \( \mathbb{G} x e 3 + 29 \) \( \mathbb{G} x e 3 \) exd4+ 30 \( \mathbb{B} x d 4 \) \( \mathbb{G} f 7 \) 31 c4 \( \pm \)) 28 exd4 \( \mathbb{G} f 7 \) 29 c4 \( \mathbb{B} b 7 \) [5] is passive for Black, but I see no obvious way for White to increase his advantage. Black should have good drawing chances.

My conclusion about 22 ... \( \mathbb{B} b 8 \) is that after 23 \( \mathbb{D} d 2 \) f5! Black is worse, but seems to be able to hold. However, it is a difficult and joyless position for Black to play.

Is there any way for Black to get more active play? Yes, but it involves sacrificing a pawn, and is therefore dangerous. Should Black do it? I think the answer is yes, but as always the devil is in the details.

\( b 2 \) 22 ... e4?! (This is suggested as best in both the match bulletin and the report by Seirawan in Inside Chess. Apparently it was found by Roman Dzindzichashvili.) 23 dxe4 (Seirawan suggests 23 \( \mathbb{D} d 2 \), but I don't understand this move; after 23 ... exd3 Black is better) 23 ... \( \mathbb{D} c 4 \) (23 ... \( \mathbb{G} f e 8 \) 24 \( \mathbb{B} b 4 \) f5 25 exf5 \( \mathbb{B} x e 3 \) 26 \( \mathbb{D} d 4 \) \( \mathbb{B} x c 3 \) 27 \( \mathbb{D} e 6 \) and 28 f6 \( \pm \)) 24 \( \mathbb{B} b 7 ! \) [6] (24 \( \mathbb{B} b 4 \) \( \mathbb{D} x e 3 \) 25 \( \mathbb{G} f 2 \) [25 \( \mathbb{G} e 1 \)!! \( \mathbb{D} c 2 \) 25 ... f5!; 24 \( \mathbb{G} f e 1 \) \( \mathbb{B} b 8 \) 25 \( \mathbb{G} f 2 \) \( \mathbb{G} f e 8 \) is okay for Black) and now Black has a big choice:

\( b 1 \) 24 ... \( \mathbb{G} f e 8 ? \) 25 \( \mathbb{B} x c 7 \) \( \mathbb{X} x e 4 \) 26 \( \mathbb{D} d 4 \) \( \mathbb{D} e 5 \) 27 \( \mathbb{D} f 5 \) \( \mathbb{G} h 7 \) 28 \( \mathbb{B} f 4 \) \( \pm \).

\( b 2 \) 24 ... \( \mathbb{D} x e 3 \) 25 \( \mathbb{G} e 1 \) (25 \( \mathbb{G} b 1 \) f5!) 25 ... \( \mathbb{D} c 4 \) (25 ... \( \mathbb{D} c 2 ? \) 26 \( \mathbb{G} e 2 \) \( \mathbb{G} a 3 \) 27 \( \mathbb{A} a 2 \) \( \mathbb{D} c 4 \) 28 \( \mathbb{B} x c 7 \) \( \mathbb{G} e 8 \) 29 \( \mathbb{B} x c 8 \) \( \mathbb{B} x c 8 \) 30 \( \mathbb{D} d 4 \) \( \pm \)) 26 \( \mathbb{B} x c 7 \) \( \mathbb{G} c 8 \) 27 \( \mathbb{B} x c 8 \) \( \mathbb{B} x c 8 \) 28 \( \mathbb{D} d 4 \) \( \mathbb{D} e 5 \) (28 ... \( \mathbb{G} b 6 \) 29 \( \mathbb{G} c 6 \) \( \pm \)) 29 \( \mathbb{D} f 5 \) \( \pm \). Still, all these lines are unclear. Sometimes White keeps his extra pawn; sometimes Black crawls out with enough active play.

\( b 3 \) 24 ... \( \mathbb{D} d 7 ? ! \) is given in the bulletin, but is not the best because the rook ends up badly placed when White goes for the a-pawn: 25 \( \mathbb{A} a 7 ! \) \( \mathbb{G} e 8 \) (25 ... a5 26 \( \mathbb{D} d 1 \) with the idea of \( \mathbb{D} d 4 \) is clearly better for White, as is 25 ... \( \mathbb{D} x e 3 \) 26 \( \mathbb{G} e 1 \) and \( \mathbb{G} x a 6 \) 26 \( \mathbb{B} x a 6 \) \( \mathbb{B} x e 4 \) 27 \( \mathbb{A} a 8 + \)

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\[ \text{b3) 29 \ldots \text{e}e3 30 \text{a}6 \text{c}x\text{d}5 (30 \ldots \text{e}e8 31 \text{e}e8 \text{e}e8 32 \text{a}7 \text{e}a8 33 \text{a}5! \text{c}c4 34 \text{b}6 \text{b}6 35 \text{d}a4! \text{c}x\text{d}5 36 \text{b}5 ++ \text{as the pawn will get through for at least a piece}) 31 \text{a}7 \text{b}6 32 \text{b}8 ++.} \\
\text{b4) Correct is 24 \ldots \text{c}8! \text{and now;}} \\
\text{b41) 25 \text{a}7?! \text{now is not so good because there is no check on} \text{a}8: 25 \ldots \text{f}e8 26 \text{d}x\text{a}6 \text{e}x\text{e}4 27 \text{a}5 (27 \text{d}x\text{d}4 \text{e}x\text{e}3 28 \text{f}e1 \text{e}e8) 27 \ldots \text{e}x\text{e}3 28 \text{e}e1 (28 \text{a}1 \text{c}x\text{d}5 29 \text{c}6 \text{a}8 \text{is fine for Black}) 28 \ldots \text{e}e8 29 \text{c}6 \text{c}x\text{d}5 30 \text{e}x\text{e}8+ \text{h}x\text{e}8 31 \text{c}4 \text{f}4 (31 \ldots \text{g}b4 32 \text{c}x\text{c}7 \text{a}8 33 \text{c}5!) 32 \text{c}x\text{c}7 \text{h}a8 33 \text{c}5 \text{b}5 \text{a}5 34 \text{c}x\text{d}6 (34 \text{c}6 \text{a}6) 34 \ldots \text{d}5 35 \text{d}7 \text{c}6.} \\
\text{b42) 25 \text{d}1 \text{and now:}} \\
\text{b421) 25 \ldots \text{f}e8 26 \text{d}d4 \text{a}5 (26 \ldots \text{e}x\text{e}3 27 \text{c}2 28 \text{c}4 \pm) 27 \text{e}7 (27 \text{b}b4?! \text{c}5; 27 \text{b}1 \text{c}5 28 \text{c}x\text{c}6 \text{c}x\text{c}6 29 \text{c}x\text{d}6 \text{b}4 \text{is better for White, but probably gives Black enough active play for a draw}) 27 \ldots \text{c}5 (27 \ldots \text{b}3 28 \text{c}4 \text{c}5 29 \text{e}5 \pm) 28 \text{d}3 \text{subdivides again:}} \\
\text{b4211) 28 \ldots \text{c}4 29 \text{e}5 \text{d}x\text{e}5 30 \text{d}x\text{e}5 \text{e}x\text{e}5 31 \text{b}a6 \text{c}4 32 \text{d}4 \text{e}x\text{e}3 \text{33 \text{b}x\text{d}6 \text{e}x\text{c}3 is better for White, but Black might draw.}} \\
\text{b4212) 28 \ldots \text{e}x\text{e}4 29 \text{b}a6 \text{d}4 30 \text{a}6! \text{d}a8 (30 \ldots \text{d}x\text{c}6? 31 \text{d}x\text{c}6 \text{f}e8 32 \text{a}d2! \pm) 31 \text{c}2! \text{d}x\text{d}2 (31 \ldots \text{e}x\text{e}3 32 \text{b}e3 \text{e}x\text{e}4 33 \text{b}x\text{d}8+ \text{h}h7 35 \text{d}6 \pm) 32 \text{b}x\text{d}2 \text{e}x\text{e}3 33 \text{b}x\text{d}6 \text{b}a4 34 \text{b}d8+ \text{h}h7 35 \text{d}6 \pm.} \\
\text{b422) But Black has a much better (and simpler) way to play: 25 \ldots \text{d}x\text{e}3 26 \text{d}4 (26 \text{d}4 \text{e}4 27 \text{d}4 [27 \text{a}7 \text{b}2 28 \text{d}4 \text{c}5! 29 \text{d}x\text{c}6 [29 \text{d}2 \text{c}4! \text{and 30 \ldots \text{a}8] 29 \ldots \text{a}6 =] 27 \ldots \text{a}5 \text{is fine for Black, as 28 \text{a}7 \text{c}5 29 \text{d}1 \text{a}8 \text{holds. Compare to line b421 above, where White had an extra pawn}) 26 \ldots \text{c}5! 27 \text{d}3 \text{c}4 \text{and again Black is fine.}} \\
\text{My conclusion is that Black seems to be all right after 22 \ldots \text{e}4 if he plays 24 \ldots \text{c}8. This reasoning may even explain why Kasparov did not play the obvious move 21 \text{c}5. However, by playing the move in the game he gives up all his advantage if Black plays correctly.}} \\
\text{21 \ldots \text{e}x\text{e}6 22 \text{b}4 \text{b}8 23 \text{f}b1 [7]} \\
\text{If White does not play this move, Black can play \ldots \text{b}6 and \ldots \text{f}b8. Now Black has a way to use the fact that White has doubled on the b-file.} \\
\text{23 \ldots \text{c}6??}
But this is not it! It seems that Anand simply missed that White could play 24 \( \text{Re7} \) and this puts him right back in big trouble again. Black could have equalized the position with 23 ... \( \text{Rxb4} \) 24 \( \text{cx} \text{b4} \) (24 \( \text{Re} \text{b4} \) \( \text{Qf7} \) is equal because White has no way to penetrate into the queening side before Black brings his king over, e.g., 25 \( \text{Qd2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 26 \( \text{Qb} \text{b3} \) \( \text{Qc} \text{c6} \) 27 \( \text{Qb} \text{b7} \) \( \text{Qd} \text{d7} \) and White has to move the knight away so the rook is not lost to 28 ... \( \text{Qc} \text{c8} \) 24 ... \( \text{Qb} \text{b8} \)! (24 ... \( \text{Qd} \text{d6} \) is also interesting. White gets nothing by 25 \( \text{b} \text{b5} \) \( \text{ax} \text{b5} \) 26 \( \text{ax} \text{b5} \) \( \text{Qe} \text{7} \) 27 \( \text{Qc} \text{1} \) \( \text{d} \text{c8} \) =, but after 25 \( \text{Qc} \text{1} \) \( \text{Qxb4} \) 26 \( \text{Qx} \text{c7} \) \( \text{Qxd} \text{3} \) [26 ... \( \text{Qd} \text{8} \text{7} \text{d4} \) is still somewhat better for White] 27 \( \text{Qd} \text{7} \), the position is tricky. My analysis suggests that Black can draw, but not without some difficulties) 25 \( \text{Qe} \text{1} \) \( \text{Qxb4} \) 26 \( \text{Qxc7} \) \( \text{Qb} \text{3} \) 27 \( \text{Qa} \text{7} \) (27 \( \text{Qd} \text{7} \) \( \text{Qd} \text{3} \) 28 \( \text{Qxe5} \) \( \text{Qxc3} \) 29 \( \text{Qd} \text{6} \) \( \text{Qxe4} \) 27 ... \( \text{Qxd3} \) 28 \( \text{Qxa6} \) \( \text{Qc} \text{4} \) 29 \( \text{Qa} \text{8} \) \( \text{Qh} \text{7} \) 30 \( \text{a} \text{5} \) \( \text{Qxe} \text{3} \) 31 \( \text{a} \text{6} \) \( \text{Qa} \text{3} \) 32 \( \text{a} \text{7} \text{d5} \), Black has contained White's a-pawn, and probably even has the advantage. Of course, White did not have to go to extremes, but it

was the only way to try to prove an advantage. So Black equalizes with 23 ... \( \text{Qxb4} \) and 24 ... \( \text{Qb} \text{8} \)!

24 \( \text{Qb} \text{7} \) \( \text{Qc} \text{8} \)

Other moves are no better:

a) 24 ... \( \text{Qf} \text{c8} \) 25 \( \text{d} \text{4} \)?! \( \text{exd} \text{4} \) (25 ... \( \text{d} \text{5} \)? 26 \( \text{ex} \text{d} \text{5} \) \( \text{ex} \text{d} \text{5} \) 27 \( \text{Qxb} \text{8} \) \( \text{Qxb} \text{8} \) 28 \( \text{Qxb} \text{8} \) \( \text{Qxb} \text{8} \) 29 \( \text{Qxe} \text{5} \) 26 \( \text{Qxe} \text{4} \)! is given as \( \text{Q} \text{c} \text{5} \) by the bulletin, and quite rightly: 26 ... \( \text{Qxb} \text{7} \) 27 \( \text{Qxb} \text{7} \) \( \text{Qxd} \text{4} \) 28 \( \text{ex} \text{d} \text{4} \) \( \text{Qf} \text{7} \) 29 \( \text{a} \text{7} \) \( \text{Qe} \text{7} \) 30 \( \text{Qxa6} \) \( \text{b} \text{8} \) 31 \( \text{Qc} \text{6} \) \( \text{Qd} \text{7} \) 32 \( \text{Qc} \text{4} \) \( \text{Qb} \text{1} \) + 33 \( \text{Qf} \text{2} \) \( \text{Qd} \text{1} \). However, Black does have drawing chances.

b) 24 ... \( \text{Qxb} \text{7} \) 25 \( \text{Qxb} \text{7} \) \( \text{Qc} \text{8} \) is the other obvious line. Now White cannot play too slowly, or Black will consolidate, e.g.,

b1) 26 \( \text{Qf} \text{2} \) \( \text{Qf} \text{7} \) 27 \( \text{Qe} \text{2} \) \( \text{Qe} \text{7} \) 28 \( \text{d} \text{4} \) \( \text{Qd} \text{7} \) =

b2) 26 \( \text{Qc} \text{1} \) \( \text{Qf} \text{7} \) 27 \( \text{Qc} \text{2} \) \( \text{Qe} \text{7} \) 28 \( \text{Qb} \text{4} \) \( \text{Qxb} \text{4} \) 29 \( \text{Qxb} \text{4} \) \( \text{Qd} \text{7} \) 30 \( \text{b} \text{5} \)
Game 12

(30 a7 b8) 30 ... axb5 31 a×b5 a8 32 b6 c8 33 f2 (33 a7 c6) 33 ... c6 34 x7 35 bxc7 xc7 =.

b3) So 26 d4! is correct with the immediate idea of d4-d5. Black must consolidate the queenside as quickly as possible, so: 26 ... f7 (26 ... a5? 27 a7 f4 28 x6 x3 29 dxe5 ±) 27 d5 e7 (27 ... exd5 28 exd5 e7 29 c4) 28 c4 exd5 (28 ... c6? 29 c5!) 29 exd5 e8 30 e4! (30 a7 d7 31 a6 b8 32 e4 b4 gives Black counterplay) 30 ... c6 (30 ... d7 31 c5! ±; 30 ... d8 31 c5! ±) 31 c5! d8 32 dxc6 xc6 (32 ... dxc5 33 xc5) 33 xc7 ±.

25 f2

The bulletin points out that 25 d4! d5! 26 exd5 exd5 27 xc5 (27 dxe5 c8) 27 ... c5 28 dxe5 f8 probably gives Black enough activity to draw.

25 ... f7!

Still reeling from his blunder on move 23, Anand recovers to find what is probably his best chance: to defend c7 laterally and seek counterplay on the kingside.

26 e2 e8 27 d4

Hellers suggested 27 f1!? g5 28 d2 to stop Black's counterplay by exchanging a pair of rooks, which is quite a reasonable idea.

27 ... g5 28 d3

Seirawan queries this move and suggests that 28 d5 was better, but without giving any analysis. I think that his claim is not justified: 28 ... exd5 29 exd5 e7 (29 ... c4? 30 dxc6 xf3+ 31 xf3 x7 32 x7 b7! + as the c-pawn will queen) 30 x7 (30 c4? e4; 30 e4 g6 gives Black counterplay, e.g., 31 b8 f4+ 32 f2 [32 f1 x3] 32 ... x3+! 30 ... x5 31 x7 32 x7 (31 ... x3? 32 d3 x1 33 x8+ x8 34 e4! and Black's knight will not escape alive) 32 b8+ (32 b3 c7 33 d3 f7) 32 ... g7 33 d3 c7 34 c4 e7 and White is only slightly better. Kasparov's move keeps a much larger advantage.

28 ... g7 29 d5 exd5 30 exd5 g4! 31 dxc6? [8]

White has two plausible alternatives. One of them allows Black to equalize, but the other was the best move and keeps a large, possibly winning advantage:

a) 31 d2! g×h3! 32 g×h3 (32 dxc6? h×g2 33 g1 h5 34 e2 h4 35 f3 h3 is better, possibly winning for Black) 32 ... e4+! 33 dxe4 (33 dxe4! e8+ 34 d3 d5 35 c2 e7 gives Black compensation, but is not clear) 33 ... e5+ 34 d4 (34 c2 d4) 34 ... d3+ 35 c4 (35 d3 e5+ is a draw) 35 ... e7! 36 d3 e5+ 37 e2 c4 =.

b) 31 h×g4 is best. Black has two moves:

b1) 31 ... xg4 32 dxc6! (32 d2? e4+! "gives
Black plenty of resources” says Seirawan, who is correct, e.g., 33 \( \text{d}x\text{e}4 \) 33 \( \text{c}2 \text{d}e5 \text{d}4 \text{x}c7 \text{x}g2 \) 33 ... \( \text{d}e5+1 \) 34 \( \text{d}d4 \text{f}7! \) 35 \( \text{b}4 \)? [35 \( \text{f}1? \text{g}5; 35 \text{x}c7? \text{e}8; 35 \text{d}d3 \) is White’s best, leading to a draw by repetition after 35 ... \( \text{d}e5+1 \) 35 ... a! 36 \( \text{c}4 \text{e}8 \text{d}3 \text{d}e5+38 \text{e}2 \) [38 \( \text{c}2 \text{x}g2+39 \text{b}3 \text{x}c4 \text{f}6+ \text{f}7! \) 41 \( \text{d}e8 \text{b}2+1 \) 38 ... \( \text{x}g2+39 \text{f}1 \text{g}6 40 \text{x}c7 \text{f}8+ \) and Black mates White in a few moves] 32 ... e4+ 33 \( \text{c}2! \text{e}f3 \) (33 ... \( \text{x}g2+34 \text{d}d2 \) 34 \( \text{gxf3} \text{x}f3 \) 35 \( \text{x}c7 \) ± is a line given by the match bulletin which looks correct.

\[b2\] 31 ... e4+ 32 \( \text{d}x\text{e}4 \text{d}e7 \) (32 ... \( \text{x}g4+33 \text{d}d3 \text{e}7 \) 34 c4 \( \text{x}g2 \) 35 \( \text{d}d4 \) ± is given by the bulletin, which again looks correct) was what Anand intended to play. He anticipated 33 \( \text{x}c7 \text{x}g4+34 \text{d}d3 \text{x}d5, \) but once again the bulletin makes the excellent observation that 33 g5! ± is correct, as I might illustrate by 33 ... \( \text{f}5 \) 34 \( \text{d}d3 \text{hxg5} \) 35 \( \text{b}8 \).

So variation \( b \) beginning with 31 \( \text{hxg4} \) would have kept a large, possibly winning advantage. Kasparov, however, completely overlooked Anand’s next move. In fact, he was so confident that Anand had to play 31 ... \( \text{gxf3} \) that he wrote the move down on his scoresheet. When Anand noticed this, he was amused enough to refrain from playing the move immediately, and to wait for Kasparov to reinforce the move on his scoresheet before playing:

31 ... e4+!

31 ... \( \text{gxf3} \) 32 \( \text{gxf3} \) \( \text{x}f3 \) 33 \( \text{a}7! \) d5 (33 ... \( \text{g}3 \) 34 \( \text{x}c7 \) \( \text{x}e3+35 \text{c}4 \text{x}c3+36 \text{d}d5 \) --; 33 ... \( \text{x}h3 \) 34 \( \text{b}8+ \) h7 35 \( \text{x}c7 \) \( \text{x}c7 \) 36 \( \text{b}7 \) +=, because 36 ... \( \text{g}7 37 \text{xg7}+ \text{xg7} 38 \text{c}7 \) ) 34 \( \text{b}8+ \) h7 (34 ... \( \text{f}8 \) 35 \( \text{x}f8 \) 36 \( \text{c}4! \) ±) 35 \( \text{d}8 \text{g}3 \) 35 (35 ... \( \text{x}h3 \) 36 \( \text{x}d5 \) ±) 36 \( \text{x}c7+ \) g6 37 g8+ f6 38 \( \text{x}g3 \) \( \text{x}g3 \) 30 h7 +.--.

32 \( \text{d}x\text{e}4 \) \( \text{gxf3} \) 33 \( \text{gxf3} \) e7+ 34 \( \text{d}d4 \) \( \text{x}f3 \) 35 e4 \( \text{x}h3 \) [9] 36 \( \text{x}c7?! \)

This move is basically a draw offer. White still has an advantage after 36 \( \text{a}7?! \), when Black would still have to play well to make a draw. Perhaps Kasparov was so shocked at having missed Black’s 31st move that he assumed the position must be a complete draw, or perhaps he just couldn’t find the energy to make a third (and unlikely) winning attempt. Whatever the explanation, after this move there is nothing left to dispute.

36 ... \( \text{x}c7 \) 37 b8+ f7 38 b7 e7 39 c7 \( \text{x}c7 \) 40 \( \text{x}c7+ \) e6 41 a7 h5 42 a6 h1

This position is a complete draw. Black’s plan is simple: he pushes the h-pawn to h7, thereby forcing White to put the rook along the h-file. Then Black swings the rook over to the a-file to exchange his
pawn for White's a-pawn. This will leave White with the e-pawn and the c-pawn against Black's d-pawn. Black will have a perfect blockade and White cannot make progress. Even if White could somehow exchange one pawn for the d-pawn, Black would still be able to get a trivially drawn rook and pawn or king and pawn endgame.

43 $\text{a}a8$ h4 [10] $\frac{1}{2}$—$\frac{1}{2}$

Play could continue 44 $\text{h}h8$ h3 45 a5 h2 46 $\text{c}c4$ $\text{a}a1$ 47 $\text{x}xh2$ $\text{x}xa5$ 48 $\text{h}h6+$ $\text{d}d7$ and White cannot make progress, so on Kasparov's offer a draw was agreed.

After 12 games: Kasparov 6½, Anand 5½
Monday, 2 October 1995

The turbulent week of games 9–12 had led into a weekend of furious work. We had to find an effective line against the Dragon and regain our mental equilibrium. We failed at both tasks.

During this game Anand's opening was heavily criticized. This was easy to do since it was unorthodox and served him disastrously. Yet I think much of the criticism was unfair. True, the opening was unorthodox, but if Anand had played correctly on move 16 he would have been fine and even had chances for advantage. Furthermore, the goal of this opening was not to refute the Dragon but to set Black new problems for one game while we searched for a better line to play.

However, if the reader suspects me of making excuses, he is right. We had spent several days looking at two different ideas, but neither ended up looking good to us. One reason the Dragon was an excellent choice by Kasparov is that it required us to devote a lot of energy pursuing false leads until we finally found a good line in game 17. Notice what a difference it made that the schedule for this match was four games a week with no timeouts, rather than the traditional three games a week with many timeouts. A faster format favors the side with the initiative, and that was definitely Kasparov at this point.

The line we chose was discovered only the night before the game. Not only were we not familiar with all its nuances, but Anand did not have much time to prepare himself mentally for the position he would
have. However, Anand himself enthusiastically endorsed the plan. The position he achieved from the opening was okay, even if not everything one would like against the Dragon. In short, the opening was not the reason this game was lost so quickly. The reason is just that Anand made some mistakes.

Perhaps after his slip on move 16, when he realized he was a little worse, he no longer felt comfortable. Perhaps he felt he "should" have a strong position out of the opening with White. I think only such a feeling, based more upon wishful thinking than a concrete assessment of the position, could explain his wildly optimistic 19th move. After that mistake the game was practically lost. The rest was a massacre.

The effect of this game was devastating to the whole team.

**ANAND–KASPAROV, NEW YORK (m/13) 1995**

**SICILIAN DEFENSE B77**

1 e4 e5 2 d4 f3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 cxd4 f6 5 c3 g6 6 a3 g7 7 d2 c6 8 f3 0–0 9 c4 d7 10 h4 h5 11 b3 c8 12 dxe6! bxe6 13 h6 [1]

This is an interesting idea. White exchanges off Black's Dragon bishop, and hopes to play for one of three things: g2-g4 and a kingside attack; e4-e5 and the better pawn structure; or d5 and more space in the center.

13 ... c5 14 c4 b6! 15 xg7 xg7 16 b3?

A better move is 16 0–0–0! Ab8 (16 ... Ae6 17 d5) 17 b3 with interesting play. Black's attack on the queenside is not so strong, and White has time to organize his play in the center and kingside before anything too drastic happens. Kasparov himself wrote in *New In Chess* that he thought White would have had a slight edge, and that he had planned to continue 16 ... Ab4 17 b3 Ae6 18 d5 xg2+ 19 xg2 dxe5 20 xed5 Ad7 in order to neutralize the game. In his opinion Black is slightly worse but no more, and I concur. So perhaps Kasparov would have drawn, but certainly White's setup is not illogical or silly!

Anand's move makes sense, but it betrays both his poor form at the moment and our insufficient preparation. The idea is simple: he wants to play for d5 before castling, to dull Black's play on the queenside and to keep the option of castling kingside. The problem is that it just doesn't work. Had he been in better form, he would have foreseen the problems. Had our preparation been less rushed and better organized, we would already have known that this plan does not work in this specific position.

16 ... Ae6! 17 d5
Other possibilities:

a) 17 0-0  \(\texttt{Ax}c4\) 18  \(\texttt{bxc}4\)  \(\texttt{w}a6\) 19  \(\texttt{Q}d5\)  \(\texttt{Q}x\texttt{d}5\) (19 ...  \(\texttt{w}\texttt{xc}4\) 20  \(\texttt{x}e\texttt{7}\)  \(\texttt{a}ce8\) 21  \(\texttt{Q}f5\)+) 20  \(\texttt{ex}d5\)  \(\texttt{w}c4\) is good for Black. The position resembles an excellent Benoni or Pirc structure.

b) 17  \(\texttt{Ax}e6\) (17  \(\texttt{w}d3\)  \(\texttt{Q}d7\)) 17 ...  \(\texttt{fxe}6\) 18 0-0-0 c4 gives Black a good initiative.

c) Kasparov thinks 17  \(\texttt{Q}a4\)  \(\texttt{w}c6\) 18  \(\texttt{Ax}e6\)  \(\texttt{fxe}6\) 19 c4 was the best here. Perhaps he is right—I will certainly admit that in general his chess judgment is better than mine—but it is not obvious to me that Anand’s move is bad, even though he missed Kasparov’s 18th. The real mistake happens two moves later.

17 ...  \(\texttt{Q}x\texttt{d}5\)! 18  \(\texttt{ex}d5\) e5! [2]

Imagine you are playing White here. What should you do? You should take a deep breath, count to 10—do whatever you need to do to clear your mind, and take a fresh look at the position. Black now has the initiative. He has achieved exactly what you don’t want Black to achieve when you play  \(\texttt{ex}d5\): he has gotten his pawn to e5. Can you take it? That is an important question, because you would like to take it. But you must be careful, because if you open up the position when you are behind in development and your king is in the center of the board, there is always the danger of something going badly wrong.

What if you don’t take the pawn? Well, it’s not a great position, but it’s not terrible. After, say, 19 0-0-0, Black would like to get his knight to b6 as quickly as possible, but White has reasonable counterplay with  \(g2-g4\) and/or \(f3-f4\). Kasparov said after the game that he thought the position would be equal after 19 0-0-0  \(\texttt{w}b4\), and indeed after 20  \(\texttt{w}xb4\)  axb4 21  \(\texttt{w}b2\), with the idea of a2-a3, I think White is perfectly fine. Who knows how the game would continue, but it’s not a disaster. Indeed, if White is really unhappy, he could play 19 0-0-0 and offer a draw. It would have been the first time in the match that Anand had initiated peace negotiations, but I think Kasparov would have accepted since his position is probably not any better, objectively speaking.

On a good day, or even an average day, Anand would have castled. And maybe even offered a draw. But this was a very bad day, and instead Anand played a horrible move.

19  \(\texttt{d}x\texttt{e}6??\)  \(\texttt{d}5\)!

It is possible that White is objectively lost at this point. He certainly has a very difficult game.

20  \(\texttt{Q}e2\)

20  \(e7\) (20  \(\texttt{Q}x\texttt{d}5??\)  \(\texttt{Q}f\texttt{d}8\) 21  \(\texttt{c}4\)  \(\texttt{fxe}6\) -+) 20 ...  \(\texttt{Q}f8\)! (20 ...  \(\texttt{w}e6\)+ 21
\( \text{a2} [21 \text{e}2 \text{f}e8 22 \text{xe}6 \text{fxe}6 23 \text{e}c2 \text{xe}7 \text{is pleasantly better for Black, although with the queens off, White has good chances to hold}] \\
21 \ldots \text{f}e8 22 0-0 0-0 \text{xe}7 23 \text{h}e1 =) 21 \text{xd}5 (21 \text{e}2 \text{c}4! \text{gives Black a vicious attack, and even the timid 21 \ldots \text{x}e7 22 0-0 [22 0-0 0-0 c4 23 \text{b}1 c3 is awful] 22 \ldots c4+ 23 \text{h}1 \text{ce}8 24 \text{d}1 \text{c}4! \text{is clearly better for Black] 21 \ldots \text{x}e7+ (21 \ldots \text{cd}8 22 \text{e}6 \text{xe}7+ 23 \text{f}1 \text{is unclear}]) 22 \text{f}1 (22 \text{e}4 \text{xe}4 23 \text{xe}4 \text{xe}4+ 24 \text{f}1 \text{e}6+ =+) 22 \ldots \text{xd}5! 23 \text{xd}5 \text{c}4! \text{gives Black a huge attack, e.g., 24 \text{d}1 (24 \text{b}xc4 \text{d}8; 24 \text{e}1 \text{d}8! 25 \text{xc}4 \text{xe}1+ 26 \text{xe}1 \text{e}3+ and 27 \ldots \text{e}1+) 24 \ldots \text{xb}3 25 \text{xb}3 \text{e}3! 25 \ldots \text{c}2 = 25 \ldots \text{c}5 =]. \text{c}4! [3] \\
20 \ldots \text{c}4! \text{c}3 \\
21 \text{c}3 \\
Of course not 21 0-0-0?? \text{xb}3 22 \text{xb}3 \text{xb}3 --. Some reports have said that this move was evidence that Anand's resistance had "snapped," but that is not fair. After White's 19th move the game was probably lost. There is no good move here, even though 21 \text{d}1 has been suggested:

a) 21 \ldots \text{c}3 22 \text{d}4 \text{fxe}6 was offered by Kasparov after the game as =, but Black can do better.

b) 21 \ldots \text{fxe}6 was suggested by Seirawan in Inside Chess. This is a strong move, e.g., 22 \text{b}xc4 (22 \text{d}4 \text{a}5+ 23 \text{d}2 \text{c}3 ++) 22 \ldots \text{b}xc4 and White's game is horrible. The problems are always the same—the exposed king, the passive and vulnerable bishop, and the pathetically out-of-play rook. Still, Black has even stronger than this.

c) 21 \ldots \text{f}e8?! 22 \text{ex}f7 \text{xe}7 was suggested as a strong sacrifice by Speelman. But if this is good, why not move the other rook to e8?

d) 21 \ldots \text{e}8! and now:

\text{d}1) 22 \text{ex}f7 \text{xf}7 gives Black a winning attack.

\text{d}2) 22 \text{b}xc4 \text{xe}6 23 \text{cxd}5 \text{e}5! 24 \text{c}4 (24 \text{d}4 \text{f}e8 24 \ldots \text{f}e8 --.

\text{d}3) 22 \text{d}4 \text{a}5+ 23 \text{d}2 \text{c}3 24 \text{d}3 \text{e}6 25 0-0 \text{f}e8 26 \text{f}2 \text{b}6! [4] (26 \ldots \text{c}a2 wins a pawn, but the main line looks even stronger) 27 \text{f}1 (27 \text{e}1 puts White in a lethal pin, and after 27 \ldots \text{e}3 28 \text{d}1 \text{d}4! 29 \text{f}1 [or else 29 \ldots \text{d}3] 29 \ldots \text{xe}2! 30 \text{xe}2 \text{d}3+ 31 \text{f}2 \text{d}2 ++) 27 \ldots \text{c}7! 28 \text{g}1 (Black threatened 28 \ldots \text{h}2) 28 \ldots \text{e}3 29 \text{b}5 \text{g}3, and White's game will soon collapse.

21 \ldots \text{e}8!
The same principle as in variation d above. The most important thing for Black now is to seize the open lines.

22 bxc4
22 exf7 $\textit{xf7} 23 \textit{d}d1 (23 \textit{f}f1 \textit{fe7} 24 \textit{f}f2 \textit{xe2}+! 25 \textit{x}e2 \textit{g}1 mate) 23 ... \textit{fe7} 24 \textit{e}1 \textit{d}4! 25 cxd4 \textit{d}d5 $-+$ was demonstrated to the masses by Kasparov after the game.

22 ... \textit{xe6} 23 \textit{f}1
Seirawan points out that 23 cxd5 \textit{e}5 24 \textit{f}1 \textit{xd5} 25 \textit{c}2 \textit{e}8 gives Black a winning attack.

23 ... \textit{fe8} 24 \textit{d}3 dxc4 25 cxc4 \textit{e}4! [5] 0–1

Anand resigned, as he realized his game was hopeless. After 26 fxe4 (26 d4+ \textit{xd4} 27 cxd4 \textit{d}2+; 26 \textit{e}1 \textit{d}6!) 26 ... \textit{f}6+ 27 \textit{e}1 \textit{xe4}+ 28 \textit{e}2 \textit{f}2+ 29 \textit{d}1 \textit{xe}2 30 \textit{x}e2 \textit{d}6+, there is nothing left to dispute.

After 13 games: Kasparov 7$\frac{1}{2}$, Anand 5$\frac{1}{2}$
We had prepared some surprises for Kasparov before the match to be used at the right moment. If ever there was a right moment, this was it. With only six games remaining to make up three points, it was imperative to try to win every game. Looking back I can say that our opening choice was perfect. We had prepared the opening well and Anand quickly gained the advantage. Unfortunately, the result was exactly the opposite of what we had hoped, and it effectively ended the match. Kasparov deserves high praise for his tremendous resourcefulness and his strong fighting qualities. When the going got tough, he put out his best effort. At the same time it is clear that he was outplayed by Anand in the opening and middlegame, and Anand was largely responsible for the result of this game.

Part of the explanation for this was outside Anand’s control. The PCA, in its admirable effort to make chess as interesting to the spectators as possible, provided constant commentary for the games by grandmaster Daniel King and international master Maurice Ashley. Unlike in previous world championship matches with commentary, the audience did not have to use headphones, but were able to listen to the commentators in person, as well as ask questions. This led to quite a lot of noise in the foyer. The players were in a soundproofed glass room, so that the audience could look in but the players could not hear them. At least, they were supposed to be unable to hear them. During this game the crowd got particularly excited because they sensed the possibility that Anand could win. (The audience, as far as I could tell, was heavily pro-Anand.) The mutual time pressure made the situation even more exciting, which led the commentators to raise their voices, which led the audience to shout more loudly, which led the commentators to raise...
their voices even more, and so on. When the players were down to their last few minutes, they could hear everything going on outside. Anand, who is distinctly less experienced with (his own!) time pressure than Kasparov, was by far more affected and simply lost the ability to think clearly.

But part of the reason for Anand’s losing this game is internal. Going back to Tal’s comment about matches in general, we can see that Kasparov had the confidence to fight hard even when his game was difficult, while Anand played timidly, hesitating far too long on certain decisions. The middlegame that arose out of the opening was not the kind of position that, under normal circumstances, would bring the quick-moving Anand into time pressure. Only hesitation stemming from nerves could explain that. This game was played under the influence of the previous games. Just as Tal wrote, the points in the middle of the match were the decisive ones.

KASPAROV–ANAND, NEW YORK (M/14) 1995
SCANDINAVIAN OPENING B01

1 e4 d5 2 exd5 ♞xd5 3 ♞c3 ♞a5 4 d4 ♞f6 5 ♞f3 c6 6 ♞e5 ♞e6 7 ♞d3 ♞bd7 8 f4 g6 9 0–0 ♞g7 10 ♞h1

Critical is 10 f5 g×f5 (10 ... ♞xg5?? 11 d×e5 wins a piece; 10 ... ♞d5? 11 ♞xd5 c×d5 [11 ... ♞g×d5 12 ♞c4; 11 ... ♞g×d5 12 ♞g×d5 ♞f×d7 13 fxg6 ±] 12 ♞e2 ±) 11 ♞f5 ♞xg5 (11 ... ♞f3 12 ♞×f3 ±) 12 ♞e6 f×e6 (12 ... ♞b6? 13 ♞a4; 12 ... ♞d8 13 ♞b3 ♞b6 14 ♞e2 is good for White) 13 d×e5 ♞xg5 and we reach an unclear position although I think Black should stand well.

10 ... ♞f5! 11 ♞c4

This works out well for Black, but by this time, Black has a good game in any case. Other moves:

a) 11 ♞f5 ♞f5 is quite comfortable for Black after he plays ... e7–e6.

b) 11 ♞d7 ♞d7 is also at least equal for Black.

c) 11 ♞e2 right away might improve over the game, but then Black might still play 11 ... h5? 11 ... e6 12 ♞e2 h5! [11]

Perhaps Kasparov underestimated this move. Now Black is slightly better. He has developed all of his minor pieces harmoniously, whereas White has saddled himself with weaknesses because of his d4 and f4 pawns. Black has every reason to be happy with the result of his opening.

13 ♞e3 ♞d8 14 ♞g1 0–0 15 ♞f3 ♞d5

The match bulletin suggested that 15 ... c5?? was a better move. It is not easy for White to continue, but I believe that if he plays correctly his chances are not worse.
a) 16 $\textit{c}x\textit{d}7? \textit{e}x\textit{d}7 is clearly better for Black.

b) 16 $\textit{d}c4 \textit{w}b4! 17 $\textit{d}d6 \textit{w}x\textit{b}2 is clearly better for Black.

c) 16 $\textit{w}d2 \textit{c}x\textit{d}4 (16 ... $\textit{d}x\textit{e}5?! 17 $\textit{f}x\textit{e}5 \textit{c}x\textit{d}4 18
\textit{e}x\textit{f}6 \textit{d}x\textit{c}3 19 $\textit{g}g5 \textit{h}x\textit{h}8 20 \textit{b}x\textit{h}5 \textit{c}x\textit{b}2 21 $\textit{g}g1 \textit{w}c3
+) 17 $\textit{f}x\textit{d}4 (17 $\textit{d}x\textit{d}4 \textit{d}x\textit{e}5 18 $\textit{f}x\textit{e}5 \textit{g}g4) 17 ...
\textit{d}x\textit{e}5 18 $\textit{f}x\textit{e}5 \textit{g}d5 ≠.

d) 16 $\textit{d}x\textit{b}7 \textit{c}x\textit{d}4 (even 16 ... $\textit{d}x\textit{e}5 17 $\textit{f}x\textit{e}5 \textit{g}g4 is interesting) and now:

d1) 17 $\textit{c}c6? \textit{w}c7 wins material, e.g., 18 $\textit{d}x\textit{d}8
\textit{d}x\textit{c}3.

d2) 17 $\textit{d}c4? \textit{w}c7 wins material again.

d3) 17 $\textit{d}x\textit{d}4 $\textit{d}x\textit{e}5 18 $\textit{f}x\textit{e}5 \textit{g}g4 ≠.

d4) 17 $\textit{w}x\textit{d}4 $\textit{d}x\textit{e}5 18 $\textit{f}x\textit{e}5 \textit{d}d5 19 $\textit{w}e2
$\textit{d}x\textit{c}3 20 \textit{b}x\textit{c}3 \textit{d}x\textit{c}3 21 $\textit{g}g1 \textit{w}x\textit{a}2 ≠.

d5) 17 $\textit{d}c2 $\textit{d}x\textit{e}5 18 $\textit{f}x\textit{e}5 \textit{g}g4 19 $\textit{d}x\textit{d}4 \textit{d}x\textit{e}5 and White cannot
defend $\textit{h}2, \textit{d}4, and \textit{b}2 from 20 ... \textit{w}b6 or 20 ... \textit{w}c7.

e) 16 $\textit{w}e1 \textit{c}x\textit{d}4 17 $\textit{d}x\textit{d}4 \textit{d}x\textit{e}5 and now:

e1) 18 $\textit{w}x\textit{e}5 $\textit{w}x\textit{e}5 (18 ... \textit{w}b4?! 19 $\textit{c}c5 \textit{w}x\textit{b}2 20 $\textit{g}g1 \textit{w}c2 21
\textit{d}x\textit{f}8 $\textit{d}x\textit{f}8 gives Black good compensation for the exchange; 18 ...
\textit{w}a6?! 19 $\textit{w}x\textit{e}5 \textit{d}x\textit{c}2 20 \textit{d}x\textit{b}7 \textit{d}d2 ≠.

e2) 18 $\textit{w}x\textit{e}5 \textit{w}c2 19 $\textit{w}x\textit{b}7 \textit{d}d3! (19 ... \textit{w}b6 20 $\textit{f}f3 \textit{w}x\textit{b}2? 21
\textit{d}d5) 20 \textit{f}f2 (20 $\textit{h}3 \textit{w}b6) 20 ... \textit{g}g4 ≠.

f) 16 $\textit{w}e2! [2] looks best, after which I
have not found a way for Black to reach an advantage.
The two main choices are:

f1) 16 ... \textit{c}x\textit{d}4 17 $\textit{d}x\textit{d}4 \textit{w}b4 (the most
ambitious move; 17 ... \textit{w}x\textit{e}5 18 $\textit{d}x\textit{e}5 \textit{d}d7
19 $\textit{w}f8 \textit{w}x\textit{f}8 gives Black good compensation
for the exchange; 18 ...
\textit{g}g4?) 19 $\textit{w}x\textit{e}5 \textit{w}x\textit{f}8 20 \textit{d}x\textit{b}7 \textit{d}d2 ≠.

e1) 18 $\textit{w}x\textit{e}5 \textit{w}c2 19 $\textit{w}x\textit{b}7 \textit{d}d3! (19 ... \textit{w}b6 20 $\textit{f}f3 \textit{w}x\textit{b}2? 21
\textit{d}d5) 20 \textit{f}f2 (20 $\textit{h}3 \textit{w}b6) 20 ... \textit{g}g4 ≠.

f2) 16 ... \textit{w}b4 17 $\textit{d}d3! (17 \textit{d}c4 is not so good, as both 17 ...
\textit{c}x\textit{d}4 18 \textit{a}a3 \textit{d}c5 19 \textit{b}b4 \textit{d}c7 20 $\textit{d}x\textit{d}4 \textit{d}x\textit{f}4 and 17 ...
\textit{d}b6 18 \textit{d}x\textit{b}6 \textit{a}x\textit{b}6 19
\textit{w}b5 \textit{w}x\textit{b}5 20 \textit{d}x\textit{b}5 $\textit{d}x\textit{c}2 are good for Black) 17 ...
\textit{d}x\textit{d}3 (17 ... \textit{w}c4
18 $\textit{d}x\textit{c}5 \textit{w}x\textit{e}2 19 $\textit{d}e2 $\textit{d}x\textit{e}5 20 \textit{d}x\textit{e}5 saddles Black with a weak b-
pawn) 18 $\textit{w}x\textit{d}3 and now:

f21) 18 ... \textit{d}b6 19 \textit{w}b5!
\[ f22 \) 18 \ldots \text{a}xb2 19 \text{a}b1 \text{a}3 20 \text{b}3 \text{a}5 21 \text{b}5 \text{c}7 (unless Black retires to this square, he cannot avoid perpetual attack against the queen) 22 \text{b}x7 \text{xf}4 23 \text{a}xa7 is unclear.

\[ f23 \) 18 \ldots e5 19 a3! \text{a}5 (19 \ldots \text{b}6 20 dxc5) 20 b4! \text{xb}4 21 axb4 \text{xb}4 22 \text{fb}1 \text{e}7 23 \text{bx}b7 \pm .

\[ f24 \) 18 \ldots c4!? 19 \text{d}2 \text{b}6 (19 \ldots b5?! ) is interesting and seems like Black's most ambitious choice. If Black can cement his light-square blockade he should stand well, so White might take on b7: 20 \text{xb}7 \text{xb}2 21 \text{ab}1 (21 a3 \text{a}4 22 \text{xa}4 \text{xb}7 is unclear) 21 \ldots \text{a}3 and the position is messy.

All in all, this was a difficult decision. I think 16 \text{e}2 was the best response, after which I am sure this analysis does not exhaust the possibilities. Anand's choice is understandable, and perhaps objectively best.

\[ 16 \text{xd}5 \]

Kasparov offered a draw with this move, and Anand thought for some time before declining. Kasparov claimed after the game that he had never expected Anand to accept the draw offer, but that he was using it to probe Anand, and see how confident he was at that moment. Kasparov said that under normal circumstances, such a strong player as Anand should instantly decline the draw, so he could tell that Anand was not feeling as sure of himself as he should have.

\[ 16 \ldots \text{cxd}5 \]

Also interesting is 16 \ldots cxd5, to play on the queenside. I cannot tell which move is stronger—perhaps it is just a matter of taste. At least, after the recapture in the game, it is absolutely clear how Black should play: drive the knight from the e5 square, take the e-file, trade the light-squared bishops, and invade White's position with the rooks (via the e-file) and the knight (via f5 or e4).

\[ 17 \text{f}2 \text{c}7 \]

The bulletin quotes Larry Christiansen as suggesting 17 \ldots \text{b}5!? 18 \text{c}1!

Kasparov recognizes the imminent danger, of course, and wastes no time in securing counterplay. Several grandmasters were chuckling at the lack of subtlety behind this move ("Could he be a little more obvious that he wants to play c4? Is that possible?"); but if the best move is obvious, then so be it! White needs some play in a hurry.

\[ 18 \ldots \text{f}6 [3] 19 \text{d}3 \]

Also interesting is 19 \text{xd}7:

\[ a) 19 \ldots \text{xf}7 20 \text{c}4 \text{dxc}4 (20 \ldots \text{xf}4 21 \text{xd}5 \text{cxd}5 22 \text{b}3 \text{d}6 23 \text{c}5 \text{e}6 24 \text{e}1 gives White plenty of compensation; 20 \ldots \text{e}6 21 \text{e}1 \text{f}7 22 \text{f}5! ) 21 \text{xc}4 \text{xf}4 (21 \ldots \text{e}6 22 \text{d}5! \text{f}7 [22 ...
d8 23 dxe6! $x$xd1 24 $x$xd1 gives White good play] 23 $\square$d4 f5 24 d6 $\square$b8 25 $\square$e2 $\square$fd8 26 $\square$h4! 22 $\square$e1 (with the idea of 23 $\square$g3) 22 ...
$\square$b8 23 h3?! gives White good play for the pawn.

b) 19 ... $\square$x d7 20 c4 $\square$xc4 (Since this does not seem to work out to advantage for Black, better tries are 20 ... $\square$g4?! 21 $\square$xg4 $\square$g4 22 $\square$b3 $\square$f7! and 20 ... $\square$e6?! 21 c5 $\square$g4) 21 $\square$xc4 $\square$e6 22 $\square$e5 f5 23 $\square$e1 $\square$e8 24 d5! $\square$xd5 25 $\square$xd5+ $\square$xd5 26 $\square$x e8+ $\square$x e8 27 $\square$xd5 $\square$xd5 28 $\square$xd5+ $\square$e7 29 $\square$d8+ $\square$h7 30 b3 =.

19 ... $\square$e8 20 b3

Now 20 c4 $\square$xc4 21 $\square$xc4 $\square$b6 is excellent for Black.

20 ... $\square$e6 21 a4

21 c4 $\square$f7! (21 ... $\square$xc4 22 $\square$xc4 $\square$e7 and now 23 $\square$b3 $\square$e6 24 $\square$b2 is unclear, but dangerous is 23 d5 $\square$xd5 24 $\square$xb6 $\square$xc4 [24 ... $\square$xb6 24 $\square$xd5] 25 $\square$xd8 $\square$xd8 26 $\square$e5 $\square$xd1 [26 ... $\square$e8 27 $\square$e2 $\square$xe5 28 $\square$xc4+ $\square$e6 29 $\square$e2+ 27 $\square$x f7 $\square$f1+ 28 $\square$xf1 $\square$xf7 29 $\square$xb7 $\square$e6 and suddenly it is not clear who is better] 22 c5 $\square$e8 (22 ... $\square$d7?!?) and although White has gained some space on the queenside, he has spent his counterplay, so Black retains an edge.

21 ... $\square$e8 22 c4 $\square$f7 23 a5 $\square$f8!

Both sides have found good ways to redeploy their pieces. Now White has to open the game to get more counterplay.

24 $\square$e5 $\square$x d5 25 $\square$e4 $\square$e6 26 a6?! b6

Of course if 26 ... bxa6, after 27 $\square$e6 Black could hardly think about keeping his extra pawn, while White would get some play against the weakened queenside (the a-pawn and the weak c5 square).

Now Kasparov made an extraordinary decision, and one that ultimately seized the initiative. Anand had about 25 minutes here, while Kasparov only had about 20. Kasparov consumed half of that time—10 minutes—and then uncorked:

27 $\square$e5?! [4]

Was this necessary? And is it good? White's game is certainly not so bad that he should panic, but Black does seem to retain a comfortable advantage at little risk, e.g., 27 $\square$b4 $\square$e4! and now:

a) 28 $\square$xe4 $\square$xe4 29 $\square$c6 (29 $\square$e6 $\square$de8, and after ... $\square$f5, Black will have a nice advantage) 29 ...
$\square$g7!, and again after ... $\square$e5 Black will stand well.

b) 28 $\square$e6 $\square$d7 doesn't seem to help White's game much; note that if White plays b3-b4, Black can respond with ... b6-b5 and then plant the knight on c4.

c) 28 $\square$e6 $\square$f3 29 $\square$x f3 (29 $\square$fx3 $\square$e4 30 $\square$e1 $\square$d7 31 $\square$e1 $\square$xb4 32 $\square$xb4 f5 =) 29 ... $\square$e4 30 $\square$e1 $\square$xb4 (30 ...
$\square$e8 31 f5! $\square$xb4 [31 ... $\square$g5 32 $\square$e6? 32 $\square$g6 $\square$xg6 33 $\square$xc8 $\square$xc8 34 $\square$xb4 \#] 31 ...

\[4\] Kasparov—Anand (14) • 27 $\square$e5
Anand’s scoresheet for game 14.

The above variations are certainly not meant to exhaust the possibilities of the position, but to give some notion of why Kasparov would want to find a radical move, something to alter the course of the game drastically. Perhaps the trickiest thing about Kasparov’s choice is that it is so tempting to decline the knight sacrifice. After all, if Kasparov has been thinking for 10 minutes, surely he must be concentrating on the lines where Black takes the knight? Wouldn’t the most practical thing be to decline the knight and force him to find another idea? It would be interesting to know whether Kasparov anticipated that Anand might want to do just that, because as the course of the game shows, there is indeed a clear idea for White if Black declines the sacrifice. In order to play the “practical move,” one must first take an accurate read of the position. It is not practical to decline a sacrifice if by so doing one allows the opponent a clear and strong plan. But when time is short, and in the heat of the battle, it is always difficult to keep one’s head. Instead one tends to play according to one’s style. Just as Kasparov played according to his style by tossing material for activity, Anand plays according to his style, and makes the “easy” move:

27 ... \textit{\textbf{W}}e6?

But this was wrong. Correct was to take the knight: 27 ... \textit{\textbf{F}}xe5 28 fxe5 (28 L\textit{\textbf{x}}d8 e4! 29 L\textit{\textbf{c}}7 \textit{\textbf{W}}e6 30 L\textit{\textbf{h}}4 exf3 31 \textit{\textbf{F}}x3 L\textit{\textbf{b}}5 =; 28 dxe5 \textit{\textbf{D}}e4 29 L\textit{\textbf{x}}d8 E\textit{\textbf{x}}d8 +) 28 ... \textit{\textbf{D}}e4 29 L\textit{\textbf{x}}d8 E\textit{\textbf{x}}d8 30 g4 h\textit{\textbf{x}}g4 31 L\textit{\textbf{x}}g4 and now:

d) Kasparov after the game gave the following variation: 31 ... L\textit{\textbf{x}}g4 32 L\textit{\textbf{x}}g4 L\textit{\textbf{f}}2+ 33 L\textit{\textbf{x}}f2 L\textit{\textbf{x}}f2 34 W\textit{\textbf{x}}g6+ L\textit{\textbf{g}}7 35 L\textit{\textbf{c}}7 (35 \textit{\textbf{W}}e6+ \textit{\textbf{F}}8 [this is the only move to try to win] 36 L\textit{\textbf{g}}1 [36 \textit{\textbf{W}}g6?]) 36 ... \textit{\textbf{W}}f7! =) 35
... Wh1+ 36 Kg1 Kg1+ (36 ... Wh3+ 37 Kh2 Kh1+ is a draw, of course) 37 Kxg1 Nh6 saying the endgame was unclear. After 38 Kh2 (38 a3+ Kg8 39 Kg2 axd4 40 e7 Kg8 41 a7 Kg5 is interesting: it's not obvious how Black could try to win) 38 ... Wh8+ 39 Kf1 Kh7 39 ... Kh8 40 a6 Kh7 42 axb5+! Kh8 45 d5 is totally unclear. Black is up a piece for a pawn, but his pieces are all passive, and White's two pawns are very dangerous.

b) But later that day, Ubilava found a better way for Black, 31 ... Wh7! 32 Kg2 (32 Kxh5 Kg8+ 33 Kh1 Kh8 is very good for Black; 32 Kg1 Kh6 gives Black a big check on e3) 32 ... Wh8 [5] and while the game is still complex, it is safe to say that Black stands better.

28 g4!

Now White has good counterplay. It is probably wrong to speak of a Black advantage anymore. Meanwhile, the noise from the commentators and the audience rose to the point where both players could clearly hear what was being said.

28 ... hxg4 29 Kxg4

At this point, Anand used up more than 10 minutes, and fell behind Kasparov on the clock—both players having less than 10 minutes to reach move 40.

29 ... Kg7?

a) 29 ... Kg8? 30 Kc7 (30 Kg3?) 30 ... Kc7 (30 ... Kd7? 31 Kxd7 Wxd7 32 Kg6+; 30 ... Kxg4 31 Kxg4 f5 32 Kxd8 fxg4 33 Kh4 g3 34 f5! Wh6 35 Kg2 +-) 31 ... Kg8 32 ... Kxe7 (31 ... Kxe7? 32 Kh6+ Kg7 33 Kxh5 gxh5 [33 ... Kxg4 34 Kg4 Kg3 35 Kxh5 Kxd1 36 Kg1 +] 34 Kg1+ gives White a strong attack) 32 Kg3!, and Black is under heavy pressure, e.g., 32 ... Kh3 33 Kg1.

b) Perhaps best is 29 ... Kg7, the point being to play ... Kxg4 and ... f5. White can play:

b1) 30 Ke1 Kg4!

b2) 30 Kc7 Kxg4! 31 Kxg4 f5 32 Kxe7 Kxe7 33 Kg2 Kxg4 34 Kf3 Kg4 and again Black stands well.

b3) 30 Kxh6+ Kxg7 31 Kxf5+ Kxf5 32 Ke1 Kf7 33 Kd2 Kd4 34 Kxe8 Kxe8 35 Kd3 with a relatively balanced position.

30 Kc7! Kg4

Black needs to defend against the threat of 31 Kxg7+ and 32 Kxh5+.

31 Kg3! [6]
31 $\text{B}$xa7!? also looks good, e.g., 31 ... $\text{B}$a8 32 $\text{B}$xa8 $\text{B}$xa8 33 $\text{B}$xe3 (33 $\text{B}$e2 $\text{B}$xg4 34 $\text{B}$xg4 f5 35 $\text{B}$f3 $\text{B}$xd4), but Kasparov's choice is quite strong.

31 ... $\text{B}$h3

Kasparov pointed out after the game that if 31 ... $\text{B}$d6 then 32 $\text{B}$xg7# $\text{B}$xg7 33 $\text{B}$xf5 $\text{B}$xf5 34 $\text{B}$xe4 gives White a strong attack:

a) 34 ... $\text{B}$xe4 (the only move Kasparov mentioned) 35 $\text{B}$g1+ $\text{B}$f7 (35 ... $\text{B}$f6 36 $\text{B}$xf6! $\text{B}$xf6 37 $\text{B}$g4 ++) 36 $\text{B}$h5+ is very strong.

b) 34 ... $\text{B}$xe4 35 $\text{B}$h5 is likewise very strong.

c) 34 ... $\text{B}$xe4 35 $\text{B}$g1+ $\text{B}$f7 (35 ... $\text{B}$h6 36 $\text{B}$f3! $\text{B}$xf4 37 $\text{B}$xf4 $\text{B}$xf4 38 $\text{B}$xf6 wins a rook because both 39 $\text{B}$xd8 and 39 $\text{B}$g5+ are threatened) 36 $\text{B}$h5+ $\text{B}$e6 37 $\text{B}$xf6!

32 $\text{B}$g1 g5

Another try is 32 ... $\text{B}$d6, and now:

a) 33 $\text{B}$xd5? $\text{B}$xd5 34 $\text{B}$xg6 $\text{B}$d7 35 $\text{B}$xd7 $\text{B}$xd7 36 $\text{B}$xe4 $\text{B}$xe4 37 $\text{B}$xf6 $\text{B}$c6! is clearly better for Black, e.g., 38 d5 $\text{B}$xf6, or 38 $\text{B}$xg7+ $\text{B}$f8 39 d5 $\text{B}$xf6.

b) 33 $\text{B}$xe4 $\text{B}$xe4 34 $\text{B}$xg7+ $\text{B}$xg7 35 $\text{B}$h5 is tempting, but after 35 ... f5! 36 $\text{B}$xg8 $\text{B}$d8 37 $\text{B}$c7 $\text{B}$g2+ 38 $\text{B}$xg2 $\text{B}$e1+ 39 $\text{B}$g1 $\text{B}$xg1+ 40 $\text{B}$xg1 $\text{B}$xe7 Black defends and emerges in an advantageous endgame.

c) 33 $\text{B}$xa7! is simple and best: 33 ... $\text{B}$xf4 34 $\text{B}$xg6 $\text{B}$d7 35 $\text{B}$xd7 $\text{B}$xd7 36 $\text{B}$g2! consolidates White's advantage, e.g., 36 ... $\text{B}$xf4 37 $\text{B}$xh4 $\text{B}$xg2 $\text{B}$xd1 39 $\text{B}$xd1, and if 39 ... $\text{B}$e4 then 40 a7.

33 $\text{B}$g4!

This move cements White's advantage. At this point Ashley, commenting on the game for the audience, demonstrated the variation 33 $\text{fxg}4$ $\text{fxg}4$ 34 $\text{B}$xg4 [7] $\text{B}$d6 (?) Kasparov opined that 35 ... $\text{B}$c8 might still give Black chances to save the game, but 36 $\text{B}$xa7 still looks quite strong to me.

36 $\text{B}$f2 $\text{B}$b5 37 $\text{B}$b7 $\text{B}$e4

37 ... $\text{B}$xd4 38 $\text{fxg}4$ $\text{fxg}4$ (38 ... f5 39 $\text{B}$xg7+!) 39 $\text{B}$xg5 $\text{B}$e6 40 $\text{B}$f5 ++.

38 f5! $\text{B}$xg4

38 ... $\text{B}$xd4 39 $\text{B}$xa7 $\text{B}$xb3 40 $\text{B}$xe4 (40 $\text{B}$c7?!) 40 ... $\text{B}$xe4 41 $\text{B}$c7! (41 $\text{B}$b7 $\text{B}$c5 42 $\text{B}$xb6 $\text{B}$e8 43 $\text{B}$d5 $\text{B}$xa6) 41 ... $\text{B}$a8 42 a7 $\text{B}$d4 43 $\text{B}$d5 $\text{B}$b5 44 $\text{B}$xb6 ++.

39 $\text{B}$xg4 $\text{B}$c8 40 $\text{B}$d7 $\text{B}$c2?

7 Kasparov–Anand (14) • 35 $\text{B}$xg4
This was the last move of time control, and Anand made it quickly so as not to overstep. However, Black's only try must be 40 ... c3, when White still has to prove he can win. The move played looks active, but has no real point, and after

41 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d5 [8]

the time pressure had passed, and Black's game was smashed. Anand resigned.

1–0

A great struggle. And for us, a great pity.

After 14 games: Kasparov 8\frac{1}{2}, Anand 5\frac{1}{2}
GAME 15

Thursday, 5 October 1995

After losing games 13 and 14, Anand would have liked to take a break. Unfortunately, there were no timeouts in this match. In previous world championship matches, each player had been allotted a certain number of timeouts that he could take when he wanted. Timeouts improve the quality of play because each side has a chance to recover from difficult moments in the match. The disadvantage is that they lengthen the match, making it more expensive to the sponsor and less exciting during the "dead time." It becomes more difficult to schedule various events associated with the match, because one never knows when one side or the other will take a timeout. It is not surprising that the PCA decided to hold this world championship match without timeouts, but this result should not be surprising, either: the players didn't have the nervous energy to fight at full strength in every game.

I could see that Anand's heart wasn't in it today. He wanted to be able to draw without even having to think. That is why he played as he did in the opening. Black can avoid the main line, but only at the peril of being worse. We had worked out all the kinks in the side variations; if Kasparov wanted to try for a win, he was welcome to do so. But if Kasparov wanted to play the best moves—as we suspected he would—the position

Chess at New York's City Hall Park went on as usual during the world championship match.
would be so level that Anand would have no chance of losing. Thus, with a draw offer from Kasparov, the losing streak was halted.

Incidentally, there was an amusing problem before the game. The glass playing booth was lit by bright lights that emitted considerable heat; the room had to be cooled constantly by air conditioning. But today the air conditioning was not functioning properly. There was even a chance that the game would have to be postponed a day. I hoped it would be rescheduled because Anand would have more time to recover, and perhaps he would feel strong enough to fight again. Sadly, the air conditioning was fixed quickly. The players agreed to start at 5:00 P.M. instead of the usual 3:00 P.M. The game was drawn so soon that the spectators still left earlier than usual.

**Anand–Kasparov, New York (M/15) 1995**

**Sicilian Defense B76**

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 xxd4 d6 5 c3 g6 6 xe3 g7 7 f3 0–0 8 d2 c6 9 g4 e6 10 0–0–0 xxd4 11 xxd4 e5 12 b1 xc8 13 a3 ab8 14 d5 xxd2 15 xxd2 xxd5 16 xg7 xe3 [1] 1/2–1/2

*After 15 games: Kasparov 9, Anand 6*
Friday, 6 October 1995

Given the bleak outlook it made no sense to play our top preparation any more. But this left the question of what Anand should play against 1 e4, which we assumed Kasparov would continue to essay. We considered various defenses, but Anand wanted to do something cheeky. I suggested that he play the Najdorf against Kasparov. Why not? It is certainly a good opening. Considering the amount of work he had done to play against it, and the work I had done to play it with Black—for the Najdorf is a normal part of my repertoire—together we could prepare it for a single game against any opponent, even Kasparov himself. And think of how amusing it would be to play Kasparov’s favorite opening against him! Anand liked this idea. I showed my notes to the team and together we prepared the critical lines for Anand.

We had to be prepared for everything, but we could not anticipate what Kasparov would play. Artur Yusupov correctly predicted that he would play 6 Qc2, but none of us realized he would play 12 d3 the way Anand himself had done. In retrospect, however, Kasparov reacted in exactly the right way.

Put yourself in Kasparov’s shoes. You have a commanding lead in the match, so you are not interested in taking any risks. All you want to do is to steer the match home to victory. Your opponent plays an unexpected and sharp
opening. You don't know whether this has been prepared ahead of time or is a complete bluff. Nor do you care to find out. You just want a nice, safe way to play. What do you do?

The answer is that you play a safe line, something you know very well, and that you know your opponent knows. You play the line that you have just spent a week and a half analyzing and debating with your opponent. And after 10 minutes' reflection, that is what Kasparov did. It was the completely correct decision on his part, and shows how mature and experienced he is in playing matches.

The players quickly reached a fairly quiet position. Even so, there was no reason Anand had to take the draw. I understood why he did it, but I was disappointed. He had stopped the bleeding in the previous game with the quick draw. If he really wanted to play, he could still have made a fight out of it. Of course the chances of winning the game were very low, but if he did win, he would have had an outside chance of winning or at least tying the match. Unfortunately Anand did not yet have the energy to play a real game of chess. Kasparov was cleverly doing nothing to provoke him, so the game was peacefully abandoned (on White's offer) after just 20 moves.

**Kasparov–Anand, New York (M/16) 1995**

**Sicilian Defense B85**

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 dxe4 f6 5 e3 a6 6 e2 e6 7 0-0 e7 8 a4 d6 9 e3 0-0 10 f4 c7 11 h1 e8 12 g3 b4 13 b5 d7 14 f3 e5 15 a4 b8 16 d4 c6 17 d2 e3 18 cxd3 d1 e8 19 g1 c7 20 d4 [1] ½–½

After 16 games: Kasparov 9½, Anand 6½
GAME 17

Monday, 9 October 1995

Anand wasn't going to finish the match without taking at least one more crack at Kasparov, and this was the game in which to do it. We spent the entire weekend studying the Dragon, in particular using the recent book *The Soltis Variation of the Yugoslav Attack* by Steve Mayer, which was very helpful. We found and analyzed a lot of interesting ideas. The opening in this game was one of the fruits of that analysis.

The game itself is a messy affair. Anand got a large advantage out of the opening, thanks to a bad reaction by Kasparov to Anand's opening novelty. Black spent the rest of the game trying to draw while White was trying to win. Anand missed his best chance to consolidate his advantage on move 28 and entered a rook endgame that Black could draw. But then Black misplayed it, and suddenly White was winning. Anand
was soon faced with the choice of two rook endgames, and he chose the wrong one. Still, White had good chances to win, and it took a combination of excellent defense by Kasparov and some help from Anand for Black to draw.

Yusupov, Ubilava, and I were excitedly analyzing the endgame while it was being played. It was terribly disappointing to see White's advantage slip away. Of course the person most disappointed was Anand. The effect on him was to drain the last drops of interest he had in continuing the match.

**ANAND—KASPAROV, NEW YORK (M/17) 1995**

**SICILIAN DEFENSE B78**

1 e4 c5 2 c3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 cxd4 f6 5 c3 g6 6 e3 g7 7 f3 0–0 8 d2 c6 9 c4 d7 10 h4 h5 11 b3 c8 12 0–0–0 e5 13 g5

No more fooling around as in games 13 and 15. This time we were going straight for the throat!

13 ... c5 14 b1 e8??

Kasparov was very proud of this move, but of course it was one we had anticipated. The idea of the move is to preemption 15 g4 (one of the main moves against 14 ... b5, the main line). After 14 ... e8 15 g4 h×g4 16 h5 xh5 17 d5 loses its point, since e7 is already defended. However, the move does little to prepare Black for a more center-oriented strategy by White.

15 h1 a5 16 a3?? ![ ]

Strictly speaking this is actually not a novelty, because it has been suggested in print before. The idea is simply to pass the buck to Black while making a useful move. What move should Black make now?

16 ... b5?

A mistake that is hard to explain. I can only assume that Kasparov saw Anand's rather obvious reply, but that for some reason he badly misassessed the resulting position.

17 x f6! e×f6

17 ... x f6 18 d5 x d2 19 x f6+ ex f6 (19 ... g7?? is a theme that sometimes applies to such positions, to take the knight with the king and keep the pawn structure intact, but of course in this position it is simply a blunder after 20 x e8+) 20 x d2 ±

18 de2! c6 19 d5

White is now clearly better.

19 ... x d2

Black would keep more dynamic possibilities by keeping the queens on with 19 ... d8?? Throughout this game, one gets the impression that Kasparov, on
the verge of securing his title, was so eager to draw
that he would trade pieces even if it worsened his
game. After the game, Kasparov admitted that his
eagerness to draw had affected his judgment.
20 \(\text{Exd2}\) \(\text{Qc4}\)
20 ... a5?
21 \(\text{Axc4}\) \(bxc4\) 22 \(\text{Ed1}\) f5 [2] 23 \(\text{exf5}\!\)
Not surprisingly, it is a mistake to try to win the
d6 pawn if that allows Black to activate his bishops by
breaking up White's pawns: 23 \(\text{Ab4}\) \(\text{c7}\) (23 ... \(\text{b6}\)!? is suggested by Seirawan, with similar ideas: 24 \(\text{Exd6}\)
\(\text{Exd6}\) 25 \(\text{fxe4}\) \(\text{Exe4}\) and so on) 24 \(\text{Exd6}\) \(\text{fxe4}\) 25
\(\text{Exd7}\) (25 \(\text{fxe4}\) \(\text{g4}\)) 25 ... \(\text{Exd7}\) 26 \(\text{Exd7}\) \(\text{exf3}\) 27
\(\text{gx}\text{f3}\) \(\text{Exe2}\) 28 \(\text{Exa7}\) and now Black gets his pawns
going on the kingside faster than White does on the queenside by 28 ...
g5!
23 ... \(\text{Axf5}\) 24 \(\text{Dd4}\)! \(\text{Axd4}\)
24 ... \(\text{Ec5}\) 25 \(\text{Axf5}\) \(\text{gx}\text{f5}\) allows Black's pawns to be shattered, but
keeps the dark-squared bishop. White should not play 26 \(\text{Df4}\) c3! (but
not 26 ... \(\text{Ah6}\)? 27 \(\text{Dxh5}\!) 27 \(\text{Exd6}\) \(\text{cx}\text{b2}\) 28 \(\text{Dd3}\) \(\text{Ec3}\) unclear, but
rather 26 c3! which keeps a clear advantage.
25 \(\text{Exd4}\) \(\text{Ec2}\) 26 \(\text{Dd2}\) \(\text{Exd2}\) 27 \(\text{Exd2}\) \(\text{Ef8}\) [3] 28 \(\text{Ec1}\)?
It is often the case that one must play some pre-
cise moves to get the most out of an advantage; lazy,
stereotyped moves can allow one's advantage to dissi-
pate. In this case, Anand saw the strongest move, 28
\(\text{Db4}\!\), but missed one crucial resource. Black might respond:

a) 28 ... \(\text{Ab6}\) 29 \(\text{Dd5}\!\) puts Black in a complete
bind, so White can bring the king up to the center
and take one or more of Black's pawns. Seirawan gives
the following sample line in Inside Chess: 29 ... \(\text{Ac8}\)
30 \(\text{Aa5}\) (it might be even better for White to refrain
from this move, and play simply 30 \(\text{Cc1}\), 31 \(\text{Dd2}\), 32
\(\text{Cc3}\)) 30 ... \(\text{a6}\) 31 \(\text{Ec1}\) \(\text{b5}\)? 32 \(\text{Exb5}\) \(\text{axb5}\) 33 \(\text{Dd2}\)
\(\text{Ec7}\) 34 \(\text{Ec3}\) \(\text{Ed6}\) 35 \(\text{Dd4}\) and White has excellent
chances to win by making an outside passed pawn on
the queenside and hitting Black's pawns.

b) 28 ... \(\text{Ec5}\) 29 \(\text{Exd6}\) \(\text{Ee5}\) looks at first like it will give Black good
counterplay, but in fact after 30 \(\text{Cc1}\) White controls Black's counterplay
and consolidates his extra pawn:

b1) 30 ... \(\text{a5}\) 31 \(\text{Cc6}\) \(\text{Ec2}\) 32 \(\text{Dd2}\) \(\text{Ec1}\) 33 \(\text{Ed1}\) \(\text{Ee2}\) 34 \(\text{Dd4}\)
\(\text{Exg2}\) 35 \(\text{Dxf5}\) \(\text{gx}\text{f5}\) 36 \(\text{Dd4}\) 37 \(\text{Ee2}\) 37 \(\text{Ef4}\) ±.

b2) 30 ... \(\text{Ec2}\) 31 \(\text{Ec1}\) \(\text{Ec1}\) 32 \(\text{Ed1}\) \(\text{Ec2}\) 33 \(\text{Ggl}\) a5 34 \(\text{Dd1}\) \(\text{Ee6}\)
(34 ... \textit{？e2?} 35 \textit{？e1 ++} ) 35 \textit{？a2} ±.

c) 28 ... \textit{c3!} was what turned Anand off to the knight move, but he
did not look deep enough: 29 \textit{？d5} (29 \textit{？d4} is also possible, but it is not as
strong. Black can continue 29 ... \textit{？c5} [29 ... \textit{？b6} 30 \textit{？d5} ± ] 30
\textit{？x}d6 \textit{？e5} [30 ... a5 31 \textit{？d3} 31 \textit{？d8+ \textit{g7} 32 \textit{？x}c3 \textit{？e} 2 33 c4 \textit{？x}g2
34 \textit{？c5} g5!] not as strong is 34 ... \textit{？g3} 35 c6 \textit{？x}f3 36 \textit{？d3}! and Black is
getting serious counterplay with his h-pawn. It is always dangerous to
allow pawn imbalances, even when in so doing you win a pawn, when
playing an endgame with a knight against a bishop.) 29 ... \textit{？c5} (29 ...
\textit{？c4} 30 g3! is the point that Anand missed, and White keeps a clear
advantage, e.g., 30 ... \textit{？x}b2 31 \textit{？x}b2 \textit{？e7} 32 \textit{？a5!} and 32 ... \textit{？c7?} is
prevented by 33 \textit{？d5+} 30 \textit{？x}c5 (30 b3 \textit{？c7}? to swing the rook to the
e-file is not so clear; 30 \textit{？x}c3 \textit{？x}c3! [30 ...
\textit{？c4} 31 \textit{？d4!}; 30 ... \textit{？e7} 31 \textit{？b2} ± ] 31 \textit{？b2}
\textit{？e3} gets the rook to the seventh rank to hit
the kingside pawns) 30 ... \textit{？x}c5 31 \textit{？a6!} c4
32 \textit{？c7!} \textit{？x}b2 (32 ... \textit{？e7} 33 \textit{？d5+ \textit{d6} 34
\textit{？x}c3 \textit{？e5} 35 \textit{？e2!} ± ) 33 \textit{？x}b2 [4] and the
weakness of the c4 pawn gives White a clear
advantage. This minor piece endgame needs
more analysis to be certain, however, and so
28 ... \textit{c3!} would have been Black's best chance.

28 ... \textit{？e6}!

Correct defense! Kasparov's instinct to exchange pieces serves him
well at this moment. A large part of White's advantage comes from his
superior minor piece, and Black should exchange it off to reach a rook
endgame. Although White will keep an advantage in the rook endgame
as well, thanks to Black's distended pawns, Black can compensate for his
pawn weaknesses by using his active rook.

29 \textit{？d4}

29 \textit{？b4 \textit{？b6} is now perfectly fine for Black, be-
cause 30 \textit{？d5} is no longer possible, but 29 \textit{？c3?} was
a better try to win than the text, because the rook
endgame is a pretty clear draw.

29 ... \textit{？x}d5! 30 \textit{？x}d5 \textit{？e7} [5] 31 \textit{？b5}
31 \textit{？a5} a6 32 \textit{？d2 \textit{？e6} (Here 32 ... \textit{c3+?} is a
mistake, because of the active position of White's rook
and the passive placement of the Black counterpart:
33 \textit{？x}c3 \textit{？e6} 34 \textit{？d3} and White simply pushes the c-
pawn to exchange it for Black's d-pawn, with every
hope of winning. However, when the rooks occupy
different squares the idea becomes much more seri-
ous.) 33 \textit{？c3} d5 34 \textit{？d4 \textit{？b6!} was given by Kasparov
after the game as equal. My analysis bears this assess-
ment out: 35 $\text{b}$xd5 $\text{b}$xb2 36 $\text{b}$e5+ (36 $\text{a}$a5 $\text{c}$xc2 37 $\text{x}$xa6+ $\text{f}$f5 38 $\text{g}$3 $\text{g}$g2) 36... $\text{d}$d6 37 $\text{v}$e2 $\text{a}$a2 38 $\text{c}$xc4 $\text{x}$xa3 39 $\text{b}$b4 $\text{e}$a1 =.

31... $\text{e}$e6 32 $\text{b}$b7

White has a slight edge, but Black should hold without much trouble. Notice that now if White plays 32 $\text{d}$d2, then 32... c3+!? 33 $\text{b}$xc3 $\text{a}$a6 34 $\text{b}$b3 $\text{a}$a4 35 $\text{g}$3 $\text{f}$6!? with the idea of 36... $\text{g}$5 is fine for Black. Black should not sit back and do nothing, because White does have a plan, albeit a slow one, of playing $\text{c}$c1-$\text{b}$2 and then freeing his rook; but by playing ... $\text{g}$6-$\text{g}$5 Black will make a passed pawn on the kingside, and this combined with this active rook will give him more than enough play for White's crippled extra pawn.

32... $\text{c}$c5?

Just as Black had gotten past the worst, he blunders again! Correct was 32... a6 when White cannot prove anything significant:

a) 33 $\text{a}$a7 d5 34 c3 (34 $\text{d}$d2 d4) 34... $\text{b}$b6 =.

b) 33 $\text{d}$d2 and Black has two options:

b1) 33... $\text{e}$e5 34 $\text{c}$c3 (34 $\text{a}$a7 c3+! and if 35 $\text{b}$xc3 $\text{a}$a5 White cannot defend the a-pawn) 34... $\text{e}$e5 35 $\text{a}$a7 (35 $\text{c}$xc4 $\text{e}$e2 36 $\text{d}$d3 $\text{g}$xg2 is unclear) 35... $\text{e}$e2 and again the position is unclear. White loses his kingside as quickly as Black loses his queenside, and the position becomes a race. But Black has no reason to think he is slower than White.

b2) 33... c3+!? 34 $\text{b}$xc3 $\text{c}$c5 (34... $\text{c}$c4 35 $\text{b}$b4) 35 $\text{b}$b4 $\text{a}$a5 36 $\text{a}$4 $\text{d}$d7! (White wants to play c3-c4, $\text{c}$c3-$\text{b}$3, $\text{a}$b6, $\text{b}$b4.) 37 $\text{f}$4 (37 $\text{c}$4 $\text{c}$6 38 $\text{c}$c3 $\text{e}$e5 =) 37... $\text{f}$5!? and Black should be fine.

33 $\text{a}$xa7 $\text{g}$5

This was Kasparov's clever idea, but in trying to force the draw he has given up too much, and he missed that White could bring his rook back into play with:

34 $\text{a}$a8! gxh4

An interesting idea is to try to stop $\text{e}$e8-e4 by playing 34... $\text{d}$d7!? but White should maintain a clear advantage by other means, e.g., 35 $\text{g}$3 $\text{f}$5 (35... gxh4 36 gxh4 $\text{f}$5 37 $\text{h}$8) 36 $\text{h}$8 $\text{f}$x3 37 $\text{h}$xg5 (37 $\text{h}$xh5 $\text{g}$4) 37... $\text{g}$x3 38 $\text{x}$xh5, or perhaps 35 $\text{g}$4!? gxh4 36 $\text{h}$h8 $\text{h}$xg4 37 $\text{x}$g4 and 38 $\text{x}$h4. Still, in this last variation Black succeeds in exchanging off the entire kingside by playing 37... $\text{f}$5!!, and given that White is clearly winning after the game continuation, 34... $\text{d}$d7!? looks like a good try, and maybe a better move.

35 $\text{e}$e8+ $\text{d}$d7 36 $\text{e}$e4 c3! [6]

36... $\text{g}$5 37 $\text{x}$c4 $\text{x}$g2 38 $\text{x}$h4 $\text{g}$5 39 $\text{b}$4 + is hopeless.
37 \( \text{Exh4}?! \)

Anand was universally criticized for missing the "obvious" winning move, 37 b4! While it is true that 37 b4 is obvious and strong, the move Anand played also leads to a promising endgame. It took excellent defense by Black and further mistakes by White for the game to result in a draw.

Still, the correct continuation was 37 b4! (not 37 bxc3? h3! 38 gxh3 \( \text{Exh3} = 37 \ldots \text{Exh4} 38 \text{Exg2} 39 \text{f1} \text{h}. What follows is not an exhaustive analysis, but I believe it is more than sufficient to establish that White should win:

a) 39 ... \( \text{Exg5} 40 \text{f}2 \text{a}2 ++ .

b) 39 ... \( \text{Exg3} 40 \text{f}4 ! (40 \text{Exf4} \text{Exe6} 41 \text{f}2 \text{f}5 42 \text{Exb3} \text{Exe5} [Just in time!] 43 \text{Exh4} \text{Exf3} 44 \text{Exh5 is unclear] 40 \ldots \text{Exg4} 41 \text{Exh5} \text{Exf4} 42 \text{Exh3} \text{Exc4} 43 \text{f}2 \text{a2} and 44 \text{Exb3} ++ .

c) 39 ... \( \text{Exg8} 40 \text{Exh5} \text{Exe6} 40 \ldots \text{Exc6} 41 \text{f}5 ++ ; 40 \ldots \text{Exd6} 41 \text{Exh6+} \text{Exe5} [41 \ldots \text{Exd7} 42 \text{Exh4} \text{Exf2} 43 \text{Exd4} \text{Exd6} 44 \text{Exd3 ++ ] 42 \text{Exb5} \text{Exg8} [42 \ldots \text{d}4 43 \text{b}6 \text{d}3 44 \text{b}7 ++ ] 43 \text{b}6 \text{Exb8} 44 \text{a}4 ++ ] 41 \text{Exh8} 44 \ldots \text{Exd7} 42 \text{Exh4} 42 \text{Exd8} 44 \ldots \text{Exd2} (42 \ldots \text{Exe5} 43 \text{Exb5 ++ ] 43 \text{b}5 \text{Exe7} 44 \text{Exd5 \text{Exe6} and now 45 \text{Exc5}! is sufficient to win by pushing the queenside pawns, but not 45 \text{b}6? \text{Exd5} 46 \text{b}7 \text{d}3! 47 \text{b}8/\text{Ex} \text{d}1 + 48 \text{Exa2} \text{dxc2} 49 \text{Exb3+} \text{Exd4} 50 \text{Exxc2} 51 \text{Exb3} \text{Exc2} 52 \text{Exc2} 53 \text{f}4 \text{Exd4}! and Black will draw the pawn endgame.

d) 39 ... \( \text{Exf2} and White has a plethora of promising options:

d1) 40 \text{Exh5} \text{Exf3} 41 \text{Exa2} \text{Exc6} 42 \text{Exb3} 43 \text{Exa4} certainly does not squeeze everything out of the position that White should have, but even this may be sufficient.

d2) 40 \text{f}4?! \text{Exc6} 41 \text{Exh5} \text{Exf4} 42 \text{Exh3} is a tempo behind line b above, but it probably makes no difference.

d3) 40 \ldots \text{Exf4} \text{Exe6} (40 \ldots \text{h}4 41 \text{Exf7}+ \text{Exc6} 42 \text{Exh7} \text{Exh2 } [42 \ldots \text{Exb5} 43 \text{Exh5+!] 43 \text{f}4 \text{h}5 44 \text{f}5 and White wins by trading the f-pawn for the h-pawn] 41 \text{b}5 \text{d}5 42 \text{b}6 \text{Exg2} (42 \ldots \text{Exd7} 43 \text{Exf7}+ \text{Exc8} 44 \text{a}4 ++ ] 43 \text{b}7 \text{Exg8} 44 \text{Eh4} \text{Exb8} 45 \text{a}4 \text{Exd6} (45 \ldots \text{h}4 46 \text{a}5 \text{h}3 47 \text{a}6 \text{h}2 \text{h}4 ++ ] 46 \text{a}5 \text{Exc5} 47 \text{Exb3} 48 \text{a}6 ++ .

37 \ldots \text{Exxb2+} 38 \text{Exxb2} \text{Exg5}

This endgame is certainly not as good for White as that after 37 b4, but it is still very difficult for Black. It is very difficult to do an exhaustive analysis of such a complex endgame. (Part of what makes it complex is that it is actually possible to "solve" it—so one must try to do so—but the solution involves very deep and broad analysis.) I have focused on certain parts of the endgame, while merely indicating the other critical juctures I perceive. The reader who would like to develop his or her skills in rook endgames is encouraged to check my analysis thoroughly, and carry it farther where it is lacking.

39 a4
This certainly looks like the best move, although perhaps White could also try 39 \( \text{b}3 \). Note that 39 \( \text{h}2 \) is hopelessly passive, and 39 g4 hxg4 40 \( \text{x}g4 \) (40 fxg4 \( \text{c}6 \) is similar) 40 ... \( \text{f}5 \) 41 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{c}6 \) ties White's rook down to the f-pawn, and so helps Black's game.

39 ... \( \text{f}5 \) [7]

The idea behind this move is to play ... \( \text{f}5 \)-\( \text{f}4 \), and then to capture on g2, and if White refrains from capturing on f4 but instead waits to capture on h5 after Black takes on g2, then Black plays ... \( \text{g}3 \) and wins the f-pawn. Kasparov was rightly proud of this move after the game. Black must strive for activity if he is to draw.

Notice that it is a mistake for Black to capture on g2: 39 ... \( \text{x}g2 \) 40 \( \text{x}h5 \) \( \text{c}6 \) (40 ... \( \text{c}6 \) 41 \( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 42 \( \text{c}3 \) is close to winning — now Black has the passive rook! 40 ... \( \text{f}2 \) 41 \( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 42 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 43 a5 \( \text{e}5 \) 44 \( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{h}2 \) 45 a6 \( \text{h}8 \) 46 a7 \( \text{a}8 \) 47 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 48 \( \text{a}5+ \) \( \text{c}6 \) 49 \( \text{d}4 \) ++; probably Anand had variations like this in mind when he played 39 a4) 41 a5 \( \text{g}8 \) 42 a6 \( \text{a}8 \) 43 \( \text{a}5 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 44 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 45 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 46 \( \text{a}3 \) ++.

40 a5

Seirawan offers two interesting ideas about this position. First, he suggests 40 \( \text{b}3 \)? with the idea of playing c2-c3 and \( \text{b}4 \), which is quite interesting. Second, he analyzes 40 \( \text{f}4 \). He is correct to assert that Black should draw, but his analysis is not sufficient or correct. (I do not mean this as a criticism. It is very difficult to analyze complex endgames like this one, and no one, no matter how strong a grandmaster, can possibly get it right in the short time that a magazine that reports the news as quickly as Inside Chess does. Yasser did very well simply to identify some interesting ideas and to give a few relevant lines.) The positions that arise are actually very interesting, so if you have a lot of stamina today, I encourage you to dive into the analysis that follows!

40 \( \text{f}4 \) and now:

a) 40 ... \( \text{g}4 \) is given by Seirawan as "!!", but it is at best a less accurate way for Black to reach the critical position. There could follow:

a1) 41 \( \text{x}h5 \) (the only move given by Seirawan) 41 ... \( \text{f}4 \) 42 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{g}4 \) (Seirawan stops here by saying this line "offers drawing chances") 43 \( \text{x}5 \) (43 \( \text{h}2 \) is clearly way to passive to be a serious try for White) 43 ... \( \text{x}g2 \) 44 \( \text{b}5 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 45 \( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{g}5 \) is a clear draw. Black should draw this position even without his d-pawn, because positions of this sort with the split bishop pawn and rook pawn in the rook endgame are drawn unless the pawns are very far advanced, or the Black king is cut off by a rank or a file from being in front of the pawns.
a2) 41 $Bxc4$ leads by force to a queen endgame where White is a pawn up: 41 ... $Bxg4$ 42 a5! (42 g3?? $h4$ ++ ) 42 ... $h4$ 43 $a6$ $g6$ (43 ... $h3$ 44 $gxh3$ $g3$ [44 ... $h3$?? 45 $a7$ $h2$ 46 $a8$/$h1$ --]) 45 $a7$ $h2$ 46 $a8$/$h1$ ++ 44 $a7$ $b7$ 45 $a8$/$h1$ $xh8$ 46 $f5$ $h3$ 47 $g6$ $xh3$ $gxh3$ 48 $f6$ $h2$ 49 $f7$ $h1$/$g6$ 50 $f8$/$g6$+$b7$ 51 $b7$/$xh6$, but this endgame should be drawn for Black because the king is perfectly placed to blockade the pawn. The only danger for Black is that White might somehow exchange queens while the pawn was so far back that Black would lose the king and pawn endgame, but this is difficult to bring about, so Black should draw without too much trouble.

a3) 41 $g3$ $xg3$ 42 $xh5$ $g6$ (42 ... $g4$? 43 $xg5$ $e6$ 44 $f8$ $c7$ 45 $e8$ $xf4$ 46 $b3$ $d7$ 47 $c4$ is much more dangerous for Black than the endgame in a1, because the king is cut off along the c-file, and White will get his pawn to the fifth rank. I am not sure that it is lost, but if it isn’t, it is certainly close!) 43 $a5$ is the same position as is reached in line b, with the insignificant difference that Black’s rook is on $g3$ instead of $g2$.

b) 40 ... $xg2$ 41 $xh5$ $e6$ (Anand in New In Chess suggests Black may have an easier way to draw: 41 ... $g4$! 42 $xf5$ $e6$ 43 $b5$ $xf4$ 44 $b3$ $d7$) 42 $a5$ reaches a critical position where Black has two reasonable moves:

b1) 42 ... $g7$? 43 $h3$! (43 $h6+$ $d5$! 44 $f6$ $g6$ 45 $xg6$ $xg6$ is a draw because Black can use the f-pawn to decoy White’s rook and thereby get his king back in front of the pawns; 43 $b3$ $b7$+ 44 $c4$ [44 $a4$ $c7$ 45 $h2$ $c4+$ 46 $b5$ $xf4$ 47 $a6$ $f1$ 48 $h4$ $f4$ 49 $a7$ $a1$ draws] 44 ... $c7+$ 45 $b5$ $xc2$ 46 $a6$ $b2+$ 47 $c6$ $c2+$ 48 $b7$ $b2+$ etc. is drawn.) 43 ... $a7$ 44 $a3$ $d5$ 45 $a6$ $c6$ 46 $c3$ $b6$ 47 $d4$ +--.

b2) 42 ... $g4$! 43 $a6$ $xf4$ and now:

b21) 44 $b3$ $f1$ 45 $c4$ (45 $h8$ $a1$ 46 $a8$ $f4$ 47 $a7$ $d5$ =) 45 ... $a1$ 46 $b5$ $f4$ 47 $b6$ $f3$ 48 $h2$ $e6$ 49 $d2$ $d5$ 50 $a7$ $b1+$ 51 $c7$ $a1$ 52 $b7$ $b1+$ is drawn.

b22) 44 $h3$ (Seirawan gives only one line after 40 ... $xg2$: 41 $xh5$ $e6$ 42 $a5$ $g4$ 43 $a6$ $xf4$ 44 $h3$, and concludes that White wins. However, in fact it is precisely here that Black draws.) 44 ... $g4$! [8] and now:

b221) 45 $a3$ $g8$ 46 $a7$ (46 $b3$ $d5$ 47 $b4$ $c6$ 48 $a5$ $c7$ draws, e.g. 49 $b3$ [to stop 49 ... $b8$] 49 ... $g1$!) 46 ... $a8$ 47 $c3$ $d5$ 48 $b4$ $c6$ =.

b222) 45 $b3$ and now:

b2221) 45 ... $d7$?? 46 $h8$! +-- and the a-pawn queens.

b2222) 45 ... $g7$ 46 $b4$ lets
White's king get too active, e.g., 46 ... \$e5 47 \$b5 \$c4 48 \$b6 f4 49 a7 \$g8 50 \$a3 f3 51 a8/+ \$x\$a8 52 \$x\$a8 f2 53 \$h8 \$e3 54 \$c6 +-. b2223) 45 ... \$g1 46 \$b4! and White can block the Black rook along the third rank, so the pawn queens, e.g., 46 ... \$a1 47 \$a3 \$b3+ 48 \$a5 \$b8 49 a7 \$a8 50 \$b6 +-. b2224) 45 ... \$d5 46 \$h8 \$g7 47 \$b4 \$c6 (47 ... \$f7 48 \$b5 f4 49 \$b6 f3 50 a7 ++) 48 \$a5 \$f7 49 \$f8 +-. b2225) But 45 ... \$g8! just barely draws: 46 \$a4 (46 \$b4 \$d7) 46 ... \$d7?! (46 ... \$b8? 47 a7 \$a8 48 \$h7 f4 49 \$b5 f3 50 \$b6 f2 51 \$h1 ++) 46 ... \$c8? 47 a7 \$d7 [47 ... \$c2 48 a8/\$a2+ 49 \$a3] 48 \$b5 f4 49 \$a3 ++) 47 \$c3 (47 \$a5 \$c7?! = 48 \$b3 [or else 48 ... \$b8 draws easily] 48 ... \$g1!) 47 ... \$c8! 48 \$b3 (48 a7 \$a8!) 48 ... \$c4+?? (I do not know whether this is the only move, but it works.) and now we consider each of White's legal moves: b22251) 49 \$b4 \$xb4+ 50 \$xb4 \$c6 =. b22252) 49 \$a3 \$c6! 50 \$b7+ (50 a7 \$a6+) 50 ... \$c8 =. b22253) 49 \$b5 \$c2 and now: b222531) 50 \$b6 \$a2 (50 ... \$c8?! 51 a7 \$a2 52 \$c3+ [White cannot improve his game any further before playing this, nor does he have any other winning idea, e.g., 52 \$b5 \$a1 53 \$x\$f5 \$b1+ 54 \$c6 \$c1+ 55 \$x\$d6 \$b7 =. Notice how critical it is that Black has a pawn on d6; without it White could play \$b5-c5+ and \$a5.] 52 ... \$d7 53 \$c7+ \$e6 54 \$e8 f4 55 a8/+ \$x\$a8 56 \$x\$a8 \$d5! and Black draws by supporting the f-pawn with the king. The d-pawn is useful right to the end, taking the c5 square from White's king!) 51 \$b5 (51 \$c3 \$b2++; one of the key ideas at work is that if White gets his king stuck in front of the a-pawn, and Black's king is on d7, the position is a dead draw) 51 ... f4 52 a7 \$f3 53 \$f5 \$b2+. b222532) 50 \$a3 \$b2+ 51 \$c4 (51 \$a5 \$c7 =) 51 ... \$b8 52 a7 \$a8 =. b22254) 49 \$a5 \$xc2 50 a7 (50 \$a3 \$c7 =; for 50 \$b6 \$c8 see line b222531 above) 50 ... \$a2+ (50 ... \$c7?! =) 51 \$b6 and now both 51 ... \$c8 (transposing again to b222531 above) and 51 ... \$c6? 52 \$b5 \$xa7 53 \$xa7 d5 54 \$b6 \$e5 55 \$c5 \$f4 56 \$b8 \$e4 57 \$e8+ \$d3 is a draw.

Finally, I should mention that Kasparov suggested 40 \$h2 to bring the white king to d3. Now that we have analyzed 40 f4 ad nauseam, you may want to analyze Kasparov's idea of 40 \$h2 and Seirawan's alternative 40 \$b3 for yourself.

40 ... f4! 41 a6 \$c7

Two moves that lose are 41 ... \$a5? 42 \$xf4 \$xa6 43 \$f5 +- and 41 ... \$c8? 42 \$xf4 \$e2 43 \$f8+ \$c7 44 a7 +++; also 41 ... \$xg2? 42 a7 \$g8 43 \$h5 foolishly puts Black in a very passive position, and White should win by playing \$h7-f7 and bringing the king up. How-
ever, an interesting alternative was 41 ... \( \text{c6?!} \) 42 \( \text{fxf4} \) \( \text{gxg2} \) 43 \( \text{f5} \) (43 \( \text{b4} \) \( \text{g7} \); 43 \( \text{a4} \) \( \text{g8} \); 43 \( \text{f7} \) \( \text{g8} \) 44 \( \text{a7} \) \( \text{h4} \) 45 \( \text{h7} \) \( \text{a8} \) 46 \( \text{f4} \) \( [46 \text{xc3 h3 47 } \text{d4} \text{h2 48 } \text{e4} \text{xa7 49 } \text{exh2 Ba5 =}] 46 ... \( \text{d5?!} \) =) and now:

a) 43 ... \( \text{h2?} \) 44 \( \text{b5!!} \) and the a-pawn queens.

b) 43 ... \( \text{f2?} \) 44 \( \text{f7!} \) \( \text{g2} \) 45 \( \text{a7} \) \( \text{g8} \) 46 \( \text{h7} \) and compared to line c below Black has lost two tempi, and it is not surprising that White can exploit this fact: 46 ... \( \text{a8} \) 47 \( \text{f4!} \) \( \text{h4} \) (47 ... \( \text{d5} \) 48 \( \text{e5} \) +; 47 ... \( \text{b6} \) 48 \( \text{f5} \) \( \text{f8} \) 49 \( \text{f6} \) \( \text{h4} \) 50 \( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 51 \( \text{f4} \) \( g7 \) 52 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 53 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{e6} \) 54 \( c4 \) \( \text{+-} \)) 48 \( \text{f5} \) \( \text{d5} \) 49 \( \text{f6} \) \( \text{e6} \) 50 \( \text{f7} \) \( \text{h3} \) (50 ... \( \text{xa7} \) 51 \( \text{f8} \) \( \text{h7} \) 52 \( \text{g4+} \); 50 ... \( \text{e7} \) 51 \( \text{f8} \) \( \text{h4} \) \( \text{+-} \)) 51 \( \text{h7} \) \( \text{e6} \) 52 \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{d5} \) 54 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{c6} \) 55 \( \text{d5} \) \( \text{-} \).

c) Correct is 43 ... \( \text{b6!} \) 44 \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{e6} \) and I believe Black draws, e.g., 45 \( \text{h6} \) (45 \( \text{d5} \) \( \text{g6} \) 46 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{b6} \) 47 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{c6} \) and Black draws by bringing the king around to \( e7 \), e.g., 48 \( c4 \) \( \text{d7} \) 49 \( \text{c5} \) \( \text{d6} \) 50 \( \text{cxd6} \) \( \text{f6} \) 51 \( \text{d6} \) \( \text{f6} \) and Black draws because he has the opposition) 45 ... \( \text{d5} \) 46 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{d1} \) 47 \( \text{f4} \) (47 \( \text{h4} \) \( \text{f1} \) =) 47 ... \( \text{b5} \).

42 \( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{g2} \) 43 \( \text{f7} + \) \( \text{b8} \! \) !
Not 43 ... \( \text{b6?} \) 44 \( \text{a7} \) \( \text{-} \); see the note to move 41, line \( b \) above.

44 \( \text{a3} \) [9]
44 \( \text{h7} \) gets nowhere; White needs the king.

44 ... \( \text{h4} \)

Interesting was 44 ... \( \text{g8?!} \), which leads to a fascinating endgame: 45 \( \text{d4} \) (45 \( \text{d7} \) \( \text{f8} =) ; 45 \( \text{e6} \) \( \text{c7} \); 45 \( \text{h7} \) \( \text{f8} \) 46 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 47 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{a3} =) ; 45 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{f8} \) 46 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{e8} !) 45 ... \( \text{h8} \) 46 \( \text{c3} \) (46 \( \text{e7} \) \( \text{h4} \) 47 \( \text{c2} \) \( \text{h3} \) 48 \( \text{b2} \) \( \text{a7} \) 49 \( \text{f4} \) [49 \( \text{d5} \) \( \text{h6} \) \( \text{+} \)] 49 ... \( \text{a6} \) 50 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{b6} \) 51 \( \text{f5} \) \( \text{c6} \) 52 \( \text{c6} \) \( \text{d7} \) 53 \( \text{f5} \) \( [53 \text{g7} \) \( \text{h5} \) \( \text{53} ... \) \( \text{h4} \) \( 54 \) \( \text{h6} \) \( \text{d8} =) ; 46 ... \) \( \text{h4} \) 47 \( \text{f2} \) \( \text{c8} !) (47 ... \) \( \text{h3} \) 48 \( \text{g1} \) \( h2 =) 49 \( \text{h1} \) is, I believe, a win for White. White's plan is to push the f-pawn to the point where it breaks Black's back. It is not easy for Black to defend, e.g., 49 ... \( \text{c8} \) 50 \( \text{a7} + \) \( \text{a8} \) 51 \( \text{xf2} \) \( \text{f2} \) 52 \( \text{g3} \) and White plays \( \text{d7} \) and then advances the f-pawn up the board. Black cannot hope to stalemate himself, because he always has to lose the d-pawn to do so, and when he loses the d-pawn the stalemate is released. Also, 49 ... \( \text{d5} \) 50 \( \text{c3?!} \) doesn't seem to change things in any relevant way. Black may have a defense, but I don't see it.) 48 \( \text{a7} + \) (48 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{xc2} \) 49 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{f8} =) 50 \( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{axa6} \) 51 \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{c8} \) 51 \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{d5} \) ! 52 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{e8} \) is a drawn endgame) 48 ... \( \text{e8} \) 49 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{xc2} \) 50 \( \text{h3} \) \( \text{c8} =) 51 \( \text{g4} \) (51 \( \text{d7} \) \( \text{f8} =) 51 ... \) \( \text{d8} \) and I believe Black draws, e.g., 52 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{d5} \) 53 \( \text{h5} \) \( \text{d4} \) 54 \( \text{c7} \) \( \text{d3} \) 55 \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{d2} \) 56 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{xa7} \) 57 \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{b6} \) 58 \( \text{f6} \) \( \text{d3} =) (58 ... \) \( \text{c5} \) 59 \( \text{f7} \) \( \text{c4} \) \( 60 \) \( \text{xc2} \) 59 \( \text{f7} \) (59 \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{d6} \) 60 \( \text{f7} \) \( \text{b6} \) 59 ... \( \text{f3} \) 60 \( \text{g6} \) \( \text{\textcopyright 1994 John Murray Publishers Inc. All rights reserved.} \)
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... and Black draws by perpetually attacking the king and pawn via g3, f3, and e3. The one place White can take shelter is f8, but then Black just plays ... \( \text{d3} \).

I am not 100% certain that this analysis exhausts the possibilities, or is even completely correct. (In fact, I am sure that it does not and is not!) I urge the reader to check this analysis. It is important because it represents Black’s other logical plan, and because the move Kasparov played in the game still gives White some chances if he plays better on move 46 than he did.

45 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{f2} \) 46 c4?

A mistake like this can only be explained by fatigue. There are several alternatives here:

a) The bulletin suggests 46 \( \text{e4} \), and Seirawan suggests 46 f4, each having a similar idea, to give up the c-pawn and use the king to run the f-pawn up the board. In fact, it leads to nothing, e.g., 46 f4 h3 47 \( \text{e4} \) h2 48 \( \text{b7}+ \) \( \text{a8} \) 49 \( \text{h7} \) is assessed as \( \pm \) by Seirawan, but after 49 ...

\( \text{xc2} \) White cannot make headway:

a1) 50 f5 \( \text{f2} = \); the f-pawn is frozen.

a2) 50 \( \text{f5} \) \( \text{f2} \) 51 \( \text{g5} \) d5! is fine for Black.

a3) 50 \( \text{f3} \) d5 51 f4 d6 52 f6 \( \text{c6} \) 53 f7 \( \text{f6}+ \) 54 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{f7} \).

a4) 50 \( \text{e3} \) d5 51 f5 \( \text{b8} \) 52 \( \text{f3} \) (52 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{f2} \) 53 \( \text{e5} \) d4 =; 52 f6 \( \text{c6} \) 53 f7 \( \text{f6} = \) 52 ...

b) 46 c3! was suggested in the bulletin, and is certainly a better move than what Anand played. It has the clever point that after 46 ...

\( \text{a2} \) 47 a7+, Black cannot capture the pawn: 47 ...

\( \text{xa7} \) 48 \( \text{xa7} \) \( \text{xa7} \) 49 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{b6} \) 50 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 51 \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{c4} \) 52 \( \text{f4} \) [10] +=. I think this is an amazing pawn endgame, because at first sight it looks as though Black should be fine. You have to count twice to believe that White really does catch the h-pawn and push his f-pawn before Black can get the c-pawn!

c) 46 a7+! was suggested by Yusupov and is definitely an improvement. This is an example of what is meant by “good technique.” Once you see that Black’s idea is to swing the rook to the a-file, it should be automatic to consider this move which gains tempi by driving the king into the corner. After 46 ...

\( \text{a8} \) 47 c4 White has improved over the game considerably: first by forcing the king one square further away, second by forcing the black rook to capture the a-pawn on the inferior a7 square (where for example it prevents Black from bringing the king out easily via b7 because of the check along the rank). I will leave it to you to decide whether these differences
would have turned the draw into a win. If so, then perhaps Black should have deviated at either move 41 or move 44.

46 ... $a2! [11] 47 $e4

There is nothing better. If 47 a7+ $xa7 48 $xa7 $xa7 49 $e3 $b6 50 $f4 $f5 and Black's king captures the c-pawn faster as compared with the lines after 46 a7+, which makes all the difference. If 47 $h7 $xa6! 48 $xh4 $a3+! 49 $e2 (49 $e4 $d5+! 50 $cxd5?? $a4+) 50 ... $e3 =) 49 ... $c7 and White cannot win with his passive king (the game continuation is a better version of this, but still drawn).

47 ... $xa6 48 $h7 $a5 49 $f4 $c8!

Black needs to rush the king back to block the f-pawn.

50 $f5

50 $xh4 $c5 51 $d4 $d7 is an easy draw. The point is that without the d-pawn and the c-pawn, the position would be completely drawn (of course, assuming Black's rook were not en prise), and the addition of the two pawns changes nothing because White's c-pawn is at least as much a target as Black's d-pawn, and because White's c-pawn is prevented from advancing and becoming a threat.

50 ... $d8 51 $f4

The position is now completely drawn, but Anand valiantly tries to squeeze just a few drops of blood from Black's rock-like position.

51 ... $c5 52 $g5 $c4 [12] 53 $g6

There is nothing better, e.g., 53 $f6 $e4! = (Seirawan), or 53 $f6 $e8 54 $g6 $g4+ 55 $f5 $g1 =.

53 ... $g4+ 54 $f7 $d5 55 $f6 $d7!

If Black did not have the d-pawn, then White would win this position. But now Black can give up his rook for White's pawn and support the d-pawn with his king.

56 $d8+ $e6 57 $f7 $f4 58 $g8 $d4 59 $f8/ $xh4 60 $c8 $e5 61 $xh4 $d3 62 $h3 $e4

There was one last impediment to securing the world championship title: not 62 ... $d2?? 63 $d3 +-. 63 $d3 $d3 ½-½

After 17 games: Kasparov 10, Anand 7
Tuesday, 10 October 1995

The 1995 World Chess Championship ended with a whisper of a game. After the disappointing near-miss of game 17, Anand had no stomach left to fight. Kasparov for his part had no reason to prolong the
match any longer. Since Anand only wanted to draw, he adopted the same defense that had sufficed for this purpose in game 16.

Kasparov had had the weekend to decide what to do if confronted with the Najdorf again. His decision to play 12 $A_f3$ was wise. By playing this move and offering a draw, Kasparov was saying, "Look, if you want a draw, you can have it right now. But if you decline, I am quite happy to play the best moves in the position and try to win. I know you think this is a good line for White, because you have been willing to play it against me. I think I know a thing or two about this position. Do you really want to defend it against an opponent who is in the mood to fight if you turn down this peace offer?" From a psychological standpoint, negotiating from strength was the right way to convince Anand to take the draw. By challenging Anand in this variation, Kasparov was also burning his bridges behind him and putting his honor on the line. Thus he would be in the mood to fight if Anand turned down the draw. Kasparov as much as confessed this reasoning in the press conference when asked about his choice of 12 $A_f3$. Once again he showed his match maturity and experience by his choice of opening. Anand, having no desire to continue, accepted the draw offer.
Anand may have lost the match, but he did not lose his sense of humor. “I hope you enjoyed the nail-biting finish,” he told the journalists at the press conference after the game.

Shortly after the press conference the prizes were awarded. Mike Couzens of Intel presented Kasparov with a huge crystal trophy and a giant “check” for one million dollars. Anand received a similar document for half that figure. After a reception at the end of the final week the 1995 world chess championship match was over.

Kasparov–Anand, New York (m/18) 1995
Sicilian Defense B85

1 e4 c5 2 d4 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 cxd4 f6 5 e3 a6 6 e2 e6 7 0–0 e7 8 a4 c6 9 f3 0–0 10 f4 c7 11 h1 e8 12 f3 ½–½

Final score after 18 games: Kasparov 10½, Anand 7½
Previous Games Between Kasparov and Anand

KASPAROV–ANAND, LINARES 1991
Petroff Defense C43
1 e4 e5 2 d4 exd4 3 d5 exd5 4 dxe5 d6 5 dxe5 dxe5 6 c4 c6 0-0 0-0 7 c4 c5 8 dxe5 c6
9 exd5 0-0 10 c2 c4 b4 11 d4 dxe2 12 dxe2 d4 13 g4 g4 14 dxe4 dxe4 15 f3 f5 16 g4
h8 17 c1 c6 18 a2 f6 19 a2 d2 20 d2 d2 d8 21 c4 d1+ 22 a1 c4 23 c4 c2 24 c4 f8 25 a4 a5
26 dxc4 d4 27 d4 f1 a3 3/2

ANAND–KASPAROV, TILBURG 1991
Sicilian Defense B82
1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 d5 d6 5 dxc6 a6 6 f4 c6 7 d3 d5 8 d7 0-0
9 d6 b6 e6 c3 xeb3 10 xeb3 cxb3 11 c4 e5 12 e4 c5 13 dxc6 xc6 14 e5 dxc5 15 d4
c5 16 dxc5 dxc5 17 dxc5 dxc5 18 d5 19 a5 xdx5 20 dxe4 21 dxe4 22 xdx5 23 xdx5
24 a4 c4 25 b4 a5 26 xdx5 c4 27 d4 b4 28 c4 b3 29 c3 18

KASPAROV–ANAND, TILBURG 1991
Sicilian Defense B48
1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 d5 e5 5 d5 d6 6 c4 e6 7 d3 d6 8
c3 f6 9 h3 c4 10 f3 c5 11 f3 d5 12 d5 d5 13 fxe5 c4 14 e5 c4 15 c5
c4 16 dxe4 dxe4 17 dxe4 dxe4 18 dxe4 dxe4 19 dxe4 dxe4 20 dxe4
cxb5 21 cxb5 cxb5 22 cxb5 cxb5 23 cxb5 cxb5 24 d4 c4 25 d4
d4 26 a4 a4 27 a4 a4 28 a4 a4 29 g3 1

KASPAROV–ANAND, REGGIO EMILIA 1991–92
French Defense C07
1 e4 e5 2 d4 d4 3 d2 c5 4 dxc5 dxc5 5 dxe5 d5 6 d4 d4 7 d3 c6 8
c4 e6 9 b4 b4 10 d5 d5 11 c5 d5 12 c5 c5 13 c5 c5 14 c5
15 c5 16 c4 17 c4 18 c4 19 c4 20 c4 21 c4 22 c4 23 c4 24 c4 25 c4 26 c4
27 c4 28 c4 29 c4 30 c4 31 c4 32 c4 33 c4 34 c4 35 c4 36 c4 37 c4
38 c4 39 c4 40 c4 41 c4 42 c4 43 c4 44 c4 45 c4 46 c4 47 c4 48 c4 49 c4
50 c4 51 c4 52 c4 53 c4 54 c4 55 c4 56 c4 57 c4 58 c4 59 c4 60 c4 61 c4
62 c4 63 c4 64 c4 65 c4 66 c4 67 c4 68 c4 69 c4 70 c4 71 c4 72 c4
73 c4 74 c4 75 c4 76 c4 77 c4 78 c4 79 c4 80 c4 81 c4 82 c4
83 c4 84 c4 85 c4 86 c4 87 c4 88 c4 89 c4 90 c4 91 c4
92 c4 93 c4 94 c4 95 c4 96 c4 97 c4 98 c4 99 c4 100 c4
KASPAROV–ANAND, LINARES 1992

FRENCH DEFENSE C18

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ∆c3 ∆b4 4 e5 c5 5 a3 ∆xe3+ 6 bx3 ∆c7 7 h4 ∆bc6 8 h5 ∆a5 9 ∆d2 cxd4 10 cxd4 ∆a4 11 ∆f3 ∆xd4 12 ∆d3 ∆c6 13 ∆f1 ∆f6 14 ∆xf3 b6 15 h6 ∆a6 16 hgx7 ∆g8 17 ∆a6 ∆x6+ 18 ∆g1 ∆xg7 19 ∆f6 ∆g8 20 ∆xh7 ∆b7 21 ∆g5 ∆xd4 22 c4 ∆e2+ 23 ∆h2 ∆c3 24 ∆h4 ∆xb8+ 25 ∆xh8+ ∆f7 26 ∆f7 ∆f8 27 ∆h6 ∆e8 28 ∆xf7+ ∆e7 29 ∆g6 ∆b8 30 cxd5 ∆xd5 31 ∆d1 ∆xe5+ 32 f4 ∆h8 33 f5 ∆e5+ 34 ∆h1 1/2

KASPAROV–ANAND, DORTMUND 1992

SLAV DEFENSE D19

1 ∆f3 d5 2 c4 c6 3 d4 ∆f6 4 ∆c3 ∆xc4 5 a4 ∆f5 6 e3 e6 7 ∆xc4 ∆a4 8 0–0 0–0 9 ∆c2 ∆bd7 10 ∆e5 ∆e8 11 ∆d1 ∆c7 12 ∆xd7 ∆xd7 13 ∆f3 ∆d5 14 ∆a2 ∆f8 15 e4 ∆g6 16 ∆e1 f5 17 ∆xd5 1–0

KASPAROV–ANAND, PARIS (RAPID) 1992

QUEEN'S GAMBIT DECLINED D30

1 ∆f3 d5 2 c4 c6 3 d4 e6 4 ∆c2 ∆f6 5 ∆g5 h6 6 ∆h4 ∆bd7 7 e3 ∆e7 8 ∆c3 0–0 9 ∆d3 ∆xc4 10 ∆xc4 ∆d5 11 ∆g3 ∆xc3 12 bx3 c5 13 0–0 ∆d6 14 ∆d3 ∆d7 15 ∆h7+ ∆h8 16 ∆e4 ∆e8 17 ∆e5 ∆a4 18 ∆xe2 ∆xd7 19 ∆eb1 ∆c6 20 ∆xc6 bxc6 21 ∆d3 ∆e6 22 ∆f3 ∆d5 23 ∆eb1 ∆c6 24 ∆d3 ∆xe5 25 ∆xh5 cxd4 26 ∆xd4 ∆f6 27 ∆fc1 ∆d7 28 ∆f5 f4 29 ∆e4 fxe3 30 fxe3 ∆b8 31 ∆xax7 ∆xb1 32 ∆xb1 ∆e8 33 ∆f1 ∆e7 34 ∆c6 ∆f6 35 ∆f1 ∆e7 36 ∆xg5 ∆e5 37 ∆f1 ∆e6 38 ∆f3 ∆e5 39 h3 ∆e8 40 f5 ∆d8 41 ∆h2 ∆c7+ 42 ∆e5 ∆f7 43 a4 ∆f7 44 ∆e2+ ∆g8 45 a5 ∆e7 46 ∆c6 ∆g8 47 ∆f7 ∆e8 48 ∆d7 ∆d8 49 ∆f5 ∆f7 50 a6 ∆e6 51 ∆b7 ∆xax6 52 ∆xa6 ∆e6 53 ∆d5 ∆g6 54 ∆g3 ∆f6 55 ∆f3 a3 56 h3 b4 57 g4 ∆f6 58 ∆a5 ∆f5 59 ∆f4 ∆b6 60 e4 ∆b1 61 ∆a6+ ∆f7 62 g5 h5 63 g6+ ∆f7 64 ∆e5 ∆b7 65 d5 1–0

ANAND–KASPAROV, PARIS (RAPID) 1992

SICILIAN DEFENSE B82

1 e4 c5 2 ∆f3 d6 3 d4 exd4 4 ∆xd4 ∆f6 5 ∆c3 a6 6 f4 e6 7 ∆f3 ∆b6 8 a3 ∆bd7 9 ∆b3 ∆c7 10 g4 h6 11 h4 g5 12 g3 d6 13 ∆b5 d5 14 0–0 0–0 16 ∆xe4 ∆f4 17 ∆xc4 ∆e8 17 ∆g4 ∆e8 18 ∆xg4 ∆f8 18 g6 a5 19 ∆fd4 b4 20 ∆db5 ∆xc5 21 a4 e2 22 ∆f5 f6 23 ∆e2 ∆xg5 24 exf5 ∆exf5 25 axf5 a4 26 ∆b1 ∆xb5 27 ∆d3 b3 28 ∆a1 ∆c7 29 a4 ∆d7 30 ∆f2 ∆d8 31 h5 e4 32 ∆d5 ∆e5 33 ∆d6+ ∆d8 34 c3 a3 35 ∆f1 36 ∆d4 ∆a5 37 ∆xe4 ∆c7 38 ∆g8+ ∆d7 39 ∆he2 1–0

ANAND–KASPAROV, PARIS (BLITZ) 1992

SICILIAN DEFENSE B93

1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 d6 3 d4 exd4 4 ∆xd4 ∆f6 5 ∆c3 a6 6 f4 e6 7 fxe6 8 ∆d3 ∆g7 9 ∆g4 10 –0–0 11 ∆f1 h6 0–0 12 ∆f4 ∆xf6 13 ∆xh6 14 ∆xh6 15 gxf6 16 h5 ∆xe5 17 ∆xe5+ ∆h8 18 ∆f3 ∆e8 19 fxe5 gxf5 20 ∆xf5 ∆e8 21 ∆xe3 b6 22 ∆f4 ∆e2 23 ∆e8+ ∆g8 24 ∆xb6 ∆d6 25 ∆xe4 ∆e1+ 26 ∆xel 27 ∆xf1 28 ∆e4 ∆xc2 29 ∆xc5 b5 30 a5 ∆eb4 31 h3 ∆e3+ 32 ∆e2 ∆e4 33 b3 ∆xax5 0–1

KASPAROV–ANAND, PARIS (BLITZ) 1992

QUEEN'S PAWN OPENING A41

1 ∆f3 d6 2 d4 ∆g4 3 c4 ∆f6 4 h3 ∆h5 5 ∆d3 e6 6 c4 ∆c7 7 ∆c3 ∆c6 8 ∆c3 0–0 9 ∆xh7+ ∆g6 10 0–0 d5 11 cxd5 exd5 12 e5 ∆e4 13 0–0 ∆d7 14 ∆c1 f5 15 ∆xd5 ∆h5 16 ∆f4 ∆xf3 17 ∆e4+ ∆h8 18 ∆xf3 ∆g5 19 ∆h5 ∆e8 20 ∆f1 b4 21 ∆d5 ∆e5 22 ∆xb4 ∆xb4 23 d5 ∆e5 24 a3 ∆ba6 25 ∆b4 ∆e4 26 ∆d2 ∆b8 27 ∆e6 ∆xe7 28 ∆d3 ∆b6 29 ∆xe5 30 ∆f1 a5 31 ∆e3 ∆xb4 32 axb4 ∆a6 33 ∆c3 ∆f1 34 ∆xf4 ∆g6 35 ∆a1 ∆g8 36 ∆g3 ∆h8 37 ∆e4 1–0
KASPAROV--ANAND, LINARES 1993

SLAV DEFENSE D18
1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 d4 cxd4 4 cxd4 g6 5 e4 d6 6 c5 a6 7 cxd6 Qxd6 8 0-0

KASPAROV--ANAND, LINARES 1994

SICILIAN DEFENSE B85
1 e4 c5 2 d4 d6 3 a4 a6 4 a3 a5 5 h3 Qc7 6 c4 e6 7 d4 0-0

ANAND--KASPAROV, NEW YORK (RAPID) 1994

SICILIAN DEFENSE B23
1 e4 c5 2 d4 d6 3 a4 a6 4 a3 a5 5 h3 Qc7 6 c4 e6 7 d4 0-0

KASPAROV--ANAND, NEW YORK (RAPID) 1994

QUEEN'S PAWN OPENING A04
1 e4 c5 2 d4 g6 3 d5 g5 4 e5 c6 5 e6 Nxe4 6 Nxe4 f5 7 Nf3 Nxd5 8 e7

KASPAROV--ANAND, RIGA 1995

EVANS Gambit C51
1 e4 c5 2 d4 d6 3 e5 Nf6 4 Ne4 e5 5 d5 Qd7 6 Qd4 e4 7 Nf3 Nxe5

ANAND--KASPAROV, MOSCOW (RAPID) 1995

SICILIAN DEFENSE B33
1 e4 c5 2 d4 d6 3 d5 cxd5 4 cxd5 Nf6 5 Nc3 d6 6 Nf3 e6 7 Bb5 Ne4 8 Qe2 Nxc3 9 bxc3 Qe7

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KASPAROV–ANAND, MOSCOW (RAPID) 1995
MODERN DEFENSE A41

1 d4 g6 2 e4 g7 3 d4 d6 4 c4 e5 5
6 f3 a6 7 d5 d7 8 c5 c5 9 e2 c6 10 b3 dxe5 11 c3
bxc6 12 g5 d6 13 0-0
b6 14 e4 c5 15 c3 c6 16 c5
bxc5 17 e5 c5 18 0-0 d5 19 e4
a4 20 e5

bxc5 21 d6 22 e2 d8 23 e7 d8 24 d6 ½–½
APPENDIX 2

# PCA Candidates Matches 1994–95

## Quarterfinal Matches
New York, June 1994

<table>
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<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Matches</th>
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<td>Viswanathan Anand</td>
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<td>Oleg Romanishin</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gata Kamsky</td>
<td>4½</td>
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<td>Vladimir Kramnik</td>
<td>1½</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigel Short</td>
<td>4 (2½)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boris Gulko</td>
<td>4 (1½)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael Adams</td>
<td>4 (3/2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergei Tiviakov</td>
<td>4 (2½)</td>
</tr>
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## ROYANISHIN–ANAND, NEW YORK (M1) 1994

**GRUNENFELD DEFENSE D78**

1 d4 Nf6 2 Bf3 g6 3 g3 Ag7 4 c4 d5 5 Ag2 dxc4 6 0–0 c6 7 Ac3 0–0 8 h3 a6 9 e4 b5 10 Af6 2 Ab7 11 Ed1 Ac7 12 Af4 Ac6 13 Ae5 Abd6 14 d5 Ac5 15 Ad4 Bd7 16 b4 cxb3 17 axb3 a5 18 Abc1 Ac8 19 Ae3 Axc3 20 Bxc3 cxd5 21 exd5 b4 22 Ec1 Ac6 23 Wa2 a4 24 bxa4 b3 25 Abd2 Abd6 26 Ac4 Abd6 27 Ag5 Abd6 28 Ac4 Ac6 29 Ag5 ½–½

## ANAND–ROMANISHIN, NEW YORK (M2) 1994

**SPANISH GAME C96**

1 e4 e5 2 Bb5 Ac6 3 Ab5 Ag6 4 Ac6 Ag6 5 0–0 Ac7 6 Ee1 b5 7 Ab3 d6 8 c3 0–0 9 h3 a5 10 Ae2 c5 11 d4 Ab7 12 d5 Ac4 13 b3 Ab6 14 a4 Ae8 15 Ae3 bxa4 16 bxa4 Ac4 17 Ae1 Ag6 18 Ac3 c4 19 Ae2 Ae7 20 f4 Ae6 21 Ab3 cxb3 22 Abd2 Ac7 23 Oxe5 b2 24 Ab1 Axa4 25 Ac4 Ac5 26 Ab4 Abd6 27 As2 a5 28 Ag4 Ae7 29 Asd6 Asd6 30 Ag4 Ae7 21 f4 32 f3 Ae7 33 Ab1 Ag3 34 Ae2 Ac8 35 Ac3 36 Ag5 Ac8 37 Eexb2 Af4 38 As7 Ac5 39 d6 Ac6 40 d7 Ac8 41 Oxd4 Acg3+ 42 Oeg3 Axc3 43 Ae2 Ae4 44 Ag7 Ae4 45 Ae5 Ae5 46 Ec7 Ae4 47 Axb1 Ac7 48 Ac7 Ae7 49 Axb1 Aaa8 50 Ae2 Ac6 51 Ae6 Ae6 52 Acf1 Ae8 53 Ab4 Ae7 54 f5 Ac5+ 55 Ae1 f6 56 Ac7 Ae7 57 Ae7 Ae7 58 Axex5 Axe5 59 Ae3 Afd8 60 Ad1 Aa7 61 Abg3 Aa4 62 Abd6 1–0
ROMANISHIN–ANAND, NEW YORK (M/3) 1994
GRUENFELD DEFENSE D78
1 d4 Ɇf6 2 Ɇf3 Ɇf6 3 Ɇg5 Ɇg7 4 Ɇc3 Ɇc6 5 Ɇc4 dxc5 0–0–0 6 Ɇc3 0–0 8 Ɇh3 Ɇb5
9 Ɇc5 a6 10 e4 Ɇb7 11 Ɇe1 Ɇbd7 12 Ɇxd7 Ɇxd7 13 Ɇc5 e4 14 Ɇe4 c5 15 Ɇf6+
Ɇxf6 16 Ɇxb7 Ɇa7 17 Ɇg2 Ɇg7 18 a4 Ɇc7 19 Ɇxb5 Ɇxb5 20 Ɇa8 Ɇe8 21 Ɇxe8
Ɇxe8 22 Ɇf4 Ɇd4 23 Ɇxd4 Ɇe5 24 Ɇd6 Ɇd8 25 Ɇa1 Ɇd8 26 Ɇe8 Ɇd6 27 Ɇxd6 Ɇxg4
28 Ɇxe8 Ɇxe8 29 Ɇa8 Ɇa8 30 Ɇc6 Ɇb4 31 Ɇb5 c3 32 Ɇxc3 33 Ɇd3 Ɇxc3 34 Ɇg2 f5 35 Ɇf3 Ɇxb4 36 Ɇc4 b2 37 Ɇa2 Ɇxh6 38 Ɇe3 Ɇg7 39 Ɇb1 Ɇh6
[Forfeit] 0–1

ANAND–ROMANISHIN, NEW YORK (h4) 1994
SPANISH GAME C96
1 e4 e5 2 Ɇf3 Ɇc6 3 Ɇb5 a6 4 Ɇa4 Ɇf6 5 0–0 Ɇc7 6 Ɇe1 b5 7 Ɇb3 d6 8 Ɇc3
0–0 9 Ɇh3 Ɇa5 10 Ɇc2 c5 11 d4 Ɇb7 12 Ɇd5 Ɇc4 13 Ɇb3 Ɇb4 14 Ɇa4 Ɇc5 15 Ɇe3
Ɇxa6 16 Ɇbxa4 17 Ɇc4 Ɇc2 18 Ɇd2 Ɇf7 19 c4 Ɇa7 20 Ɇa2 g6 21 Ɇb2 Ɇh5
22 Ɇd3 Ɇd8 23 Ɇc3 f6 24 Ɇf1 Ɇg7 25 Ɇc2 Ɇf7 26 Ɇb1 Ɇxbl 27 Ɇxb1 Ɇb7 28
Ɇb2 Ɇxb2 29 Ɇxb2 Ɇh7 30 Ɇc2 Ɇf4 31 Ɇh2 Ɇd7 32 Ɇe1 Ɇe8 1/2–1/2

ANAND–ROMANISHIN, NEW YORK (M/5) 1994
GRUENFELD DEFENSE E60
1 d4 Ɇf6 2 Ɇf3 g6 3 Ɇg5 Ɇg7 4 Ɇg3 d5 5 exd5 Ɇxd5 6 Ɇg2 Ɇb6 7 e4 0–0 8 0–0
Ɇg4 9 d5 Ɇd7 10 Ɇc3 c6 11 Ɇa4 cxd5 12 Ɇxd5 Ɇa6 13 a5 Ɇxc4 14 Ɇb3 Ɇe8 15
Ɇe1 Ɇe8 16 Ɇg5 Ɇe5 17 Ɇa4 Ɇf5 18 Ɇe4 Ɇc4 19 Ɇac3 Ɇd6 20 Ɇe3 Ɇxe4 21
Ɇxe4 Ɇxe4 22 Ɇxe4 1/2–1/2

ANAND–ROMANISHIN, NEW YORK (M/6) 1994
SPANISH GAME C90
1 e4 e5 2 Ɇf3 Ɇc6 3 Ɇb5 a6 4 Ɇa4 Ɇf6 5 0–0 Ɇc7 6 Ɇe1 b5 7 Ɇb3 d6 8 Ɇc3
Ɇg4 9 d3 Ɇa5 10 Ɇc2 c5 11 h3 Ɇd7 12 d4 Ɇc7 13 Ɇbd2 Ɇxd4 14 Ɇxd4 Ɇe8 15
Ɇe1 0–0 16 Ɇf1 Ɇd6 17 Ɇd3 Ɇf4 18 Ɇxf4 Ɇxf4 19 Ɇa1 Ɇd8 20 Ɇf6 21 Ɇd2
Ɇg7 22 Ɇc1 Ɇb6 23 b4 Ɇxc1 24 Ɇxc1 Ɇb7 25 Ɇb1 Ɇe8 26 Ɇc1 Ɇc7 27 Ɇg4
Ɇd8 28 Ɇe3 Ɇwb8 29 Ɇxe7 Ɇxc7 30 Ɇb3 f6 31 Ɇd1 Ɇf7 32 Ɇa3 Ɇc2 33 Ɇc3
Ɇg5 34 Ɇxg5 Ɇxd2 35 Ɇf3 Ɇwc2 36 Ɇe1 Ɇwd2 37 Ɇf3 1/2–1/2

ROMANISHIN–ANAND, NEW YORK (M/7) 1994
GRUENFELD DEFENSE D72
1 d4 Ɇf6 2 c4 g6 3 Ɇg3 Ɇg7 4 Ɇc4 Ɇg2 d5 5 Ɇxd5 Ɇxd5 6 Ɇc4 Ɇb6 7 Ɇe2 Ɇe8 8 Ɇd5
0–0 9 Ɇc6 10 Ɇb3 Ɇc6 11 exd5 Ɇc6 12 Ɇe4 Ɇe4 13 Ɇd4 Ɇc5 14 Ɇb3
Ɇe6 15 Ɇc5 Ɇd7 16 Ɇd2 Ɇc5 17 Ɇa3 Ɇe4 18 Ɇd4 a5 19 Ɇe4 Ɇg4 20 Ɇe3 Ɇf6
21 Ɇe5 Ɇd6 22 Ɇe7 Ɇd5 23 Ɇf6 Ɇxf6 24 Ɇb5 Ɇa5 25 Ɇf5 Ɇb6 26 Ɇe6 Ɇc8 27
Ɇe5 Ɇd7 28 Ɇe1 Ɇb4 29 Ɇf4 Ɇc3 30 Ɇg4 Ɇd5 31 Ɇe2 Ɇe5 32 Ɇcb1 Ɇg5 33
Ɇd4 Ɇf4 34 Ɇe3 Ɇe4 35 Ɇd4 Ɇe5 36 Ɇe3 Ɇb4 37 Ɇc3 Ɇf5 38 Ɇd5 Ɇd5 39
Ɇe5 Ɇd7 40 Ɇa4 Ɇe2 41 Ɇf4 Ɇe4 42 Ɇd4 Ɇc1 43 Ɇf3 Ɇxb4 44 Ɇd3 Ɇc5 45
Ɇe7 46 Ɇe5 Ɇd7 47 Ɇe7 48 Ɇe2 Ɇd2 49 Ɇe6 Ɇe6 50 Ɇc5 a5
51 Ɇba4 52 Ɇg2 Ɇc5 53 Ɇe4 Ɇe7 54 Ɇc4 Ɇh6 55 Ɇe4 Ɇc4 56 Ɇc4 Ɇc6 57 Ɇd4
Ɇd5 58 Ɇd6 Ɇf8 59 Ɇc3 60 Ɇxe5 61 Ɇc5 62 Ɇf3 63 Ɇe4 64 Ɇh5 65 Ɇuxh5
Ɇh2 66 Ɇe4 67 Ɇe3 68 Ɇe4 69 Ɇe3 70 Ɇd4 71 Ɇe2 Ɇxe2 72 Ɇxh2 73 Ɇh5 74 Ɇe2
Ɇxc5 75 Ɇxc5 Ɇxh8 76 Ɇxb5 77 Ɇd5 78 Ɇc7 79 Ɇh5 80 Ɇf6 81 Ɇg5 82
Ɇg4 83 Ɇd4 84 Ɇb7 0–1

KAMSKY–KRAMNIK, NEW YORK (M/1) 1994
SLAV DEFENSE D44
1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 Ɇc3 Ɇf6 4 Ɇf3 e6 5 Ɇg5 Ɇxg4 6 Ɇe4 dxc5 7 Ɇb5 e5 8 Ɇa4 g5
Ɇxg5 hxg5 10 Ɇgb7 11 Ɇe6 Ɇb7 12 g3 c5 13 Ɇd5 Ɇb6 14 Ɇg2 0–0–0 15 0–0

180
Kramnik-Kamsky, New York (M2) 1994

**Openings**

- **English Opening A17**
- **Slav Defense D43**
- **Kaminsky-Kramnik, New York (M3) 1994**
- **English Opening A35**
- **Slav Defense D31**
- **Kaminsky-Kramnik, New York (M5) 1994**
- **English Opening A31**

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**Appendix 2**

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SHORT–GULKO, NEW YORK (M/1) 1994
CARO-KANN DEFENSE B17
1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 c4 c6 4 c3 dxe4 5 dx4 d7 5 Qf3 g6 6 Qg5 dxe6 7 Qc4
8 f3 8 f6 9 h3 c6 10 c3 0–0 11 Bh2 e5 12 Bf4 Qc4 13 Bd1 Bf3 14 Bb3
Bb6 15 Bc5 Bc5 16 Qe2 Bd8 17 Bd1 c7 18 b3 Bxb2 19 Bxd2 a6 20 g3 h6
21 Qe5 Qd8 22 Qxd8 Qxd8 23 Bf1 Qa5 24 Qf6 Qf6 25 Qxh7 Qxc3 26
Qxh6 Qd4 27 Qg2 Qd2 28 Qa8+ Qh7 29 Qb3 Qg8 30 a4 g6 31 Ab5 Qc3 32
Qxc3 Qxc3 33 Bf3 Bf8 34 Qe4 Qe7 35 Qe2 f5 36 Qf3 Qe1 37 f3 Qg4 38 Qg4 h5
39 Qh4 hxg4 40 hxg4 Qd6 41 b4 g5 42 Qe3 Qd2 43 Qf1 Qf1 44 a5 Qe2 45 Qf5
Qc7 46 Qxe6 Qe1 47 Qf7 Qd2 48 Qe8 Qc1 49 Qa4 Qd6 50 b5 Qc5 51 b6 Qd2
52 b7 Qf4 53 Qh3 Qh8 54 Qc3 Qd6 55 Qa5 Qc7 56 a6 1/2–1/2

GULKO–SHORT, NEW YORK (M/2) 1994
ENGLISH OPENING A29
1 c4 e5 2 d4 Qf6 3 Nf3 Qc6 4 g3 d5 5 cxd5 Qe6 6 Qg2 Qb6 7 0–0 Qe7 8
a3 0–0 9 b4 Qe8 10 a3 Qe8 11 Qb2 c5 12 b5 Qd4 13 Qd2 Qd2 14 c3 Qc6 15 Qf3
Qe5 16 Qe5 Qxe5 17 d4 Qg5 18 dxe5 Qxd1 19 Qxd1 Qxc5 20 Qd8 f6 21 Qfd1
Qf7 22 Qe4 Qc4 23 Qd5 1–0

GULKO–SHORT, NEW YORK (M/3) 1993
CARO-KANN DEFENSE B17
1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 c4 c6 4 Qe4 Qd7 5 Qc4 Qg6 6 Qg5 e6 7 Qe2 Qb6 8
Ab3 h6 9 Qh5 Qe5 10 Qc5 11 a3 Qc7 12 Qd3 Qd7 13 0–0 Qd6 14 dxc5 Qxc5 15
Qc6 16 Qd4 Qg4 17 Qd2 Qf6 18 Qh1 0–0 19 Qxf6 exf6 20 Qg4+ Qh7 21
Qe4 f5 22 Qe6+ Qh8 23 Qh4 Qg7 24 Qad1 Qe5 25 Qh5+ Qh7 26 f4 Qh8 27
Qg5+ 1–0

GULKO–SHORT, NEW YORK (M/4) 1994
NIMZOINDIAN DEFENSE E54
1 c4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 exd5 Qxd5 4 d4 Qf6 5 Qc3 e6 6 Qf3 Qb4 7 Qd3 Qxc4 8
Qxc4 0–0 9 g3 Qe8 10 b4 Qc6 11 Qf4 Qe6 12 Qd4 Qe4 13 a4 Qc5 14 Qd3 Qd6
15 Qe3 Qb6 16 Qa1 0–0 17 Qh4 Qe5 18 Qf1 Qc6 19 Qe5 Qd5 20 Qe6 Qc6 21
Qf4 22 Qa5 23 Qd6 Qc7 24 Qf3 Qf5 25 Qd3 Qd7 26 Qf1 Qd6 27 Qd2
Qf7 28 Qf7 Qh8 29 Qd2 Qd2 30 Qa5 Qc6 31 Qc2 Qxd6 32 Qc3 Qc6 33
Qg4 Qd4 34 Qa1 1/2–1/2

SHORT–GULKO, NEW YORK (M/5) 1994
CARO-KANN DEFENSE B17
1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 Qc3 Qxc4 4 Qe4 Qd7 5 Qc4 Qg6 6 Qg5 Qe6 7 Qc7 8
Bb6 8 Qh3 9 Qf5 a5 10 c5 11 a3 Qc7 12 Qd3 Qd7 13 0–0 Qd4 14 Qf4 Qd5 15
Qxd6 Qxd6 16 Qad1 0–0 17 Qxd4 Qc5 18 Qf1 Qc6 19 Qe5 Qd5 20 Qf4 Qc6 21
Qh3 a4 22 Qa3 Qc5 23 Qd6 Qe7 24 Qb4 Qc5 25 Qd3 Qd7 26 Qf1 Qd6 27 Qd2
Qe8 28 Qe4 Qf7 29 Qh2 Qb6 30 Qe5 Qc7 31 Qd1 Qd4 32 Qxd4 Qe8 33 Qf6
Qe7 34 Qxe7 Qxc6 35 Qd4 Qf8 36 Qd3 Qd7 37 Qd7+ Qxb7 38 Qxb7 Qd7
39 Qc5 Qxe4 40 Qe5 Qd5 41 g3 b6 42 Qxb6 Qxb6 43 Qf2 Qf7 44 Qc3 f6 45 Qd3
Qd6 46 Qd4 Qg6 47 Qd1 Qe8 48 Qh4 Qc6 49 b3 1/2–1/2

GULKO–SHORT, NEW YORK (M/6) 1994
SLAV DEFENSE D10
1 c4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 Qd5 Qxd5 4 Qf4 Qc6 5 e3 Qf6 6 Qc3 a6 7 Qd3 Qg4 8
Qge2 e6 9 f3 1/2–1/2
Short–Gulko, New York (m/7) 1994
CARO-KANN DEFENSE
1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 dxe4 4 dxe4 Qd7 5 Ac4 Qg6 6 Qg5 e6 7 We2 Qb6 8 Ab3 h6 9 Qf3 a5 10 c3 e5 11 a3 Wc7 12 Ah3 Qd7 13 0–0 cxd4 14 Axf4 Qd6 15 Axd6 Wxd6 16 ffd1 0–0 17 Wxd4 Wc5 18 Wd4 Wb5 19 Wxb5 Axb5 20 Wc1 Wbd7 21 Wd1 We6 22 Wd4 Qe5 23 Axc2 Aec 24 Ac1 Wxe4 25 f3 Wf6 26 Wd3 Qxd3 27 Wxd3 Qfd8 28 We5 Wd5 29 Wxd5 Qb5 a4 31 Wd4 Qfe8 32 Aec2 Wf7 33 Wf2 Qec3 34 g3 f5 35 Aef3 h5 36 c4 Qf6 37 Wd6 Qd7 38 Wec3 Wc8 39 Ah4 Qe5 40 c5 Qxf3 41 Wb6 Qe5 42 Wxb7+ Wg6 43 Wxh4 Wf4 44 gxh4 gxh4 45 b4 f3 46 We6 Qg6 47 Wb3 Qg4 48 Wh8 Wg7 49 Wb7+ Wf6 50 Wh8 Wg7 51 Wb7 1/2–1/2

Gulko–Short, New York (m/8) 1994
SLAV DEFENSE D10
1 c4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 Wf6 4 e3 a6 5 Qf3 b5 6 b3 Qg4 7 We2 e6 8 Qe5 Axc6 9 Wd3 Axd3 10 Qxd3 Qe7 11 Qe3 Qd7 12 0–0 0–0 13 Qe2 Qe8 14 Qf4 Qf8 15 g3 Qg6 16 Qf5 f6 17 Qxf6 18 Aed1 Qf8 19 Wge2 Qf7 20 Qf4 Qd4+ 21 Axd4 Wf6 22 Wf1 Qd7 23 h4 Wxe8 24 Qe2 Wd4 25 Qxd4 e5 26 Qxe5 Qxe5 27 b4 Qd4 28 Qxe8 Qxe8 29 Wf3 Qd8 30 Wc1 a6 31 Qe5 h6 32 Wb2 Qf7 33 f4 Wf8 34 Qh3 Qf7 35 We6 Qf8 36 Qxh4 Qg7 37 g5 Qxh5 38 Qh4 Qf6 39 Wxf5+ Wg6 40 Wxe4 Wf7 41 WHh4 Qf3+ 42 Wxf3 Wxf3 43 Wh4 Qf4 44 Wxf3 Qg6 45 We5+ Qh6 46 Wh6 Qf6 47 Wg1 Qg7 48 Wf7 Wh6 49 Wxe4 Qf7 50 Wf5 Qg8 51 Wg5 Qxh5 52 Wh5 Qxg5 53 We8 Qg1 54 Wf7 Wxf7 55 Wh4 Wf4 56 Wf4 We4 57 Wh4 Wg6 58 Wf6 Wxf6 59 Wh7 Wf7 60 Wh7 We7 61 Wf6 Wh7 62 Wh6 We7 63 Wh5+ Wh8 64 Wf3+ Wh7 65 Wh6+ Qxg7 66 Wh6+ Qg8 1/2–1/2

Gulko–Short, New York (m/10) 1994
SLAV DEFENSE D10
1 c4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 Wf6 4 e3 a6 5 Qf3 b5 6 b3 Qg4 7 We2 e6 8 Qe5 Qf5 9 Axf3 Qe7 10 0–0 0–0 11 Wc2 Qbd7 12 Aa4 Wc8 13 Wxb5 a5 14 c5 e5 15 Aed2 Wc7 16 Qc2 Wd7 17 Qa4 Wd4 18 Axf4 Wxe8 19 Aec1 Qf8 20 Wb2 Qb7 21 Whb1 Wxa8 22 Wc1 Qeb 23 Qae2 Wh8 24 Wxa2 Qxe2 25 Wha4 Wc8 26 We3 g3 27 Wh2 Qd8 28 Wd2 Wh7 29 Axb3 30 Acd2 Qb8 31 Qf4 Qa6 32 Wxa6 Qxa6 33 Qf5 Qg4 34 g4 Qg5 35 Wf4 h5 36 Qe2 Qd8 37 Qd2 Qg7 38 Wc1 Qf5 39 Wh3 Wf6 40 Qh4 Qe8 41 h5 1/2–1/2

Short–Gulko, New York (m/11) 1994
CARO-KANN DEFENSE B12
1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 Wf5 4 Qe3 e5 5 Qf3 b5 6 b3 Qg4 7 We2 e6 8 Qe5 Aeb6 9 Ac3 Wxd3 10 Axd3 Qe7 11 Qd4 cxd4 12 cxd4 Qe7 13 0–0 Qf5 14 b4 f5 15 Wxf4 Qxf4 16 h4 Qg5 17 Wh2 WH6 18 Qf1 Qf7 19 Aed5 g5 20 Wc1 Wc8 21 Wg1 Wxh4 22 Wxh4 Qf7 23 Ac5 Qe6 24 Qc6+ Wh6 25 Wxb6 Wxb6 26 Wd4 Qd7 27 Qh6 Wxf6 28 Qg5 Wh6 29 Wf5 We8 30 Wh6 Qf6 31 Qd3 Qf4 32 Wh4 Wb8 33 h5 Qg8 34 Qh6 Wh7 35 Qf6 Qxf5 36 Wh5+ Wg7 37 Qf4 Qd6 38 Qh7 Wh5 39 Wh3 Qf5 40 Qe7 Qe5 41 Whx6 Wf4 42 Qe3 Wxe3+ 43 Qf4 WHh7 44 Qh4+ 45 We2 Qc5 46 Wxh6 Wxh6 47 Qf6 Qb7 48 Wh5 Qa3 49 Qb5 Wd3 50 Wh2 Whx6 51 Wxf6+ Qxf6 52 Wh5 Qf4 53 Wh3 Qa3 54 Qc5 Qd6 55 Qf1 56 Wf6 Qf6 57 Wef4 Qc6 58 Qf5 Qc5 59 Qh5 Qg2 60 Qf6 Wg1 61 Qe2 Wf1 62 Wh6 Wgl+ 63 Wh7 Wh6 64 Wf4 Wf6 65 Whx6 Wf8 66 Wg2 Wh7 67 Wxf7 We8 68 Wf5 Qc7 69 Wf6 70 We1+ 70 Qc6 1–0
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GULKO–SHORT, NEW YORK (m/12) 1994
QUEEN’S GAMBIT DECLINED D35
1 c4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 dxc4 4 cxd5 exd5 5 Ag5 c6 6 e3 f6 7 3f3 Ag6 8
3x6 fxe6 9 3x6 gx6 10 3d2 9d7 11 3d3 8b6 12 b3 3a3 13 Ag2 3d7 14
3g3 9c8 15 h4 8d6 16 3h5 3xd3 17 3x3 3b2 18 6ab1 3xc3 19 3xe3 8h8 20
3f3 a5 21 a4 4 f2 22 3h2 4e3 23 3xe4 3xe4+ 24 6f2 5 25 6f3 8e6 26 6fl 3g3 27
fxe4 28 8f4 3ag8 29 8f2 6h6 ½-½

TIVIAKOV–ADAMS, NEW YORK (m/1) 1994
CARO–KANN DEFENSE B17
1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 3d2 dxe4 4 3xe4 3d7 5 3f3 3g6 6 3g3 3e7 7 3ad3 3c5 8 0–0
3xd4 9 3xd4 3e5 10 3b3 3e7 11 3c1 0–0 12 3f3 3c5 13 a4 3b6 14 3d2 3bd5
15 3b5 3d7 16 4 c4 3xb5 17 axb5 3b4 18 3xb7 3c2 19 6axa5 3e1 20 6xa8
3xa8 21 6xa8 3xa8 22 3xe1 3a4 23 c5 3e4 24 6c6 3d5 25 3f1 3f8 26 3g3
3xe3 27 6xe3 3e8 28 3e3 29 3f2 3h6 30 3f3 3d8 31 3xg7 3h4 32 3d4
3d4 33 3xd4 3xb5 34 3xe4 3e7 35 3xc3 3xc6 36 3g3 3d6 37 3d3 3f5 38 3f4
3f2 39 3e5+ 3f6 40 g4 f5+ 41 6g5 4xf5+ 42 3f4 3xb2 43 3g3 3h5 44 3e4
4b4 45 3f6 3xf6 46 3f4 3e4 47 3h6 3e2 48 3xe6 3h4 39 3f4 40 3g2 50 3f3
3g6 51 3g5 52 3f4 3d5 53 3e1 3g4+ 54 3f3 3f6 55 3g3 3f5 56 3d8 6h4
57 3h2 h3 58 3g3 8g6 59 3f2 3f4 0–1

ADAMS–TIVIAKOV, NEW YORK (m/2) 1994
SICILIAN DEFENSE B51
1 e4 c5 2 3d3 d6 3 3b5+ 3c6 4 0–0 3g4 5 h3 3h5 6 3c6 7 3d3 a6 8
4a4 3c7 9 d4 b5 10 3xb5 axb5 11 3xb5 0–0 12 b4 3f3 13 3g3 3b8 14 3a4
c4 15 d5 3f6 16 3e3 3d7 17 3c6 e6 18 b5 exd5 19 exd5 3d6 20 3b4 3e7 21
a4 3f6 22 a5 3e6 23 3xc6 3xh5 24 3c5 3e8 25 3b6 1–0

TIVIAKOV–ADAMS, NEW YORK (m/3) 1994
CARO–KANN DEFENSE B17
1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 3d2 dxe4 4 3xe4 3d7 5 3c4 3g6 6 3g3 3e7 7 3d3
3f5 8 3e2 c6 9 3g5 3e7 10 0–0 3g4 11 3h1 0–0 12 h3 3xf3 13 3xf3 6b5
14 3d3 3d5 15 3e3 3e8 16 3g4 3f8 17 3f4 3f6 18 f5 h6 19 3h4 3xf4 20 3g7+
3xg7 21 3xg7+ 3f8 22 3h6+ 3e8 23 3xh6+ 3f8 24 exf7+ 3e7 25 3g6 3d5 26 3c3
3d5 27 3h1+ 3e5 28 3f5 1–0

ADAMS–TIVIAKOV, NEW YORK (m/4) 1994
QUEEN'S INDIAN DEFENSE E18
1 d4 3f6 2 3f3 e6 3 c4 b6 4 g3 3b7 5 3g2 3e7 6 3c6 3c0–0 7 0–0 3e4 8 3d2
3f5 9 d5 3f6 10 3c2 3xc3 11 3xc3 exd5 12 cxd5 3xd5 13 3d1 3c6 14 3b4 6d6
3h4 3a6 16 3a3 3g5 17 3xe4 3xe4 18 3xd6 3xf7 19 3g2 3h6 20 3f4 21 3e1
3c7 22 3w3 3w5 23 4a4 3e6 24 3b4 3a8 25 3b5 26 3xb7 3e7 27 3w2 3ac8
3b6 3e8 29 3b1 3g7 30 3c6 3d5 31 3d6 3c4 32 3c6 3d5 33 3d6 3c4 34
3xb6 3f4 35 3e3 3e2+ 36 3h1 3d3 37 3a1 3xh5 38 3xh5 3xh5 39 3xa7
3xa7 40 3xa7 3a8 41 3d5 3xa7 42 3xg5+ 3f7 43 3d3 3a1+ 44 3g2 0–1

TIVIAKOV–ADAMS, NEW YORK (m/5) 1994
SPANISH GAME C86
1 e4 e5 2 3f3 3c6 3 3b5 a6 4 3a4 3f6 5 0–0 3c7 6 3xc6 5 3e5 7 3c6 6 3e3
3xc6 9 3a3 3e7 10 3d3 0–0 11 0–0 6b6 12 3e2 3b7 13 3d1 3d8 14 3g5 6g6
15 3c4 3f6 16 3e1 3d5 17 3xd5 exd5 18 3w2 f6 19 3x4 3e7 20 3d2 f6 21
ADAMS–TIVIAKOV, NEW YORK (m/12) 1994
SIKILLIAN DEFENSE B52
1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 Ab5+ Ad7 4 Adx7+ Adx7 5 0–0 Agf6 6 Aes2 e6 7 b3
Ad7 8 Ab2 0–0 9 c4 a6 10 d4 cd4 11 Ag4 Ab6 12 Ac2 Aac8 13 Agc3 Aes8 14
Af1 Ac5 15 Axc1 Ag5 16 Axh5 Aes5 17 g3 Ab5 18 Agd1 Aed8 19 Ac4 Axf8
20 Ac b7 21 Aa3 Aex8 22 Aes3 Aed8 23 Aex2 Ac5 24 Ab4 b6 25 h4 Agf6 26 Ac3
Aed7 27 Ab2 Ac5 28 gf Ac7 29 g5 Ac5 30 Ac2 Ac6 31 Ad2 b5 32 Axb5 Axb5
33 Axd4 Axd4 34 Ad4 Aa8 35 Ac2 Aec8 36 Acd1 Aec8 37 Ac1 Aa6 38 Ac3
Aa7 39 Ac1 Ag8 40 Ac4 Ac5 41 Ad4 Aha7 42 Add2 Aa6 43 Acf2 Ad8 ½–½

TIIVIAKOV–ADAMS, NEW YORK (m/13) 1994
SPANISH GAME C85
1 e4 e5 2 Asf d6 3 Ad5 a6 4 Aa4 Bf6 5 0–0 Ac6 6 Acx6 dxc6 7 Ag4 Ag4
8 h3 Agf3 9 Wd3 0–0 10 d3 Ac7 11 Af3 Ac3 12 Agf4 Ac3 13 Ac5 Ac3
14 Ad4 Ac6 15 Ac5 Ac5 16 Agx5 Aes5 17 Aex5 Ag5 18 Acf1 Agf1 19 Aec4
Hd8 20 Acg1 Agf7 21 Ag5 Ac5 22 Ag5 Ag5 23 Ac3 Ac3 24 Ab3 Ac3
25 Agg4 Acg4 26 Acg4 Aeg5 27 Acf3 Ag5 28 Ad4 Ag5 29 f3 Aes5 30 Ac1
Aed3 31 Aexd3 Axa2 32 Aexd3 Aed3 33 Aed3 Aed3 34 Acg5 Aeg7 35 Axd2
Aeg7 36 Aa4 Ac6 37 Ac4 Ac5 38 Acg1 Acg1 39 Ag7 Aeg7 40 Aexe5 Ag4
41 Aexf6 h5 42 Ac1 Aglx e4+ Aeg5 Ac5 44 Aexb7 Aa8 45 Aa6 Agf7 46 Agf7
Aa6 47 Ac8 Adg5 48 Acg4 Ag4 49 Axf8 Ad6 50 Axf6 Ag8 51 Ac4 Ag4
52 Ac1 Aexe5+ 53 Ac1 Aa4 54 Aa1 h5 55 Aa4 Axf7 56 Acf5 57 Ac5 Agx5
58 Aa5 Aa5 59 Ad4 Axd4 60 Aa6 Aa6 61 Acf5 Ac5+ 62 Agx1 Aa1 63 Ac5 Agc3
64 Aa4 Ag4 65 Aa4 Aa4 66 Aa4 Aa4 67 Aa4 Aa4 68 Aa4 Aa4 69 Ag3 Aa3
70 Aa3 Aa3 71 Aa3 Aa3 72 Aa3 Aa3 73 Aa3 Aa3 74 Aa3 Aa3 75 Aa3 Aa3
76 Aa3 Aa3 77 Aa3 Aa3 78 Aa3 Aa3 79 Aa3 Aa3 80 Aa3 Aa3 81 Aa3 Aa3
82 Aa3 Aa3 83 Aa3 Aa3 84 Aa3 Aa3 85 Aa3 Aa3 86 Aa3 Aa3 87 Aa3 Aa3
88 Aa3 Aa3 89 Aa3 Aa3 90 Aa3 Aa3 91 Aa3 Aa3 92 Aa3 Aa3 [105 moves] 1–0

ADAMS–TIVIAKOV, NEW YORK (m/14) 1994
SIKILLIAN DEFENSE B22
1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 Aa4 e5 4 Aa5 Ac6 5 Ac4 Ac6 6 Ac2 d6 7 exd6 e6 8 d4
Axd6 9 0–0 0–0 10 Ab3 g6 11 dxe5 Aexe5 12 Ac2 Ac7 13 Aa6 Aa5 14 Ac4
Ac7 15 Ac4 Aa4 16 Aa4 Aa4 17 Aa6 Ac7 18 Ac7 Agf6 19 Aa6 Aa6 20 Acx6
Axb6 21 Axb6 Axb6 22 Axc1 Ac6 23 Ad5 Ag7 24 Agb1 Ac5 25 Axc5 Axc5 26 Axc5
Axe5 27 Aexe5 f6 28 Ac5 Aa5 29 Ad6 Ae5 30 Ac5 31 Ac5 32 Ac5 33 Ac5
Aa5 34 Ac5 Ad5 35 Agd2 Aa8 36 Ac3 h5 37 Ac3 Ac3 38 Ac3 Ac3 39 Ac3
Ac3 40 Ac3 Ac3 41 Ac3 Ac3 42 Ac3 Ac3 43 Ac3 Ac3 44 Ac3 Ac3 45 Ac3 Ac3
46 Ac3 Ac3 47 Ac3 Ac3 48 Ac3 Ac3 49 Ac3 Ac3 50 Ac3 Ac3 51 Ac3 Ac3
52 Ac3 Ac3 53 Ac3 Ac3 54 Ac3 Ac3 55 Ac3 Ac3 56 Ac3 Ac3 57 Ac3 Ac3
58 Ac3 Ac3 59 Ac3 Ac3 60 Ac3 Ac3 61 Ac3 Ac3 62 Ac3 Ac3 63 Ac3 Ac3
64 Ac3 Ac3 65 Ac3 Ac3 66 Ac3 Ac3 67 Ac3 Ac3 68 Ac3 Ac3 69 Ac3 Ac3
70 Ac3 Ac3 71 Ac3 Ac3 72 Ac3 Ac3 73 Ac3 Ac3 74 Ac3 Ac3 75 Ac3 Ac3
76 Ac3 Ac3 77 Ac3 Ac3 78 Ac3 Ac3 79 Ac3 Ac3 80 Ac3 Ac3 81 Ac3 Ac3
82 Ac3 Ac3 83 Ac3 Ac3 84 Ac3 Ac3 85 Ac3 Ac3 86 Ac3 Ac3 87 Ac3 Ac3
88 Ac3 Ac3 89 Ac3 Ac3 90 Ac3 Ac3 91 Ac3 Ac3 92 Ac3 Ac3 [105 moves] 1–0

Semifinal Matches
Linares, September 1994
Viswanathan Anand 5½
Michael Adams 1½
Gata Kamsky 5½
Nigel Short 1½

ANAND–ADAMS, LINARES (m/1) 1994
ALEKHINE'S DEFENSE B04
1 e4 Agf6 2 c5 dxc5 3 d4 Ac5 4 Aa4 Aa5 5 Agc5 Axc5 6 Aa5 Aa5 7 Ag5 8 Ag5
Ac5 9 Ac5 Ag7 10 Ac5 Ac5 11 Ac5 Ac5 12 Ac5 Ac5 13 Ac5 Ac5 14 Ac5 Ac5 15
Appendix 2

ANAND–ADAMS, Linares (M/2) 1994

SPANISH GAME C80

1 e4 e5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 d5 4 exd5 cxd5 5 e5 e4 6 d4

ANAND–ADAMS, Linares (M/3) 1994

SPANISH GAME C92

1 e4 e5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 d5 4 exd5 cxd5 5 e5 e4 6 d4

ANAND–ADAMS, Linares (M/4) 1994

VIENNA GAMBIT C29

1 e4 e5 2 d3 d6 3 f4 d5 4 exf5 c5 e4 5 e3

ANAND–ADAMS, Linares (M/5) 1994

CARO-KANN DEFENSE B19

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 d3 dxe4 4 dxe4 c5 5 d4 c6 6 d3 d7 7 h4 h6 8 h5

ANAND–ADAMS, Linares (M/6) 1994

CENTER GAME C22

1 e4 e5 2 d4 exd4 3 dxe4 4 dxe4 d6 5 d2 6 b7 7 d7 exd7

SIICILIAN DEFENSE B52

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d5 e5 4 dxe5 d4 5 dxe4 6 d5 e5 7 dxe5

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KAMSKY–SHORT, LINARES (M/1) 1994
QUEEN'S GAMBIT ACCEPTED D20
1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e4 c5 4 f3 Ab4+ 5 c3 exd4 6 cxd4 Qe7 7 Qc4 Qc6 8 Qe3 0–0 9 a3 Qx3+ 10 bxc3 Qa5 11 Qe2 b6 12 0–0 Qb7 13 Qc2 Qe8 14 Rad1 Qd8 15 Qf4 Qg6 16 Qxc7 Qxe7 17 Qh2 Qxd4 18 exd4 Qxg2 19 Qxg2 Qxc6+ 20 d5 Qxc7 21 d6 Qb7+ 22 f3 Qe8 23 Qh1 Qf8 24 Qg1 Qe6 25 Qb5 Qb8 26 Qd6 Qd7 27 Qf4 Qc5 28 Qg5 a6 29 Qf1 Qab7 30 Qf3 Qe8 31 Qe5 Qf8 32 Qe7 Qd8 33 Qf6 Qc6 34 Qe3 Qd8 35 Qxd8 Qxd8 36 d7 Qf8 37 Qd6 Qa5 38 Qxb6 Qd7 39 Qxd7 Qd6 40 Qd5 Qf3 41 Qe4 Qe7 42 Qc6 Qc6 43 Qa2 Qb8 44 Qc7 Qd8 45 Qxd7+ 1–0

SHORT–KAMSKY, LINARES (M/2) 1994
SICILIAN DEFENSE B35
1 e4 c5 2 Qf3 g6 3 d4 Qxd4 4 Qxd4 Qc6 5 Qc3 Qg7 6 Qe2 Qf6 6 Qc4 Qg5 8 0–0 0–0 9 Qb3 d6 10 h3 Qh5 11 f4 Qd7 12 Qd3 b5 13 Qac1 Q5 14 a4 b4 15 Qxc6 Qxc6 16 Qxa4 Qxb4 17 Qd5 Qxd5 18 exd5 Qd7 19 Qf2 Qe8 20 Qb1 Qf5 21 Qd2 Qa4 22 Qg7 Qd4 23 Qc4 Qe8 24 Qd3 Qa5 25 Qe1 Qb5 26 Qa5 Qc7 27 Qxc7 Qxe2 28 Qa3 Qxa3 29 Qb2 Qf3 30 Qf4 Qxe4 33 Qxe4 f5 34 Qe2 Qf7 35 Qg2 Qc4 36 Qc3 Qd4 37 Qxf5 Qxf5 38 Qf2 Qxe3 39 Qxe3 Qc3 40 Qd4 Qf1 41 Qd5 Qh5 42 Qh4 Qc4 43 Qf3 Qf1 45 Qb4 Qg1 46 Qb5 Qg3 47 Qh2 Qe3 48 Qxe6 Qa3 49 Qd7 Qa7 50 Qd8 Qh1 51 Qh2 Qa+ 52 Qd7 Qh8 0–1

KAMSKY–SHORT, LINARES (M/3) 1994
SICILIAN DEFENSE B92
1 e4 c5 2 Qf3 d6 3 d4 Qxd4 4 Qxd4 Qf6 5 Qc3 a6 6 Qa4 Qc6 7 Qe2 e5 8 Qb3 Qe7 9 0–0 0–0 10 Qg5 Qe6 11 Qf3 Qxf3 12 Qxf3 Qxf3 13 a5 Qc8 14 Qg4 Qh8 15 c3 Qh6 16 Qb6 Qc7 17 Qxc6 Qxe6 18 Qd3 Qc7 19 Qad1 Qa5 20 Qxa5 Qxb6 21 Qc4 Qa7 22 Qe2 b5 23 Qxd6 Qh6 24 Qd3 Qb6 25 Qg3 Qd8 26 Qfd1 Qd8 27 Qf1 Qd8 28 Qd1 Qd8 29 Qe2 Qe3 30 Qxe3 Qxe3 31 Qd3 Qc6 32 Qe2 h6 33 Qg2 a5 34 Qb3 Qc4 35 Qf2 a4 36 Qh4 Qf6 37 Qwd2 Qh7 38 Qd7 Qc6 39 Qf6 Qd4 40 Qd3 Qc3 41 Qbd6 Qe7 42 Qd6 Qc6 43 Qb5 Qe5 44 Qc4 Qa2 45 Qa2 Qa5 46 Qa8 Qf7 47 Qhd3 Qh5 48 Qa6 Qc7 49 Qg4 Qf8+ 50 Qxe4 Qb6 51 Qb5 Qc7 52 Qa4 Qc4 53 Qb5 Qxe4 54 Qxe5 Qxe5 55 Qxe5 Qf8 56 Qx4 Qd7 57 Qb4 Qd7 58 Qf5 Qd5 59 Qf4 Qf7 60 Qe3 Qf1 61 Qd4+ Qc5 62 Qb4+ Qd5 63 Qg4 Qf5 64 Qxg7 Qxh5 65 Qd7 Qf5 66 Qc5 Qd5 67 Qc2 Qd8 68 Qc5+ Qb6 69 Qb3 Qe8 70 Qc4 Qd8 71 b5 Qd6 72 Qe5 Qc7 73 Qf5 Qd3 74 Qc4 Qd7 75 Qf4 Qf4 76 Qb3 Qh3 77 Qd4+ Qc8 78 Qc6 1–0

SHORT–KAMSKY, LINARES (M/4) 1994
SPANISH GAME C64
1 e4 c5 2 Qf3 Qc6 3 Qb5 Qc5 4 c3 Qf6 5 d4 Qxd4 6 c5 Qe4 7 Qxd4 Qb4+ 8 Qbd2 0–0 9 0–0 0–0 10 Qf4 Qxd2 11 Qxd2 Qd7 12 f3 a6 13 Qxc6 Qxc6 14 Qa3 Qxd2 15 Qxd2 Qb5 16 Qe1 Qh4 17 Qre3 Qac8 18 Qc1 b6 19 e6 Qxe6 20 Qxe6+ Qh8 21 Qd2 Qf8 22 Qe4 Qxe4 23 Qxe4 Qd7 24 Qa4 Qg8 25 Qc5 Qc5 26 Qxc5 Qxc5 27 Qxc5 Qb5 28 Qf2 Qf7 29 Qa3 Qd5 30 h4 Qh5 31 Qg5 Qd4 32 Qd7+ Qg8 33 Qe3 Qd7 34 Qe5 Qc4 35 Qf4 g6 36 Qe6 Qf7 37 Qb6 Qd5 38 Qg5 Qd7 39 Qf6 Qe7 40 Qa3 Qc6 41 Qb7+ Qe6 42 Qf4 Qa4 43 Qhe7 Qc2 44 Qg4 Qxg4 45 Qf3 Qd1 46 Qg5 Qc2 47 Qe7 Qd5 48 Qf6 Qf6 49 Qg6 Qc5+ 50 Qd6 c3 51 bxc3 Qxg6 52 Qxg6 Qa5 53 h5 Qxa2 54 h6 Qh2 55 g5 1–0
KAMSKEY–SHORT, LINARES (M/5) 1994
NIMZOINDIAN DEFENSE E48
1 d4 Nf6 2 c4 e6 3 Nc3 Ab4 4 e3 c5 5 a3 d6 6 Bgs2 cxd4 7 exd4 d5 8
exd5 Qxd5 9 0–0 Qd6 10 c4 c7 11 a3 0–0 12 Lc2 Qe8 13 Qd3 g6 14 Lh6 b6
15 f3 e5 16 fxe5 dxe5 17 f6 gxf6 18 h4 h5 19 Qd7 20 Qxh5 Qd7 21
Qh4 Qxf6+ Qxf6 22 Qxf6+ Qxf6 23 d5 Qxe4 24 dxe6 f5 25 Qxd8 Qxd8 26 Qd1 1–0

KAMSKEY–SHORT, LINARES (M/6) 1994
SPANISH GAME C78
1 e4 e5 2 f4 d5 3 c4 c5 4 d3 Nc6 5 Nf3 Nf6 6 Bc4 Bb4 7 Bb4 8 c5
Bxf3 9 Qxf3 e5 10 Nd2 Nbd7 11 Ne4 0–0 12 Bg5 Bd6 13 Bxf6 Bxf6 14
0–0 Bg7 15 f3 f6 16 Bd3 Bxd3 17 cxd3 Qf6 18 Nb5 c6 19 a3 a6 20
Qa4 a5 21 b3 Bd7 22 Bb2 b6 23 Ng5 Bb7 24 Nf3 Qe7 25 f4 exf4 26 exf4
c5 27 Bd3 cxd4 28 Nb5 Qc7 29 f5 Nh5 30 Qf3 Qg7 31 Qg3 Bf8 32 h3 Bc5
Qd6 33 h4 Bxf4 34 gxf4 h5 35 Bg5 Qb5 36 Bf2 Bxf2 37 gxf2 Qh1 38
Qxh1 Qf3 39 Qe4 Bb1 40 Qxh4 Bxh4 41 h5 Qf2 42 Qg3 Bf3 43 Bf3 Bxf3 44
Qxf3 Qc6 45 Bd2 Qb5 46 Bb1 Bg7 47 Qf1 Qc7 48 Bc2 Qd7 49 Bf1 Bxf1 50
Bxf1 Qxf1 51 Qxh5 Qxh5 52 Qxh5 Qc6 53 Bb5 Qg6 54 h5 Qxh5 55
Qxh5 Bxh5 56 Qxh5 Bg7 57 Qg4 Bf8 58 Qd7 Qg6 59 Qxe6 Bxe6 60
Bxh4 Qf7+ 61 Qg5 60 Qh6 ½–½

Final Match
Las Palmas, March 1995
Viswanathan Anand 6½
Gata Kamsky 4½

ANAND–KAMSKEY, LAS PALMAS (M/1) 1995
SPANISH GAME C92
1 e4 e5 2 f4 d5 3 Lc3 Nc6 4 cxd5 cxd5 5 Qc7 6 Bb5 Qd6 7 Qxb5 Qxb5
8 Nf3 Qxe2 9 Qxe2 10 Qd8 11 Qxd8 Qxd8 12 Qxd8 Qxd8 13 Nbd2 Qb7 14
Qa4 c6 15 Bd2 Qe7 16 Ne4 Bxe4 17 Nxe4 Qe7 18 Ng5 Qd5 19 Qh5 Qd6 20
Qg4 Qg7 21 Qf3 Qe5 22 c5 Qxc5 23 Qc2 0–0 24 Qe1 Bg7 25 d1 Qf6 26
b3 Qd8 27 Be7 Qf6 28 Qa7 Qe6 29 Qe2 Qf6 30 Qe8 Qc7 31 Qc7 Qe7 32
Qe7 Qc7 33 Qd4 Qc4 [Forgo] 0–1

KAMSKEY–ANAND, LAS PALMAS (M/2) 1995
GRÜNFELD DEFENSE D85
1 d4 Nf6 2 c4 g6 3 Nc3 d5 4 exd5 Qxd5 5 e4 Qxc6 6 Bxc6 Aa5 7 Bf1
exd4 8 Qxd5 0–0 9 Qf1 Qxd4 10 exd4 c5 11 c3 Qh4 12 Qf6 Qxh6 13
Qg5 Qd7 14 Qe3 Nh5 15 Qc8 Qg5 16 Qxh6 Qxh6 17 Qxh6 Qxh6 18
Qxh6 Qxh6 19 Qxh6 Qxh6 20 Qxh6 Qxh6 21 Qxh6 Qxh6 22 Qxh6 Qxh6 23
Qxh6 Qxh6 24 Qxh6 Qxh6 25 Qxh6 Qxh6 26 Qxh6 Qxh6 27 Qxh6 Qxh6 28
Qxh6 Qxh6 29 Qxh6 Qxh6 30 Qxh6 Qxh6 31 Qxh6 Qxh6 32 Qxh6 Qxh6 33
Qxh6 Qxh6 34 Qxh6 Qxh6 35 Qxh6 Qxh6 36 Qxh6 Qxh6 37 Qxh6 Qxh6 38
Qxh6 Qxh6 39 Qxh6 Qxh6 40 Qxh6 Qxh6 41 Qxh6 Qxh6 42 Qxh6 Qxh6
43 Qxh6 Qxh6 44 Qxh6 Qxh6 45 Qxh6 Qxh6 46 Qxh6 Qxh6 47 Qxh6 Qxh6
48 Qxh6 Qxh6 49 Qxh6 Qxh6 50 Qxh6 Qxh6 51 Qxh6 Qxh6 52 Qxh6 Qxh6
53 Qxh6 Qxh6 54 Qxh6 Qxh6 55 Qxh6 Qxh6 56 Qxh6 Qxh6 57 Qxh6 Qxh6
58 Qxh6 Qxh6 59 Qxh6 Qxh6 60 Qxh6 Qxh6 ½–½
ANAND–KAMSKY, LAS PALMAS (m3) 1995

SPANISH GAME C78
1 e4 e5 2 d3 f3 d6 3 d3 f6 4 d3 g6 5 d3 e4 d5 6 c3 f5 d3 e7 0-0 8 c5 8 f3 9 d4 e4 d5 10 e3 g5 0-0 c5 11 b3 d7 12 c4 e5 13 dxe5 dxe5 14 a4 d7 15 c5 f6 16 a5 a6 17 c6 b5 18 c5 d5 19 e5 fxe5 20 dxe5 f6 21 a4 g4 f7 22 dxe3 gxf3 23 gxh3 f4 24 a3 c3 25 xg3 c5 26 a3 xe5 27 g3 g8 28 dxe5 b5 29 g5 e2 30 a4 a6 31 c3 a4 32 f3 a3 33 c1 e3 34 a3 b3 35 d3 f8 36 e2 d7 37 f7 d8 38 b7 a1 39 f1 g7 40 b3 e6 41 b8 c4 42 c3 h5 45 h4 44 d4 45 a5 h5 46 d1 h4 47 g5 f5 48 xf5 a2 49 f4 b3 49 e6 50 f3 51 f8+ f7 52 e1 xd5 55 e8 f3 54 f6 h5 55 f7 d4 56 e4 56 f6 57 b7 dxe4 58 fxe4 1–0

KAMSKY–ANAND, LAS PALMAS (m4) 1995

SPANISH GAME C80
1 e4 e5 2 f3 d6 3 d5 a6 4 d4 g4 d5 0–0 g5 0–0 dxe4 d5 e4 d5 f3 6 e5 d5 f3 d5 7 d5 e5 8 d5 d5 e5 9 d5 c3 10 e3 f3 d5 e5 11 d5 d5 e5 12 d5 d5 c3 13 d5 d5 c3 14 d5 d5 c3 15 d5 d5 c3 16 d5 d5 e5 17 d5 d5 c3 18 d5 d5 f3 19 d5 d5 b3 20 a3 d5 21 c3 d5 b4 22 d5 d5 e4 23 d5 d5 b3 24 d5 d5 f3 25 d5 d5 e2 26 d5 d5 e2 27 d5 d5 f6 28 d5 d5 e5 29 d5 d5 c4 30 d5 d5 d6 31 d5 d5 e5 32 d5 d5 e5 33 d5 d5 e5 34 d5 d5 f3 35 d5 d5 c3 36 d5 d5 e5 37 d5 d5 e5 38 d5 d5 f3 39 d5 d5 e5 40 d5 d5 c3 41 d5 d5 e5 42 d5 d5 f3 43 d5 d5 e5 44 d5 d5 e5 45 d5 d5 e5 46 d5 d5 e5 47 d5 d5 e5 48 d5 d5 e5 49 d5 d5 e5 50 d5 d5 e5

KAMSKY–ANAND, LAS PALMAS (m5) 1995

SPANISH GAME C92
1 e4 e5 2 f3 d6 3 d5 a6 4 d4 g4 d5 0–0 f3 d5 e5 1 d5 d5 e5 2 d5 d5 e5 3 d5 d5 e5 4 d5 d5 c3 5 d5 d5 e5 6 d5 d5 c3 7 d5 d5 f3 8 d5 d5 e5 9 d5 d5 c3 10 d5 d5 e5 11 d5 d5 e5 12 d5 d5 c3 13 d5 d5 c3 14 d5 d5 c3 15 d5 d5 c3 16 d5 d5 c3 17 d5 d5 c3 18 d5 d5 c3 19 d5 d5 c3 20 d5 d5 c3 21 a4 d5 22 d5 d5 e5 23 a3 d5 24 d5 d5 e5 25 d5 d5 c3 26 d5 d5 e5 27 d5 d5 e5 28 d5 d5 e5 29 d5 d5 c3 30 d5 d5 c3 31 d5 d5 c3 32 d5 d5 c3 33 d5 d5 c3 34 d5 d5 c3 35 d5 d5 c3 36 d5 d5 c3 37 d5 d5 c3 38 d5 d5 c3 39 d5 d5 c3 40 d5 d5 c3 41 d5 d5 c3 42 d5 d5 c3 43 d5 d5 c3 44 d5 d5 c3 45 d5 d5 c3 46 d5 d5 c3 47 d5 d5 c3 48 d5 d5 c3 49 d5 d5 c3 50 d5 d5 c3

KAMSKY–ANAND, LAS PALMAS (m6) 1995

SPANISH GAME C80
1 e4 e5 2 f3 d6 3 d5 a6 4 d4 g4 d5 0–0 f3 d5 e5 1 d5 d5 e5 2 d5 d5 e5 3 d5 d5 e5 4 d5 d5 c3 5 d5 d5 e5 6 d5 d5 c3 7 d5 d5 f3 8 d5 d5 e5 9 d5 d5 c3 10 d5 d5 e5 11 d5 d5 e5 12 d5 d5 c3 13 d5 d5 c3 14 d5 d5 c3 15 d5 d5 c3 16 d5 d5 c3 17 d5 d5 c3 18 d5 d5 c3 19 d5 d5 c3 20 a4 d5 21 b3 c4 22 d5 c3 23 d5 b3 24 d5 b3 25 d5 b3 26 d5 b3 27 d5 b3 28 d5 b3 29 d5 b3 30 d5 b3 31 d5 b3 32 d5 b3 33 d5 b3 34 d5 b3 35 d5 b3 36 d5 b3 37 d5 b3 38 d5 b3 39 d5 b3 40 d5 b3 41 d5 b3 42 d5 b3 43 d5 b3 44 d5 b3 45 d5 b3 46 d5 b3 47 d5 b3 48 d5 b3 49 d5 b3 50 d5 b3

ANAND–KAMSKY, LAS PALMAS (m7) 1995

SPANISH GAME C92
1 e4 e5 2 f3 d6 3 d5 a6 4 d4 g4 d5 0–0 f3 d5 e5 1 d5 d5 e5 2 d5 d5 e5 3 d5 d5 e5 4 d5 d5 c3 5 d5 d5 e5 6 d5 d5 c3 7 d5 d5 f3 8 d5 d5 e5 9 d5 d5 c3 10 d5 d5 e5 11 d5 d5 e5 12 d5 d5 c3 13 d5 d5 e5 14 d5 d5 c3 15 d5 d5 e5 16 d5 d5 e5 17 d5 d5 e5 18 d5 d5 e5 19 d5 d5 c3 20 a4 d5 21 b3 c4 22 d5 c3 23 d5 b3 24 d5 b3 25 d5 b3 26 d5 b3 27 d5 b3 28 d5 b3 29 d5 b3 30 d5 b3 31 d5 b3 32 d5 b3 33 d5 b3 34 d5 b3 35 d5 b3 36 d5 b3 37 d5 b3 38 d5 b3 39 d5 b3 40 d5 b3 41 d5 b3 42 d5 b3 43 d5 b3 44 d5 b3 45 d5 b3 46 d5 b3 47 d5 b3 48 d5 b3 49 d5 b3 50 d5 b3

ANAND–KAMSKY, LAS PALMAS (m3) 1995

SPANISH GAME C78
1 e4 e5 2 f3 d6 3 d5 a6 4 d4 g4 d5 0–0 f3 d5 e5 1 d5 d5 e5 2 d5 d5 e5 3 d5 d5 e5 4 d5 d5 c3 5 d5 d5 e5 6 d5 d5 c3 7 d5 d5 f3 8 d5 d5 e5 9 d5 d5 c3 10 d5 d5 e5 11 d5 d5 e5 12 d5 d5 c3 13 d5 d5 e5 14 d5 d5 c3 15 d5 d5 e5 16 d5 d5 e5 17 d5 d5 e5 18 d5 d5 e5 19 d5 d5 c3 20 a4 d5 21 b3 c4 22 d5 c3 23 d5 b3 24 d5 b3 25 d5 b3 26 d5 b3 27 d5 b3 28 d5 b3 29 d5 b3 30 d5 b3 31 d5 b3 32 d5 b3 33 d5 b3 34 d5 b3 35 d5 b3 36 d5 b3 37 d5 b3 38 d5 b3 39 d5 b3 40 d5 b3 41 d5 b3 42 d5 b3 43 d5 b3 44 d5 b3 45 d5 b3 46 d5 b3 47 d5 b3 48 d5 b3 49 d5 b3 50 d5 b3
KAMSKY–ANAND, LAS PALMAS (M/8) 1995
TORRE ATTACK D03
1 d4 Nf6 2 c4 g6 3 Ag5 Ag7 4 c3 d5 5 Qbd2 0–0 6 e3 c6 7 Ac2 Ag4 8 0–0
Qbd7 9 b4 a5 10 b5 a4 11 Ac1 e8 12 c4 Wa5 13 h3 Ac3 14 Qf3 e6 15 bxc6
bxc6 16 Ac2 Ac8 17 Efd1 Ac8 18 Ac4 Ebc8 19 cxd5 exd5 20 e4 dxe4 21 Acxe4
Qxe4 22 Acxe4 Ac3 23 Ebl Ac6 24 Acxc6 Wa6 25 Ab5 Qxc2 26 Qaxa6 Qd5 27
Ad2 Qd8 28 Ag5 Ac7 29 Qxe7 Qxe7 30 a3 Ac3 31 Ea1 Qd5 32 Ac7 Bd7 33
Ab8 Qf5 34 d5 h5 35 Ac2 Ac6 36 Ac4 Qd4 37 Ad1 Qd4 38 Ac2 Ac2 39 Acf1
Qe7 40 Ac1 Ee1 41 Ae1 Ae3 42 Ac1 Qe4 43 g3 Qe5 44 Ac2 Qf5 45 Ac2 Qd6
46 Acg2 Ac6 47 Ab3 Qa5 48 Ab5 49 Qxg5 Qxb5 50 Ac1 Qxa3 51 Qxa3
Qxa4 Ac4 52 Ab3 Ac6 53 Ac2 Ac6 54 f4 Qf5 55 Acf2 Qe7 56 g4 hxg4 57 hgx4 Qd6
58 Ac4 Qe8 59 Qd4 Qd6 60 Ac4 Ac8 ½–½

ANAND–KAMSKY, LAS PALMAS (M/9) 1995
SPANISH GAME C92
1 e4 c5 2 Ab5 Qc6 3 Ab3 a6 4 Ab4 Qe4 5 0–0 Qe7 6 Ac1 b5 7 Acb3 d6 8 c3
0–0 9 h3 Ab7 10 d4 Qe8 11 Qbd2 Qf8 12 a4 h6 13 Ac2 exd4 14 exd4 Ab4 15
Ab1 Qd7 16 b3 Ab2 17 Ab6 Ag7 18 Ac1 Ac8 19 Ac3 c5 20 d5 Ae7 21 Af1 Ac7
22 Acxg7 fxg7 23 Oe1 h5 24 Ad2 Qg8 25 axb5 axb5 26 Qd1 Qa6 27 Ac3 b4 28
Qxb5 Qc7 29 Ac3 Qxb5 30 Acb5 Qe8 31 Ae4 Qf6 32 Wb6 Wb8 33 Wg5 Wg7 34
Qa7 Ac7 35 Ac6 Ae8 36 e5 Qe8 37 Ae7 Ab7 38 Ac7 Ac7 39 Ab7 Ae8 40
Ae1 Ac7 41 Ae7 Ab8 42 Qxh6 c4 43 Qxc4 h3 44 Ab1 b2 45 Ae5 Ab3 46 Ac4
Ab4 47 Ag5 Ac3 48 Ae4 f5 49 exf6 Qxd5 50 f7+ 1–0

KAMSKY–ANAND, LAS PALMAS (H/10) 1995
GRUENFIELD DEFENSE D87
1 d4 c5 2 Ac6 Qc6 3 Ab5 a6 4 Ab4 Qe4 5 0–0 Qc6 6 bxc3 Qg7 7 Ac4 e5 8
Qe2 0–0 9 Ac3 Ac6 10 Oe1 Qxd4 11 exd4 Wa5+ 12 Ac1 Ac3 13 Ab3 Qxb3 14
Ab3 Ac7 15 f4 Ee8 16 Ac2 Ac8 17 d5 Qxb3 18 axb3 Ab2 19 Qxc8+ Qxc8 20
Qxa2 Qc2 21 Qf3 f5 22 exf5 Ac5 23 Ad1 Ac3 24 Ac3 Qd6 25 b3 Qf2 26 Qc4
Qd7 27 Ac1 Qf7 28 g4 h5 29 Qg3 Ac5 30 Qc6 Ac6 31 dxc6+ Qxc6 32 Ac3 Qb2
33 Ad1 Ab2 34 Ac3 hxg4 35 hxg4 Ab1 36 Ac2 Qf1+ 37 Ac4 Eg1 38 Ac3 Ac1+ 39
Ah4 Eg1 40 Qc3 Qf1+ 41 Ac4 ½–½

ANAND–KAMSKY, LAS PALMAS (H/11) 1995
SICILIAN DEFENSE B84
1 e4 c5 2 Qf3 d6 3 d4 Qxd4 4 Qxd4 Ab6 5 Ac3 Ac6 6 Ac3 e6 7 Ac2 Ac7 8 f4
Qc6 9 Qd2 Qxd4 10 Oxd4 0–0 11 0–0 0–0 12 Qa5 13 Ab6 Qxb6 13 Ac6 Ab6 Qe8 14 e5
d5 15 f5 Qd7 16 Wa4 Qc8 17 Ah6 Qa5 18 Qf6 19 Qf6 Qe5 20 Qc3 Ac5+ 21
Ah6 Qf6 22 Qd5 Qxg4 23 Ac7 Qf8 24 Qc7 Qa6 25 Ac5+ Ac8 26 Acx6
Qxe6 27 Ac7 Ae8 28 h3 Ab6 29 Qg4 Ah4 30 Qc6 Ah4 31 g5 Ad5 32 Ac1 h6 33
gxh6 gxh6 34 Ac8+ Ah7 35 Ac6 Qb4 36 Ac5 Acx2 37 Qc1 Ac4 38 Ac4 Qd3+ 39 Qxd3 Qxd3 40 Qxh8+ Ac6 41 Ac4 Ag5 42 Ac5 Qxg5 43 Ac2 Ac5 44 Ac8
Ac6 45 Ab8 Qh4 46 Ac5 47 Ac4 48 Ac5 Qd4 49 Ab3 Af1 49 Ab4+ Ac3 50 Ac2 1–0
Kasparov versus Anand: The Inside Story of the 1995 World Chess Championship Match is the definitive account of one of the most anticipated world title matches in chess history. Challenger Viswanathan Anand was in the lead after nine games at the top of New York's World Trade Center, but champion Garry Kasparov mounted a ferocious comeback to retain his crown.

In addition to complete descriptions and analyses of all the match games, Kasparov versus Anand includes comprehensive background on both players and authoritative coverage of events before and during the match. With 32 photographs, 2 illustrations, 3 tables, 107 diagrams, and 90 supplemental games in 192 pages, this book is at once a valuable record, an instructive textbook, and a candid, entertaining account of chess at the top.

Patrick Wolff, international grandmaster and two-time U.S. chess champion, helped to prepare Anand for his challenge and was one of his key assistants during the match. As Anand's longtime friend and trainer, Wolff adds a unique perspective to his trademark sincere, personal reporting and precise, in-depth analysis.